its development were established well before Yugoslavia was forced to make a way for itself beyond the Soviet fold. That third world non-communist countries and even the capitalist countries of Western Europe can be regarded as progressive is a matter of ideology as well as of policy and can be traced to the Yugoslav Communists' preoccupation in the days before and shortly after they came to power with accommodating a difficult domestic situation to the projected socialist future. Rubinstein's failure to seek out the deep roots of nonalignment results in his conclusion that the Yugoslav Communists «may still feel the emotional tug of Moscow but their heads are elsewhere — in the Third World and the markets and technology of the West» (p. 328). The fact is that emotion — or, more correctly, ideology — attracts them to all three areas and indeed that the distinction between emotion and reason is much less obvious than indicated in this formulation. For Yugoslav Communists, blocs are not only wrong, they are irrelevant to the true distribution of forces in the world.

The uncertainty of the future is an inevitable conclusion in any study of international relations. Rubinstein's is no exception. His conclusion is only partially mitigated by a recognition that nonalignment is a function of longstanding ideology and is not simply a combination of Tito's personality and good fortune. Since Rubinstein completed his book, Nasser has died, the Yugoslavs have become involved in negotiations for Mediterranean cooperation, Tito has been awarded the Order of Lenin, there has been yet another Middle East war, and Yugoslavia has twice signed trade agreements with the European Economic Community. Evidence is readily available to prove that Yugoslavia is moving left, right, and center all at the same time. One cannot say that nonalignment is being sacrificed, because the motives which existed for establishing a nonaligned policy in the first place are still those which animate Yugoslav foreign and domestic policy. Yugoslavia remains in the minds of its leaders a model as well as a guiding spirit of the future international system, and this model is likely to outlive both personalities and changing fortune. As Tito once reminded critics, it is better to be a bridge that a chasm.

**Center for International Studies**

**Cynthia W. Frey**


Leo Mates defines nonalignment as «a policy strictly based on independence, conducted by states which experience a strong feeling of insecurity but are not able to cope with events in their environment. It is substantially a defensive policy, but one that is at the same time imbued with fervent nationalism» (p. 108). Part I of *Nonalignment* focuses upon the origins of the movement, with emphasis on the problems of the developing countries, and Part II is devoted to international relations during the Cold War and beyond. The last hundred pages of the book contain an appendix of useful documents of the nonaligned movement.

It is the great strength of this book that it demonstrates the connection between the domestic needs and the foreign policies of the states which call themselves nonaligned. It is suitable that such a work be written by a Yugoslav, as that state perhaps more than any other is evidence of such a connection. Because it was written by Mates it can be taken as the authoritative statement from within the movement on nonalignment. Recently retired after ten years as Director of the Institute of International Politics and Economics in Belgrade, Mates has been involved with the development of Yugoslav foreign policy from the beginning. A Communist from 1937, he was active in the Communist youth movement, was a Partisan, then
Editor in Chief of Tanjug and, as a member of the diplomatic service, he served as Under-secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador to the United States, Permanent Representative to the United Nations, and personal secretary to President Tito. His writings have always gone beyond the treatment of nonalignment as a self-contained system, regarding it rather as part of the larger postwar international environment and subject to the same changes as that larger system.

Mates has described nonalignment elsewhere as an outcome of the simultaneous convergence of the Cold War and economic backwardness in a large group of states. It is natural, then, that he would regard the two conditions as intimately related in the minds of third world statesmen. He writes that «Modernization is carried out under the compulsion of two major motives: to promote stability and to strengthen their international position» (p. 129). Modernization, then, is not merely a matter of economic growth but one of accommodation to an international system which existed prior to the birth of the new states and about whose structure and operation they have had no say. For Mates, «The nonaligned countries are completely new structures created in specific conditions that came into being in a way which is different from the ways in which the states of the developed world came about» (p. 92). Nonalignment is a response to a changed international system in which great power arguments appeared irrelevant to the great majority of new and small states. Because they could not identify their own interests with that system, when forced to participate in it they were inclined to strike short-term bargains with it, now with one side, now with another. Such behavior, rational to the participants, was regarded as capricious by the developed powers.

