The extent to which the national churches and their bishops and lower clergy provided cultural, intellectual, moral, and political leadership is one of the distinguishing marks of the national movements in Southeastern Europe during the nineteenth century and provides an important point for comparison and contrast of these movements. The roles played by the Montenegrin vladike, by the Bulgarian exarchate, by the Rumanian Orthodox Church in Transylvania under Bishop Andreiu Şaguna, by the Serbian Orthodox Church of Southern Hungary under Patriarch Josip Rajačić, and by the Croatian Catholic Church under Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer were similar, yet distinctive. Unfortunately, the lack of thorough, in depth scholarly descriptions and analyses of the parts played by some of these institutions and their leaders seriously hampers the inviting prospect of making the much-needed comparison and contrast.

The role of the Bulgarian exarchate has received careful and thorough attention in the works of Richard von Mach, Der Machtbereich des bulgarischen Exarchate in der Türkei (1906), Cyril Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria (1943), and Patriarch Kiril, Graf N. P. Ignatiev i b’’garskiat ts’rkoven v’’pros (1958) and Natanail, mitropolit Okhridski i Plovdivski, 1820-1906 (1952). Likewise, Keith Hitchins describes and analyzes the leadership role of the Rumanian Orthodox clergy under Bishop Şaguna in a series of articles on Şaguna and in his The Romanian National Movement in Transylvania (1969)2. Émile Haumont provides a general survey of the activities of the Montenegrin vladike, the South Hungarian Serbian clergy, and the Croatian church under Bishop Strossmayer in La Formation de la Yougoslavie (1930), but little has been done to go beyond this. Jovan Radonić has published Patriarch Rajačić’s autobiography in Posebna izdanja Srpske akademije nauka (1951), and Ferdo Šišić’s Korespondencija, Rački-
Charles J. Slovak

*Strossmayer* (1928-1931) and *J. J. Strossmayer, dokumenti i korespondencija* (1933) provide valuable source materials on the Croatian leader. But no thorough and scholarly description and analysis of Strossmayer's activities as both the religious and political leader of his people exists. This article intends to serve as an introduction to his activities and his role as a Balkan Bishop.

The leadership role among the Balkan nationalities fell to their churches partly by default and partly by tradition. Among the Balkan nationalities, where the overwhelming majority of the people was poor, ignorant, and rural—kmetovi, tarane, or raje, only the clergy possessed sufficient intellectual training, financial means, and breadth of influence to develop and propagate the ideas of national self-awareness and self-rule. Until the mid-nineteenth century, most of the people of the Balkans were unfree serfs bound to the land. Only a small number enjoyed the status of free, landholding peasants, while many others were landless, rural proletarians. The middle class was small and often of a different nationality than the rural majority. In Transylvania, German "Saxons" dominated. In the Croatian lands, Germans, Magyars, and Italians made up most of the middle class, while in Bulgaria, this class was predominantly Turkish or Greek. In the same way, the noble classes tended to be of a different nationality than the rural peasants. Only Croatia-

3. The work of Milko Cepelić and Matija Pavić, *Josip Juraj Strossmayer, biskup bosansko-djakovački sriemsli* (1900-1904) was published to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of Strossmayer's becoming Bishop of Djakovo. Though a storehouse of information for the period 1850-1900, it is lacking in critical conclusions and evaluations. The same may be said of Janko Barlè's *Josip Juraj Strossmayer* (1900). This small volume is hagiographic in tone, but is of some use for details, especially from the bishop's childhood. The one scholarly life of Strossmayer, Tade Smičiklas, *Načrt života i djela J. J. Strossmayera* (1906) is far from thorough. Smičiklas himself in his introduction describes the work as a sketch and suggests that it only be used as an outline for a later, more complete work. Two booklength works relating to Strossmayer have been published recently. One is a collection of essays edited by Anton Zollitsch entitled *Josef Georg Strossmayer. Beiträge zur konfessionelle Situation Österreich-Ungarns in ausgehenden 19. Jahrhundert und zur Unionsbewegung der Slawen bis in die Gegenwart* (1962). The other is Vladimir Koščak, *J. J. Strossmayer/Franjo Rački Politički spisi* (1971), which is a collection of articles and speeches by Strossmayer and his close friend Franjo Rački. It has a useful introduction, but is most valuable for its thorough description of archival materials relating to Strossmayer and his activities. The author's unpublished doctoral dissertation at the University of Illinois "Josef Juraj Strossmayer, A Balkan Bishop: The Early Years, 1815-1854" (1974) deals with the first half of the bishop's long life. Joseph Matl's "Josef Georg Strossmayer", *Neue österreichische Biographie* (1956) provides a good reference outline of Strossmayer's later life. For an analysis of Strossmayer's thought, see Slobodan Jovanović, *Politički i prane rasprave*, v. III, (1932). The most important Yugoslav scholar of Strossmayer's life and activities, Ferdo Šišić, began but did not complete a multivolume study entitled *J. J. Strossmayer i južnoslovenska misao* (1922). The one complete volume deals only with the background of the Yugoslav revival.
Slavonia had a significant number of noblemen of the majority nationality. Although some of these noblemen did play an important role in the Croatian movement, most were impoverished, ill-educated, and more dedicated to high-living than to national development. Because the towns and cities of the Balkans were small administrative or commercial centers with virtually no large-scale manufacturing during the nineteenth century, there was no true working class in the region. The clergy alone had the organization, training, and concern for the welfare of the people to allow it to assert a leadership role when the national movements came into bloom during the nineteenth century.

But equally as important was the tradition of joint religious and temporal leadership which in Southeastern Europe had developed with Byzantine caesaro-papism and had continued, considerably reinforced, under Turkish rule. The Muslim Turks allowed their Christian subjects to retain their Christianity because it was one of the monotheistic, revealed religions which Mohammed had taught should be tolerated. To deal with its non-Muslim subjects, the Ottoman Turkish state, highly theocratic like its Muslim predecessors, organized the millet system whereby relations between the government and these subjects were handled by their religious leaders. The Greek Patriarch of Constantinople was recognized as the head of the Orthodox Christian millet and the chief rabbi of the capital city was the head of the Jewish millet. For the Christian peoples of the Balkan peninsula, the church hierarchy became the only representatives which they had to the governmental structure. Unfortunately for the non-Hellenic portions of the Balkan population, a Greek hierarchy came to dominate most of the Balkan churches with only the lower clergy actually having significant contacts with the people. Nevertheless, national culture and learning retreated into the churches under the Turks and it was from the churches that it would later emerge.

