Il me semble que l'auteur est trop sévère au sujet de la contribution de cet investissement pour le développement économique de la Turquie intéressée alors à améliorer sa défense, à s'approcher de l'autarcie et à introduire dans les provinces orientales les résultats du progrès technique. Dans la période des armées trente le gouvernement turc a dû sous l'influence de la crise mondiale faciliter le développement industriel afin de remplacer les produits jusqu'alors importés par des produits industriels turcs. La mobilisation des ressources financières locales a réussi et l'auteur estime la contribution du capital étranger (russe et britannique) à 34% de l'ensemble des investissements industriels turcs des armées trente. L'auteur estime que la pourcentage du revenu national investi en Turquie est passé de 5% environ à 8-9% en termes réels et 20,8% en 1969. Les investissements industriels du secteur public ont été dispersés dans tout le pays et en fonction du principe que ces entreprises publiques devraient être en état de faire la concurrence aux entreprises privées. L'état est parvenu à assurer à ces entreprises les ressources financières requises et le potentiel humain requis. L'auteur relève que le secteur agricole n'a guère eu alors sa part dans les investissements publics, mais il admet justement qu'il ne pouvait pas en être différemment.

Les conditions économiques, monétaires et politiques changèrent radicalement après 1945 malgré le fait que la Turquie parvint à rester non belligérante pendant la seconde guerre mondiale. La contribution de l'aide étrangère, de l'admission de la Turquie à l'OTAN et de l'augmentation substantielle de la demande de produits industriels par les habitants de la Turquie, dont le nombre croît à un taux élevé, sans oublier la contribution de l'inflation et des difficultés afférentes à l'équilibre de la balance des paiements ont tous beaucoup contribué à l'industrialisation. L'auteur fort justement relève en Turquie la diversification croissante de la production industrielle, l'augmentation de sa part, dans le revenu national d'une part dans les exportations d'autre part. Il admet que l'importance accrue du secteur privé a été indiquée mais qu'elle ne signifie nullement la liquidation de la planification; simplement la continuation de l'économie mixte, comme elle s'est présentée à la fin de la première guerre mondiale, a été assurée sur une base plus rationnelle.

L'auteur relève la croissance des investissements industriels et autres en Turquie et souligne que l'industrie ne reçoit plus en pourcentage la part du lion comme dans les années trente. Il admet la diminution de l'importance de financement étranger sans entrer dans les détails de cette évolution comme toute non indiquée, comme le démontre l'évolution dans certains autres pays et il exprime l'espoir, je dirai fondé, que l'application d'une politique monétaire et cambiaire plus réaliste que dans le passé facilitera l'expansion de l'exportation de produits industriels turcs. Il n'est pas nécessaire d'ajouter qu'il s'agit d'un phénomène répandu mais que cela ne diminue pas le mérite de l'industrie turque à y participer.

L'auteur est quelque peu critique de la tendance de la politique économique turque à négliger les problèmes sans relation avec le proche avenir, mais je ne peux pas partager à son point de vue puisque il y a tant de facteurs imprévus à considérer, comme le démontre l'évolution de la situation mondiale en général. En examinant l'industrialisation de la Turquie il n'y a pas à sousestimer l'importance des obstacles à surmonter et les complications découlant de l'augmentation substantielle continue de la population et du manque de tradition Industrielle dans la majorité des cas de ceux qui s'y adonnent.

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When making an analysis of the economic development of any country during a
century within approximately 260 pages, an author or authors have to face substantial difficulties. The result of the efforts involved has to be judged accordingly. In the case of Hungary the authors, an economist and a historian, seem to be obsessed by comparisons with similar developments in the leading western European countries. Hungary, however, is really the most Eastward lying country of Central Europe whose links with the West were due to its incorporation within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The latter disappeared in 1918. Certainly Hungary's collaboration with the Comecon countries does not facilitate its contact with the West, and certainly does not facilitate developments similar to those realised in the West, inasmuch as her Comecon partners are ready to buy under conditions characteristic of a sellers' market, all the commodities the Hungarian authorities involved are ready to export.

As far as part I is concerned, the authors stress the contribution to economic development first of the possibility of unlimited duty free agrarian exports to Austria and the Czech lands, second of the substantial import of capital from these countries and from other Western countries. On the other hand they complain that the duty free import of manufactured commodities into Hungary from both Austria and the Czech lands prevented industry from developing as much as would have been otherwise possible, thus wages remained at very low levels and the whole development process was delayed. Let me mention in this connection that the industrial development of Hong Kong proves that these arguments do not correspond to reality. There is no doubt that the authors are right when supporting that the way the country was governed, the influence of the landed aristocracy and the uneconomic orientation of education did not further development. They are also right when stressing the contribution to Hungarian economic development of foreign capital, the contribution of the government towards attracting capital, the extent of the railway system and the contribution of various factors to industrialisation even if not sufficient and not observed in all sectors. The conditions of the workers both in agriculture and, up to a certain degree, in industry were of course not rosy but history teaches that this is unavoidable before the targets of development are realised.

