Some of the other significant articles include: i) «Ein Auslandbrief des Kaisers Johannes VIII. vom Jahre 1447», written in collaboration with Franz Dölger, the eminent Byzantinist at the University of Munich. Composed in a rather «vulgar» Greek and addressed to Sarudsha-Paşa (a Greek by birth), a confidant of Murad II, it discloses the fragile and dangerous Ottoman-Byzantine relations of the time. The authors provide the historical facts underlying the text and a translation of it, and a commentary on the diplomatics (Byzantine) of this writing - which belongs to the category of imperial «foreign letters». ii) «Ein marokkanisches Staatschreiben an den Freistaat Ragusa vom Jahre 1194/1780», in which Babinger deals with the history of this rare document in Ragusa's (= Dubrovnik) little known relations with Marocco, and provides a transcription of the text, a translation, as well as a brief discussion of its diplomatics (Maroccan). And finally, iii) «Ewlijas Tschelebi's Reiseweg in Albanien». In this thirty-eight pages long article, Babinger has collected translated, and carefully annotated all textual references to Albania (in 1670) in that untiring traveler's multivolume Seyâhatnâme. Ewliya Tshelebi had a parently wandered through Albania a number of times, and his observations on the political and cultural conditions in that country are of greatest value, as they bring to light the somewhat dark chapter of Albania's history during Ottoman rule. «Für die Kunde der Balkanhalbinsel im 17. Jahrhundert», says Babinger, «bedeutet Ewlijas Wanderbuch also ohne Zweifel eine der wichtigsten Quellen, deren planmässige Ausbeutung mancherlei Fragen der Kulturgeschichte, der Volks- und Länderkunde jener wenig erschlossenen Zeiten klären und gewiss zu den reizvollsten Aufgaben der Südosteuropa-Forschung zählen dürfte».

The editors have placed us in their debt for recovering here many of Babinger's significant writings, which were previously scattered in various journals. And we commend the publisher for the layout and presentation of the book that are most pleasing to the eye!

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Arthur Leon Horniker


Having written a number of articles on the military and other reforms of Selim III (1789-1807), it was to be expected that Professor Stanford J. Shaw would sooner or later give us a full account of the reforms enacted by this sultan and of the consequent disaster that befell him. Indeed, in his voluminous work here under consideration, Shaw has attempted to record in exhaustive and sometime exhausting detail: the aims and fortunes of Selim's various reform undertakings against the backdrop of the wars with his arch-enemies Austria and Russia, and later with France, and of the internal anarchy, revolts and disintegration of the empire. To execute this substantial study the author has not only incorporated previous European research but has also utilized Ottoman and modern Turkish sources, as well as supplemented all this by «original research in all source materials from [Selim's] reign remaining in the Ottoman archives and libraries». His _apparatus criticus_, comprising reference works, collections of documents, archival materials (both Turkish and European), Ottoman chronicles, general histories, and special studies and reports, covers twenty-one pages of the book. Yet despite the extensive research and overwhelming density of detail, Shaw's text has serious deficiencies, some of which will be considered below, as well as a surprising evaluation
of Selim as an Ottoman reformer. However, as this large book is written as straight history in the traditional chronological approach, and in order to give the reader an idea of the wealth of material covered in it, this review will generally follow its structural order.

When Selim III became sultan on the sudden death of his uncle Abdülhamid I (1774-1789), he inherited an empire whose entire structure was undermined and decayed—the result of a long process of decline (Ch. I). Highly talented and largely self-educated, his correspondence with King Louis XVI of France indicates that already as prince he was imbued with the idea of restoring to the Ottoman Empire its former greatness and power through reform and modernization (Ch. II). But, as Shaw undertakes to show, from the start unsurmountable forces were in Selim's way and in the end they shattered his plans and brought on his demise.