In the eighteenth century, the importance of the church hierarchy grew as the strength of the Turkish state began to decline and the power of its representatives in the outlying regions weakened. The increasing significance of the church hierarchy fused with a growing awareness of nationality to make national churches a necessity in the eyes of the patriotic. A conflict over the disestablishment of the Serbian national church eventually led to the first successful uprising against Turkish rule by one of the subject nationalities, the Serbs in 1804. The first phase of the Bulgarian struggle for independence centered in the movement for the establishment of an autocephalous Bulgarian exarchate. But, perhaps, the archetypal Balkan church led by a Balkan bishop was the Montenegrin church and state, which was headed by a dynasty of vladike. The Njegoš vladike ruled a de facto autonomous, virtually inde-
ependent Montenegro from the late seventeenth century until Montenegro was incorporated into the Yugoslav kingdom following the First World War. Until 1851, the Njegoši prince-bishops, succeeding from uncle to nephew, headed both the religious and secular administrations of their land. In 1851, Vladika Danilo I secularized the office of vladika and Montenegro became an hereditary principality whose royal house provided sons and daughters for royal marriages throughout Europe.

Within the Austrian Empire, the ecclesiastical organizations of the Romanian, the Serbs of Southern Hungary, and the Croats of Croatia and Slavonia also provided leadership for the national movements. Indeed, the struggles to establish independent and recognized national churches marked the beginnings of national consciousness for these nations. The movements for independent church organizations stretched back to the very beginning of the eighteenth century, as in Transylvania when a portion of the Romanian Orthodox clergy sought to gain independence and recognition for their church and people by signing an act of union in 1700. In return for accepting the Four Points of Union of the Council of Florence of 1439, the Rumanians hoped to gain acknowledgement by the imperial court of their religion as the fifth received religion and of their nation as the fourth recognized nation within the Transylvanian feudal constitution. At first, their decision seemed to produce abundant fruit. The Second Leopoldine Decree of 1701 promised to those Rumanians who joined the Uniate Church the same social and political rights and privileges as those enjoyed by Roman Catholics. However, the court instituted these changes so slowly that the Rumanian national movement in Transylvania throughout the eighteenth and into the nineteenth century consisted in large measure of efforts by the leaders of the Romanian Uniate Church to improve the educational and economic position of their people and to gain implementation of the reforms promised by the court.

The court's refusal to recognize the Rumanians as a natio within the Transylvanian constitution eventually discredited the Uniate Church and its leaders in the eyes of many Transylvanian Rumanians. Consequently, when the court formally acknowledged the existence of the Rumanian Orthodox Church with the appointment of a bishop in 1784, direction of the Rumanian movement shifted to leaders of the Orthodox Church. Its leadership role

4. This involved recognition of the Pope of Rome as the visible head of the Christian Church, use of unleaven bread in the communion, acceptance of the existence of purgatory, and acknowledgment of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son.

reached its pinnacle under Andreiu Şaguna, who was appointed general vicar of the Rumanian Orthodox Church in 1846 and archbishop two years later. Şaguna, a young and very promising protege of the Serbian Metropolitan Josip Rajačić, had done much to assert the ecclesiastical and political rights of the Orthodox Rumanians and to reconcile their differences with the Orthodox Serbs of Southern Hungary. Upon taking office, he immediately undertook the reorganization of his consistory in a more business-like fashion, the improvement in the education and training of the village clergy, and the building of schools for the people. With the coming of the 1848 revolutions, he used his semi-official position both to promote the interests of the Rumanian people at the Hapsburg court and to urge a closer attachment of the Rumanians of Transylvania to the Hapsburg dynasty since he felt the destinies of both were inextricably bound together. The Hapsburgs for their part encouraged the development of Şaguna's Balkan Bishop role both during the revolutionary era and later during the 1860's when the constitutional arrangement of the empire was being redone. Anxious to prevent the development of a liberal, middle class political movement among the Rumanians, they sought to maintain Şaguna in his role as leader of his nation. Thus, Emperor Franz Josef in 1865 communicated directly with Şaguna on the question of dissolving the Sibiu diet rather than dealing with secular party leaders.

The South Hungarian Serbian movement followed a similar course. When Austrian armies were forced to withdraw from Serbia in 1690, approximately 70,000 Serbs followed their Patriarch Arsenije north of the Danube to settle in Southern Hungary so as to avoid Turkish reprisals for the aid they had given the Austrians. Emperor Leopold granted the Serbs lands and promised them their own semi-autonomous region and the right to choose their own Patriarch and Voivod, a civil and military leader. However, Austrian recognition of the Serbs' special rights and privileges lasted only until the death of Patriarch Arsenije with the result that throughout the remainder of the eighteenth century and into the first half of the nineteenth century, the Serbian movement had to concentrate on regaining recognition of its lost rights and privileges.

The most important step forward for the Serbs came with the 1848 revolutions. In May of that year, Serbian lay and ecclesiastical leaders met at Sremski Karlovci and elected Josip Rajačić as Serbian Patriarch and Stepan Šupljikac as Voivod. The imperial court, anxious to assure itself of a loyal

7. Ibid., p. 62.
following at the backs of the rebellious Hungarians, quickly recognized these elections. Rajačić dominated the religious and political aspects of the Serbian movement with Šupljikac concentrating on military affairs until his death in December 1848, when Rajačić assumed complete control of the movement and came to play the classic role of a Balkan bishop.

In spite of the recognition of their churches and their leadership roles which the Hapsburgs seemed to encourage, both Şaguna and Rajačić as Balkan Bishops were severely limited in their effectiveness. Official recognition of the rights and privileges of their positions was very recent and lacked the force of tradition within the Hapsburg context. This did not detract so much from their role as leaders of their people as it did from their effectiveness as spokesmen to the governmental establishment. Moreover, grants of increased freedom to their churches coincided with governmental attempts to restrict ecclesiastical influence in cultural, intellectual, and educational affairs, particularly after the Hungarian government ended church supervision of schools in 1872. In addition, the Rumanian and Serbian churches, which had not enjoyed established status until after the upheavals of 1848-1849, entered the world of political and national contention largely destitute of the necessary bases of power. Neither Şaguna nor Rajačić had at his disposal the large, well-trained clergy needed to propagandize effectively or the immense landholdings or other sources of income needed to found and support schools and other cultural institutions. Finally, the government was able to dissipate much of both Şaguna’s and Rajačić’s energies and efforts by playing them off one against the other. Using the question of the creation of separate Orthodox metropolitanate or the continuance of Rajačić’s jurisdiction over the Rumanians as a goad, the government was able to control effectively both the Serbian and Rumanian church leaders. Perhaps the best example of this was the government’s manipulation of Şaguna during negotiations for the Ausgleich of 1867 through threats to abandon his church to the Serbs. Both Şaguna and Rajačić were forced then to act more as spokesmen of the government to their nations rather than as spokesmen of their nations to the government. They had no true independence of action. Eventually, both the Rumanians and Serbs repudiated their leadership and turned to more modern secular, middle-class political leaders.

