THE DIPLOMACY OF THE GREAT POWERS
AND THE BALKAN STATES, 1908-1914

The idea of a union of Balkan peoples directed against Ottoman rule dates from the time of Rhegas, if not before;¹ and although the idea never disappeared entirely at no time did it become a matter of practical politics until the twentieth century. By that time the Balkan States, and especially Bulgaria, were beginning to develop their military power and by 1911 Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, Roumania and Montenegro possessed not only well-trained officers and men but also modern rifles and artillery.² The Turks themselves had not been idle and the German officers who trained had made some impression on them. This was evident in the war of 1897 against Greece; but Bulgarian officers had noticed that the Turk had his limitations where he encountered the better trained and the better led elements of the Hellenic army; and although the Germans gave it out that the Turks were becoming a military power of some consequence, their secret reports to the German War Office were certainly far from optimistic, especially following the Young Turk revolution of 1908 and during the Turkish-Italian war of 1911. By that time the military balance of power had changed in favour of the Balkan Christians, who enjoyed, too, a strategic advantage, which became all the more pronounced with the development of the Hellenic Navy under a British military mission. So considerable indeed was this increase of Balkan military strength³ that the Great Powers, who were tending to divide into two armed camps had necessarily to pay particular attention to their Balkan policies, with the result that, more than ever before, Balkan rivalries became caught up in the rivalries of the major European nations. The two sets of rivalries stimulated one another and the more the major powers tended to divide into two opposing systems, the more free were the Balkan powers, either severally or in alignments, to pursue their national interest. Under the earlier regime of Bis-

¹. On this subject, see the excellent study by N. Botzaris, *Visions Balkaniques dans la préparation de la Révolution Grecque*, Paris, 1962.
². Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece all had guns from the French Creusot factory.
³. It is interesting to note that at Lule Burgas more men were engaged than at Mukden or at the battle of Sedan.
mark's *Drei Kaiser Bund* with its restraining influence on Russia and Austria-Hungary and during the subsequent decade of Austro-Russian co-operation beginning with the Balkan Agreement of 1897, the Balkan powers found little room to manoeuvre. Bulgaria in particular was unable to seize Macedonia which seemed to be within her reach; and Greece, constantly frustrated in Crete and still suffering from her heavy defeat in 1897, seemed not to have a true friend in Europe. In 1907 the Greek King and Theotokis made some attempt to get out of the *impasse* by entering a Mediterranean League which, they imagined, had come into existence. Nothing came of this plausible and imaginative move, and Greece, like Bulgaria and Serbia, had to wait for the shackles of European diplomacy to slacken and to make what progress they could in improving their military forces. When at last from 1908 onwards the European scene began to undergo revolutionary changes, the fates began to work in favour of Greece. To the Greeks of that age, such fortune was not apparent and at times the future must indeed have seemed very black. But in one way and another they took their chances and by 1913 had gained the major part of Macedonia including Kavala, certain territory in Epirus, including Janina, possession of numerous Aegean Islands and the long sought prize of Crete. Greece owed this magnificent achievement (true it fell short of greater aspirations) to her own efforts — to the great sacrifices of the people, to the great leadership of King Constantine, to the political skill and perhaps the caution of Venizelos; but great as this achievement was, it would never have been possible had general conditions taken an unfavourable turn.

4. This Austro-Russian agreement which was renewed and revised in 1904 enjoyed the somewhat reluctant support of the other four Great Powers, who had given to Austria and Russia a kind of mandate to pacify Macedonia. About this mandate, there was considerable misgiving: France and England in particular felt that the two Eastern Powers were incapable, owing to their inefficiency and perhaps ulterior motives, of restoring order in Macedonia. But the very existence of this mandate and the attempt of Great Britain to influence and enforce its exercise meant that a kind of European Concert was in being—a Concert which would regulate any revision or execution of the clauses of the Treaty of Berlin (1878) and in so doing restrain the Balkan Powers. The Bulgarian Government, under orders from Russia not to precipitate a war with Turkey, certainly avoided compromising itself in Macedonia.


6. Great as was the contribution of Venizelos to Greece, it was perhaps fortunate that he was overruled and yet that he was not overruled too often. One could indeed speculate endlessly on this vexed question.
Briefly speaking, these favourable conditions were as follows: the Serbian-Bulgarian rivalry; the Roumanian-Bulgarian antagonism; the extreme caution of Austro-Hungarian policy and the lack of a truly co-ordinated Balkan policy upon the part of the Triple Alliance Powers; the predilection of Russia for Serbia and of France for Greece, which, combined with the considerable co-ordination of the policy of the Entente Powers turned the scales against Bulgaria; and finally the almost complete inadequacy of Bulgarian policy, which might have been more successfully conducted if it had been entirely in the hands of King Ferdinand himself. Of these conditions the Greeks took great, if not full, advantage and reaped the reward of their less spectacular though nonetheless equally important struggle which they had conducted in Macedonia during the decade before the Balkan Wars.

I

The attempts made before 1911 to bring about Balkan alignments were prompted rather by the rivalries of the Balkan powers among themselves than by the recognition of the necessity to unite for common action against the Turk. The Serbo-Bulgarian negotiations which began...
shortly after Pašić became foreign minister at Belgrade in February 1904 were, it is true, prompted by the need for security against Austria-Hungary and Turkey respectively; but on the Bulgarian side at least they were aimed against Greece who was suspected of collusion with Turkey; and an attempt was made to reach agreement on spheres of influence in Macedonia. Encouraged by Italy, the two Balkan powers concluded a secret treaty on 12 April 1904 by which they undertook to preserve the status quo, to support the Mürzsteg programme of reforms for Macedonia, to guarantee mutually the two ruling dynasties, to furnish to each other military assistance in the event of attack, to pursue a united action in Macedonia and old Serbia and to work for the solution of the Albanian question favourable to Montenegro. They also undertook to refer all problems on which they could not agree either to Russia or to the Court of Arbitration at the Hague. In a Protocol signed the following day the two Powers declared the Sanjak of Novibazar a part of the Vilaget of Kossovo: in other words Bulgaria pledged Serbia to oppose annexation by Austria of that region. The following July Bulgaria and Serbia made a tariff treaty and, despite Austrian hostility and the subsequent 'Pig War', went on to conclude further economic arrangements. On the question of Macedonia, however, little real headway was made: Pašić made numerous attempts to reach definite agreements but these were constantly thwarted by excessive Bulgarian claims. By 1908 the Secret Serbo-Bulgarian alliance, for what it was worth, had ceased to exist. A similar fate befell the even less promising Greco-Roumanian negotiations, which, though supported by Austria, had foundered completely by June 1906. These negotiations were, on the Greek side, aimed against Bulgaria in Macedonia: they were a fruitless attempt to end, and only succeeded in increasing, the collaboration of the Roumanian and Bulgarian propagandas in that region.

Such was the fate of these premature attempts to bring about Balkan alignments. Already, however, significant changes were taking place in the relations of the Great Europeans. In May 1906 Isvolsky succeeded
Lamsdorf at the Russian Foreign Office and in the following October Aehrenthal replaced Goluchowski at Vienna. The old co-operation of Russia and Austria-Hungary was not likely to continue. Aehrenthal was to develop a new and more vigorous Austrian policy, and Isvolsky, having come to an agreement with England in August, 1907, was ready to divert Russia from Asian adventures and to play a vigorous role in South Eastern Europe. These two policies were bound to clash. To solve Austria's southern Slav problem, Aehrenthal hoped to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina (which indeed Russia had sanctioned at the Congress of Berlin) and to make this move more acceptable to the Powers he proposed to renounce Austrian military rights in the Sanjak of Novibazar. To make this renunciation the more attractive he obtained from the Sultan the concession to build through the Sanjak the Uvaö-Mitrovitsa railway — a concession which, for Russia and Italy, threatened an Austrian penetration to Thessaloniki. The Mitrovitsa concession stampeded Isvolsky into an attempt to do a deal with Austria — Russian consent for the annexation of Bosnia, Herzegovina and the Sanjak in return for Austrian support for opening the Straits. At first Aehrenthal was cautious, but following the Young Turk Revolution of July 1908, he hastened to bring about the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, fearing that the Young Turks, if given time to consolidate their rule, might prove more difficult to manage than the old or might even grant autonomy to those provinces and remove the case for annexation. There followed the famous meeting of Isvolsky and Aehrenthal at Buchlau in mid-September, 1908, and the much disputed "agreement" they came to. It is certain that Isvolsky agreed in principle to the annexation, but he imagined that

11. Few Austrian statesmen believed that the way to Thessaloniki was through the Sanjak: the way to Thessaloniki was through the Morava valley, i.e. Serbia. Aehrenthal's predecessor favoured, in the event of the collapse of Turkey, the annexation of the Sanjak, less the town of Novibazar. He had no wish to see Serbia and Montenegro joined in that region, but he would have given Kossovo Polje and Uskub to Serbia and to Montenegro Ipek and Djakova, thus linking up these two countries. Hostile to the idea of an independent Macedonia, he would have partitioned that region, allowing Greece to reach the Struma and to have a northern frontier running from Serres to Janina. Aehrenthal, as his Memorandum of 9 August 1908 shows, considered that since the Young Turk revolution of 1908 the garrisons in the Sanjak, consisting of some 5,000 men in scattered units, served no political or military purpose. Holding the Sanjak would not prevent the formation of a large Slav state: it were better to favour Bulgaria and use Bulgaria to reduce Serbia who, thus reduced, would find its future in a Tripartite Slav-Hungarian-German Monarchy. Like his predecessor, Aehrenthal had no designs upon Thessaloniki.

12. At the Congress of Berlin the Turks had declared that the occupation of these territories should be regarded as provisional.
this, like other possible revisions of the Treaty of Berlin—Bulgarian Independence, the status of Montenegro and the opening of the Straits—would be a question for a European Conference. Hence Aehrenthal's hasty announcement of the annexation (which took Isvolsky by surprise) and his encouragement to Bulgaria to declare complete independence gave the coup de grace to the deteriorating Austro-Russian alignment.

The declaration of the annexation had a profound effect upon the Serbians. To them Austria-Hungary now stood out clearly as the implacable enemy of the Slav race and it began to dawn upon them that perhaps their salvation lay with the Entente Powers. They protested against the annexation as an immediate danger to the political existence of their country; they ordered mobilisation; and Prince George of Serbia went with Pašić to St. Petersburg to plead their cause. But Russia, who was not in a position to fight a war, could only console them with promise of help at some future date. The Serbs even endeavoured in company with Montenegrins to negotiate an alliance with Turkey in order to forestall an Austrian-Turkish agreement; but the Turks insisted that such an alliance should be directed against Bulgaria as well as against Austria and therefore the negotiations failed to prevent the Austrian-Turkish agreement from being made. Any Serbian alignment directed against Bulgaria was strongly opposed by the Entente Powers, who endeavoured in April 1909 to promote a Serbian-Bulgarian rapprochement, which Turkey herself might also enter.

Isvolsky had placed his hopes in the European Concert to ride the storm. Indeed his original manoeuvre had been based on the assumption that Europe would control certain revisions of the Treaty of Berlin. But the trouble was that the Concert was fast becoming a feeble force in European diplomacy. France and England showed great caution, fearing the outcome might be war. Italy, owing to Tittoni's dealings with Aehrenthal, was compromised. Germany, although less favourable to the Young Turks than the old, was hostile to Isvolsky, the author of the Anglo-Russian

13. Proclaimed on 6 October and announced to the Austro-Hungarian Delegations on 8 October.

14. It was in 1908 that the Narodna Odbrana, a society for the protection of Slav interests in the annexed provinces, was founded at Belgrade. For the further developments of the effects of the annexation upon Serbian policy, see below.

15. The British Foreign Office greatly favoured a Bulgarian-Serbian alignment and Charykov, the Russian minister at Constantinople, worked for a Serbian-Bulgarian-Turkish agreement long after such an alignment was a matter of practical politics or indeed the policy of the Russian Foreign Office.
Entente and therefore, albeit with some misgiving, tended to keep close to Austria. The whole result was that preliminary agreements so necessary for launching a Conference could not be made. Austria conceived of a conference purely as a bureau d'enregistrement of the annexation. France and England opposed a conference which might lead to an unlimited revision of the Treaty of Berlin: and Germany had no wish to haul Austria before an assembly which would only discuss «compensations to the small states of Balkan bandits». Germany indeed threw her weight on the side of Austria. On 22 March 1909, just when Austria was on the point of patching up differences with Russia, she sent to St. Petersburg a note which was virtually an ultimatum, requiring Russian agreement to the abrogation of Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin, that is to say the clause defining the status of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the Sanjak. Just over a week later Serbia came to heel. On 31 March 1909 she recognised that she had not been injured in her right by the fait accompli created in Bosnia-Herzegovina and by the Austro-Turkish agreement on that question. She undertook to abandon her attitude of protest and opposition, to live thenceforward with Austria on a footing of good neighbourliness, to reduce her army and to disband her irregular forces. This capitulation upon the part of Serbia rendered the much discussed conference quite unnecessary.10

The Bosnian crisis was a vital step in the process of the division of Europe into two armed camps. On the German side it led to the Molke-Conrad correspondence which virtually transformed the defensive alliance of 1879 into what, given certain circumstances, might become an offensive instrument. On the Russian side it led to attempts, despite the lack of support from France and England, to organise, in combination with the Western Powers, a resistance to Austro-German penetration into the Near East and to restore to Serbia freedom of action. The crisis in fact brought into the foreground the age-long rivalry of Austria and Russia which a whole century or more of diplomacy had succeeded in containing. To the Balkan powers (and indeed to Italy) the new situation opened up endless possibilities and presented difficult problems of policy — problems which came to have much significance in the struggles of political parties in the Balkan capitals.

