

publications. Although the name of Milovan Djilas appeared several times in this publication, there was no mention of Mihajlo Mihajlov, a distinguished literary specialist.

This publication is most useful for the appended chronology of literary events and the biographical notes. It does not, however, provide much valuable information in its theoretical part, which seems to be an interesting experiment centering around Marxist limitations in literature.

*The Hoover Institution,
Stanford University*

WILLIAM S. HEILIGER

Phyllis Auty - Richard Clogg (eds.), *British Policy Toward Wartime Resistance in Yugoslavia and Greece* [School of Slavonic and East European Studies University of London], The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1975, pp. 308.

In July 1973 the History Department of the School of Slavonic and East European Studies of the University of London sponsored a conference to reconsider official British attitudes toward the wartime resistance in Greece and Yugoslavia. The conference re-evaluated these attitudes in light of the official British records opened in January 1972 and the recollections of those who participated in formulating and executing official policy. As the editors point out in the preface, the volume, which is based on material delivered at the conference, concentrates on the year 1943 and is not a systematic analysis of British Balkan policy. There is neither an attempt to give a coherent view of events inside Yugoslavia and Greece nor extended coverage of Britain's relations with the exiled governments. The editors' aim is to «elucidate a substantial number of points that are unclear in previously published accounts» by examining the declassified records of the Foreign Office, War Cabinet, and Chiefs of Staffs, which include Special Operations Executive (S.O.E.) papers passed to these agencies. They have the official histories in mind here. The editors are modest, however, for the volume does more than that, especially in regard to the Greek resistance. The book destroys the speculative hypotheses on the conspiratorial character of British policy as found in the works of André Kédros, Dominique Eudes, and Heinz Richter.

The book is divided into two unequal parts, the first of which is longer and consists of seven papers. Part two presents a discussion of the papers by the twenty-one participants. Bickam Sweet-Escott begins the first part with an informative survey of S.O.E. organization and policy regarding the Balkans, and in arguing that the confusion in British policy resulted from «the conflict between the government's short-term military aims and its long-term political needs» states the theme that unites the volume. This view is not new but the richness of detail revealing the decision making process at work is. Elisabeth Barker illuminates this process as she traces the conflicting shifts and turns among individuals as well as departments in London's

search for a viable Yugoslav policy, S.W. Bailey gives a useful account of his mission to Mihailovic, but scholars will prefer to rely on Jozo Tomasevich's recent exhaustive study of the Chetniks. F.W. Deakin surveys Allied Mediterranean strategy which serves as background material.

In his paper entitled «'Pearls from Swine': The Foreign Office Papers, S.O.E., and the Greek Resistance», Richard Clogg makes a signal contribution. The phrase is taken from British ambassador Reginald Leeper who used it in reference to S.O.E. reports and staff. Leeper's hostile view of S.O.E. was shared by his superiors in London. Clogg is critical of Leeper's handling of the Greek andarte mission to Cairo in August 1943 and rehabilitates Brigadier E.C.W. Myers role in Anglo-Greek affairs. In a separate paper, Myers updates his own position with the aid of the new documents. C. M. Woodhouse clarifies the debate within the Greek Communist Party over the size and role of the andarte army and details the deterioration between London and the resistance in the summer of 1943. The general thrust of the papers by Clogg, Myers, and Woodhouse is revisionist and suggests the good relations between Britain and the Greek resistance would have continued but for the Foreign Office's insistent support for the Greek monarchy, made this impossible. Agreement on a coalition government in August 1943 may have prevented December 1944. In Clogg's view this move would have at least put Britain in a stronger moral position.

Valuable contributions are made in part two but lack of space and the large number of discussants prevents naming all of them. Special note, however, should be made of the statements by Sir Fitzroy Maclean, George Taylor, and the «Afterward» by H. Seton-Watson. Taylor, who was Chief of Staff of S.O.E. London, raises more questions than he answers in his all too brief but tantalizing remarks on London and Cairo's use of high level German «wireless intercepts».

Though limited for the most part to the years up to 1943, the volume's skillful blending of professional historians working with recollections of those directly involved in the events goes far to advance our understanding of this period. In spite of the book's high cost, professional libraries will want to include it in their collections.

The College of Wooster

JOHN L. HONDROS

Sharon Zukin, *Beyond Marx and Tito: Theory and Practice in Yugoslav Socialism*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975, pp. 302.

Professor Zukin has written a notable work about contemporary Yugoslavia. Combining political science with sociology she analyzes her subject with admirable thoroughness and skill. Beginning with an exposition of the works of such notables as Milovan Djilas and Svetozar Stojanović, a philosophy professor at the University of Belgrade, and, like Djilas, a critic of the growing gap between Marxist theory and Yugoslav practice, she compares the ideas of these dissidents with those of the estab-