By contrast, Josip Juraj Strossmayer, who was appointed Bishop of Djakovo in November 1849, was able to act as an independent Balkan bishop, retaining at least the moral political leadership of his nation for almost a half century. This was due in part to the greater strength and independence

9. Ibid., p. 866.
of the Croatian Catholic Church, and in part to Strossmayer's personality.

The making of the Catholic Church in Croatia into a Balkan Church had been a two stage process, one in which the church first lost its independence based on feudal privileges and was driven nearer the people, and then regained its independence on a new, more modern basis. Through the reign of Maria Theresa, the Catholic Church of Austria had been an integral part of the feudal structure in which social, political, and economic rights were based on grants of privilege from past Austrian rules. The church hierarchy as the first estate enjoyed the same type of privileges as those enjoyed by the noble and aristocratic landowning families. The church, particularly the Jesuits, had control of the educational system as well as owning vast lands, which it used to support thousands of monasteries throughout the land. The clergy, with the exception of the frequently poor and ill-educated parish priests, were a privileged caste which concentrated its attention on the other privileged classes and strove to maintain its own position. Concern for and contact with the common people was limited.

However, during the reign of Maria Theresa, the position of the church began to change as the state assumed control of the schools, thus limiting considerably the church's position of power. Then in 1773, following the lead of the French and Spanish monarchs and Pope Clement XIV's bull dissolving the order, Maria Theresa abolished the Society of Jesus within the Hapsburg domains. The Jesuits—despite the jealousy of the secular clergy and the other orders—had done much to organize the strength of the church and had been the most effective defender of its privileged position. Abolition of the Society was to have far-reaching consequences as the state sought to force the church to concern itself more with the needs of the people. For example, the plan of studies for theological schools was reorganized, shifting the emphasis from the scholastic philosophy favored by the Jesuits to a more practical pastoral theology.

In the Croatian kingdoms of Croatia and Slavonia, the Franciscans took over the Jesuits' position as the most important teaching order. In Slavonia, at the humanistic gymnasium in Osijek they introduced instruction in the native language to replace the German which the Jesuits had used, thus greatly improving the opportunities for the Slavic youth of the region to get an education and to enter into a bureaucratic or ecclesiastical career. But of

even greater significance in the long run was the replacement of the Jesuits by the Franciscans in Zagreb, the cultural and administrative center of the Croatian lands, where they again changed the language of instruction—only this time from the kajkavian dialect of Serbo-Croat to the štokavian dialect. The Jesuits in keeping with their close ties to the feudal structure had held forth in kajkavia, the *lingua croatica*, the recognized and privileged language of the medieval Croatian kingdom. The Franciscans, on the other hand, had a tradition of using štokavian, the *lingua illyrica*, a language which had never been granted a privileged position by the Hapsburgs, but the one spoken by the majority of Croats and by virtually all of the Serbs. The introduction of štokavian into the schools and academies of Zagreb moved the church closer to the people, favoring the rural lower genry and peasantry. The use of kajkavian had favored the aristocratic, privileged classes. Finally, the abolition of the Jesuits and their replacement by the Franciscans contributed to a nationally oriented Catholic Church in Croatia by increasing contacts between the Croats and their Catholic South Slav brethren still living under the Turks in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Roman Catholicism in the two Turkish provinces was exclusively the domain of the Franciscans because there was neither a secular nor a regular church hierarchy there, only the Franciscan missionaries whose predecessors had come there in the fourteenth century. Under Josef II the contacts between the Franciscans of Bosnia and those of Austria were very deliberately increased.

The church lost almost all of its feudal privileges during the reign of Josef II. The state absorbed the church and its functions making of it “a bureau for the maintenance of the state’s authority in the area of morality”.

Josef sought to make the clergy another branch of his enlightened bureaucracy, one whose function was to inculcate patriotism and piety in the people. This led directly to the abolition of those monasteries which were not devoted to the training of the young or the maintenance of hospitals. Josef considered monks who devoted their lives to contemplation and prayer while others supported them useless. Having no contact with the people, they could teach them nothing. Therefore, he applied a large portion of the monies raised by confiscation of monastic lands to building churches and helping the secular clergy, those nearest the people.

Since a clergy which would promote patriotism and piety needed not only to have contact with the people but also to be devoted to the state and to


the emperor, Josef favored the secular clergy over the regular clergy because as apostolic ruler for most of his domains, he had some control over the bishops of his lands, a control which would have been difficult to extend over the myriad of monastic houses which existed when he came to the throne. Josef also moved to shift the allegiance of the clergy from Rome to an Austrian state church. He limited communications between the bishops of his domains and the Pope and even went so far as to seek the establishment of an Austrian patriarchate. And in 1786 he backed a group of his bishops who by the Punctuation of Ems sought to establish their episcopal independence from Rome. The overall result of Josef's reforms, then, was that the church became an instrument of state policy.

At the same time the church was being incorporated into the state bureaucratic structure and losing its independent feudal position, it was being moved nearer the people. Maksimilijan Vrhovac, Bishop of Zagreb from 1787 to 1827, placed the Josephinian church on a very firm basis in the Croatian lands by a great expansion of contact between the clergy and the people, increasing the number of parish priests and improving their standard of education. The greatest problem he faced was the lack of a standard popular language in which he could train his clergy. This he sought to remedy by having the clergy throughout Croatia and Slavonia collect the words, poems, and songs of the people and send them to him for compilation. In this way, he made a beginning in the establishment of a standard language for the South Slavs. The more overtly nationalistic leaders of the Illyrian movement, both secular and ecclesiastic, later completed the work.