Equally important to Mates' analysis is his conviction that the international system is more than the sum of its parts — that it has a life of its own, changing and influencing the states that make it up as they change and influence it*. He points out both the greater maneuverability and the greater uncertainty over the previous bipolar system presented by a system in which three superpowers share hegemony. Thus the leaders of the nonaligned cannot and ought not to try to set forth rigid organizational or ideological guides for their adherents. States can be more or less nonaligned and can reach temporary accommodations with the great powers when their own interests require it. Mates is not concerned that such accommodations will become permanent, for he has often noted that, although there have been defections from the ranks of the nonaligned, these have never been defections in the direction of one or another bloc. This tolerance can be seen in the equanimity with which many Yugoslavs received India's military and commercial agreements with the Soviet Union. It is important above all that nonalignment (either as a loose movement or in the form of an organization such as UNCTAD) not be allowed to become a battle ground between East and West or between rich and poor. Conflict with the developed countries is no basis for a long term policy because in the end, all countries have the same interests and share the same goals (p. 271).

Mates brings to bear some interesting analyses of Yugoslavia's place in the nonaligned world. First, he is at pains to demonstrate that adherence to nonalignment was less natural for Yugoslavia than for the countries of the third world. «Yugoslavia had inherited from her past the tradition of European civilization. She was consequently predisposed to seek her identity and interests within the European political pattern. In the event of a division into two camps, it was logical for Yugoslavia to opt for one of the two sides...Yugoslavia, in fact, belongs to that world with which the nonaligned countries neither could nor wanted to identify themselves from the start» (pp. 175, 177). He argues that Yugoslavia could never

expect concrete benefits from a nonaligned policy. Yugoslav interest in the success of non-alignment rests rather upon a belief in «the principle of the thing» as well as in its long run benefits to all members of the international community (p. 216). Skeptics might argue that a lack of any material commitment to nonalignment has made it relatively easier for Yugoslavia than for the others to stray into one or another camp at convenient times. Mate's response would very likely be that it is better for Yugoslavia, which has one foot in Europe and one in the third world, and can therefore see both sides of an issue, to remain as flexible as possible rather than to adhere strictly to a policy whose issues — such as the defeat of colonialism — are not always relevant or at least are not among Yugoslavia's top priorities. Such flexibility has served Yugoslavia well in the past, in any event.

The book concludes with a survey of various scenarios of the future international system and of the direction which nonalignment is likely to assume within it. Tempering his earlier optimism, Mates is no longer saying that «There are no vicious circles in the development of nations which could not be broken»*. It is not possible to hope that the superpowers will settle all their disagreements amicably and will turn over huge amounts of development capital to the third world while guaranteeing its security in perpetuity. It is time to forget such utopian expectations as well as those which depended upon «mediation» by the nonaligned among the great powers. Furthermore, there have arisen serious conflicts among the nonaligned states themselves. Most important for the nonaligned is that they set their own houses in order, building up internal strength, so that they can fight economic battles with material strength rather than relying on moral force as in the past. They should expect to influence the gradually growing détente only in exceptional circumstances when they can formulate major issues clearly to arouse world public opinion (pp. 338-9). The demise of the issues which originally held the nonaligned together does not mean that their function is over. International security and development are the result of agreements and compromises, which involve hard work, and not of pronouncements from a position of weakness. Mates wisely observes that no great power is going to act against its own interests simply to avoid being voted down in the General Assembly. The nonaligned must stop «appealing to the conscience of mankind» and get to work inside the system, if they intend to change it. Furthermore, they must «de-ideologize» nonalignment and use it as a positive instrument for their own good rather than as a defensive device in the propaganda war with the great powers (p. 361). He is telling the nonaligned states that they are no longer «new nations», that they must grow up to the fact that their stake in the future demands compromises with the present. They must close ranks on specific issues and open them up on general ones. It is difficult advice, especially for the poorest states which are not in much of a position to help themselves; and while Mates acknowledges their special problems, his concrete proposals for such states remain skimpy. Cooperation on limited issues with economically dissimilar but politically compatible states, such as Yugoslavia is attempting with the small states of Eastern and Western Europe in order to secure arms limitations in the region, is still a tactic reserved to the relatively well off states among the nonaligned; only they have the diplomatic and material resources to devote to such an undertaking. Most Yugoslav leaders are prepared by ideology to accept this special role. As the behavior of the Arab states during the energy crisis indicates, other third world leaders may understand their obligations differently. Polarization in the world remains likely even when motives and issues change.