First there was the war with Russia and Austria—to which Shaw gives an inordinate amount of space (five chapters, III-VII). In progress since 1787, it evolved from the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774) and the secret agreement of 1783 between Catherine II and Emperor Joseph II for the dismemberment of the Ottoman domains and a «mutually satifying» division of the spoils. To assure its continuation until the lost territories (especially the Crimea) were wrested from the hands of his enemies, Selim was immediately forced to subordinate any kind of meaningful reform to securing the «full cooperation of the established military and religious classes». But his campaigns of 1789-90 brought the empire to the brink of disaster, which was fortuitously averted by: the advent of the French Revolution and the desire of the major powers to stifle its progress before its seditious doctrines could spread over the continent; the revolt of the Netherlands against Habsburg Austria; the ascendency of Prussia in the Germanies at the expense of war-weakened Austria and its proposed alliance with the Porte directed against its rival, and Britain's intervention against the Russian-Austrian scheme for dismembering the empire. All of this compelled the belligerents to negotiate a peace settlement, bringing an all-around very costly war to an end but without greater territorial concessions than those Selim was willing to grant to Austria in the treaty of Sistova of August 1791 and to Russia in the treaty of Jassy of January 1792.

The empire saved and relatively free from foreign danger, Selim III was now able to proceed with his reforms. Shaw devotes seven chapters (VIII-XIX), the major part of his work, to the central theme - Selim's reform measures, known as the «New Order» (Nizam-i Jedid = Nizam-i Cedid), a subject on which, as mentioned at the outset of this review, he has worked on before. In these chapters, containing an astounding accumulation of facts and details, Shaw writes about: Selim's limited and often frustrated efforts of reform during the war (1789-1792); his building up of a group of reformers to assist him in carrying out his peace-time undertakings and the military, administrative and religious proposals which they submitted at his request to the Imperial Council (Divan-i Hümayun); the actual introduction of the military reforms envisaged in the reports and plans, including new regulations in the Spahi and Janizary corps, and the creation of a Nizam-i Jedid army and an independent «treasury of the new revenue» (Irâd-i Jedid Hâzinesi), organized specifically for its support (all of which eventually led to the revolt of the Janizaries against Selim in 1807); the technical reforms in the manufacture of cannons and rifles, in the manufacture of gunpowder, and the establishment of schools of naval engineering and of artillery; the administrative, economic and social reforms; the revival of the long decayed navy. The interested reader will find an expanded version of this chapter (XII) in the first issue of new periodical TURCICA, Re-
vue d’études turques (Tome I, 1969), S. J. Shaw, «Selim III and the Ottoman Navy», pp. 212-341. And the reforms of the empire’s relations with foreign nations. However, in writing on the Nizam-i Jedid corps, Shaw has left unresolved a problem in the historiography on this organization, which I believe to be serious, and which requires consideration.

In his discussion of the «new army», Shaw states — but without making clear who the originator of it was - that Chelebi Mustafa Reshid Efendi, «the most important of the reformers», was «made director of the entire Niam-i Jedid organization...» (pp. 128-129). Only much later (on page 369), he says that Mustafa Reshid Efendi was the «originator of the Nizam-i Jedid army and the treasury». But Johann Wilhelm Zinkeisen, in his Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches in Europa (VII, pp. 318ff.), credits Mahmud Tschelebi-Efendi with being the originator («Urheber») of the troop and who «blieb auch die Seele und Hauptbeförderer derselben». Zinkeisen provides a brief sketch of Mahmud Tschelebi’s life and activities and writes about the «new army» as Tschelebi’s creation (See section, «Sultan Selim III. als Reformer, neue Organisation des Diwans und erste Versuche der Einrichtung der ‘Neuen Truppen’ (Nisam-Dschedid) durch Tschelebi-Efendi» [pp. 318-328]; and pages 322ff., on «Tschelebi-Efendi errichtet die neue Kriegskasse (Iradi-Dschedid).») In a lengthy note (pp. 323-324), Zinkeisen lists the sources underlying his discussion: «Diese Notizen über Mahmud Tschelebi-Efendi entnehm wir den Depeschen Knobelsdorf’s (Prussian ambassador to the Sublime Porte 1790-1803, and not «1790-4») vom 15. Mai und 2. Juli 1800 und seiner eigenen (Tschelebi’s) Schrift... «Explication de l’institution du Nizamy-Gedid, ou Nizam Dgedid, et remarques curieuses à cet égard, par Tschelebi-Efendi, l’un des principaux dignitaires de l’empire ottoman, conseiller, ministre d’état, etc., traduites du manuscrit original turc». He also reports that Knobelsdorf had sent a copy of this work to his government on 10 August 1800. In addition, Zinkeisen names other contemporary Ottoman and western sources on the Nizam-i Jedid. Now, the available evidence indicates that Shaw knows of Zinkeisen’s treatment of the «New Order», but he has completely disregarded it. Nowhere in the book is there any mention of Mahmud Tschelebi and his work, nor has Shaw undertaken a critical evaluation of Zinkeisen’s sources and account. I believe that Shaw was obligated in the interest of scholarship to resolve this historiographical problem. His complete silence in the matter is, to say the least, highly regrettable! Furthermore, Zinkeisen states that Tschelebi’s writing is to be found «bei Wilkinson, Tableau de Moldavie et de la Valachie, etc., S. 265-355». Shaw, on the other hand, lists the following item in his bibliography (pp. 503-504): «Münib, Mehmed, Hulasat ul-Kelam fi Redd ul-Avamm (Istanbul, 1911), Contemporary discussion of Selim’s reforms. Translated as ‘An explanation of the Nizam-y Gedid institutions, and some curious remarks concerning it...’ in Wilkinson, An account of the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia (London, 1820), pp. 216-294)». It is curious that here the title of the book is given without the name of the author. Shaw owes his readers an explanation.