Though it lacked an established, independent position of power, the Croatian church under Vrhovac had taken the first step toward becoming a Balkan church. Divested of its feudal privileges which had separated its interests from those of the mass of the people, it was now in a position to assume leadership of a mass-oriented national movement. Throughout the Illyrian period, the Catholic clergy worked hand in hand with other national leaders, but their efforts were often stymied by interference from the Hungarian church hierarchy under whose control they fell. Consequently, on 10 October 1845, the Croatian Sabor sent a request to the emperor asking that the Zagreb bishopric be elevated to the rank of archbishopric with the bishoprics of Senj, Djakovo, Križevac, and the titular bishopric of Beograd as suffragan dioceses. Emperor Ferdinand took no action on the request for some time, but the Croatian national leaders and the Bishop of Zagreb, Juraj Haulik, realized the project would take a great deal of patience to get through

15. Ibid., p. 166.
the governmental bureaucracy and to overcome the resistance of the Hungarian Primate, Archbishop Janos Simor of Esztergom. For this reason, neither the Croatian Sabor of October 1847, the revolutionary Velika narodna skupština of March 1848, nor the Croatian Sabor of June 1848 repeated the request. The Croats waited instead for the emperor to act on the October 1845 request. This process took longer than anticipated. In spite of the rewards which the Croatian leadership felt certain the Hapsburgs would award them for their loyal service in putting down the rebellious Hungarians during 1848-1849, the court, the government, and the Papacy dragged their feet and ignored Croatian pleas for action, so that it was not until the end of 1852 that Pius IX’s Bull Ubi primum placuit finally elevated Zagreb to an archbishopric.

At the same time that the Croatian church was getting its independence from the Hungarian hierarchy, the Catholic Church throughout the Hapsburg domains was being given a more independent position vis-à-vis the state. Following the recommendations of the bishops’ conference which met in Vienna in the spring of 1849, the government granted to the bishops freedom of communication with their flocks and with the Papacy, the power to build and develop their own local diocesan seminaries, and control of church-owned property. Consequently, the Croats then had their own autonomous church, a Balkan church which could provide an institutional framework sufficiently independent of both the government and the Hungarian church and at the same time sufficiently near the people to provide strong and effective leadership. All that was wanting was a Balkan bishop to head this Balkan church. Here Strossmayer, the newly appointed Bishop of Djakovo, came to the fore. He was a man of the people, with a reputation for brilliance, energy, and understanding of and compassion for his people. But more importantly, he was determined to make use of the independence of the Croatian church to promote the interests of his nation. He had been alienated by the court’s reluctant attitude toward the establishment of an autonomous Croatian church and by its failure to follow an aggressive policy with regard to the rights and interests of the Catholic Slavs living in Bosnia. Further, he believed that the Croatian leadership had lost much of its advantage in 1848-1849 by toady too much to the court. A proud, even vain man, he was determined to prove that he could do better. Upon his consecration as Bishop of Djakovo, he took as his motto, “All for the faith and the homeland.”

18. Ibid., pp. 14-16.
19. Slovak, “Strossmayer, the Early Years”, pp. 276-278.
He began giving his all by founding schools. Even before assuming office in 1850, he set his clerical council to the task of expanding the work of the Djakovo diocesan seminary. Then he founded a seminary at Djakovo for Franciscan missionary priests from Bosnia and aided the seminary at Omiš in Dalmatia. A men’s preparatory school was founded at Djakovo in 1857 and a women’s school in 1859. In 1865 he contributed 11,000 florins to the founding of a women’s teacher college. But his most important contribution in the field of education was the founding of the Zagreb university. Strossmayer began working for a Croatian university in the summer of 1849. At that time, he came to be on good terms with Count Lev Thun, the Minister of Cults and Instruction, to whom he proposed the founding of a university in Zagreb. Thun was interested, but before they could formulate any substantial plans for such a university, the Bach regime with its centralizing tendencies forced them to delay their work.

However, Strossmayer did not abandon the idea, and after the disaster of the War of Italian Liberation felled the Bach regime, he reformulated his plans for a university in Zagreb. On 20 April 1861, in a speech before the newly convened Croatian Sabor, Strossmayer proposed the founding of a Croatian university. Nationalist leaders among the Croats greeted this proposal enthusiastically; they believed that a university in Zagreb would be the beginning of the spiritual liberation of the South Slavs from domination by and imitation of strictly Western European culture. Although an obviously worthy cause in the view of the leaders of the Croatian Sabor, the program ran afoul of centralists in Vienna and it was not until after the Ausgleich of 1867 and the Nagodba of 1868 had rearranged the political organization of the empire that royal sanction for the university was given in 1869. Strossmayer and others had by that time collected over 240,000 florins for the building and endowment of the university. But five more years elapsed before the university opened as further problems arose with the Hungarian Ministry of Education under whose authority the university now came as a result of the Ausgleich. The university finally opened in October 1874.

Another of Strossmayer’s important contributions to the cultural and intellectual life of the South Slavs was the Yugoslav Academy of Science and Art. In 1860, he and his friend, Franjo Rački, began working for the establishment of an academy which would help to unify the literary and scientific en-

21. Letter from Strossmayer to the Djakovo clerical council, 19 December 1849, in Šišić, Dokumenti i korespondencija, p. 79.
22. Letter from Strossmayer to A. T. Brlić, 20 August 1849, in Šišić, Dokumenti i korespondencija, p. 60.
deavors of the Serbs and Croats, to provide them with a distinctly Yugoslav institution independent of domination by either the Eastern or the Western intellectual worlds. The Croatian Sabor, meeting in 1861, approved Strossmayer’s proposal for the establishment of the academy; royal sanction was granted in 1866. The Croatian Sabor chose the original fourteen members of the academy. They met for the first time in July 1867 and chose Strossmayer as patron of the academy and Rački as the first president. The academy soon had underway an extensive program of publication, research, and collection of materials relating to Croatian national life24.

A great admirer of painting as an art form, Strossmayer wished to provide South Slav painters with examples of works by master artists, from which they could draw inspiration or learn techniques by copying. He had become interested in painting while a student in Vienna where he visited both the galleries of the Belvedere Palace and the Academy of Painting as well as the private collections of Czernin, Harrach, Liechtenstein, and Schönborn25. Strossmayer himself began collecting art works as soon as he became Bishop of Djakovo and in 1866 donated his collection to the Yugoslav Academy. Strossmayer also contributed 62,000 florins toward the construction of a gallery which was built on Zrinski Trg in Zagreb. In 1883 the academy officially named it Galerija Strossmayerova26.