Italy was the first to move. For some time she had been tentatively seeking Russian support in the Balkans against Austria, and Isvolsky seized

16. By that time Aehrenthal, restrained by Hungarian interests, was no longer in favour of a policy of partitioning Serbia between Austria, Bulgaria and Roumania — a policy which Bülow had, it would seem, been prepared to support.
the opportunity to conclude the Racconigi Agreement of 24 October 1909. By this Agreement the two Powers undertook to strive for the maintenance of the status quo in the Balkans, but, in the event of any Balkan development, to apply the principle of nationality, excluding all foreign domination. Any manoeuvre at variance with those aims they were to oppose by common diplomatic action. Neither Power was to make a fresh Balkan agreement with a Third Power without the participation of the other. Finally Russia undertook to view with goodwill Italian interests in North Africa and Italy the Russian interests in the question of the Straits.

Although this agreement stated the common aim of preserving the status quo, it nevertheless assumed that the status quo was likely to be destroyed, in which event any attempt of Austria to resume her old rights in the Sanjak would be opposed, as would also any attempt by Austria to annex territory or even to give Serbian territory to Bulgaria. That this at least was the Russian interpretation of the Agreement is evident from the instructions Isvolsky sent to his agents in Montenegro, Serbia and Bulgaria. For the present they were to work for the maintenance of the status quo; but at the same time they were to make it clear that Russia had Slav interests at heart. The Slav states must unite and work together and thus fulfil the principle: the Balkans for the Balkan States. Here, then, is one of the underlying ideas of the Balkan Alliance, the idea of a Slav League under the patronage of Russia, who would mediate between the conflicting aims of the Slav nationalities and thus prevent Austria from profiting from their rivalries. These rivalries were not so easily exploited as the Central

17. At Racconigi Isvolsky read to Tittoni, the Italian minister, the Austro-Russian secret agreement of 15 October 1904 as proof of Austrian duplicity. This treaty had been communicated to Germany, but not to Italy. By this agreement each power engaged to observe neutrality in the event of the other becoming engaged in war with a third Power. The aim of the Treaty was to guarantee Russia in the event of war with England and Austria in the event of war with Italy.

18. Action of another order was to be reserved.

19. Italian aims are less easily stated. Italy already had a definite agreement (1897) with Austria over Albania. She had also certain ill-defined obligations under Article VII of the Triple Alliance which, it could be argued, conflicted with the Racconigi Agreement. Tittoni probably attached most importance to Russia's blessing of Italy's North African interests and hoped to remove all ambiguity by negotiating a tripartite Austrian-Italian-Russian Agreement. This never materialised but in December 1909 Italy made an agreement with Austria concerning the Sanjak. Should Austria need to occupy the Sanjak, Italy would be consulted beforehand and (the implication is) be suitably compensated. The two cabinets agreed not to make a separate agreement with a third power in Balkan matters but to act jointly and
Powers imagined. When early in 1909 Germany attempted to win over King Ferdinand of Bulgaria by offers of Serbian territory there was no response from Sofia. Partly out of gratitude, partly from his usual timidity, but chiefly because of his suspicions of the German Powers, Ferdinand preferred to keep on good terms with Russia, hoping to get a reasonable deal in Macedonia at the expense, if not so much of Serbia, then certainly of the Greeks, about whose claims Isvolsky had no precise ideas except that they should be fulfilled as little as possible.

II

If the year 1908 saw a radical change in the relations of the Great European Powers, it marked also a turning point in Balkan affairs. During the five preceding years a fierce conflict had been waged in Macedonia by Bulgarians, Roumanians, Greeks and Serbs in defiance of the futile efforts of the Great Powers to pacify that region. All these nationalities had endeavoured to stake out for themselves the regions they hoped to acquire upon the demise of Turkish rule. The Bulgarians, finding that educational and religious propaganda combined with occasional co-ercive practices, had produced only very moderate results, from 1897 organised a terrorist movement directed as much against Hellenism (the Greek Church, Greek schools and Greek economic and cultural activity) as against Turkish officials and Turkish landowners. In 1902 the Greek elements in Macedonia began to take a stand against the Bulgarians and by 1904 bands organised and armed in Greece had begun a counter-offensive. Exactly what success this counter-offensive achieved is difficult to measure but

to keep one another informed of any proposal that might be made by a third party concerning the Balkans, the Ottoman coasts and the Aegean.

This agreement may be said to have defined and to have brought up to date Article VII of the Triple Alliance. Tittoni who negotiated it did not reveal that Italy had an agreement with Russia. Whether in fact this agreement tied Austria’s hands during the Balkans is a very debatable point.

20. Russia had supported Bulgarian independence and, by waiving the outstanding indemnity due from the Sultan since 1878, had made available the compensation which Bulgaria paid to Turkey for her new status.

21. Greek army personnel and Cretans joined these bands, which were assisted by substantial internal organisations, notably those at Monastir and Thessaloniki—organisations consisting of intelligence agents, informers, guides and organisers of supplies. In this work the Greek consulates, to which Greek officers were attached, played an important part. The Greek Government outwardly disavowed these organisations and protested its inability to prevent bands from crossing the extensive northern frontier.
what is certain is that the Bulgarians failed to "bulgarise" even all those areas of Macedonia which were racially and linguistically predominantly Slav. The Bulgarian-Macedonian movement was divided in its aims; it encountered Serbian as well as Greek opposition; it suffered heavily at the hands of the Turks; and it never found sufficient local support in Macedonia to carry the day. Nor was it strongly supported by the Bulgarian Government, which under pressure of the Powers and especially of Russia and out of fear of war with Turkey, did much — certainly more than the Greek Government — to restrain its self-appointed agents in Macedonia. At all events the Bulgarian-Macedonian movement failed; for nothing short of almost complete success in this type of activity was necessary to resolve the Macedonian question in favour of Bulgaria. So effective was the Greek counter-offensive, that by 1908 a kind of status quo had been restored.

The unrelenting struggle was still in progress when in July 1908 the whole scene was suddenly and fantastically transformed by the Young Turk Revolution. Planned by the Committee of Union and Progress and led by Major Niazi, this revolt was directed against the effete absolutism of Sultan Abdul Hamid, who, under extreme duress, had allowed the Powers to impose a humiliating yet entirely inadequate supervision of the Turkish administration in Macedonia. The Young Turks demanded the Constitution of 1876 and called upon all Turkish subjects to cease their feuds, to live as brothers, and to collaborate in reforming the Ottoman Empire. This appeal had an amazing and inexplicable success. The hardened warriors came down from the mountains and fraternised with the Turks in the towns and large villages; men of all creeds ceased their bickerings; and old conspirators now jostled peacefully to find a place of honour in the new regime. The more discerning, however, saw that the Young Turks were likely to be more frustrating than the old; and it was not very long before they were proved to be right. It was soon evident that the Young Turks

22. Largely the product of inhabitants from Macedonia who had crossed into Bulgaria, the movement was divided on the question whether to work for an independent Macedonia (either as an end in itself or as a means towards later incorporation in Bulgaria) or for staking a claim for the annexation of large territories should Macedonia be partitioned.

23. Witness the failure of the risings of 1902 and 1903.

24. The Greek movement, too, certainly had its difficulties. There were differences between the Cretans, the Greek nationals and local patriots. These in part arose from the vexed question of how "arrangements" should be made with the local Turks.
were out to "ottomanise" the Empire. By the year 1909 the bands in Macedonia had renewed the struggle. The Young Turks were determined to disarm the Christians and now that the system of European supervision had broken down they were likely to give no quarter. While that system of control (for what it was worth) had lasted, the Balkan powers had hopes that local autonomies on the basis of "nationalities" would be established; and the Bulgarians in particular had fondly imagined that a large "semi-autonomous" Bulgarian Macedonia might be created by the Powers. It was this wishful thinking which to a great extent explains why the Bulgarian Government acted with so much circumspection during the period 1904 to 1908; and it was largely because of the disappearance of European control in Macedonia that the Bulgarian Government began to think in terms of a Balkan alliance and to pay some attention to Isvolsky's agents.

All the same a war with Turkey was hardly practical politics in the years 1909 to 1911. Turkish military power was an unknown quantity and was not to be underrated. In any case, there could be no adventures without the approval and, if necessary, the support of Russia; and everything depended upon a Balkan alliance, which was not in sight. The need for that alliance was emphasized however in September 1911 when Italy, on the pretext of Turkish ill-treatment of her nationals, declared war on the Ottoman Empire, which declaration was followed, in early October, by landings in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. Had a Balkan alliance been in existence the Balkan powers perhaps might have seized all European Turkey. As it was the European Powers were able to exercise a restraining influence. For some time they confined Italy to a war in peripheral areas and denied her the

25. Shevket Pasha said to a friend of Bourchier, the Times Correspondent: 'Don't suppose that I care much about the Parliament or what happens to it. What we wanted when we proclaimed the Constitution was to get rid of the Europeans.'

26. The Mürzsteg programme had vaguely suggested that new administrative boundaries should be drawn on the basis of "nationalities". There was no agreement on what constituted "nationality". The Greeks opposed the plan of local autonomies, except on the basis of a status quo, which they reserved the right to define. For them the basis of nationality was not linguistic and racial but religious and cultural.

27. Her real motive was to compensate herself for the free hand which France was likely to get in Morocco. Since 1887 she had obtained from various negotiations "recognition" of her North African interests from all the Powers. Her judgement of the diplomatic situation for this adventure was most adequate: for Aehrenthal was gratified that she had turned her attention away from Albania. But had Conrad, the Austrian Chief of Staff, had his way, Italy, who had made herself vulnerable, might have been attacked and defeated.

28. Local Arab opposition held up the Italians in Tripolitania.
opportunity of attacking the centres of Turkish power. As time went on
the restraint was relaxed, for Isvolsky's successor, Sazanov, veered in favour
of Italy and advocated an attack upon the Straits or at Thessaloniki. Not to
be outdone, Germany, in the interest of the Triple Alliance, advocated to
Austria a favourable interpretation of Article VII of the Tripartite Treaty.29
Aehrenthal's successor, Berchtold, accepted this advice and sanctioned a
temporary Italian occupation of Rhodes, Scarpanto and Stampalia. By the
end of May Italy had occupied all the Dodecanese and she was hoping to
seize also Mytelene, Lemnos, Chios and Samos. But further encroachment
was opposed by Russia, France and Great Britain, and also by Austria,
who made it clear that, if Italy occupied these islands, Austria herself
would probably seek compensation in another quarter. Hence Italy, much
to the disappointment of Balkan Powers,30 was never able to attack Turkey
in a truly vital spot. Both belligerents were in a quandry. Italy wished to
end a war which she was prevented from fighting to a successful conclusion:
and Turkey realised that the longer the war dragged on the less would she
be able to face the threat developing from the Balkan States. Eventually
preliminaries were signed at Ouchy on 15 October, 1912. Italy was to
withdraw from the Islands. The Turks undertook to withdraw their troops
from Libya. England, Germany, Austria and France then recognised Italian
sovereignty in that region.

The Italian-Turkish war had both encouraged and alarmed the
Balkan Powers. Any action that weakened Turkey was welcome, but there
was the danger that Italy might make acquisitions. Greece in particular
feared that Italy might acquire not only the Dodecanese but also Chios,
Mytelene and Samos. The threat to the other powers was less direct.
The danger was however that Italian gains would give rise to the de­
mand for compensation by other European Governments, and especially
by Austria. It can therefore be said that in the formation of the Balkan

29. Austria had held that Article VII precluded Italy from seizing Aegean
Islands. It could, however, be argued that Lesbos, for example, or the Dodecanese
were outside the regions envisaged in this Article.

30. At the beginning of the Tripolitan War, Montenegro offered assistance
to Italy and proposed action to other Balkan States. At the time, Italy was hoping
to keep the war localised and was anxious not to arouse the Balkan powers. Nothing
had come of the rumoured Greek-Italian alliance. Venizelos made an offer to join
Italy and both the Serbians and Bulgarians made approaches to Rome. Danev
advised the Italians to attack Turkey in Europe, and at the same time informed
Russia that, in the event of an Italian invasion of Turkey, Bulgaria could not be
a mere spectator. This alarmed Russia, who had no wish to see a general upheaval
in the Balkans.
League distrust of Italy, as well as the fear that she might make peace too soon, played a part of some importance. Of supreme importance, however, was the Turkish mobilisation in European Turkey in October 1911: this certainly impressed upon Bulgaria the need to come to an understanding with Serbia.

III

The Balkan Alliance was long in forming. In 1909 Isvolsky had sent Hartwig to Belgrade to conduct Russian policy.31 Hartwig was a fervent Pan-Slav and he set about the task of reconciling Bulgaria and Serbia. This was not easy for King Ferdinand preferred to retain freedom of action and was reluctant to make an alliance with Belgrade. In the spring of 1911 however he found it expedient to form a new pro-Russian Cabinet under Geshov and Danev who, in the elections of June 1911, obtained a large majority. Geshov had always advocated a cautious policy of friendly negotiations with Turkey and he was a strong opponent of the Bulgarian Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation and of its programme of Macedonian autonomy. He wanted to take the Macedonian question out of its hands, as Cavour, in his opinion, had taken the Italian question out of the hands of revolutionaries. But he came to the conclusion that the Bulgarian element was rapidly dwindling in Macedonia and, seeing the approach of the Italian war, he came to believe that an alliance with Serbia was necessary.32 This policy was indeed advocated by the Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation;33 but one of the conditions on which this organisation insisted was that Macedonia should become an autonomous unit—a principle not likely to find favour with the Serbians. Geshov had at least to pay lip service to this principle, for he could not ignore the Revolutionary Organisation. To facilitate matters he chose as his negotiator, Rizov,34 who had been in charge of the negotiations of 1904 and who had been a prominent leader in the Macedonian cause. Rizov undertook to arrange matters with the Macedonian organisation. But before the negotiations got

31. He arrived in September 1909. It would seem that he came under the influence of Paäic, who impressed upon him the needs of Serbia.
32. H. W. Steed, Vienna correspondent of the Times who visited Sofia in August, 1911, probably persuaded him to seek agreement with Serbia.
33. Similarly, the Serbian organisation, Uyedinenje ili Smrt, (which had broken away from the Narodna Odbrana) favoured common action with Bulgaria, but it was not until later that it put real pressure on the Government.
34. At the time he was in Sofia on leave from Rome, where he was the Bulgarian agent.
under way,\textsuperscript{96} the Italian–Turkish war had broken out. This event caused both the Bulgarian Government and the Serbian Government, acting under some pressure from Russia, to hasten their negotiations.\textsuperscript{96} Early in October Rizov went to Belgrade and then later to Vienna to meet Geshov and Stanchov, the Bulgarian minister from Paris.\textsuperscript{97} The basis for the discussions was the Treaty of 1904. The Bulgarians proposed that the alliance should be defensive against all states and that the \textit{casus foederis} should arise if either Turkey or Austria-Hungary attempted to occupy Balkan territory, or even if Serbian and Bulgarian interests called for a settlement of the Turkish question. If it were impossible to obtain autonomy for Macedonia, then Serbia and Bulgaria were to divide that region. Montenegro was to be invited to join the alliance. Russian agreement was to be a \textit{conditio sine qua non} for the conclusion of the Treaty.