It is a pity that the authors in Part II did not deal with the economic repercussions of the Trianon treaty which deprived Hungary of 67.3% of its prewar area and of 38.4% of its prewar population, inasmuch as a great part of those inhabitants incorporated in the Little Entente states were of Hungarian nationality. The authors are right when stressing that foreign trade under the new circumstances had to expand despite the tremendous difficulties they mention, omitting, however, the loss of the Russian market, which in combination with the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, constituted the main cause of the difficulties encountered by the central European countries. After the 1931 crisis, with the imposition of foreign exchange control and the virtual moratorium on foreign debts, the Hungarian economy gradually recovered. It plunged, however, into new adventures in the context of the effort of obtaining the radical amendment of the Trianon treaty. Of the territories recovered in 1938, 41% were lost following the defeat of both Germany and Hungary; in the latter, much had been destroyed independently of the great number of those killed, wounded or lost on the Russian battlefields and later in Hungary itself. The contribution of foreign capital, the reduction by 75% of the fallow land industrialisation which did not prevent unemployment, the low level of wages and the difficulties of both adaptation to the new conditions and of the reduced saving possibilities, and last but not least, world war II inflation are well exposed. The authors' opinion on the effects of an eventual decision to devalue the Hungarian currency does not seem to be accurate at least to the undersigned. On the other hand, the authors are perfectly right in considering that to judge the unfavorable repercussions of world war
On Hungary, it is necessary to add military expenses and involuntary credits to Germany. Reconstruction and war reparations have, however, also to be calculated.

In part III, the authors had to be careful, and this probably did not allow them to be objective. There is no doubt that when all owners and creditors, both national and foreign, are deprived of everything they own or are entitled to, the others must notice some improvement of their lot. This did not materialise as proved by the violent and bloody events of 1956, and by the necessity of stationing Russian troops permanently in the country. The first fact is mentioned but not the second. The tendency of the authors is to attribute all improvements—some of them are unavoidable under more or less normal conditions with any regime—to the measures of the Communists ruling Hungary since 1945, but this cannot be accepted. Let me add that the conditions prevailing in Hungary are better than in other countries under communist government, but they cannot be compared with those of Western countries. Some of the great difficulties are mentioned by the authors but of course not in the way they dealt with those of 1848-1944. Since 1956, the Hungarian government has become more interested in avoiding unnecessary hardships simply in order to enforce certain targets even if not realistic. The authors do not forget waste which is unavoidable in the public sector. They are right in stressing the virtual disappearance of illiteracy and the improvement of living conditions which, however, does not apply to the 350,000-400,000 families which were deprived of everything and even of the right to live in Budapest. This concerns roughly 20% of the inhabitants of Hungary. The authors dislike the growing importance of coal in Hungary but that does not seem justified because economic policy has to exploit all resources available even if this is not done in other countries.

Let me mention finally that the authors admit 1) that Hungary exports manufactured commodities to the Comecon countries whilst foodstuffs and raw materials are exported to the West as was happening more than a hundred years ago, 2) that the investments in infrastructure are inadequate inasmuch as the amounts allocated usually show violent swings, 3) that foreign capital is no longer needed. Let me say, however, that Hungary got loans in the Eurodollar market and in the Soviet Union; Hungary also is keen for the launching of joint ventures. The housing shortage is still acute.

I have to disagree with the authors' comparisons with Greece, where the achievements have been really spectacular (income per capita 1938 $ 90 and 1973 $ 1,300) without the imposition of any sacrifice on the people.

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In the profuse and complex literature dealing with the history of ceramics in the Ottoman Empire, the ceramics of Kütahya, with their close links to the Armenian community of that city, have always occupied the place of country cousins to the famous and brilliant tiles and vessels assigned to the town of Iznik. A reassessment of the importance of the Kütahya tradition is proposed both implicitly and explicitly in this beautifully-printed two-volume study by John Carswell of the American University in Beirut and C. J. F. Dowsett of Oxford University; it comprises both a detailed study of the ceramics associated with the Armenian Cathedral of Jerusalem, and a general history of Kütahya ceramics from the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries.