Ratiu tells how Gheoghiu-Dej, founder of Romania’s monolithic Communist Party, forced through an industrialisation program, refusing to be swallowed by the Soviet bloc’s COMECON, and created, by this show of independence, an upsurge of nationalistic patriotism. But Ratiu challenges the view taken by many Western commentators that Dej shared these nationalistic feelings, and shows him as a dedicated Stalinist who merely exploited the natural response of a people who saw glimpses of their nation’s lost values.

Ratiu also does not attribute patriotic motives to Dej’s successor in 1965, Nicolae Ceausescu, who pursued the same independent line: trading with the West, criticising the invasion of Czechoslovakia and flirting with Peking.

Then gradually came the swing back to Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy with Ceausescu’s shock 1971 speech outlining the «mini-cultural revolution;» the gradual return to the Soviet orbit under the pressure of a conciliatory Brezhnev, and the eventual membership of the COMECON and the Warsaw Pact. But still the paradox exists: the links with the West persist, with approaches to GATT, to the Common Market, and even to the international Monetary Fund.

Ratiu offers an answer to this seeming contradiction: Moscow is not without benefit from the globe-trotting Ceausescu’s highly personalized dictatorship. But what of the future? He paints a vivid panorama of life under the privileged oligarchs: the shortages, the informers, and the frustrations. However, he also convincingly asserts the strength of the anti-communism of the Romanian people and the continued clinging to traditional values. Communists have not captured the spirit of the people, claims Ratiu. «They have created a moral crippled with a split personality».

The work is quite readable. That there are no supporting references and footnotes is no handicap to this excellent work, quite convincing with its details.

There is also a bibliography (pp. 131-133); it is actually the weakest part of Ratiu’s presentation, for several recent works, covering the same field, are not noted. (As a minor point: this reviewer’s book, Contemporary Romania and Her Problems, was not published by a «California University Press, 1932», but by the Stanford University Press, and reprinted in 1971 by Arno Press, New York).

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This is an excellent, brief study of the very critical period in the recent history of the Middle East and southeastern Europe, when World War I was coming to its end, the Ottoman Empire was cracking to its doom, and the Turkish Republic was aborning. Appropriately, the author, of Cypriot Turkish ethnic origin, begins his study with the Armistice of Mudros (October 30, 1918), the story of the conflicting claims against the crumbling Ottoman Empire, and the Greek invasion of Izmir and
its repercussions in May 1919. He lays the foundations of Turkish nationalist diplo­macy, during the period of May 1919-April 1920, in the earlier stages of the Greco-Turkish conflict, in the Congresses of Erzurum (July 1919) and Sivas (September 1919), dominated as they were by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

The primary aim of the Turkish Nationalists, as is now clear, was to establish an independent Turkish state and nation, with secure and solid foundations in the Anatolian plateau. After eleven years of war, beginning in 1912, the Turks won the military contest, and under the guidance of Mustafa Kemal the Nationalists were able to split the Western Allies and hold on to their ties with Soviet Russia. But diplomacy failed to solve the basic problem until military successes had been achieved as registered in the Armistice of Mudanya (October 11, 1922). At the Conference of Lausanne (November 1922-July 1923), the Turkish representatives—İşmet Pasha, without previous diplomatic experience—were able to achieve their fundamental aims—independence and territorial integrity, abolition of the capitulations, and to lay the foundations for the advent of the Republic, proclaimed on October 29, 1923. As Dr. Sonyel points out, nationalist foreign policy achieved a great, if not total, success. They destroyed «every vestige of ex-territorial and supra-national privileges hitherto enjoyed by the foreigners in Turkey in the form of the Capitulations, and secured in all the essentials complete independence, national sovereignty and territo­rial integrity», as postulated in the National Pact. «This magnificent achieve­ment» was primarily the work of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

Dr. Sonyel heads the Department of Social Sciences at Sedgehill School, London. This is his doctoral dissertation, written at the University of London, under the direction of Professors D. Dakin and Bernard Lewis. It is based primarily on English, Turkish and Greek sources, primary and secondary. Well-balanced and well written, based on sound research, Dr. Sonyel's work should be widely studied. It is a good illustration of the short-sighted folly of attempting to impose «solutions» on unwilling peoples, determined to resist. The book should be read along with a number of recent works dealing with similar themes in the same period, including Michael Llewellyn Smith's Ionian Vision: Greece in As­ia Minor, 1919-1922 (1973) and Paul C. Helmreich, From Paris to Sévres: The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Paris Peace Con­ference (1974). There is an excellent, brief bibliography of works in English, Greek and Turkish sources.

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*Harry N. Howard*


Written under a NATO grant and fellowship, *The Warrior Diplomats* is a com­prehensive study of the development, problems, national strategies and achieve­ments of the Turkish Republic since the collapse and partition of the Ottoman Em-