
This book represents the second part of a two-volume political diary by Kosta St. Pavlovich. The first volume was reviewed in *Balkan Studies*, No. 12,2 (1971). Pavlovich held the position of Chief of Cabinet to the Prime Minister Slobodan Yovanovich when the latter was heading the Yugoslav Royal Government in exile during World War II. When Tito's regime became established in 1945, Yovanovich took the initiative of changing the name of the Yugoslav exile government to that of Yugoslav National Committee (hereafter YNC). Yovanovich continued to head it as president and the author of this diary served as secretary. Composed mainly of the last democratically elected leaders of Yugoslav political parties, the YNC claimed to represent the legal and democratic continuity of Yugoslavia. Its chief objective was to reestablish a democratic regime in Yugoslavia now under communist rule. For this purpose the first task of the YNC was to make itself truly representative of all Yugoslav peoples, which task necessitated primarily the presence of Dr. Vlatko Macek on the committee and political understanding with him. Macek was the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party which was the political choice of more than ninety percent of Croats. It is the Serbian and Croatian negotiating positions of a non-finalized agreement regarding the political and constitutional form of a post-Titoist Yugoslavia, as well as the reasons for failing to reach such a Serbo-Croatian accord that constitute the main theme of this diary. The other issues discussed in the diary are of episodic character and are concerned: with the unsuccessful efforts of King Peter II and the YNC to save General Mihailovich from execution; with the futile activities of the YNC and King Peter to form the Balkan Federation and the Federal Movement of Central and Eastern Europe together with exiled politicians from these regions; with the opposition of the Yugoslav King and the YNC to any underground anti-Tito movement in Yugoslavia; with the basic disinterestedness of official circles of the Western Powers in the political work of the YNC; and with the reasons which led to very strained relations between King Peter II and the YNC.

As the author emphasizes in his epilogue to this diary, Yovanovich's eagerness to negotiate a Serbo-Croatian agreement regarding the political form of a liberated Yugoslavia was motivated by Dr. Yovanovich's sincere conviction that in the long run the interests of all Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, and Yugoslav minorities could be best safeguarded in a common state. This thought posited for Yovanovich an imperative concern to preserve the political integrity of a post-Titoist Yugoslavia, bearing in mind that Yugoslavia as a political entity could survive only with the political consent of the autonomy-seeking Croats. It was, therefore, in this spirit that Yovanovich extended to Macek an invitation to join the YNC as a full member, and to present the Croatian proposal for a Serbo-Croatian understanding. As can be gathered from Macek's first draft submitted in October of 1946 to the YNC and from several additional negotiating positions taken by Macek between 1946 and 1948, the Croatian proposal for a Serbo-Croatian agreement regarding the organization of a free Yugoslavia amounted to the following:

1. Yugoslavia would be constituted as a confederate union headed by the Karadjordjevich dynasty, and consisting of three states: Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia.

2. Croatia would be a sovereign state and would determine which sovereign prerogatives she would renounce in favor of the confederate government.

3. After the liberation of Yugoslavia, the first step in the organization of the confederacy would consist in the formation of the three states. Each state would have its own legislature,
its own army, and only in the case of war a common confederate general staff would be constituted.

4. A Confederate Assembly (Skupstina) would be organized. However, in order to prevent the legislative dominance of the Serbs in the Confederate Assembly, «all contested issues» between the Serbs and the Croats, especially the Serbo-Croatian state boundaries issue would have to be agreed upon before the return to liberated Yugoslavia.

5. Croatia would encompass the former Province (Banovina) of Croatia as stipulated by the Macek-Cvetkovich Agreement of 1939, the part of Istria, formerly under Italian domination, populated by Croats, and six new districts in Vojvodina. The signatories to this agreement, that is, the representatives of Serbian, Croatian, and Slovenian political parties would be bound to defend the provisions of the 1939 agreement in the Confederate Assembly as well as before the Yugoslav people.

6. The province of Bosnia would be partitioned between Serbia and Croatia, and the dividing boundaries would be mutually agreed upon before the return to free Yugoslavia.

7. The State of Slovenia would consist of the pre-war Province (Banovina) of Drava, and the part of Istria populated by Slovenes.

8. The State of Serbia would embrace all other remaining territories of Yugoslavia.

9. The negotiations and signing of this agreement would have to be done among and by the representatives of Serbian, Croatian, and Slovenian political parties.