When later Geshov met\textsuperscript{98} Milovanović (who suspected that King Ferdinand had hatched some plot in Vienna\textsuperscript{99}) he found it impossible to reach agreement on the division of the prospective spoils. Milovanović preferred not to have precise territorial agreements but to leave disputed points to the arbitration of the Tsar. When eventually the first Serbian draft of treaty reached Sofia on 3 November 1911, the difficulties became more apparent. All mention of Macedonian autonomy was omitted and it was proposed that Russia should arbitrate on the division of the Vilayets of Thessaloniki and Monastir. To this the Bulgarians objected. The Serbs then suggested the mapping out of three zones, one an uncontested Serbian zone, the second an uncontested Bulgarian zone, and the third a zone

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{35} In September Garting had succeeded in opening negotiations between Milovanović, the Serbian Foreign Minister, and Tochev, the Bulgarian envoy at Belgrade.
\item \textsuperscript{36} On 29 September 1911, Nekludov, the Russian Minister at Sofia, advised Geshov to come to terms with Serbia, Greece and Montenegro. On 2 October he was informed that Bulgaria was prepared to settle the Macedonian question with Serbia. Seeing that a Bulgarian-Serbian alliance would be offensive, Nekludov asked for instructions: he was instructed to make it clear that action would not be approved by Russia unless it was a response to a provocative action of Turkey and that Russian action would depend on the steps taken by Austria-Hungary.
\item \textsuperscript{37} For a full discussion of the Serbian-Bulgarian negotiations see the article by Gunnar Hering, above below pp. 296 - 326.
\item \textsuperscript{38} On a train between Belgrade and Lipovo.
\item \textsuperscript{39} It is said that Geshov removed his suspicions, but the fact remains that Milovanović wished to “insure” with Russia. Ferdinand had approved the negotiations but had advised caution in negotiating. Geshov himself was prepared to leave much to Russia, but he could never ignore completely the demands of the Macedonian Organisation.
\end{itemize}
reserved for Russian arbitration. Again, no mention was made of Macedonian autonomy. At this point the negotiations were transferred to Paris but little headway was made. King Ferdinand’s visit to Vienna in November 1911 seems to have accounted for some of the delay. But rumours of a Russian-Turkish Straits agreement, not to mention fears of a Russian agreement with Austria, instilled a sense of urgency. Indeed, Nekludoff let it be known that if Serbia and Bulgaria failed to come to terms, Russia would reserve the right to act as her interests dictated. By the end of December some measure of agreement had been reached, but the territorial question still caused difficulties. Eventually it was agreed to separate the Macedonian problems from the main treaty and to deal with them in a secret annex. The Treaty and the Annex were at last concluded on 13 March 1912. These agreements were followed by a series of military conventions, which were subsequently modified.

The two parties agreed “to come to each other’s assistance with all their forces in the event of any of the Great Powers attempting to annex, occupy, or even temporarily to invade with its armies any port of the Balkan territories which are today under Turkish rule, if one of the parties considered this as contrary to its vital interests and a casus belli” (Art. II) and “to succour each other with their forces, in the event of one of them being attacked by one or more states” (Article I).

40. In Paris Rizov made a strong case for autonomy for Macedonia: “...in the event of war with Turkey, Serbia and Bulgaria could find no more acceptable, more justifiable, and less provocative platform than the principle of Macedonian autonomy.” The Serbian view was that if autonomy should prove impossible or of short duration, a division or method of division should be agreed beforehand. The Serbians had seen what had happened to Eastern Roumelia. Their principle, which was to be embodied in the subsequent Treaty [see below], meant that Bulgaria could not acquire a large part of “Serbian” Macedonia by later absorbing the whole of an autonomous Macedonia.

41. Russia feared that the outcome might be a Bulgarian-Turkish-Roumanian agreement, but nothing is definitely known of what passed between Ferdinand and Aehrenthal.

42. Military Convention of 29 April, Military Agreement concerning war with Austria or Roumania, 1 July, Military Agreement concerning war with Turkey, 2 July. The modifications were signed on 4 and 28 September. Text of the Agreements are given by Geshov, in his apologia, The Balkan League, 1915.

43. In the military Agreement the likely attackers, Roumania, Austria and Turkey are specifically named. No mention is made of Italy. Bulgaria was to provide at least 200,000 troops and Serbia, 150,000. Article III of the Military Convention states: “Bulgaria owes Serbia the same assistance if Austria-Hungary sends, on whatever pretext, her troops into the Sanjak of Novi Bazar, with or without the
The Secret Annex, though paying lip service to the *status quo*, stated (Article I) that, if conditions in Turkey became a danger to the national interest of the contracting parties and one party thought that military action was necessary, then that party should make "a reasoned proposal to the other", which was bound to give a reasoned reply. Should an agreement favourable to action be reached, it was to be communicated to Russia, and if the latter Power was not opposed to it, military operations would begin as previously arranged...In the opposite case, when no agreement had been reached, the parties were to appeal to the opinion of Russia which opinion, if and in so far as Russia pronounced herself, would be binding on both parties. Should Russia give no opinion and one party went to war on its own responsibility, then the other party was bound to observe a friendly neutrality towards its ally and to go to its assistance in the event of a third party taking the side of Turkey.

Article II provided that all territories acquired by combined action envisaged in the Treaty and in Article I of the Annex should constitute common property, the repartition of which was to be made immediately or, at the latest, within three months after peace was restored. Despite this, however, the Article went on to state: "Serbia recognises the right of Bulgaria to the territory east of the Rhodope Mountains and the river Strouma; while Bulgaria recognises a similar right of Serbia to the territory north and west of the Shar Mountain". As regards to territory lying between the Shar Mountain and the Rhodope Mountains, the Archipelago and Lake consent of Turkey..." This undertaking by Bulgaria was not simply a price that Bulgaria had to pay for the Serbian alliance. Bulgaria feared that Austria would advance through the Sanjak into Macedonia and that her ally, Roumania, would in fulfilment of the Austro-Roumanian agreement of September 1900 attack Bessarabia with a view to acquiring Silistria, Rustchuk, Shumen and Varna: Bulgaria gave the undertaking on the strength of Russia's pledge of June 1902 to defend the inviolability of Bulgarian territory in the Dobruja. An attempt had been made in December 1909 - February 1910 to extend the military convention of 1902 but this had failed. When in May 1912 Danev went to St. Petersburg to inform the Russians of the Serbo-Bulgarian agreements, the question of a Bulgarian-Russian military alliance was again raised. But the Russians, who feared such an alliance would precipitate war, refused to commit themselves and later (January 1913) stated that the convention of 1902 was no longer valid. But that same month Sazonov, wanting English and French support in restraining Roumania, informed those powers of the existence of that convention, which, he said, was still in force. The following June, Sazonov repudiated the convention. It is often said that on the Bulgarian side the Agreement was aimed solely against Turkey, but as Gechov shows in his work *The Balkan League op. cit.* Bulgaria was much concerned with the possibility of an attack from Roumania.
Ochrida, if the two parties became convinced that the organisation of this territory into an autonomous province was impossible, in view of the common interests of the Bulgarian and Serbian nationalities, or owing to other internal or external causes, then Serbia was to undertake not to claim any territory beyond the line^44 Mount Golem to Lake Ochrida. Bulgaria was to accept that line if Russia pronounced in its favour. Beyond that line to the northwest as far as the Shar Mountains lay a roughly rectangular zone stretching on both sides of the upper Vardar. The division of this area, in the event of failure to reach agreements by direct negotiation, was to be left to Russian arbitration^45, as were also^46 all disputes concerning the interpretation and execution of any part of the Treaty, Annex, or Military Convention.

No mention was made in the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of Albania or of Southern Macedonia. In the latter, Bulgaria would, eventually, have to come to some agreement with Greece, but given certain developments the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement could possibly have enabled Bulgaria to expand in that direction. Had Austria contained Serbia, had Bulgaria patched up agreements with Austria and had Sofia been prepared to pay a price to Bucharest, then indeed it is just possible that she would have made gains at the expense of Greece. As it was, in the first Balkan war she took Kavala, Serres and Drama and she even sent a force to Thessaloniki. Indeed, at the time of its creation, the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement held out a greater promise to Bulgaria than to Serbia. True, the agreement gave to Serbia the possibility of gains in Albania and of an outlet to the Adriatic. But at the time such expansion was very doubtful and Pačić for one always believed

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44. This line was drawn on a map attached and was described in some detail in the article. It passed through Mount Kitka, Mount Lisetz, Mount Gradishte, through Vetersko and Sopot on the Vardar, to Peropole Mountains Tchesina, Baba, Kroushta Tepessi, Protoiska, Ilinska, thence to Lake Ochrida near the monastery of Gobovtzi.

45. The Serbians might reasonably assume that the Tsar would award them most, if not all, perhaps even more than the contested zone: It should be noticed that while Serbia was not to make claims beyond the Golem-Ochrida line, the Tsar was "free" to amend that line:

46. What follows is a summary of Article IV. Article III provides that copies of the Agreements should be communicated to Russia:

47. The question of the Vilaijet of Adrianople was in 1912 a Bulgarian-Russian problem rather than a Greek-Bulgarian one. When Danev pleaded for including Adrianople in the Bulgarian sphere of influence, Sazonov replied that this province had been left outside the frontiers of San Stefano Bulgaria: The Russians indeed had no wish to see Bulgaria, who might pass under Austrian or German influence, in a dominating position near the Straits.
that Serbia had given too much away for a most doubtful return. He feared that in any case Ferdinand would not honour the agreement and would refrain from fighting Austria—even that he might, if it suited him, betray the secret to Vienna.\footnote{It seems that when he went to Vienna in June 1912, he told the Austrians nothing, but he did hint at a deal over Albania.} For Serbia, however, there was very little option. Ever since 1903 she had been seeking a Bulgarian alliance (behind Bulgaria stood the not unfriendly Russia) as a defence against Austria. At one time her interests had centred in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but since 1908 her gaze had shifted to Albania, to the Sanjak and to Macedonia. She could not therefore, in view of the crisis developing in the Balkans, refuse overtures of Bulgaria, supported as they were by Russia: all she could do was, after hard bargaining, to make the best of the situation and later to shift her ground if it suited her to do so. Greece, as we shall see, was in a somewhat analogous position. For her as for Serbia the Balkan league was but an incident in the Macedonian struggle—a mere device, required by circumstances and not an instrument of any lasting value.

Like the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance the Bulgarian-Greek agreement was a long while in making. A significant part was played by J. D. Bourchier, the \textit{Times} Balkan correspondent,\footnote{From his articles in the \textit{Times} in 1913 it is clear that his role was considerable, though he refrains from saying precisely what he did.} who was a friend of Venizelos. Bourchier had met Venizelos in Crete and had come to regard him as the likely saviour not only of Greece but of Hellenism. The two met again in Athens early in 1910\footnote{Bourchier had gone there to report on the political situation following the Greek Military Revolution of August 1909.} and on 26 February Venizelos unfolded to Bourchier his ideas concerning the desirability of a Greek-Bulgaria alliance. In the months that followed the two friends frequently discussed the matter in Bourchier's room at the Hôtel Grande Bretagne. In the spring of 1911 Bourchier sent proposals\footnote{These were for a defensive alliance for the protection of Christians in European Turkey.} (known only to the Greek King, Venizelos and himself) to the Bulgarian legation at Vienna for onward transmission to Sofia. He also sent letters to Geshov and King Ferdinand, advocating a Greek-Bulgaria agreement. These letters reached Sofia in April. King Ferdinand however had no desire to be drawn into a war over the question of Crete. Moreover the Russians advised Bulgaria to make first an agreement with Serbia; and indeed it was not until the Bulgarian Government had decided to negotiate with Serbia (that is to say just before
the outbreak of the Tripolitan War) that it showed some willingness to enter into 
opparlers
 with Greece.52 On 16 October, Panas, the Greek minister at Sofia, offered Geshov a defensive alliance against Turkey. Greece, therefore, even before Serbia, declared herself ready to assist Bulgaria in the event of a Bulgarian-Turkish war. Hence it was the delay in the Serbo-Bulgarian negotiations which retarded the Bulgarian negotiations with Greece;53 and it was not until 6 February 1912 that Geshov entrusted to Bourchier a verbal message which he delivered in Athens on 19 February 1912.54 The Greek King, Venizelos,55 and the Crown Prince were all in favour of following up the Bulgarian rapprochement and on 4 March Panas was instructed to negotiate further at Sofia. On 27 April 1912 Panas presented to Sofia a draft treaty.56 This, like the Serbian drafts, was not acceptable to Geshov. It contained nothing about autonomy for Thrace and Macedonia and nothing about the privileges of the Christian provinces embodied in Article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin. Like the Serbs, the Greeks had

52. Bourchier had gone to Sofia in September. On the way he had had conversations with Milovanović, but he seems to have taken no direct part in the Serbo-Bulgarian negotiations. The necessity of agreement with Greece had for some time been realised in Sofia, as it was feared that Greece might enter an Albanian-Austrian-Roumanian combination. Geshov (The Balkan League, op. cit. p. 19) speaks of "our uncertainty that some agreement...did not exist between Turkey and Roumania; to say nothing of the danger that Serbians and Greeks might intervene in a Turco-Bulgarian war, under conditions far less favourable to us than if we had previously come to terms with them."

