reconstruction of the mainstays of the German socioeconomic order in the late 1870's in
the wake of the Great Depression which converted the agrarian interests to protection­
ism and led to the agrarian-industrial combination that lasted until the collapse of the
Reich. It is this combination, of course, which explains the new tariff policy. While com­
mercial considerations might not have been Bismarck’s foremost immediate motive for the
alliance, they cannot be dismissed as long term expansionist goals. To be sure, the author
does not disregard completely the new internal socioeconomic configurations, but he min­
imizes the importance of the economic factor in Bismarck’s foreign policy. I find this position
as much unconvincing as Professor Waller finds Böhme’s arguments. Admittedly, these
problems cannot be resolved easily, and the debate is bound to continue unabated.

In spite of points of disagreement on general interpretative issues, this is a very good
study of the period and a welcome contribution to our overall understanding of Bismarck’s
policy. The Bismarck that emerges from this study is hardly the master chess player, hardly
the man who was always in control of his policy. Certainly in his short term responses to
circumstances he was more successful than any of his contemporaries, but the test of foreign
policy is its long term consequences. Professor Waller’s study has effectively denuded the
Iron Chancellor of his formidable panoply.

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George Lenczowski, Soviet Advances in the Middle East, Washington, D. C., American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972, 176 pages, $ 4.00 (Paper).

George Lenczowski's volume is one of a series undertaken by the American Enterprise
Institute in an examination of issues raised by the deterioration of the position of the United
States in the Middle East. Indeed, Professor Lenczowski (University of California, Berke­
ley) has served as the director of the general project, which has included Howard Ellis’
Private Enterprise and Socialism in the Middle East (1970), Lee Preston’s Trade Patterns
in the Middle East (1970), Harry B. Ellis’ The Dilemma of Israel (1970), Richard H. Pfaff’s
Jerusalem: Keystone of an Arab-Israeli Settlement (1969), Ralph H. Magnus’ Documents
on the Middle East (1969), George Lenczowski’s United States Interests in the Middle East
(1968), and Majid Khadduri’s Major Middle Eastern Problems in International Law (1972).

These are all highly useful volumes, prepared by well-known scholars and writers.
The new contribution to the series is no exception. To the contrary, it is a well-grounded
study of a very important phenomenon on the Middle Eastern scene —one which requires
examination from many angles of approach, including the angle of the American interest
in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. The work begins with a consid­
eration of doctrinal foundations —a study of ideological elements which have entered into
the development of Soviet policy and interest in the Middle East—in which the contribu­
tions of Lenin and Stalin are elaborated and the developments in the post-Khrushchev
period. Professor Lenczowski then proceeds to examine the evolution of Soviet policy on
a country-by-country basis in the post-World War II period from 1945 down to date,
beginning with Iran and Turkey — along the so-called Northern Tier of the Middle East.
After that he goes into the Arab World, centering on Egypt, Syria and Iraq. He closes
with a discussion of Soviet arms and the military presence. Appendices include the Soviet-
Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 1971, a note on the tanker fleets of the Communist bloc in 1970, and a brief statistical summary concerning the transit of Soviet warships in the Turkish Straits. There are six black and white outline maps.

Readers of *Balkan Studies* will find of special interest the chapters devoted to Iran and Turkey (Chapters 2 and 3), and more especially the latter, which examines the Soviet designs on Turkey and the Turkish responses thereto during and immediately following World War II, when the USSR not only had very serious demands as to control of the Straits and territorial demands in the Kars-Ardahan area of Eastern Anatolia, especially, but sought to convert Turkey into a Soviet satellite. While Professor Lenczowski does not examine the contemporary situation in Greece or the Balkan area, in view of the limitations of his book, he does comment briefly on the Cyprus problem. The volume should serve very usefully as background for the more current developments in Soviet and American policy in the troubled Middle East. All serious students will welcome it as a sound, scholarly work, which throws light in dark corners.

*Bethesda, Maryland*

**Harry N. Howard**


Much has been written, over the years, concerning the processes of modernization in Turkey and even in the late Ottoman Empire. Much also has been written concerning the Turkish political elite, Frederick W. Frey's *The Turkish Political Elite* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1965) being the pioneer study of the select group of Turks who came to high political and administrative leadership in the Turkish Republic after World War I under Atatürk and İsmet İnönü. Those who studied that volume readily concluded with the author that Atatürk had brought with him the ablest body of modernizers then available in any «developing» country.

That conclusion is probably still valid, despite the persistent questions continually raised by the developments and events since 1950, when the Democratic Party broke the political monopoly of the Republican People's Party, transformed the Republic into a multi-party structure, and introduced a period, especially after 1960, of political uncertainty in the country. Turkey was acknowledged to be, not quite the full-fledged democratic political structure it seemed in 1950, but a developing country with many complicated problems.

Those who seek a more basic understanding of these developments will do well to consult *Managers of Modernization* by the Professors Leslie L. and Noralou P. Roos, of Northwestern University. The authors well point out that the Republic of Turkey inherited not only a strong bureaucratic tradition and structure from the Ottoman Empire, but the personnel who had staffed that structure. They treat of the administrative system in two political environments: 1) in the period prior to 1950 when the Republican People's Party held a monopoly of power and the Republic was dominated by an urban elite with strong official ties; 2) in the period after 1950, with the victory of the Democratic Party and the introduction of multi-party politics, when the Turkish Government became more responsive to local