Macek's proposals regarding the confederate set-up, the number of confederate states, and the sovereignty of Croatia found favorable reception with Yovanovich provided that Serbia and Slovenia enjoyed the same sovereign status as Croatia. Although Yovanovich would have preferred a federal Yugoslavia, he was convinced that the Serbs had to accept these three Croatian demands because, as Yovanovich felt, their acceptance by the Serbian politicians was the only way to induce Macek to commit himself to the preservation of the integrity of Yugoslavia. However, Yovanovich very soon realized that Macek's positions were not definitive but subject to modifications. For example, subsequent to the introduction of his own proposal of having a confederacy composed of three states, in his public utterances in America Macek implied that this number might be increased. This, of course, would have resulted in the parcelization of Serbia. As Yovanovich repeatedly complained to the author of the diary, he considered Macek evasive in negotiating the agreement, and taking a position of «expectancy», as if waiting for new constellations in international relations, and for a change in the internal situation in communist Yugoslavia. In this sense, the unwillingness of Macek to become a full member of the YNC when invited by Yovanovich, the former's reluctance to participate in any common Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian protest or demarche with Western Powers on behalf of the Yugoslav people, Macek's inclination to believe in the possibility of obtaining political self-determination for the Croats within the confines of communist Yugoslavia were only a few instances which evidenced to Yovanovich that Macek's negotiating postures were rather temporary and exploratory.

The provision in Macek's proposal whereby the organization of the confederacy had to be preceded by the formation of the three confederate states was not viewed with any suspicion by Yovanovich because as long as Macek was committed to the constitutional and therefore integrative role of the Confederate Assembly, Yovanovich felt assured that the integrity of Yugoslavia would not be brought into jeopardy. However, by May of 1948 Macek requested from Yovanovich that Serbo-Croatian negotiations abroad «solve all disputed questions» between the Serbs and Croats. Such an insistence, inferred Yovanovich, meant that Macek by this time saw no use for the constitutional role of the Confederate Assembly in liberated Yugoslavia, and was now committed to the «principle of three State Constitutional Assem-
bles». As Macek communicated his fears to Yovanovich, a national assembly could again be a legislative forum in which the Serbs could «outvote the Croats» as they had done in pre-war national assembly. The 1948 shift in Macek’s thinking was, of course, inconsequential in view of the fact that Macek’s draft of 1946 foresaw the existence of a Confederate Assembly. The new position of Macek was not so novel to Yovanovich because it expressed an old political ambition of Macek, namely, of giving Yugoslavia, as Yovanovich termed it, the constitutional form of «trialism», which form Macek had modelled after the defunct Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy’s constitutional form. Although Yovanovich detested the Austro-Hungarian model, it can be deduced that a Serbo-Croatian compromise could have been reached in this respect because, as Yovanovich appraised the negotiation problem, the only serious obstacle for him was the state boundaries issue.

The main stumbling block to a Serbo-Croatian agreement was the boundary between Serbia and Croatia, and especially the boundary in Bosnia. As Yovanovich explicitly stated, an agreement with Macek could have been «easily achieved» if the Croatian leader had not insisted on determining the boundaries prior to the return to liberated Yugoslavia. Yovanovich felt that the acquiescence to the Croatian boundary demand could conceivably damage the interests and endanger the safety of the Serbian population which might remain within the confines of Croatia. This thought was all the more convincing to the Serbian leader since the memory of the massacre of one third of the Serbs (ca. 600,000) and the expulsion of another third living in the territory of Pavelich’s Croatia was very fresh. Consequently, not only Yovanovich but also the entire Serbian leadership took the firm position that the boundary question be postponed till the return to Yugoslavia.

The very catastrophic experience of the Serbs living in Croatia during World War II made the Serbian leaders antagonistic and alerted them to Macek’s proposal whereby the signatories to the agreement being negotiated between Yovanovich and Macek would be bound to defend the Macek-Cvetkovich Agreement of 1939 in the Confederate Assembly before the people. By this agreement Macek obtained from Prime Minister Cvetkovich a territory for Croatia in which a significant number of Serbs lived, as well as a quasi-federal status for Croatia. In spite of the fact that Yovanovich was one of the staunchest opponents of the 1939 agreement, he was now willing to meet Macek’s request because, as Yovanovich confided to the author of this diary, the obligation to defend the agreement would not be permanent due to the possibility that the Confederate Assembly might approve or disapprove of it, and because the compliance with the 1939 agreement would not be subject to international arbitration. This being so, Yovanovich expected that the Serbian politicians would accede to Macek’s demand. (It should be noted here that the contemplated manoeuvre of Yovanovich to evade the obligation would have been made inoperative by Macek’s intention to eliminate the institution of the Confederate Assembly altogether).