53. No wonder, then, that on 3 November 1911 Geshov told Bourchier that he did not know how to reply to Greece. The Russians continued to advise Bulgaria to come first to an agreement with Serbia.

54. On his way back to Athens Bourchier saw the Greek Patriarch and the Bulgarian Exarch: both were favourable to the Greco-Bulgarian alignment. The Patriarch declared his readiness to abolish the "Schism" but he also stipulated certain conditions which the Bulgarians were unlikely to accept.

55. Venizelos had become Prime Minister on 18 October 1911.

56. In April Bourchier accompanied Venizelos on a tour in Greece and like the minister met with a great reception. In the solitude of Mount Pelion they discussed in loud voices (Bourchier was very deaf) the details of the draft treaty. They arrived back in Athens on 24 April. (It was on this occasion that Bourchier dissuaded Venizelos from sending a Vice-roy to Crete in defiance of the Powers, who had refused to restore the Commissionership of that Island.) Venizelos himself has recorded that Bourchier played a most important part in the making of the Greco-Bulgarian Agreement. Upon the outbreak of the Balkan War he telegraphed (7 October 1912) to Bourchier as follows: "Je vous remercie et je vous serre la main comme à un des principaux artisans de cette œuvre magnifique qu'est l'union étroite des peuples chrétiens de la péninsule balkanique."
always opposed the idea of Macedonian autonomy; and they also realised the pitfalls in Article 23 of the Berlin Treaty upon which a case for autonomy could be based. Geshov was unwilling to proceed with the treaty until Greece accepted the following formula: "Greece undertakes not to offer any opposition to an eventual demand by Bulgaria of administrative autonomy for Macedonia and the vilayet of Adrianople, guaranteeing equal rights to the nationalities there". This formula the Greeks rejected. Geshov then endeavoured to commit the Greeks to fight for the rights of Christians in Turkey which were based on Treaties, but Panas accused him of working in a roundabout way, or trying to get back to the idea of autonomy by basing Christian rights exclusively on international treaties and principally upon Article 23 or the Treaty of Berlin.67 Geshov then offered to introduce words which spoke of Christian rights "conceded" by the Sultans and "deriving from the treaties". Even this failed to satisfy the Greeks at first and it was not until on or about 23 May that they finally gave way. By that time the general situation had become critical. The Greeks must have known of the existence of the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement, even though they were unaware of its provisions; and they realised that they had everything to gain by entering a combination which did not restrain them. They had in fact kept their hands free and had even put on record that they were not prepared to abide by a Bulgarian interpretation of the Treaty of Berlin. On the Bulgarian side there was even greater haste. "I may mention . . .", writes Geshov, "that, owing to lack of time, we were unable to conclude with Greece an agreement with respect to the future frontiers of Macedonia". Had this vexed question, however, become the subject of discussions, it is most unlikely that a Treaty would have been signed, for the conflicting Greek and Bulgarian aspirations in that region were less easily reconciled than those of Sofia and Belgrade.

This Greco-Bulgarian Treaty was signed on 30 May and dated 16/29 May.68 The preamble set forth the object of preserving peace in the Balkan Peninsula and of securing the peaceful existence of the various nationalities in Turkey and their rights "whether they derive from treaties or have been conceded in a different way".68 These objects were to be attained by a "solid defensive treaty", both parties "promising not to impart to their purely defensive agreement any aggressive tendency".

57. The point is that the rights of the Patriarchate did not derive from international treaties but from firmans and Berats of the Sultan.
58 L. Albertini, op. cit., p. 365, wrongly dates it 12 June 1912.
59. This was the final wording which avoided the basing of Christian rights solely on Article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin.
Article I provided that if one of the parties should be attacked by Turkey, either on its territory or through systematic disregard of its rights, based on treaties or on the fundamental principles of international law, the two contracting parties would assist each other with all their armed forces, and would not conclude peace except by joint agreement. In Article II the two powers agreed to work together both as regards Turkey and towards the Great Powers “to secure the respect of the privileges deriving from treaties or otherwise conceded to the Greek and Bulgarian nationalities, and to obtain political equality and constitutional guarantees”. Article III provided that the treaty should remain in force for three years and Article IV for secrecy. An annexed declaration stated that the treaty did not apply “to the case of war breaking out between Greece and Turkey in consequence of the admission in the Greek Parliament of the Cretan deputies, against the wishes of Turkey”. In that event Bulgaria was only bound to observe towards Greece a friendly neutrality. This declaration was subsequently superseded by Article VI of the Greco-Bulgarian Military Convention of 5 October 1912, which was not concluded until after mobilisation had begun. This article stated that Bulgaria would go to the assistance of Greece should she be attacked by Turkey when attempting to settle the Cretan question in accordance with the wishes of the Cretans. By that time the decision to begin hostilities had been taken and provocative action had been arranged: Montenegro was to demand satisfaction for certain injuries; and Greece was to admit the Cretan representatives to the Parliament of Athens. Here indeed Greece had seized the opportunity of solving the Cretan question. She also attempted at this stage to gain from Bulgaria a recognition of her territorial claims in Macedonia, but Sofia refused to bargain. The Serbians even went back on the arrangements made in March and on 28 September (two days before mobilisation) so defined Old Serbia as to include the towns and surroundings of Prilep, Kitchevo and Ochrida — territories that had been earmarked for Bulgaria. Indeed right from the outset each Balkan power was determined to carry off what spoils it could and to exploit whatever military or diplomatic situation should develop. The Balkan League was simply a device for synchronising a military effort upon the part of the four powers who for long had realised that the simplest way to settle the Turkish question, before it was too late and while circumstances were favourable, was to attack Turkey simultaneously and present the European powers with a fait accompli.60

60. The League was in its other aspect a diplomatic weapon forged by Rus-
The text of the Greco-Bulgarian treaty was not shown to Serbia but the Serbians and the Russians knew the gist of it. The Serbians at least knew of its existence, just as the Greeks knew of the existence of the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement. It was therefore only to be expected that there should be negotiations between Greece and Serbia. These negotiations went on through the summer of 1912 but it was not until 22 October (by that time the war had begun) that the Greek Foreign Office submitted to Belgrade a draft of treaty. This proposed treaty, however, can hardly be regarded as a complement to the existing Balkan alignment but as a portent of the rift within it and of the subsequent Serbo-Greek alliance against Bulgaria. It was proposed that the two powers should give one another full support with all their forces in the war against Turkey and should not make peace except by common accord; and that they should endeavour to secure from Turkey the rights belonging to the Serbian and Greek nationalities. It was proposed that the two powers should give one another full support with all their forces in the war against Turkey and should not make peace except by common accord; and that they should endeavour to secure from Turkey the rights belonging to the Serbian and Greek nationalities. No mention was made of Bulgaria, but the implication was that Greece and Serbia should combine to protect their interests in Macedonia. Nothing came immediately of these negotiations which were not resumed until the spring of 1913, but there nevertheless existed some form of entente between the two powers and indeed between Greece and Montenegro.

No formal written agreement was concluded between Montenegro and Bulgaria. Russia indeed was strongly opposed to all idea that Montenegro should join formally the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance. Her membership would only make that alliance entirely uncontrollable and it was even feared that she would betray the arrangement to Vienna. In June 1912, however, Bulgaria began independent negotiations with Montenegro and by August it was agreed that Montenegro could have whatever territory she could conquer. She was also promised financial aid. Parallel negotiations went on between Montenegro and Serbia, but it was not until 6 October that a formal agreement was made. This treaty was directed

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61. The projected treaty went on to speak of the privileges which the Patriarchate would accord to the Serbian churches. Part of the text is given by Driault et L'Héritier, op. cit. pp. 80-1.

62. In November 1912 the Greek minister in Vienna spoke of a defensive alliance between Greece and Serbia; but Venizelos later (April 1913) made it clear that there was no formal alliance between Greece on the one hand and Serbia and Montenegro on the other. Defensive arrangements without a formal treaty seem to have been made between Greece and Montenegro in June 1912.
against both Turkey and Austria. It was agreed to partition the Sanjak and to refer disputed places to arbitration. Montenegro was to be given a subsidy and was to take the initiative in beginning the war. Already Bulgaria had arranged that Montenegro should open hostilities not later than 28 September and that she should contain as many Turkish forces as she could in return for subsidies. Bulgaria herself was to begin hostilities within one month of the Montenegrin action. Thus, the interminable Montenegrin-Turkish border disputes (which had been the chief obstacle to a formal alliance) were now to be used as a means of starting the war.

The Balkan powers had at last arrived, in spite of their intensive rivalries, at a decision to fight together. This decision was reached during the period of increasing crisis in European Turkey and in Europe at large—the Tripolitan War, its spread to the Aegean and the likelihood of its termination; the Turkish constitutional crisis of the spring of 1912; the revolt of the Moslems of Kosovo and the mutiny of the garrison at Monastir in the summer, the Albanian revolt of July 1912, which was supported by Montenegro and Serbia and which caused Montenegro to send on 10 August 1912 a virtual ultimatum to the signatories of the Treaty of Berlin, intimating that if they did not intervene Montenegro would be obliged to defend her cause; the massacres at Kotchani and Berana; the attack in August by Isa Boleta and his Albanians on Uskub—an event which led the Turkish Government, despite the opposition from the Young Turks (who were now out of office), to announce belatedly a policy of administrative centralisation; the demands of the Albanians for the vilaijets of Uskub and Monastir—demands which aroused anxiety in Athens and Belgrade; the attempt of the new Turkish War Minister, Nazim Pasha, to purge the Turkish army, which, as a result, was virtually destroyed as an effective military force; and finally, the excitement in the Balkan capitals, the popular demand for war, especially in Sofia, where the Macedonian and Thracian brotherhoods were holding a congress. Equally alarming was the Austrian Note of 13 August 1912 with its suggestion that the Turks should be encouraged to implement the new policy of decentralisation. This seemed to forbode the establishment of a large independent Albania which would encroach upon territories desired by Greece, Serbia and Montenegro. It was at this point that the King of Montenegro took the initiative: he offered to begin hostilities; and this offer was ac-

63. Germany was not consulted beforehand as she was likely to oppose it, and in any case Berchtold had no desire to confront England with an Austro-German proposal.
cepted on 26 August by Bulgaria and shortly afterwards by Greece and Serbia. As soon as this decision was taken the Bulgarian, Serbian and Greek military chiefs began discussions, which, like the preceding political conversations, revealed the divergent interests of the Balkan powers. About the middle of September Bulgaria informed Russia (as was required by the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance) of the decision to go to war with Turkey unless the Great Powers could induce the Sultan to implement Article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin in accordance with Bulgarian demands. This move put to the test the "veto clause" which, so Sazonov had contended, gave Russia considerable control over the Balkan powers. Sazonov was in a quandry:

64. Venizelos had thought that Greece was still insufficiently prepared despite the achievements of the French military mission under General Eydoux. He was on the point of offering to Turkey a small tribute and recognition of Turkish suzerainty in Crete in return for the right of Cretans to sit in the Parliament of Athens. It was clear however that Greece could not be an idle spectator if the other Balkan powers attacked Turkey.

65. It now seemed that Serbia would have to concentrate large forces against Austria but it was eventually agreed that the whole Serbian army would operate in the Macedonian theatre. Military agreements were finally made on 28 September (Bulgaria and Serbia) and 5 October (Bulgaria and Greece). Greece was to provide at least 120,000 troops, and to establish naval supremacy in the Aegean.

66. On 30 March 1912 Sazonov had given London and Paris some information of the Serbo-Bulgarian Agreement, stressing its defensive character and the Russian "veto clause." This information had leaked out from the Russian Embassy in London to the Germans, who knew Russia was prevaricating when she stated that the Treaty was made without her aid. The Germans told King Carol of Roumania who informed Vienna. Vienna later heard of the Treaty from the Germans; but Berchtold did not believe in its aggressive character. The British agent at Sofia was shown by Geshov a text of the Treaty but it was not till November that London had definite information about the Secret Annex. Italy, too, obtained an early knowledge of the Treaty. France, however, was kept almost entirely in the dark, but Poincaré was more suspecting than the Germans and Austrians. He went to St. Petersburg in August and managed to get more information out of Sazonov, who revealed the Treaty and the Annex but not the Military Conventions. Poincaré saw at once that the agreements contained the seeds of a war not only against Turkey but also Austria. Sazonov, however, claimed again that the "veto clause" left Russia in control, arguing even that Serbia and Bulgaria could not mobilise without Russian consent. Poincaré doubted this and saw immediately that the whole arrangement was a breach of Article I of the Franco-Russian Agreement of 1891, which had stipulated that the two powers should consult each other on all questions likely to jeopardise peace. Poincaré was a realist and, setting great store on the Entente, framed French policy in such a way as to change completely the two-decade old Franco-Russian alliance, which until 1912 had been a purely defensive instrument with a very limited scope, and with doubtful possibilities. The 1891 Treaty did not oblige France to help Russia in the event of Germany's joining Austria in
Russia was not in a position to fight a war: there was the danger that if the Balkan powers were too successful, Bulgaria might dominate the Straits or Austria might be provoked into making war on Serbia. He therefore warned Bulgaria that Turkey would quickly make peace with Italy; that Roumania was likely to launch an attack; and that the Balkan Allies could expect only diplomatic support from Russia. He also appealed to the Powers to urge upon the Sultan the necessity of reforms. Thus, the age-long farce was about to repeat itself and, as usual, the Turks, in order to forestall the Powers, issued their own reform programme and called up 100,000 Redifs for manoeuvres in Thrace. On 28 September the Balkan powers made their final decision to mobilise on 30 September and 1 October. By that time Great Powers had at length decided to take collective action at Constantinople. They had taken note of the Turkish Government's intention of introducing reforms and would examine with the Sublime Porte the reforms required and the means for guaranteeing their execution, it being understood that these measures should not infringe the territorial integrity of the Empire. This declaration of a status quo was in effect more a warning to Austria.

a war launched by Russia against Austria: the casus foederis for France was:—an attack on Russia by Germany or by Austria supported by Germany. By the assurances he gave to Sazonov he virtually offered French support (which would involve also England) in the event of the interference of Germany in an Austro-Russian war. Poincaré had seen the importance of Balkan military forces for the Entente and he therefore began to "underwrite" Russia, alternatively restraining and encouraging her as the situation demanded.

As early as June 1912 (that is the time of Ferdinand's visit to Vienna) the Temps reported a division of Macedonia between Serbia and Bulgaria. In November 1913 (on the occasion of his next visit) the Matin published a full text of the Treaty and Military convention. It is possible that these two leakages were designed to frustrate a suspected rapprochement between the Austrian and Bulgarian courts.

The Turks, for long suspicious of the formation of a Balkan alliance, had confirmed its existence by September 1912: they took additional military precautions and, in so doing, helped to hasten the war.

67. A similar warning was given at Belgrade on 19 September. But the Slav Balkan powers could never believe that Russia could afford to see them vanquished: and they always assumed that powerful elements in Russia would remove timid ministers.

68. Sazonov issued a Circular Note on 17 September to this effect but made no suggestion of any collective demarche at the Balkan capitals. On 22 September Poincaré drew up a plan for action which was to be agreed first by the Entente and was then to be presented to the Triple Alliance. The plan underwent many changes in the course of its discussion. Its final form owed much to the understanding between Poincaré and Kiderlen.

69. This action was not taken until 10 October.
than to the Balkan Powers, but Berchtold agreed to it because it also bound
Russia; and because it meant also that, if the Balkan states disturbed the
territorial status quo, then Austria might claim compensations. This de-
termination to uphold the status quo and to work for reforms (all so re-
miniscent of the policy followed a decade earlier) was to be announced by
Austria and Russia, acting on behalf of Europe at the four Balkan cap­i-
tals. The Powers stated their intention to base themselves on Article 23 of
the Treaty of Berlin and to take in their hands the execution of the re-
forms. They ended by saying that, if notwithstanding all this, a war should
break out, they would tolerate no modifications of the territorial status
quo of European Turkey. It was not however until 8 October that Austria
and Russia made this representation to the Balkan capitals. That same day
Montenegro began hostilities against Turkey, pointing out to the Powers
that her requests for earlier intervention had been ignored. Athens, Bel-
grade and Sofia, all stated that they needed time to consider the matter.
On 13 October they gave their defiant reply: as previous reforms had al-
ways failed, the three powers would address themselves directly to the Sul-
tan, indicating the principles on which reforms must be based. This they
did in a Memorandum. They demanded reforms based on Article 23 of
the Treaty of Berlin, stipulating that these should take into account "ethnic
nationalities" and provide for administrative autonomy, elected local as-
semblies, a reformed gendarmerie and local militia, educational and reli­
gious freedom. They further demanded that the autonomous area should have
Belgian or Swiss Governors and that the reform programme should be car-
ried out by a mixed Christian - Moslem commission, which was to be con­
trolled by the Ambassadors of the Great Powers and the Ministers of the
four Balkan States. Finally they demanded that the Turks should forth-
with demobilise. The memorandum was in effect an ultimatum to Turkey
and a statement of the rights of Balkan Christians to public opinion in

70. True, there was no clear idea in Vienna what these should be.
71. The date was of her own choosing but her action was in accordance with
the original plan. Greece, however had not been prepared to admit the Cretan De-
puties to the Athens Parliament until hostilities began.
72. Her note of 10 August 1912 requesting a settlement of her boundary
problems.
73. One need hardly say that each Balkan power attached its own meaning
to these words. For Bulgaria the ultimate goal was an autonomous Macedonia. For
Greece and Serbia the ultimate goal was partition and the preservation of the rights
of the Patriarchate in so far as these were compatible with or furthered nationalist
aspirations.
The Partition of the Vilayets of Thessaloniki and Monastir.
Europe. No answer from the Porte was expected; and as no prompt reply was given the Balkan powers decided on 17 October to go to war.\textsuperscript{14}

Contrary to the prevailing opinion of European military experts, the Balkan Allies carried all before them.\textsuperscript{74} Having won victories at Bounar Hissar and Lule Burgas the Bulgarian-Thracian army forced the Turks back by early November to the Chatalja lines outside Constantinople, having been content to contain Adrianople. Serbian and Montenegrin troops overran the Sanjak of Novibazar. The main Serbian forces won a great victory on 18 November to the north of Monastir and then pushed on towards the Adriatic, occupying Durazzo on 30 November. Montenegrin troops besieged Scutari. The Greeks invaded Epirus and on 10 November laid siege to Janina. On the eastern front Greek forces took Elassona (23 October) Kozani (25 October) and Katerina (28 October) and then having defeated the Turks at Janica on 8 November entered Thessaloniki only some hours before a force of Bulgarians.\textsuperscript{75}

The relative ease with which the Bulgarians overcame the main but highly disorganised Turkish forces\textsuperscript{77} was in the end to contribute to their undoing. These victories, which surprised them,\textsuperscript{78} led them to extend their lines of communications. The amazing thing is—so primitive was their transport system—that they managed to reach the Chatalja lines. Attacks made on these lines on 18 November failed completely and cholera began to take a greater toll of the Bulgarian troops than did Turkish gunnery, which was notoriously inefficient. By tying up her forces at Chatalja and Adrianople (areas in which it was unlikely that Russia would favour her expansion) Bulgaria deprived herself of any likelihood of dominating Ma-

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\textsuperscript{74} The declaration of war was to be presented next day and was to cite various grievances. The Porte forestalled the Serbian and Bulgarian ministers by handing them their passports. The Greek minister presented his declaration on 18 October. Turkey signed a preliminary peace with Italy on 15 October and the final Treaty of Lausanne on 18th October.

\textsuperscript{75} Vienna did not expect the Turks to win, but nevertheless believed that the war would not be a short one.

\textsuperscript{76} Dates are in the Gregorian Calendar. Greeks until 1924 followed the Julian.

\textsuperscript{77} The Turkish army containing many raw recruits and deprived of many of its best officers did not carry out Izzet Pasha's military plan which had been approved by the German military adviser, Goltz. Instead of remaining on the defensive, the Turks decided to exploit their quicker concentration and to take the offensive. Their plan was to knock out the Bulgarians and gain control of the Thessaloniki-Constantinople railway and of the harbour of Burgas. They would then meet the threat from Greece and Serbia.

\textsuperscript{78} At the time they were negotiating with the Russians for mediation.
This situation was later to be fully exploited by the Greeks and Serbians.

On 4 November the Turks requested the Powers to bring about an armistice. This request was passed on to the Balkan capitals some ten days later. In the meantime, however, Turkey herself had approached the Balkan powers who had agreed to conduct direct negotiations without the intervention of the European Powers. But it was not until 3 December that Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro signed an armistice. Into this arrangement Greece did not enter. As the Turks would not surrender Janina, she wanted to continue the siege of that town and she also wanted to maintain the war upon the sea. She did however send representatives to the Peace conference which began in London on 16 December.

In the meantime the European Powers were adjusting themselves to the new and unforeseen situation which had so rapidly developed. Instead of discussing how to enforce a status quo they began to consider the concessions which might be made to the Balkan powers in the event of a Turkish defeat. Even Austria-Hungary was willing to proceed upon these lines. She had refrained from intervention against the Serbians and Montenegrins. Berchtold was not the one to take the responsibility of forestalling and crushing Serbia. At an Austrian Foreign Office conference held in October it had been decided that the Sanjak was not worth a war and that the really vital area for Austria was the Eastern Adriatic. In other words, Albania was much more important than the Sanjak. Nevertheless

79. King Ferdinand was itching to have a Te Deum sung in Sophia. He probably calculated on Austrian diplomacy or military action to contain Serbia.

80. Berchtold had refrained from occupying the Sanjak as such a move might bring Austria into conflict with Russia, who had carried out (probably as a matter of routine) trial mobilisation on 30 September. He worked on the assumption that Russia, particularly in view of her ties with England and France, would help to maintain a status quo. If Austria were to enter the Sanjak, then it were better she should go as the mandatory of the Powers than on her own account. No doubt, too, Berchtold kept in mind the Austro-Italian agreement of December 1909, which was that Austria should not occupy the Sanjak without first agreeing on some compensation for Italy. In any case Berchtold had no ultimate intention of preventing all natural development in the Balkans. Like Aehrenthal, whose policy he took over, he was quite content for Austria to have a voice in the final settlement in which she would favour Bulgaria and Roumania at the expense of Serbia. The mere threat of an Austrian occupation of the Sanjak (which neither Aehrenthal nor Berchtold attempted to deny) was more useful than the actual occupation. Berchtold also assumed that neither Germany nor Italy would support a vigorous Austrian policy. Where Germany was concerned this assumption was wrong. What worried Berlin was the fear that the political leadership of the Triple Alliance might be transferred
Berchtold seems to have had no fixed ideas concerning his Albanian policy. His whole policy was one of caution of waiting for the Balkan alliance to disintegrate, of eventually establishing good relations with Bulgaria, and of reconciling her with Roumania. Russia, too, acted with great circumspection. Sazonov welcomed the armistice, for the last thing he wanted was a Bulgarian entry into Constantinople. In fact, Russia clung longer to the idea of restoring the status quo than did Austria.

On 30 October Berchtold submitted to Berlin a statement of Austria's views. This statement was subsequently submitted to Rome and Bucharest (3 November) and later to the Entente capitals (4 November). An Albania capable of an independent existence should be established. Serbia should be denied expansion to the Adriatic but nevertheless along with Montenegro should enjoy an increase in territory provided they would enter into an economic union with Austria and pursue a friendly policy towards her. Rumania should have adequate compensation. Thessaloniki should become a free port and Austria should enjoy free trade in former Turkish territories.

This attempt to deny a port to Serbia was strongly opposed by Sazonov and it was not long before extreme tension arose between Russia and Austria who both began to increase their forces. Owing however to the intervention of Kiderlen, Poincaré and Grey, the storm blew over. Austria and Italy accepted a plan for providing Serbia with a commercial outlet to the Sea and Russia called off her plans to mobilise. Austria also offered to support Serbian claims to the whole Vardar valley including Thessaloniki in return for Serbia's abandoning her pretensions to the

to Vienna. The Germans rightly demanded that they should be kept informed and they took great pains to find out what Austria really wanted.

81. In November Danev attempted to enlist Austrian support for a speedy conclusion of peace. He also discussed with Berchtold at Budapest the Roumanian-Bulgarian difficulties. Berchtold then sent Conrad on a special mission to Bucharest.

82. He would probably have preferred a Turkish victory, for it was easier to stop the Turks than to restrain the Balkan Allies.

83. This even ruled out a Serbian corridor to the Sea. Austria feared that a Serbian port might become a Russian one; and that Italy would then leave the Triple Alliance and co-operate with Serbia. Italy however supported Austria in denying to Serbia a port: for Italy feared that a Serbian port could easily become an Austrian one. In the event of an Austro-Russian conflict, it is most unlikely that Italy would have gone to the help of Austria. No Italian government could have led the country into such an adventure. Italy's agreements with Austria concerning Albania did not pledge Rome to give Vienna military support.

84. The offer had the approval of Italy who had even suggested it. Italy had
Adriatic coast. By such means, as also by the offer of a customs union, Berchtold hoped to divide the Balkan allies and to bring Serbia within the Austrian orbit. Pašić however fully realised that Serbia would never get Thessaloniki and that to accept Austria's offer would dissolve prematurely the Balkan Alliance. In any case, he did not want Serbia to become too dependent economically upon Austria.

Although the Serbian opposition had been encouraged by Hartwig at Belgrade, Sazonov himself was not prepared to go to extremes in supporting Serbia. He instructed Hartwig to inform Pašić that no support could be expected from Russia for the acquisition by Serbia of an Adriatic seaport; that Austria was opposed to this expansion and so were Germany and Italy; and that France and England were not prepared to let this matter be an issue between themselves and the Central Power. This last assertion was perhaps not absolutely true, although at least it was a fair construction to put upon the evasive pronouncements which Sazonov had received from Paris and London. Poincaré, however, subsequently complained that Russia too freely explained away her lack of support for the Balkan states by citing French and English caution. France in particular found with Russia the same kind of difficulty which Germany experienced with Austria: neither Russia nor Austria would state clearly and stead-

alternatively proposed that Serbia should have access to the sea at San Giovani or Alessio in Montenegrin territory.

85. As a fact, France had been made the scapegoat at Belgrade in 1908.

86. On 4 November Poincaré had written to Isvolsky: "I desire to know if the Imperial Government is, like us, strictly hostile to all annexation of Ottoman territory by a great power, and if it will be disposed to examine with France, as well as with England, how this danger should be met." Isvolsky saw that this move was based upon a new interpretation of the Franco-Russian alliance. Indeed, throughout the Balkan crisis there took place clarifications of the relationships of the Entente Powers. France revealed to Russia the Franco-Italian accord of 1902 and in return Russia disclosed to France the Racconigi Agreement. Great Britain attempted to reach understanding with Italy. Already Poincaré had informed Sazonov that though there was no treaty between France and England, yet England had given a pledge to aid France should Germany attack her: and he had also informed Isvolsky of the Franco-British naval arrangement by which the French North Sea and Channel Fleet was to be transferred to the Mediterranean while the main English naval forces were to remain in home waters. He had advised Sazonov to concert naval measures with England. Sazonov, however, was more interested in the English attitude to an Austrian war against Serbia. Grey's reply was that all depended on the "contingency", adding that the matter of a Serbian port was not a satisfactory one. Sazonov therefore had some reason to be cautious. On the other hand, Grey was more forthcoming to France, for, although in the exchange of cor-
fastly pursue their interests. France began to fear that Russia's moderation
(in face of Austria's mobilisation in Galicia) was likely to cause a decline
in the prestige and deterrent power of the Entente. Similarly there was a
feeling in Berlin that Austrian vacillation might seriously weaken the Triple
Alliance or that her concessions might eventually lead to Germany's having
to fight alongside a weakened Austria in the event of a general war.87

The outcome of the discussions among the Great Powers was the
decision to hold a conference in London and to reserve for their own
consideration the problems of Albania, Adrianople and Constantinople,
Mount Athos, the frontier of Roumania, and the Aegean Islands.88 This
conference opened on 12 December. There were, then, two conferences in
London, for, as we have seen, the Balkan Powers had sent representatives
to London for a conference, which began its sessions at St. James's Palace
on 16 December. At the time that these two conferences met the situa-
tion was still highly critical. Austrian and Russian military preparations had
not been slackened.89 Austria still refused to allow Serbia a port and to let
Scutari go to Montenegro. Serbia had refused to accept the compromise
of a commercial outlet90 and Montenegro continued to besiege Scutari.