Selim III’s efforts to strengthen the empire through reforms were frustrated, however, by the political disintegration of the empire, brought on by revolts and anarchy in its various provinces, and by the war which was forced on him by the French revolutionary government. Shaw’s descriptions of the various uprisings and Selim’s efforts to suppress them (between 1792-1806, chapters XV and XVIII) constitutes an important contribution to the history of the empire at that time. He discusses at length such little known developments as: the rise of notables (âyân) and of derebeys (lords of the valley) and their «bandit armies» in Anatolia; the seizures of political power by Mamluk and beduin chiefs in Egypt, Syria and Iraq; the revolts against Ottoman rule in Arabia by the Wahhabi religious movement and by the armies of the Saudi family; the resistance of the «mountain rebels» in the Balkans (encouraged
by Russia and Austria) to oppression by the Janizaries and their cruel yamak auxiliaries; the rise of Balkan notables in Macedonia, Thrace and Bulgaria, and the Serbian revolution (first aided by Austria and later by Russia) under Karageorgii in 1802-1806. These revolts forced Selim to divert his energies and resources from the reforms to regular campaigns against the rebels, which «sapped the strength and vitality of the central government». For these reasons, Selim had tried to remain neutral in the wars of the French Revolution (Ch. XVI).

But a momentous event occurred in July 1798 which embroiled him in an unwanted war against France — Napoleon Bonaparte's invasion of Egypt. It threw the Porte into the arms of Britain and Russia as an ally in the «war of the triple alliance» (1798-1802) and forced Selim once again to postpone his reforms (Chapter XVII). Shaw describes: the fortunes of the French expeditionary force during the more than three years occupation of Egypt and its eventual evacuation; the transformation of the country through the overthrow by the French of the long-established institutions of society (by eliminating the Mamuluk and Ottoman ruling classes) and replacing them with western-type institutions; the breakdown of the triple alliance, the separate negotiation by Selim and the French of the Peace of Paris (1802), and by the British and the Russians with the French of the treaty of Amiens (1801).

We miss, however, in Shaw's narrative of the invasion of Egypt some pertinent documentation which throws light on Talleyrand de Perigord's (the French minister of foreign affairs) and Bonaparte's diplomatic duplicity against Selim (see, pp. 254ff.). He obviously is not aware of Talleyrand's proposal to the Directory for the conquest of Egypt (six months before the invasion), pointing to the political and economic advantages which would accrue to France from it. The highly illuminating «Extrait d'un rapport de ministre des relations extérieures au directoire exécutif, en date du 13 février 1798,...» is in I. de Testa, Recueil des traités de la Porte Ottomane avec des puisances étrangères, Tome Premier. FRANCE, pp. 521-535. (Talleyrand may have revived(?) the 126 year-old plan outlined by Leibniz in his memorial to Louis XIV for the conquest of Egypt. The French translation of Leibniz's Latin text, «Mémoire adressé par Leibnitz à Louis, au mois de janvier 1672», is in de Testa, pp. 525-534). There also is no reference to two significant Ottoman documents which display Selim III's outraged reaction to France's violation of his neutrality: his eloquent but bitter manifesto, which he circulated among the European powers, denouncing the invasion of his empire without any provocation on his part («Manifeste de la Sublime Porte, en date du 12 septembre 1798...» in de Testa, pp. 548-553), and his violent attack on France in the firman declaring war on that country («Firman de la Sublime-Porte, en date du...décembre 1798...»: «Les Français (Dieu veuille détruire leur pays de fond en comble, et couvrir d'ignominie leurs drapeaux!) sont une nation d'infidèles, obstinés et de scélérats sans frein», etc., etc., in de Testa, pp. 567-571).

While in the years between the treaty of Amiens and Selim III's overthrow the Ottoman Empire had some respite from war, it did not enjoy internal tranquility nor was it removed from the diplomatic conflicts of the great powers — which would have permitted Selim to intensify his reforms. And Shaw describes (Ch. XIX): the successful progress of the Serbian revolution (with open Russian support) and of other uprisings; the difficult external relations with which Selim had to contend on the resumption of war between Britain and France in 1803 and the entry of Russia and Austria into the «third coalition» against Napoleon I (emperor since 1804) two years later; Russia's diplomatic opposition to recognition by the Porte of the imperial title assumed by Napoleon, and the major event which directly and disastrously affected Selim's reforms and eventually himself — the strong military and religious reaction to the Nizam-i Jedid in the summer 1806, forcing Selim to suspend his reforms.
and immobilize the «new army». In the remaining four chapters (XX-XXIII) Shaw deals with the triumph of reaction. He analyzes the causes for the failure of Ottoman reform politics and discusses: the deposition of Selim III, the «infidel sultan», by the Janizaries and the ulema; the elevation of his cousin Mustafa IV to the sultanate and his reactionary regime; the latter's overthrow by Bayrakdar Mustafa Pasha, with view of restoring Selim and reviving his reform policies, and his placing of Prince Mahmud on the throne (as Mahmud II) on the news of Selim's murder by Mustafa IV's slaves.

What of Shaw's conception of Selim III as a reformer? Because of his study of Selim's career as history rather than biography he does not bring into sharp relief a portrait of the Sultan which would give a vivid view of his personality and character, and of his aims and achievements as a reformer. In fact, having recounted exhaustively all the events which had occurred during his hero's reign and his reactions to them, Shaw, in my opinion, gives a false estimation of the Sultan as a reformer when he concludes that «Despite indications that Selim was a 'modernist' in many ways, the evidence at hand seems to indicate that he was a man of his time and no more, that at most he was a link between the traditionalist reformers who preceded him and the modernist reformers who followed» (p. 403).

Selim was indeed a man of his time but one who clearly understood the dangerous position in which his empire found itself and the radical innovations that were necessary to save it. He understood the tremendous forces of the French Revolution which were convulsing Europe and knocking at the gates of his empire, and he was sympathetically touched by them. Foreign and Ottoman observers were from the start impressed by his real talents, education and purposeful ideas for modernizing the empire, and much was expected of him: Thus von Diez, the Prussian ambassador to the Sublime Porte (1784-1790), writing to his court about the new Sultan, said in his dispatches (of 1 and 22 May 1789): «Ce Prince est certainement supérieur à sa nation en talents et en activité et perait être destiné à en devenir le réformateur. Mais il faudra des années pour remettre un gouvernement qui est déchu depuis plus d'un siècle». (Zinkeisen, op cit., VI, p. 722, note 1). But Selim's failure successfully to carry out his objectives was due to forces which he could not control.

Selim III was indeed a traditionalist, but not in the sense advanced by Shaw. He was in the tradition of such reforming sultans as Osman II, Mahmud I and Mustafa III, who were thwarted by the reactionary ulema and the Janizaries from carrying out reforms which they felt were needed to restore their empire to its earlier dominion and greatness. Also, Shaw equates modernization with westernization. But while the Ottoman Empire had for centuries been influenced by political, social and cultural developments in Europe, it had utilized these in creating and expanding a powerful Islamic empire! (And contrary to Shaw's belief, such borrowing was not a one-way traffic. Is he not aware of the Ottoman influences on the Christian world in military organization, art and literature, architecture, dress, mode of life, etc.?). Moreover, Selim III was a true modernist in the comprehensiveness of his reforms, as Shaw himself demonstrates in his extensive investigation of the «New Order». Selim was not a mere link «between old and new». It was he who laid the strong foundations on which his successors, beginning with Mahmud II, could rebuild and revitalize the empire by the Tanzimat and later reforms.

Despite my comments, Shaw's volume is an important contribution by an American scholar to the history of the Ottoman Empire and should attract students in the field. And Harvard University Press is to be commended for the excellent technical production of the book.

Brooklyn, New York

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