Another aspect of Strossmayer’s interest in the intellectual life of the South Slavs was his support of diverse literary efforts. He was in direct or indirect contact with almost every Croatian writer of his time. So pervasive was Strossmayer’s influence that Ljuba Babić in his novel Osvit (Education) described recent Croatian history as comprising three periods: Illyrian, Bach Absolutist, and Strossmayerian27. Strossmayer did all that he could to encourage and support the growth of a national literature for his people. His support of individual writers came most often in the form of simple encouragement, but at times—particularly during the 1850’s when various Croatian literati fell on hard times—it took the form of financial backing. For example, he paid the costs of publishing Petar Konarelić’s Biskup Sv. Ivan Trogirski i Kralj Koloman in 1858. He also gave jobs to writers who were clerics or would-be clerics. Andrija Torkvat Brlić served as his financial manager in

the early 1850’s and Luka Botić was at the same time his archivist28. Strossmayer did not limit his aid to Croatian writers. He helped the brothers Miladinov in their collecting of Bulgarian folksongs and later interceded unsuccessfully on their behalf when they were imprisoned by the Ottoman authorities. Moreover, the Croatian leader gave financial aid to a wide variety of intellectual and literary societies throughout the Slavic world, including the Dalmatian, Slovene, Slovak, and Serbian Matice, the Czech Zemski musei, and the Slavianska besieda of the Bulgarians in Sofia29.

In addition to supporting Slavic, particularly Croatian, literary efforts, Strossmayer was interested in promoting the cultural life of his people by making them more aware of their past. To this purpose, he supported historical research, particularly the collection of old documents. One of the first and most generous supporters of Ivan Kukuljevic’s Društvo za povjesnicu jugoslavensku when it was founded in 185030, Strossmayer also encouraged the collecting of documents from medieval Dubrovnik and paid for the publication in 1863 of Theiner’s Veta monumenta Slavorum meridionalium historia illustrantia. The support of such historical research was also an important aspect of the work of the Yugoslav Academy.

Strossmayer saw in the history of the South Slavs the key to another project of his which he believed would be of eternal benefit not only to his nation but to all of mankind—the reunification of the Eastern and Western Churches. While a student in Vienna, he wrote his dissertation for his doctorate in theology on the schism between East and West31. As a bishop, Strossmayer worked for reunification of the churches because he felt that the great mass of Slavs would thereby become firmly attached to the Papacy, thus creating a veritable army of defenders of the Christian faith. The rededicated Slav Christians would then carry through the spiritual regeneration of Europe and eventually of the entire world32. Although he carried on an active correspondence with the Russian religious philosopher Vladimir Solov’ev regarding the fusion of the Russian Orthodox and Roman Catholic Churches, for the most part Strossmayer pursued more attainable goals, concerning himself primarily with those Orthodox Slavs nearer to home, the Serbs and the Bul-

garians. Essentially, he attempted to make the Catholic Church in Croatia as acceptable as possible to these peoples. One means of achieving this was to increase the significance of the Slav Apostles, Saints Cyril and Methodius, in the Roman Catholic hierarchy of saints. Strossmayer was an important supporter of the Association of Cyril and Methodius, which was founded in Brno and Paris in 1850 for this purpose. He also tried to persuade the Papacy to elevate Cyril and Methodius from the rank of local saints to the rank of saints venerated throughout the Roman Catholic world. This Pope Leo XIII did in his circular *Grande munus* of September 1880. When Strossmayer and a group of Slavs made a pilgrimage to Rome to celebrate the 7 May 1881 feast of Saints Cyril and Methodius, the Croatian prelate expressed to Pope Leo the gratitude of the Slavic peoples for the elevation of their holiday, saying that it would tie the Slavs more closely than ever to the Roman Church so that they who had for so long been last among the Roman Christians, would become the first.

Strossmayer also sought the introduction into the Roman Church of a Slavic liturgy to be used by all Slavs. He felt that this would not only help in the conversion of Orthodox Slavs to Catholicism, but would also strengthen the Catholic Church's ties with the Slavs who were already Catholic. If all Slavs were to use a common liturgy, a great impetus would be given to the movement for one church. In pressing for a Slavic liturgy, Strossmayer followed in the footsteps of earlier Croatian leaders by urging the adoption of the glagolitic liturgy, a Roman Catholic Slavonic liturgy which had been used since medieval times by various congregations in coastal Croatia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia. The glagolitic liturgy was more likely to be accepted for the Slavic world by the Roman Curia than the other existing Slavic liturgy, the Old Slavonic liturgy, which was an Orthodox liturgy and therefore likely to raise complaints of schismatism. Strossmayer's proposals for the adoption of the glagolitic liturgy throughout the Catholic Slavic lands was well received in Rome once Leo XIII became Pope in 1878. But the Austro-Hungarian government in fear of a South Slavic separatist movement opposed its adoption. When Strossmayer began planning for the consecration of the new cathedral at Djakovo in 1882, he sought special permission to use the glagolitic liturgy in the ceremony. The Papacy was willing, but the Austrian government vetoed the plan. Strossmayer changed his approach and asked that Bishop Posilović of Senj, in whose diocese the glagolitic liturgy was used, be allowed to come to Djakovo to conduct a special glagolitic service.

for the consecration. Again the plan was rejected by the Austrian and Hun-
garian governments\textsuperscript{35}. But Strossmayer did succeed in getting recognition for
the glagolitic liturgy among non-Austrian Slavs. For example, the concor-
dat which he helped to negotiate between the Papacy and Montenegro in 1886
provided for the use of the glagolitic liturgy among the Catholics of Mon-
tenegro.

Strossmayer’s new cathedral at Djakovo symbolized his work for a re-
united church. His predecessor, Josip Kuković, had initiated a collection for
the building of the cathedral, and Strossmayer began work to complete the
project as soon as he became bishop. In 1853 he made a trip to Vienna, Prague,
Köln, Speyer, Mainz, and Bamberg and in 1859, to Venice, Padua, and Bo-
logna to study cathedral architecture\textsuperscript{36}. He wanted a church of which all
Yugoslavs could be proud. The final outcome was a combination of all Stross-
mayer felt to be the good qualities of both East and West. There were Byzan-
tine tiles, German paintings, and local wood carvings. The inscription above
the main entrance read, “For the Glory of God, a united Church, the love
and concord of the peoples”\textsuperscript{37}.

All of Strossmayer’s work for church unity, cultural awareness, and edu-
cation of his people had a very deliberate nationalistic and political tone. One of the most important projects of the Yugoslavism to which he dedicated
his life was the establishment of common cultural norms and institutions for
all South Slavs. By promoting reunification of the churches, he sought to
bring together the two institutions which had come to be the greatest source
of division between the Serbs and the Croats, who made up the bulk of the
South Slav peoples. “Love and concord of the people” were essential if the
South Slavs were to take their place among the nations of modern Europe
who ruled their own destiny and contributed to the overall welfare and cul-
tural development of mankind. But more than just harmony among them-
selves was needed if the South Slavs were to be a free nation. They needed their
own institutions and the means to support them. Strossmayer tried to fill
this need with the Yugoslav Academy and the Croatian church. He also felt
that the people had to be made aware of their distinctive nationality and the
advantages of a governmental system in which their affairs were handled by
men of their own nationality rather than by Germans in Vienna or Magyars
in Pest. At the same time, they had to have the necessary intellectual tools
and skills to make them capable of carrying out their duties to their nation.