Upon the London negotiations Sir Edward Grey exercised a mod-
erating influence. He persuaded Sazonov to accept the principle that Serbia
should be content with gains in the Sanjak91 and with a commercial out-

87. During the Balkan crisis the Triple Alliance, like the Entente, took stock
of its position and in December 1912 the Treaty of Triple Alliance was renewed.
In November the Austrian Chief of Staff visited Molke at Berlin. Molke gave Sche-
man to understand that if France mobilised then Germany would automatically do
so also. Hollweg's declaration in the Reichstag on 2 December made a clear assu-
rance to Austria of German support.

Treaties of defensive alliance suffer from two inter-related difficulties: either
the one party acts too vigorously and has to be restrained; or it displays excessive
timidity and reduces the value of the alliance for the other party.

88. This agenda had been suggested by Kiderlen on 18 November. The original
idea was to hold the Conference in Paris but the Central Powers preferred a con-
ference in London where Poincaré and Isvolsky would be less influential. Austria
attempted, but without success, to have Roumania admitted to the conference.

89. Austria had called to the colours 224,000 men and Russia 350,000. Conrad
had on 12 December become once again the Austrian Chief of Staff.

90. Pašič in the London Times of 25 November demanded for Serbia the
coastline Alessio-Durazzo which should be joined to Old Serbia by the area stretch-
ing between the lines Alessio-Djakova and Durazzo-Lake Ochrida.

91. Austria was prepared to let the Sanjak go to Serbia and Montenegro.
let in the Adriatic. The result was that the Conference decided that Serbia should be given a commercial outlet in an Albanian port which should be connected with Serbia by a railway under European control. The Conference also decided that an autonomous Albania should be established under the suzerainty of the Sultan and under the control and guarantee of the European powers. But the frontiers of Albania proved to be difficult to settle. Mensdorff, representing Austria, insisted on the principle, “Albania for the Albanians”, and claimed for Albania, Dibra, Djakova, Prizren, Ipek, Ochrida and Scutari. Later, however, Austria showed willingness to give away Ipek, Prizren and Ochrida, provided Russia would agree that Scutari went to Albania. Russia then demanded that Austria should renounce Djakova for Albania. As time went on Austria gave way on Dibra and the Reka valley and eventually (March 1913) she agreed that Djakova should be left outside Albania, provided Scutari should be included.

But the trouble was that Scutari was still besieged by the Montenegrins who, assisted by the Serbians, were unwilling to cede it to Albania. Austria, having given way on so many points, counted upon the action of the powers to compel the Montenegrins to renounce Scutari. But as this move was not forthcoming, Austria threatened separate action and the danger of war with Russia was only averted by a conference decision of 28 March 1913 to stage a naval demonstration. The Montenegrins still refused

92. France had given Russia less moderate advice. France took the view that, if war were inevitable, it were better it came soon and on a Balkan issue. On any other issue (as the Morocco crisis had shown) Russia was unlikely to give adequate support to France.

93. The Austrian interests in a large Albania were religious, economic and strategic. Certain Austrians however favoured a policy of saturating Montenegro with Albanians so as to detach her from Serbia.

94. All this time Germany, who normally complained of Austrian weakness, considered that Austria was too unyielding on lesser issues. Germany feared being dragged into war under unfavourable conditions, that is to say when the Balkan powers were inclined towards the Entente. Molke gave Conrad sound advice which was prophetic: Austria should wait until Bulgaria and Serbia quarrelled over the booty (Macedonia) and then align with Bulgaria. Molke's words were in accordance with the views of Kiderlen. But after Kiderlen's death (30 December 1912) Germany's policy changed. Kiderlen, who little favoured Roumanian claims, was ready to offer Thessaloniki to Bulgaria in order to break the Balkan alliance. Hollweg, however, thought that if Bulgaria obtained Adrianople, then Roumania should have Silistria. By March 1913 the Kaiser was advocating an Austrian-Serbian-Roumanian-Greek alignment which even Turkey might join.

95. The naval demonstration was the subject of much discussion among the Entente Powers. France was not anxious for it until she were given Russian authorisation.
to give way and there was a danger that Austria and Italy would take independent action. This danger became all the greater when on 23/24 April the Turkish Governor of Scutari, Essad Pasha, surrendered to the Montenegrins. Austria again threatened action and made further military preparations. Germany was ready to support her but Italy, by offering to undertake a perfectly useless action at Valona, was evasive. Italy's action caused Austria to hesitate. Meanwhile the King of Montenegro, under admonitions from Russia and hopes of financial assistance, agreed to evacuate the city. Hence for the moment the war clouds rolled away.

IV

On the other questions before the Conference the Great Powers made little headway, for everything depended upon the terms of peace to be agreed between Turkey and the Balkan states at St. James's Palace. The Allies were demanding the cession of Adrianople and the Aegean Islands; but the Turks refused to give way and on 6 January 1913 negotiations were suspended. Russia had already urged the Turks to climb down, saying that she herself could not guarantee to remain neutral if the war continued. The French proposed a naval demonstration, but to this Germany and Great Britain were opposed. On 17 January, however, after overcoming many difficulties, the Powers presented a Note to the Porte. They reminded the Turks that Constantinople and the Asiatic provinces were in jeopardy: and then went on to offer that, if the Porte accepted the demands of the Allies, they themselves would guarantee Moslem interests in Adrianople and ensure that the Islands did not constitute a threat to Asiatic Turkey. On 22 January 1913 a Turkish Grand Council decided on peace, but the following day, as a result of a coup d'état, the Young Turks, who had fallen in July 1912, returned to office and it was they who on 30 January 1913 answered the Note of the European Powers. They were prepared to cede a part of Adrianople: they would agree to place the Islands at the disposal of the Powers, on condition that they should not go

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96. He may have been bribed: but he would probably have had to surrender sooner or later.
97. She interpreted Article VII of the Triple Alliance as giving her a right to compensations and to "parallel" action to forestall the Greeks at Valona.
98. There was some discussion of the Aegean Islands. Russia favoured that they went to Greece, except for the four near the Dardanelles. It was the general opinion that these four islands should be neutralised.
99. The German view was that there was no objection to Bulgaria's acquisition of Adrianople, provided she could win it by herself.
to Greece. For some time the Balkan powers had contemplated breaking the armistice, and they now decided to resume hostilities on 3 February. Bulgaria, finding her position at Chatalja most unfavourable, concentrated on taking Adrianople. The Greeks, who had already seized control of the Aegean, renewed attacks on Janina and occupied further parts of Epirus. The Serbians, having little else to do, sent help to the Bulgarians at Adrianople and to the Montenegrins at Scutari.

This resumption of hostilities interrupted the Roumanian-Bulgarian negotiations which had been going on in London. These were concerned with the problem of the Roumanian frontier. The Entente, like the Central powers, but for different reasons, had been anxious to reconcile Bulgaria with Roumania. Roumania had threatened to seize Silistria but Austria and Germany had held her back. On 8 January 1913, Danev, under strong pressure from the Entente Powers had offered: ecclesiastical and educational autonomy to the Koutso-Vlachs in Macedonia; the dismantling of Silistria; the cession of twenty villages; and a guarantee of the Dobrudja. Roumania, however, demanded the Turtukaia-Balchik line for her frontier. These negotiations were resumed in Sofia in February; but in spite of further pressure from the Entente powers, Bulgaria refused concessions. She did nevertheless agree to accept the mediation of the Ambassadors at St. Petersburg. Before the conference met Bulgaria had captured Adrianople (26 March) and had become even less yielding. Eventually however (8 May 1913) it was agreed that Silistria should go to Roumania.101

Meanwhile the European Powers, who had taken on the task of arranging peace with Turkey presented on 22 March to the Balkan courts the peace preliminaries upon which they themselves had agreed. All Turkish territories (except Albania) west of the Enos-Maritsa-Ergene-Midia line were to be ceded to the Allies; the Aegean islands were to be at the disposal of the powers, Turkey was to renounce her interest in Crete, no war indemnity was to be demanded from Turkey, but the Balkan powers were to have a voice in the discussions of the international Commission for the regulation of the Ottoman debt. These terms were presented to Constan-

100. The Central Powers hoped to disrupt the Balkan Alliance: the Entente Powers had hopes of detaching Roumania from the Central Powers or at least of saving Bulgaria from the folly of failing to pay a price to Bucharest.

101. Berchtold was still trying to compensate Bulgaria by giving her Thessaloniki, to which he was prepared to add Thassos, Samothrace, and some Black Sea territory. Delcassé saw that this would only give rise to a more serious Greco-Bulgarian conflict.
tinople on 31 March and were immediately accepted. Not until 21 April did the Balkan Powers give a qualified acceptance of these terms; it was not until the middle of May that their delegates reached the conference; and it was not until Grey had made a threat to wind up the conference that the preliminaries were finally signed on 30 May 1913. The Ambassadorsial Conference then attempted to deal with the problems reserved for its decisions. These were: the Government of Albania; the Albanian southern boundary; and the Aegean Islands. On all these issues the Triple Alliance failed to speak with one voice. After much opposition from Germany, the Prince of Wied was nominated Prince Elect of Albania. Germany supported Greece in the matter of the Southern boundary, favouring a northerly line starting at Cape Kephali; Italy favoured a more southerly boundary beginning at the mouth of the Kalamas; and Austria attempted to make a compromise. Italy, however, was prepared to let Greece have the region of the Pindus Wallachians, but Austria, in deference to Roumania, raised objections. Throughout, the whole boundary problem was bound up with the question of the Islands. Here Germany favoured Greece, but Italy did all she could to curtail Greek expansion in the Aegean. On 1 August Grey proposed that an international commission should delimit the southern boundaries of Albania, which should include Koritza, Stylos and Sasemo. He also proposed that Greece should have the predominantly Greek islands except Tenedos, Imbros and Thassos and that Italy should return to Turkey the islands she was holding, their disposal to be decided by the Powers. To this the French objected. They held that if Korytsa and Stylos went to Albania then the Italian-held islands

102. Bulgaria, unable to force the Chatalja lines, began direct negotiations with Turkey on 15 April for a suspension of hostilities.

103. Venizelos had insisted on discussing with the Powers the Albanian boundaries and the disposal of the Aegean Islands, both of which questions were vital to Greece.

104. The conference ended on 9 June, it having been agreed that the decisions were definitive though not necessarily complete.

105. Italy and Austria had prepared a scheme. This provided for (i) an independent neutralised state under a prince (ii) a gendarmerie under officers from the small European states (iii) an international commission to work out a judicial system. This scheme underwent much revision and decisions were not reached till the end of July.

106. Early in June, Greece and Serbia concluded separate negotiations with Turkey and even contemplated an alliance, which was favoured by Germany. Greece wanted Turkey to keep the Bulgarians occupied on the Chatalja line. All the time, she skilfully bid for support both from the Entente and from the Triple Alliance.
should go to Greece. But none of these matters was finally settled for on 11 August 1913 the London Conference was adjourned sine die.

V

By that time the Second Balkan War had been fought and the Balkan powers were making peace at Bucharest. As Molke and others had foreseen, Bulgaria and Serbia were likely to quarrel over the spoils. Serbia, having failed to gain a footing on the Adriatic, had, as early as 22 February 1913, demanded compensation in Macedonia and access to Thessaloniki through the Vardar Valley, complaining that Bulgaria had not assisted her, whereas she herself had sent 50,000 men to Adrianople. Greece, too, had a score to settle with Bulgaria. Indeed, while Bulgaria was occupied at Adrianople, the Greeks had assembled strong forces in Macedonia and they were bent on getting Serres, Drama and Kavala. With the Serbs they were secretly negotiating an alliance and they were in no haste to conclude peace. They had been quite willing to see Bulgaria weaken herself at Adrianople and the assistance which the Serbians gave in that region was by no means prompted by altruistic motives.

As early as January 1913 conversations had taken place at Thessaloniki between Crown Prince Alexander of Serbia and Prince Nicholas of Greece. Venizelos was in London and advised caution; but on his return to Greece he stopped in Belgrade for talks with Pašić. The outcome was an agreement (eventually signed on 4 May) to divide all territory west of the Vardar and to have a common frontier. The final form of treaty was signed on 1 June along with an additional declaration and military convention. The two Powers decided to divide Macedonia on the principle of effective occupation and to insist on their decision in the event of arbitration. They agreed on a common frontier running from Ochrida and passing south of Monastir to Ghevgheli. The Serbian-Bulgarian frontier was to run from Ghevgheli by way of the confluence of the Bojimia-Dere and then eastward to the old Bulgarian frontier. If arbitration on these

107. Even in January, Serbia had intimated that she required that a new frontier should be drawn. Her case (though not all the arguments she employed) was a very reasonable one and Bulgaria, in her own interests, should have given way.