In Yovanovich’s view, the failure to reach a Serbo-Croatian understanding was due not only to the boundaries issue and Macek’s shifting and delaying tactics but was also helped by the obstructionist activities of the «Integral Yugoslavs», and the opposition by the «Great Serbs». Yovanovich explicitly blamed the «Integral Yugoslavs» within his own YNC, that is, the leaders of cross-ethnic Yugoslav political parties, for having constantly obstructed his negotiations with Macek, and to have actually prevented the signing by Macek, Yovanovich, and Slovenian leaders of the first Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian solidarity manifesto in 1947. The antagonistic behavior of the «Integral Yugoslavs» was motivated not only by their conviction that Yugoslavia is composed of one and the same people and that, therefore, her division into three ethnic states would be an impossible solution, but also by their awareness that they, as
cross-ethnic leaders, had no role in shaping the Serbo-Croatian agreement, and no political future in a confederate Yugoslavia.

A strong debilitating effect on the negotiations was also exercised by the "Great Serbs," a group whose objective was to unify all the Serbs in an agrandized Kingdom of Serbia. Like Yovanovich they too took an unyielding attitude toward Macek's territorial claims and his terms that an agreement with the Serbs could be brought about successfully only under the condition that the Serbian political parties agree to the determination of state boundaries between Serbia and Croatia before the return to Yugoslavia. As Yovanovich saw it, the political platform and influence of the "Great Serbs" became increasingly dominant among the Serbs abroad and at home. Yovanovich's efforts to moderate their influence in more Yugoslav terms were unsuccessful. Even King Peter II, who maintained cordial relations with Macek, fell, Yovanovich asserts, under the complete influence of the "Great Serbs." In August of 1948 the King informed Macek that an agreement with the Serbs could be negotiated only on condition that Macek be willing to accept the territorial and boundary situation as it existed on the 6th of April of 1941, that is, on the day the Axis forces attacked Yugoslavia. The boundaries question, added the King, would then be decided by a Constitutional Assembly upon the return to Yugoslavia. The same message was sent to Macek by the Serbian political parties to which Macek never responded. In March of 1949, the Serbian leaders communicated again to Macek that their representatives were ready to come to the United States for negotiations. Macek's laconic reply was that in his opinion the best thing would be "to postpone the negotiations for the time being." As the diary shows, this was the last exchange on the question of the Serbo-Croatian agreement between Macek and the leaders of the Serbian political parties. Yovanovich died in 1958, Macek in 1964, and King Peter II in 1971.

Perhaps the chief significance of the diary lies in its depiction of the principal contours of Croatian autonomous ambitions, and the nature of a Yugoslav confederacy which a realistic Serbian political leadership with the longitudinal view of Yovanovich could tolerate. The 1971-72 demands of the rebellious Croatian communists revealed striking similarities with Macek's constitutional and political design for Yugoslavia. Thus, the autonomous ethnic aspirations of the Croats have persisted for half a century irrespective of the differentiated ideological surroundings. Prof. Yovanovich took the latter fact into consideration already in 1946, and probably this is the factor which will remain latent in the foreseeable future in whatever kind of political contingency Yugoslavia may find herself.

The cryptic and non-annotated remarks of the diary can be understood only by readers thoroughly familiar with Yugoslav affairs. A translation of the diary into English would be warranted only if the author supplied the text with extensive explanations. This does not, however, diminish the value of the diary as a primary source material.

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Rudolf Bičanić's *Economic Policy in Socialist Yugoslavia* will be found valuable both by the reader who knows little or nothing about Yugoslavia and by the reader familiar with the Yugoslav economy who wants a more complete understanding of the system and how it developed. It presents not a chronological history of the Yugoslav economy, but a number of topics (e.g. planning, industrialization, income distribution, growth, and foreign trade), describing for each the evolution of policy through three periods: administrative socialism(1945-