\textsuperscript{35} Vitežić, “Die katholischen Slawen”, p. 35.
\textsuperscript{36} Mati, “Strossmayer”, p. 75.
\textsuperscript{37} Stolna crkva u Djakovo, \textit{Posebna djela Jugoslavenske akademije znanosti i umjet-
nosti}, v. XVIII, (1900), p. 41.
Schools were essential if the South Slavs were to have their own educated leaders and governmental officials and if they were to be able to make intelligent choices concerning their own future. In addition, education would open up new economic opportunities to the mass of the people. Greater economic freedom of action and greater wealth would make the South Slavs stronger politically. Strossmayer believed that the spread of education made the progress of the nation “irresistible”, and therefore felt that whatever money and other resources were available to back the national cause could best be spent on schools which taught South Slav students in their South Slav language.

He saw that without schools of their own, the youth of the Yugoslav nations would be culturally enslaved by the Germans, Magyars, and Italians; and loss of the nation’s youth would mean loss of the nation, for it was in its youth that the future of the nation lay.

Strossmayer’s great interest in history and the uncovering of the South Slav past grew out of his desire that the people recognize their distinctiveness as a nation. As his colleague Rački argued, the job of the linguist or writer was to make the South Slavs aware of their unity, while the job of the historian was to make them aware of their development as something separate from that of the Germans, Italians, or Magyars. A second great advantage for the nation which might accrue from historical research was that such work could also uncover important rights and privileges which were due the nation, but which had been forgotten over the centuries. This might prove important for the Croats in their struggles to establish their position vis-à-vis the Austrians or the Hungarians within the empire. It could also be beneficial for Strossmayer as a bishop within the Roman Catholic Church. He sought always to make his bishopric more powerful and to reestablish old rights of the bishopric, especially in Bosnia. In the early 1850’s, he sent his close friend Mate Topalović to Bosnia and then to Rome to search through the archives for documents relating to episcopal jurisdiction of Bosnia. He also reendowed the old Slavic Chapter of St. Jerome in Rome, thus providing South Slav students with the opportunity to study and to research in Rome.

Strossmayer himself made a careful study of the church’s past, which helped him in his encounters with the Papacy at the Vatican Council of 1869-1870 and in his efforts to have the province of Bosnia placed under his jurisdiction when Austria-Hungary occupied Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1878. His

40. Jovanović, Politički i prane rasprave, p. 246.
study of church history also encouraged Strossmayer in his campaign for the elevation of the Slav Apostles, Saints Cyril and Methodius. In addition to what it would do for the reunification of the churches movement, Strossmayer may well have seen personal advantage in the elevation of the two saints. Professor Imre Boba in his recent book, *Moravia's History Reconsidered*, has demonstrated that contrary to generally accepted belief, Methodius was never in what is today Moravia. The Moravia of which he became bishop was not a territory but rather a city in Sirmium, the region which made up the bulk of Strossmayer’s modern Djakovo bishopric. This would make Strossmayer the successor of Methodius. By stressing the importance of Cyril and Methodius, particularly the fact that the Pope had named Methodius metropolitan of the Slavs, Strossmayer may well have been laying the foundation for a claim on his part to primacy among the Slavs. That he was aware of his position as possibly a successor of Methodius is indicated in Barlé’s short biography of him42.

Strossmayer did not limit his efforts for his nation to cultural and educational affairs. He also sought basic and far-reaching institutional and political reforms within both the Austrian Empire and the Roman Catholic Church. It was the tenacity with which he pursued these reforms which made him the leader of his nation throughout the second half of the nineteenth century. During the 1860’s he tried to be his nation’s parliamentary Ban Jellačić, to defend the rights and aspirations of the Croatian and Serbian people in the assemblies and chancellories of the empire during the constitutional crises which followed Austrian defeats in wars with Piedmont-Sardinia and Prussia, just as Ban Jellačić had defended them on the battlefield in 1848-1849. His program was essentially the same as Jellačić’s had been, a federal or triallistic Austrian state, in which Germans, Magyars, and Slavs would be united in a common empire under the House of Hapsburg, but in which they would be free to regulate their own affairs with regard to economics, education, and social welfare43. But Strossmayer differed greatly from Jellačić in his willingness to take a stance in opposition to the Emperor and the government if necessary to gain concessions for his nation. He recognized that alternatives for the South Slavs existed outside of the Austrian Empire and did not hesitate to consider these possibilities. Either Austria would absorb more South Slavs into the empire from the territories currently under Ottoman rule and grant them the position due them, or else Serbia would lead the way in uniting

42. Barlé, *Strossmayer*, p. 66.
the Balkan Slavs, thus creating a new state which would have great attraction to the South Slavs living within the Austrian Empire[^4].

Active participation in politics began for Strossmayer in the spring of 1860 when he was called to Vienna to participate in an expanded Reichsrat, which had the task of reorganizing the empire in such a way as to gain greater support for a dynasty that felt its prestige waning as a result of the defeats in the War of Italian Liberation. He gained political prominence by his strict adherence to a program of unity and integrity for the three Croatian kingdoms of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia. The most burning issue of the day to the Nationalist Party, of which Strossmayer was the informal head, was the question of whether the Medjimurje district, which was part of the medieval Croatian kingdom and where a large number of Croats lived, but which had come under the administration of the Hungarian kingdom in the eighteenth century, should be formally incorporated into Hungary or returned to Croatia[^45]. The Emperor and central government were particularly anxious to gain the support of the Magyar nationalists and, consequently, they decided in favor of turning the district over to the Hungarian kingdom. This led to an open split between Strossmayer and the Emperor following a personal audience in February 1861[^46]. In the Croatian Sabor, which met on 15 April 1861, Strossmayer began a determined opposition to what appeared to be the Austrian government's decision to wipe out all of the concessions which the Croats had won in 1848-1849 and to turn the Croatian kingdoms over to the Hungarians. He told the deputies, "Gentlemen, the interests of blood and sweat are the most holy interests of our people, for enough of our people's blood has poured out, and enough of our sweat has been wrung from us"[^47]. He believed that the Austrians were being narrow-minded and short-sighted and he intended to shock them into recognizing reality.