108. The Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Coromilas, who had a thorough understanding of the Macedonian question, managed to bring his influence to bear upon Greek policy. As Geshov points out he was powerfully assisted by Bulgarian jingoism, who declared against all efforts of the National Party in Bulgaria to come to terms with Greece. Coromilas saw that Russia did not favour a powerful Bulgaria.
lines should prove impossible the two powers were to assist each other with all their armed forces. In the event of victory, the two Powers would take more territory. Serbia was to have the region lying north and north-west of the Vardar-Perelik line and Greece was to take the area to the south and south-east. Serbia was to have a corridor to the sea. Each power was to win for itself the territories staked out.

Serbia and Greece had hoped to enlist the support of Roumania, who, despite the award of Silistria by the Ambassadors of St. Petersburg on 8 May 1913, was not fully reconciled to Bulgaria. Roumania however preferred to retain a free hand.\(^{109}\) Hence when at the end of May Austria (through Germany) made yet another attempt to win over Roumania she met with no success, having failed to make a really adequate offer. In the end, Roumania was to throw in her weight on the side of Greece and Serbia. Throughout the whole Balkan crisis she had held a key position, which she exploited with considerable skill. Among the many causes of Bulgaria's undoing was her failure to make adequate concessions to Bucharest. Even Geshov, who throughout followed a relatively realistic and moderate policy,\(^{110}\) miscalculated on the attitude of Roumania. So convinced was he that Russia would arbitrate between Serbia and Bulgaria and that the Entente would smooth out the difficulties between Bulgaria and Greece, that he never saw the need of paying a price to Roumania.

The whole procedure of arbitration provided for in the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty was a failure from the start. It was indeed only a device to obtain the blessing of Russia and to postpone contentious problems. No such machinery was provided in the Greek-Bulgarian agreement and this omission may have contributed to the failure of the arbitration envisaged in the Serbo-Bulgarian arrangement. But the main causes of that failure lay in the general character of the Balkan War. This war was fought in

\(^{109}\) Approaches to Roumania began in March 1913. Maiorescu's view expressed in a Memorandum of 19 April 1913 to King Carol was that "all negotiations for an alliance with us might only render the Bulgarians more conciliatory towards the claims of the Greeks and the Serbians and help to consolidate their alliance, to the detriment of Roumania." The Greeks in pressing for alliance with Roumania intimated that Turkey might be prepared to join it.

\(^{110}\) Geshov, having accepted the compromise of a small autonomous Macedonia which at the same time was to be a contested zone, was from the beginning in an extremely weak position. On the other hand, he was opposed to the attack on Chatalja and to all idea of pushing on to Constantinople. He was also opposed to the resumption of hostilities in February 1913. But he was no match either for the politicians in his own country or for those in the Balkans at large. He resigned office on 30 May 1913.
defiance of the Powers, even of Russia, and it was to be expected that the Balkan States would submit only to the minimum degree of European control and would utilise the rivalries of Europe each to its own advantage. At no point was Russia able to exercise powers of arbitration: she could indeed call attention to those rights accorded in the Treaty; but in point of fact she could work only as a member of the Entente within a much divided European concert.

Moreover the delay in making peace with Turkey (this delay was certainly designed by Greece and Serbia) reduced considerably the chances of referring disputes to arbitration. According to the Secret Annex to the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty there was no need to make a final partition of territory until "within a period of three months after the restoration of peace". On the other hand it was stipulated that the division of the spoils could "take place immediately". It was perfectly clear however that any Serbian-Bulgarian agreement would depend on a Bulgarian-Greek agreement, but this in turn depended on the peace terms with Turkey and on the various territorial problems which the Great Powers had reserved for their own decisions. Bulgarian-Greek discussions began as early as October 1912111 and were taken up again from time to time; but without result. Meanwhile from December 1912 onwards, Russia frequently advised Bulgaria and Serbia to reach agreement and at length on 30 April 1913, when the situation in Macedonia had become highly critical, reminded those two powers of their obligation to refer disputes to the Tsar’s arbitration. Both gave in effect a qualified agreement to arbitrate, Bulgaria insisting that the Treaty should be carried out to the letter, and Serbia insisting on a revision of its terms. Pašić virtually insisted that "amicable" revision should take place before arbitration in order to make clear the character of the dispute which had arisen and to facilitate the task of arbitration. On 21 June 1913, Hartwig, confessing his failure to persuade the Serbian government to accept Russian arbitration without reservations, wrote: "The general impression here is that [Russia wants] to force Serbia to accept all demands of Bulgaria". That same day however Sazonov invited Danev112 and Pašić to submit their cases within four days. He was hoping to hold a conference of the Balkan prime ministers at St. Petersburg.119

111. Coromilas claimed a population of 2,000,000 in Macedonia, leaving Bulgaria some 1,300,000 souls.
112. He had replaced Geshov.
113. Venizelos was prepared to go if the other ministers consented. Danev, however, was not so sure that Pašić had agreed to arbitration. Pašić had, in fact,
Meanwhile Savov, the Bulgarian Commander-in-chief, was clamouring to occupy territories ceded by Serbia in the Treaty. He was aware of the Greek-Serbian partition treaty and he wanted to move his restless troops to advantageous positions. Danev saw that war was inevitable and that if he went to St. Petersburg, Bulgaria would lose, both to the Greeks and to the Serbians. With Ferdinand's agreement he therefore, while expressing willingness to go to St. Petersburg, called on Russia to make within seven days an arbitral award on the basis of the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty. This peremptory action brought upon Bulgaria the wrath of Sazonov: "... You are acting on the advice of Austria... Do not expect anything from us, and forget the existence of any of our engagements from 1902 until today".

On 28 June Savov ordered an attack for the following day upon the Serbian and Greek positions. This order had been approved by King Ferdinand, who, among other calculations, reckoned on Austria's coming to the assistance of Bulgaria. If Conrad, the Austrian Chief of Staff, had agreed only to a "free arbitration" and not to arbitration confined to the "disputed" zone of Macedonia.

114. Savov originated this idea.
115. The Russo-Bulgarian military agreement. See above, note 43.
116. Danev must have known if it. Danev indeed hoped that the attack would hasten a Russian arbitral award in favour of Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Cabinet had no knowledge of the order and forced Danev to countermand it, but Dobrovich, the confidant of King Ferdinand, gave to Savov an order to continue. Savov asked Danev for instructions to proceed since the Serbians continued operations. Danev tried to make Savov resume fighting on his own responsibility. This Savov refused to do and on 3 July the King replaced him by Dimitriev. The Bulgarian Cabinet appealed to Russia to restrain the Greeks and Serbians, but these two powers ignored Sazonov's advice. Ferdinand, it would seem, like Danev, was greatly influenced by the Bulgarian Macedonian organisations, which had threatened him with assassination. Failing to realise that Russian policy was hostile to Bulgaria, Ferdinand, Danev and Savov all calculated that a military incident would force Russia to give a favourable arbitral award. Here they erred not only in their political but also in their military judgement. They underrated the ability of the Greeks and Serbians to move rapidly to the offensive.

117. He told Savov that the first shots would bring Austrian troops across the Danube. Ferdinand was never the master of his own house and he could never control Bulgarian policy to bring it into line with his own ideas. According to a letter which Jovan Jovanović wrote to the historian Albertini (op. cit. p. 460, note 4) Ferdinand confessed to having communicated in July 1912 a plan to Vienna according to which Bulgaria, having made use of Russia to obtain an alliance with Serbia and Greece, would overcome Turkey, then annihilate Serbia with the help of Austria-Hungary, and finally vanquish Greece. He is said to have admitted in July
had his way, all might have been well; but Berchtold and the Austrian Emperor were not convinced that a large Bulgaria was to Austria’s advantage.¹¹⁸ In any case, they were not certain that Bulgaria would win; but, if she won, then Russia would go to the help of Serbia. Hence once again, Austrian policy largely reduced itself to one of waiting upon events, but at the same time of preparing for possible contingencies.

Opposing any European declaration of non-intervention (this would only encourage the Balkan states to fight) and reckoning that in the event of war Bulgaria would be a match for Greece and Serbia, Berchtold again endeavoured to promote an understanding between Bulgaria and Roumania. As before, Austria would favour Sofia only if she herself aligned with Bucharest. But neither Austria, nor Germany, nor Italy, was prepared to exert pressure on Roumania; and when Danev made enquiries at Bucharest (June 1913) he received the usual answer—that the cost of Roumanian neutrality would be the Turkukaia-Balchik line.¹¹⁹ Later Ferdinand offered to Roumania, who had mobilised, the less favourable Turkukaia-Dobrich-Kavarna line, but this was refused. Danev again turned to Russia, but he met with no response.¹²⁰

VI

In the Second Balkan War the Greeks and Serbians quickly won success.¹²¹ On 1 July the Greeks overcame the Bulgarian garrison at Thessaloniki and then advanced to occupy Serres, Drama and Kavala. On 8 July, following their victory at Bregalnitsa, the Serbians entered Istip. Roumania, who had mobilised on 3 July, declared war one week later and on 11

¹¹³ that he signed the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement with the intention to tear it up. What Ferdinand failed to reckon on was Berchtold’s timidity and the reluctance of Bulgarian politicians to appease Roumania.

¹¹⁸ The Germans were inclined to agree with this. Jagow stated that Serbia was less of a danger to Austria than was “ruthless” Bulgaria, adding that Austria’s trade route to Salonika would be safer through Serbia and Greece, than through Bulgaria. Nevertheless Germany would have supported Austria in a war against Serbia. Italy, on the other hand, would probably not have supported Austria.

¹¹⁹ For that price Bulgaria could probably have bought Roumanian neutrality without Austrian assistance. Danev resigned on 2 July but Ferdinand pressed him to stay in office.

¹²⁰ It is not improbable that Roumania received encouragement from Russia and France to attack Bulgaria. At least they made no attempt to restrain her, for it was their policy to detach her from the Triple Alliance. There is no evidence on the other hand that Austria had encouraged Bulgaria to attack Serbia.

¹²¹ They formally declared war on 5 & 6 July.
July occupied the Dobrudja quadrilateral without opposition. The following
day the Turks entered the war and by 22 July had retaken Adrianople.

While these events were taking place, Russia made efforts to stop
the war. On 9 July Sazonov proposed an armistice which was to be fol­
lowed by a Balkan conference at St. Petersburg. But the Serbians and
Greeks, fearing Bulgarian perfidy, refused to go. In any case King Con­
stantine and his entourage were determined to get to Kavala, if not
beyond. King Ferdinand, who had counted on Austrian assistance, on 15
July replaced the pro-Russian Danev Ministry by the pro-Austrian Cabinet
under Radoslav with Genadiev as Foreign Minister and that same d i y ap­
pealed to Austria for help. But Austria (who all along had been counting
on Roumanian neutrality and Bulgarian military success) continued, in
spite of the new situation that had developed, to wait upon events and
advised Ferdinand to make a direct appeal to King Carol of Roumania.
Roumania promised to halt her advance. On 22 July Genadiev proposed
an Austrian - Roumanian - Bulgarian alliance, but to this proposal Austria
made no immediate response, being content merely to consult Germany
and Italy about this matter.

Meanwhile on 20 July Roumania had proposed to Bulgaria, Greece
and Serbia a general peace, but Greece and Serbia, although urged by
Vienna to cease hostilities, preferred to carry on. Greece was indeed pre­
pared to consider an armistice, but insisted that preliminaries should be
signed on the field of battle. Later Greece agreed to sign preliminaries at
Bucharest provided the armistice were signed at the same time. On 28
July representatives of Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria arrived at Bucharest.
At the first session of the Conference on 30 July they agreed upon a five-

122. Constantine had become King of the Hellenes following the assassina­
tion of King George at Thessaloniki on 18 March 1913. King George had refused to
leave Thessaloniki: he was determined to show to Europe and to Bulgaria that Greece
had legitimate rights in Macedonia. Shortly after his accession, he had become a
convert to the ‘Great Idea’ and no-one can deny that during his long reign of fifty
years he gave unselfish and loyal service to the Greek cause. His son Constantine
was less cautious and perhaps had less political insight; but to him must go the
chief credit for the success of Greece in the Second Balkan War.

123. The danger was then an armistice would allow the Bulgarian army to
concentrate against Greece. On this matter Constantine gave way to Venizelos and
accepted this compromise. In any case, King Peter of Serbia, who suspected Greek
designs, wanted to make peace as soon as possible. Austria and Russia had by now
arrived on common ground. Neither power wished to see Bulgaria drastically wea­
kened; and Russia in particular was alarmed at the Turkish success at Adrianople.
Moreover, Russian public opinion was more pro-Bulgarian than pro-Serbian.
day armistice. Greece and Serbia then put forward extensive claims, if only to have enough room to make concessions under pressure from the Great Powers, who were likely as signatories of the Treaty of Berlin to claim the right to "revise" decisions made at Bucharest. Serbia claimed the Strouma frontier but finally accepted the frontier on the watershed of that river, thus leaving the Stroumitsa area to Bulgaria. She insisted however on Kotchana and Istip. Greece claimed the Aegean coast and an ample hinterland as far as Makri, thus leaving Bulgaria some twenty-five miles of coast line. The real trouble arose over Kavala, which under pressure from the Powers, Venizelos was prepared to surrender. Austria and Roumania favoured its going to Bulgaria, but France and Germany, each wishing to earn Greek friendship, favoured that Kavala should go to Greece. German support for Greece indeed cut across the Austrian policy of cultivating the friendship of her "natural ally" Bulgaria. From the Austrian point of view Greece was a liability rather than an asset to the Triple Alliance: it would be difficult to protect her coast from the navies of the Entente Powers; she was unlikely to support Austria in a conflict with Serbia, and Greek aspirations in general (above all Greek dreams of Asia Minor and the more immediate designs in Epirus) were either of no interest to or even in definite conflict with the true interests of the Triple Alliance.

The Treaty of Bucharest (10 August 1913) was brief: to it was annexed three protocols on boundaries. Roumania was to have the Turkukaia-Balchik line. Serbia was to have the Vardar valley north of and including Ghevgheli with Istip and Kotchana but not the corridor to the Aegean which had been mentioned in her negotiations with Greece. Greece was to have Crete, Kavala, and the boundary running from just north of Koritsa, between Monastir and Florina, to Doiran, south of Strumitsa, Petrich and Nevrokop to the mouth of the Mesta, approximately parallel to

124. Austria had hopes of a "revisionary" conference, but Germany gave little or no support to this idea. This point is discussed below.

125. Austria wanted these areas to go to Bulgaria. She also wanted Bulgaria to get territory on the right bank of the Vardar; but this, in view of the military situation, was patently absurd.

126. Germany put pressure on King Carol who then worked for the award of Kavala to Greece. Russia could not look favourably upon this award: she feared that Greece would become too powerful in the Aegean. Austria had agreed with Russia, without consulting Germany, that Kavala should go to Bulgaria. The Austrian view was that the Balkan policy of the Triple Alliance was the concern of Rome and Vienna.
the north Aegean coast. Mixed commissions were to delimit the frontiers.  

Bulgaria had thus signed away the major part of Macedonia to Greece and Serbia. She had done this in the hopes (raised by Austria and Russia) that the Treaty would be revised by the Great Powers in conference. The idea of revision had been proposed by Grey as early as 21 July before the peace-making began, but France and Germany eventually opposed this move and England and Italy could accept the principle of revision only if it were unanimously agreed. Serbia, Greece and Roumania strongly opposed revision but Bulgaria made a declaration to the effect that she hoped the Powers would improve her position. In the end Russia accepted the principle of non-revision and Austria, having no support from Italy and Germany, could not insist.

Austria had retreated all along the line and it was not until the Albanian frontier question arose again that she took a firm stand. The Serbians still continued, on the grounds of strategic necessity, to occupy areas assigned to Albania. Claiming that the Austrians, Bulgarians and Turks were stirring up trouble in Albania, the Serbians, who were doing the same thing themselves, were demanding boundary rectifications and a government in Albania friendly to Serbia.  

On 4 September Austria called for a collective dénonciation by the Powers at Belgrade but in this Russia refused to join. Early in October, the Serbians occupied further Albanian

127. The Greek demand for an indemnity was rejected, as was also the Bulgarian demand for the autonomy of religious communities in newly-acquired territories, it being accepted that the Greek and Serbian constitutions provided for religious and educational freedom. On the other hand an exchange of notes between Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece on the one hand and Roumania on the other established the autonomy of Koutso-Vlach schools and churches and the right of the Roumanian Government to subsidise them.

128. Maiorescu, President of the Conference, stated that this declaration "could neither weaken nor invalidate in any way whatever the juridicial value of the Treaty". The declaration was not annexed as a protocol to the Treaty. Bulgaria therefore had no legal basis for any claim for revision.

129. England formally recognised the settlement of Bucharest in the Spring of 1914: but none of the other powers ever gave formal recognition.

130. Albanians, cut off from their markets by the award of Ipek, Prizrend, Dibra and Djakova to Serbia, had invaded Dibra. The Serbians had therefore entered Albania. Austria feared a threat to Durazzo.

131. For example, Essad Pasha, who, for a price, was likely to make concessions.

132. An earlier demarche, instigated by Grey, had been made on 17 August. Pašić frequently stated the intention to withdraw Serbian troops but always found good excuses for not doing so or for not being able to do so.
townships. Russia took the view that the Powers were responsible for order in Albania and that, if they failed to maintain it, then Serbians must take action themselves. On 14 October Austria sent a warning to Belgrade and demanded explanations. Of this Berchtold informed the Powers. Pašić replied that the Serbian forces had been ordered to halt but that actual withdrawal would depend on circumstances in Albania. On 17 October Berchtold sent a verbal note to Belgrade which was presented the following day and which stated that under no circumstances could Austria-Hungary consent to the modification of the international decision on the confines of Albania: the Serbian troops must be withdrawn within eight days, or otherwise Austria would find it necessary to have recourse to appropriate means to assure the realisation of her demand.\textsuperscript{133} The Serbians, under pressure from Hartwig, immediately gave way and by 25 October had withdrawn their troops to the line fixed by the London Conference;\textsuperscript{134} and although there were protests from London, Paris and St. Petersburg, no attempt was made either to support Serbia or to encourage her to resist. Indeed Sazonov was glad to be relieved of the responsibility of supporting Serbia at this juncture.

After the capitulation of Serbia, Austria began to fear the revival of the Balkan League, which now that Turkey had been removed from the European scene, might be aimed against Austria.\textsuperscript{136} Berchtold still hankered after a rapprochement with Bulgaria, but Germany had very little use for King Ferdinand and much preferred agreements with Rumania and Greece and, if possible, Serbia. Both policies were likely to encounter difficulties. In December 1913 at the Bulgarian elections, although the pro-Russian party was beaten, the pro-Austrian party was also reduced by the gains of the Socialist and Peasant parties. Bulgaria was now unlikely to align with Austria unless Austria could persuade Germany to allow Bulgaria to take Kavala from the Greeks.

Meanwhile following the Treaty of Bucharest, Austria (and indeed Russia, out of rivalry) had endeavoured to favour Bulgaria on the question

\textsuperscript{133} Germany, but not Italy, was informed of this ultimatum. Germany approved of it. Italy disliked it. Conrad had pressed for war on Serbia but Tisza, while favouring the ultimatum, was against war.

\textsuperscript{134} Pašić, always under pressure from the organisation of the \textit{Black Hand}, welcomed to some extent the excuse to give way to \textit{force majeure}.

\textsuperscript{135} Roumania, even, might attempt to do something for the Transylvanian Roumanians under the rule of Hungary. Roumania had close relations with Serbia. The Austro-Roumanian-German-Italian defensive alliance of 1883 which was renewed in February 1913 was unknown to the Roumanian Parliament, which displayed friendship to the Serbians.
of the Bulgarian-Turkish frontier. Germany, on the other hand, favoured Turkey, to whom she wished to secure Adrianople. Attempts to deal with this problem on a collective basis broke down and the question became one for direct negotiations between Bulgaria and Turkey. Turkey was in a relatively strong position: and she was aware of the disunity of the Powers who were looking to the future and who realised the importance of Asiatic Turkey. Bulgaria was in a dilemma: with a disorganised army and no true friend, she must save as much of Thrace as possible and yet appease Turkey. Her one advantage was that Turkey needed Bulgarian friendship because of the growing threat from Greece. At length the two powers agreed (Treaty of Constantinople, 30 September 1913) on the boundary, Waritsa to Rezvoya, so drawn as to include Demololo, Adrianople and Kirk-Killise in Turkey.136

Parallel with the Bulgarian-Turkish negotiations ran the Greek-Turkish discussions. According to the Treaty of London of 30 May 1913, the Powers were to decide on the future of Aegean Islands—a problem which was still tied up with the question of the Southern Albanian frontier. In spite of counter moves from Austria and Italy, Germany did her utmost to reconcile Greece and Turkey. It was however Roumania who finally brought Greece and Turkey to the point of signing the Treaty of Athens of 14 November 1913. King Carol informed Constantinople and Athens that any Turkish-Bulgarian attack on Greece would result in Roumanian intervention. This Treaty merely re-established diplomatic and commercial relations.137 No decision was made with regard to the disposal of the Aegean Islands: it was merely agreed to maintain the position established by the Treaty of London.

All this time Greece continued to make representations to the frontier commission for the Albanian frontier. On this commission from which Greece was excluded, Austria, Germany and Italy as a rule worked together and so did France and Russia. The British representative frequently cooperated with his Austrian and Italian colleagues and was often hostile

136. Austria, facilitated these negotiations and she endeavoured, until rumours of a Greek-Serbian-Roumanian alliance caused Bulgaria to hesitate, to form a Bulgarian-Turkish military alliance. Germany tried to sabotage this policy by favouring an entente between Greece and Turkey.
137. A similar treaty was signed between Serbia and Turkey at Constantinople on 14 March 1914. This dealt with questions of nationality, schools, religious problems and economic matters. There was no treaty between Turkey and Montenegro but Montenegro signed an agreement with Serbia on 7 November 1913 concerning the division of the Sanjak and other territories.
to Greece. At length the Protocol of Florence (19 December 1913) fixed the frontier, Phtelia (near Stylos) to Lake Prespa, and awarded Koritsa and Argyrocastro to Albania.

Venizelos had pressed always for simultaneous decisions on the Islands and the Southern Albanian frontier. Grey had favoured this and on 12 December had drawn up a Memorandum which suggested that all the Islands, including those held by Italy but excluding Tenedos, Imbros and the Dodecanese should go to Greece. These last were to go to Turkey. The plan leaked out and caused a great outcry in Rome and in Constantinople. On 14 January, however, the Triple Alliance Powers accepted Grey's proposals in principle but ruled out all idea of "enforcing" the award or of expediting the Italian evacuation of the Dodecanese. The decision of the Powers was announced to Athens and Constantinople on 13/14 February 1914. It was stipulated that Greece should withdraw her troops from Southern Albania (Northern Epirus is the Greek designation) by 31 March: only when these troops had been withdrawn was she to get the Islands. These Islands she was not to fortify, and she was to prevent their use for smuggling. The Turks merely "took note" of the decision of the Powers. Greece agreed to evacuate Albania, but proposed boundary rectifications around Koritsa and the Argyrocastro valley. She requested a guarantee for the Islands which were not fortified; and she also demanded certain religious, property, and linguistic rights in the territories she was to abandon in Northern Epirus. On 28 February 1914 however Northern Epirus declared its independence and Venizelos ordered a blockade of Santi-Quaranta, thus forestalling possible Italian intervention. Greece eventually with drew her troops at the end of April, but irregular levies remained. Albania indeed was to see much fighting and disorder and many problems remained unsolved when the 1914-18 War broke out. Much the same is true of the Islands. The Turks held out for Chios and Mytilene and offered in exchange some of the as yet unreturned Dodecanese. War was on the point of breaking out, but Roumania and Serbia warned

138. She offered certain concessions on the coast and a sum of two and a half million francs.

139. The outcome was the Statute of Corfu, an arrangement between the Control Commission of Albania and the provisional Government of Northern Epirus. The provinces of Koritsa and Argyrocastro were given autonomy and Chimarra was granted its old "Turkish" privileges. This arrangement was sanctioned by the Powers in July 1914. The question of Northern Epirus was to come up at the Peace Conference of 1919 and before the League of Nations.

140. Venizelos was ready to cede those Islands in return for a mutual guarantee of possessions in the European mainland.
Greece that if she became involved in hostilities with Turkey they could not see their way to deal with a Bulgarian intervention. This problem, like many others arising out of the Balkan Wars — the questions of debts, contracts, financial claims and railway problems — all remained unsolved when the Sarajevo incident opened another chapter in European history and set going a chain of events in the somewhat different Europe which the Balkan Wars had created.

Turkey in Europe (the old terrain of Concert diplomacy141) had almost entirely disappeared, her place being taken by the much enlarged Balkan Powers143 with their increased potential military power, their increased freedom of action and their fierce national rivalries. After the Balkan Wars, the Austro-Hungarian Empire was more than ever exposed to danger and the great question was whether that Empire could so transform itself as to remove the danger or combat it in a Europe where other forces were at work and where undercurrents ran deep — Anglo-German naval rivalry, the Franco-German tension, the rival commercial interests in Asiatic Turkey, the sense of the inevitability of war, the fears, the armament race with all its complications giving rise to military calculations, and the

141. As a political and philosophical idea the European Concert seems never to have been adequately studied. As part of the mechanics of diplomacy it does indeed receive treatment in the numerous monographs on particular episodes in diplomatic history; but no one has adequately investigated its history as a whole, its place in international relations and the extent to which as a moral and legal idea it entered into the minds of those who formulated and executed national policies. Early in the nineteenth century an instrument of Austro-British collaboration, Concert diplomacy usually displayed and continued to display its greatest power on Near Eastern questions. The Crimean War largely resulted from a temporary breakdown in Concert diplomacy. During the Balkan Wars despite the closer alignments and more clear-cut divisions of the Great Powers, the European Concert was not without strength for Grey, Berchtold and even Sazonov, all in their various ways, believed in it as a legal and legitimate means of pursuing national interests and reconciling them with the needs of Europe and humanity. In much the same way they conceived of and worked for a balance of power.

142. Bulgaria had increased her area by about one-tenth but had added only some 120,000 souls to her population of 4.3 millions. Greece had increased her territory by about 68% and her population from approximately 2.7 to 4.4 millions. Her population was now roughly equivalent to that of Bulgaria. Serbia had almost doubled her territory and had increased her population from 2.9 to 4.5 millions. (Montenegro now had a population of 0.5 million and Albania 0.85 million). Roumania had received a small increase and her population was approximately 7.5 million.
diplomatic activity in the Balkans which continued unabated, for now more than ever the Balkan Balance of Power had to be related to that of Europe. Indeed Balkan diplomacy was to exert a profound influence upon the Great Powers when they themselves went to war and was to bedevil the relationships within the two opposite camps.143

Greece in particular had achieved considerable freedom of action, but the freedom to choose gave rise to political difficulties which were to endanger the whole structure of the state. Moreover Greece had acquired a large and not easily defended frontier in an area which had necessarily to be settled and organised as an integral part of the nation. One of her northern neighbours was hostile and would take the first opportunity to regain the territory she had fought for in vain. Another northern neighbour was friendly but was the foe of Austria. The third northern neighbour was hostile to Greece but friendly to Austria. The remaining neighbour, Turkey, was hostile to Greece, yet to some degree under the influence of Germany, who in turn was within limits, ready to advance Greek interests. Such was the confused and hazy vista from 1914-Athens. But in the end the old "Macedonian alignments" developed; and after a long and fierce struggle Greece assisted by her allies dealt the first knockout blow to the Central Powers in Macedonia, regained the territory she had fought for since 1904 and extended her boundaries into Eastern Thrace.

143. This topic is admirably dealt with by W. W. Gottlieb, Studies in Secret Diplomacy during the First World War, 1957.