In a letter to Metel Ožegović, a friend in the Interior Ministry in November 1862, Strossmayer outlined his view of the political situation in the empire and the chances of success for the Croats. He thought that as a result of the October Diploma and the February Patent, by which the constitutional structure of the empire was reorganized, a new series of battles would be fought over the same questions which had been settled in 1848-1849. Only this time, they would be fought on a bloodless parliamentary battlefield. Here the Croats would be at a distinct disadvantage because the Croatian Sabor was too moderate and allowed itself to be merely a "blind tool of the

[^4]: Jovanović, Politički i prane rasprave, p. 258.
[^45]: Mati, "Strossmayer", p. 78.
German ministry". This had been the cause of all of the problems which beset the Croats both past and present. All Austrian governmental officials were the same; they held the same thoughts and had the same intentions. Bach, the chief minister of the 1850's, and Schmerling, the new chief minister, were one and the same thing, it was only in form that they differed. Strossmayer had tried to make them understand that there were more important questions for the empire than just the Magyar Question. The fate of the empire would be determined more by the Yugoslav Question, which was closely bound up with the Eastern Question, than by a merely interior problem like the Magyar Question. Strossmayer felt that the Croats had to demonstrate to the people of Europe that they were indeed a mature nation. In the meantime, they would continue to appear to be rebels and traitors because they would not blindly trust in a government which was not their own and because they would not "toady to the palace"48.

Strossmayer's independent course made him a threat. Since his Nationalist Party had gained control of the Sabor, he was named to head the Croatian delegation which met with Deák, the Hungarian Prime Minister, in April 1866 to work out an agreement concerning the constitutional arrangement between Croatia and Hungary preparatory to the establishment of the dual monarchy. However, Strossmayer and his separatists refused to consider a position within the Hungarian kingdom, insisting instead that they had been granted complete independence of Hungary in 1848 and could not be forced to give this up. In an effort to force the Austrian government to take greater note of the rights and demands of the South Slavs, Strossmayer in late 1866 and early 1867 began working on an agreement with Prince Mihajl of Serbia to cooperate in freeing Bosnia from the Turks and incorporating it into the Serbian principality49. Prince Mihajl was working out an alliance of Balkan Christians to end Ottoman domination of the Balkans and planned to incite a riot in Bosnia and Herzegovina which he would use as a pretext for a war of liberation. Though Austria was preoccupied with her internal problems, Mihajl felt it essential that they have the cooperation of the Croatian frontier troops if he was to succeed in taking over in Bosnia. For this reason, he sought from Strossmayer some guarantee that if Austria attempted to intervene to prevent Serbia from taking over Bosnia, the Croatian troops would offer passive resistance or even engage in a mass mutiny against such a move50.

49. Koščak, Politički spisi, p. 45.
There was also some discussion of a possible union of the Croatian kingdoms with Serbia. It is difficult to say to what extent Strossmayer agreed to the Serbian prince’s program because no documentary evidence exists that the two leaders did work out an agreement, and the planned uprising in Bosnia and the resulting war, which would have brought the agreement into effect, never occurred. There is, however, evidence that Strossmayer did encourage Mihajl in his project to become king of the Serbs and Croats and that he promised to use his influence with the Catholic clergy in Bosnia to get them to accept a Serbian takeover there.

In the spring of 1867, Franz Josef decided that he had had enough of Strossmayer’s obstructionist tactics and intrigues. On 29 April he called Strossmayer to Vienna for a personal audience in which he gave the Croatian leader the choice of either accepting the Hungarian compromise program or not attending the Sabor and taking a trip abroad to rest. Strossmayer refused to give up the idea of an autonomous Croatia and, consequently, he, along with the Czech leaders Palacky and Rieger, travelled to Paris to attend the world’s fair. His choice of exile rather than submission dramatized the resistance of the Croats to the centralizing policies of the Germans and Magyars of the empire. However, the political situation was now a disaster. In December 1867, Prince Mihajl abandoned his policy of cooperation with the Croats and relieved his pro-expansionist foreign minister, Ilija Garašanin, of his duties. Mihajl then turned to the Hungarian government to support his ambitions. Shortly thereafter he was assassinated, and the Serbian throne fell to the child Prince Milan. As a result of Mihajl’s defection and a newly decreed set of election regulations, Strossmayer’s National Party suffered serious losses of prestige and power. Consequently, the final negotiations for the Nagodba, which determined political relations between Hungary and the Croatian kingdoms in 1868, were carried through by the unionists rather than by Strossmayer’s party.

Though he participated in the renegotiation of the Nagodba in the early 1870’s, Strossmayer was for all practical purposes out of politics after 1868. But he remained one of the most important leaders of his nation and he continued to oppose both the dualistic system which had been established in 1867 and the centralizing attitudes which characterized both the Pest and Vienna governments. He remained convinced that dualism was a blunder which,
like all of Austria's systems of government, would last only until the first foreign policy crisis; and he was certain that this crisis would involve the Eastern Question\textsuperscript{56}. Dualism was the worst possible thing which could befall the Slavs, for by it they were caught in a grindstone with two wheels—the centralism of the Pest ministry and the centralism of the Vienna ministry. And he knew that centralization, which was the exploitation and domination of one nationality by another, could not be tolerated in the nineteenth century, a time of growing national awareness by all peoples of Europe. It was contrary to the true spirit of "right and evangelicalism" which was needed if peace, stability, and Christianity were to be maintained throughout the world\textsuperscript{57}.

Strossmayer opposed centralization of power not only within the Austrian empire but also within the Roman Catholic Church. He believed that the Papacy was taking the wrong approach by insisting on greater centralization in response to the secularizing tendencies of the nineteenth century. He advocated a decentralization of the Catholic Church which would permit greater freedom of action for Catholic leaders among all of the various nations of the world. He saw the nineteenth century as a time of rising nationalism, resulting in a decentralization of Europe. If the Catholic Church was to maintain its position of moral leadership, it, too, would have to decentralize and ally itself with the spirit of nationalism. He was then an opponent of the movement for a declaration of Papal Infallibility which was afoot among ultramontanist church leaders and an advocate of national churches within the Catholic Church. Papal Infallibility would destroy all hope of a reunion of the Eastern and Western Churches, which was essential to the future of Strossmayer's Yugoslavism, for it would completely alienate the Orthodox, who had always denied the Pope's claim to primacy. His position led Strossmayer into open conflict with Pope Pius IX at the time of the first Vatican Council of 1869-1870. Pius had called the council together to affirm his absolute leadership of the Catholic Church, but Strossmayer and other liberal bishops sought instead to make it an occasion for basic reforms and the assertion of the rights of the bishops and of the national churches. On 24 January 1870, Strossmayer spoke before the council advocating sweeping reforms—of the College of Cardinals, of the See of Saint Peter, of the Roman Congregations, and of the Canon Law. He argued that it was essential that the Papacy be "universalized", that it be made more open to non-Latin influences and personnel. It had become an Italian institution and this seriously undermined its ability

\textsuperscript{56} Jovanović, \textit{Politički i prane rasprave}, p. 257.

\textsuperscript{57} Prelog, \textit{Strossmayerova čitanka}, p. 71.
to act as a force for international good. Strossmayer’s insistence on reforms and opposition to Papal Infallibility was so adamant that he was eventually alienated from almost all of his fellow bishops. At one point, he was forced from the speaker’s stand by shouts of “Lucifer!” “He is another Luther!” and “Let him be cast out!” At the end of the council, Strossmayer was one of three opposition bishops who refused to approve the decree of Papal Infallibility, and he refused to publish it in his diocese for many years following the council.

Strossmayer’s actions at the Vatican Council constituted a deliberate attempt to focus world attention on himself and on his nation. On 23 November 1869, before the opening of the council, he wrote to Rački that it was essential that the Croatian people keep informed about the council and be proud of the role their bishop was playing. He intended to prove to them and to the people of the world that a Croat could be significant even in so important a gathering as the Vatican Council. Publicizing the plight of the Croatian and other South Slav peoples and winning Western European support for their national aspirations was one of the greatest tasks Strossmayer set himself. He carried on a lengthy correspondence with William Gladstone and Lord Acton of Great Britain, in which he argued for the destruction of the Ottoman Empire and the expansion of a revitalized Christianity throughout the world.

One may readily suspect Strossmayer of deliberately creating incidents which would draw attention to himself and his people, particularly with his Kiev telegram and the resulting Belovar incident. In August 1888, Strossmayer sent a telegram of congratulations to the Panslav Committee in Kiev on the occasion of the 1000th anniversary of the Christianization of the Kievan State. The telegram concluded with “blessings on the universal mission which God has designed Russia to fulfill in the world.” Strossmayer’s telegram earned him some notoriety as a Panslavist, particularly in the newspapers of Italy. But a real incident was created on 13 September when Emperor Fanz Josef met with the bishops of Croatia at Belovar while observing maneuvers being held in the district. The Emperor informed Strossmayer that he

60. Letter from Strossmayer to Franjo Rački, 23 November 1869, in Sišić, Korespondencija Rački-Strossmayer, p. 100.
had acted very foolishly in sending the telegram of congratulations to Kiev, that his act could well prove very harmful for both his state and his church. To this, Strossmayer rather unexpectedly responded that his conscience was clear in the matter. He then left the reception with two other Croatian bishops and after an unsuccessful attempt to see Crown Prince Rudolph, left Belovar before evening, deliberately missing without explanation the state banquet to which he had been invited. He received great public acclamations of support on his return trip to Zagreb, and news of the incident was reported throughout Europe. The incensed Austrian Emperor brought pressure on church officials in Vienna, Pest, and Berlin to urge the Pope to appoint a coadjutor for Strossmayer's Djakovo bishopric so as to deprive him of his source of independent strength and to leave him with only his title.

The Belovar incident was indicative of the independent position which Strossmayer enjoyed and which he sought to use in order to improve the political, economic, and social position of his nation. He thus consciously sought to make himself a Balkan bishop, both the spiritual and the temporal leader of his people. He even insisted on being called "Vladika" rather than "Biskup", the usual word in Croatian for "bishop". Vladika was the title used by the Slavic Orthodox bishops under Turkish rule, particularly the prince-bishops of Montenegro, and was derived from the same stem as "voditi", the Serbo-Croatian word "to lead". Earlier leaders of the Croatian church had been cultural and intellectual leaders of their people and had participated in the political life of the empire as magnates in the Hungarian Diet and occasionally as locum tenens for the Croatian Banate when the office was vacant, but they had not been political leaders who sought to build up around them a mass following. Strossmayer, on the other hand, assumed the complete role of a Balkan bishop, leading his people both spiritually and politically.

Strossmayer as a leader of the Balkanized Croatian church even Archbishop Juraj Haulik of Zagreb, who as Croatain Metropolitan with his see in the city which was the cultural, intellectual, economic, and administrative center of the Croatian lands was the most likely of the Croatian bishops to take the lead. Haulik because of his background and personality did not—and could not—perform the function of a Balkan bishop within the Croatian church. He was an older man, whose outlook was bounded by the tradition of the Josephinian church. He had provided leadership for a cultural revival, but he remained a passive political leader, playing only the role the state assigned him and not attempting to build a mass following among the people. But

64. "Zagreb, 28 rujna", Narodni list, 3 October 1888, p. 1,
equally important, Haulik was not a Croat. He was a Slovak, and though he might understand and sympathize with the Croatian people, he could not identify with them. He remained a foreigner brought in by the government to supervise the Croatian church. Strossmayer on the other hand was a man of the people. But more important, because he had seen in 1848-1849 the disastrous results of a leadership too anxious to accommodate itself to the government, he was determined to lead the Croatian people actively and aggressively by seeking changes in their economic and administrative status and by promoting their cultural and intellectual rebirth. When Haulik died in 1869, there was much talk among the Croatian people of Strossmayer replacing him, but both the Austrian government and the Roman Church were unwilling to consider him for the Croatian Metropolitanate because of his determined resistance to their centralizing policies.

But in actuality, the Djakovo bishopric was a better base for Strossmayer from which to work than Zagreb would have been, particularly as he was eager to expand the national consciousness of the people from a relatively narrow Croatian nationalism to a wider Yugoslavism. The Djakovo bishopric, lying in the fertile plains of Slavonia and Syrmium, had a greater income than the Zagreb archbishopric, providing Strossmayer with more funds with which to support the cultural and educational institutions he felt were so essential to the development of his people. In addition, the Djakovo bishopric was a štokavian-speaking region, a cultural crossroads between the East and West, which could lead the way in unifying the Eastern-looking Serbs and the Western-looking Croats into a strong and unique Yugoslav nation. Finally, the Djakovo bishopric was more Balkan in character. It was an outlying region, where a strong leader like Strossmayer could build up a dedicated mass following far away from the supervision of the central government. Strossmayer's assertive and morally righteous personality combined with the independence and wealth of his Djakovo bishopric to make him the leader of his nation both politically and religiously throughout the second half of the nineteenth century. He became, as the Croatian writer Vladimir Nazor described him, "a new Moses who would lead his people from slavery to the promised land".

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