
As Dr. Campbell remarks in his introduction to this excellent case study in peace-making, "the problem of Trieste was one of the classic territorial disputes in European history". For years it defied solution and threatened the peace of the area, when, in 1954, "a set of intensive secret negotiations suddenly produced an agreement that not only resolved the deadlock, but ushered in a period of remarkably good relations between Italy and Yugoslavia". The settlement of the problem of Trieste on October 5, 1954, is of exceptional significance not merely because of the substantive importance of the problem in Italo-Yugoslav relations, but also because of the light which it throws on the principles and the art and practice of successful diplomatic negotiations. As noted above, it is an excellent case study of the way in which successful diplomatic negotiations can and should be conducted, if they are to lead to sound and enduring solutions of difficult and concrete problems. Dr. Campbell, Senior Research Fellow on the Council of Foreign Relations, New York, and former officer in the Department of State, has done a superb job in editing this brief volume, and in placing the Trieste issue in historical and contemporary perspective.

The substance of the book is based on interviews which Dr. Campbell and Dr. Joseph E. Johnson, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, carried on with the five leading participants in the difficult discussions and negotiations: Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson (USA); Sir Geoffrey W. Harrison (British Foreign Office); Vladimir Velebit (Yugoslavia); Manlio Brosio (Italy); and Ambassador Robert D. Murphy (United States).

As Dr. Campbell points out, the success of the Trieste negotiations was a matter, not only of the skillfully applied techniques by well-trained and long-experienced diplomats but of the changing political context. This was not 1946 or 1947, in the period immediately following World War II but 1954. In his concluding chapter, Dr. Campbell points out that a number of primary elements entered into the final solution, one of which was timing. Another was the constructive initiative on the part of the United Kingdom and the United States, both of which were anxious for a settlement of the complex Trieste question. Still another very important element was the relatively free hand given to the middlemen, Ambassador Thompson and Sir Geoffrey Harrison, and, indeed, the very high character and quality of all the diplomats involved. The secrecy of the negotiations with both Italy and Yugoslavia contributed much to the ultimate success of the negotiations, since occasional adamant stands which had to be compromised did not ultimately prevent solutions. The home front and domestic public opinion were kept under effective control. A generous letter from President Eisenhower to President Tito, dated September 10, 1954, delivered by Ambassador Murphy, was also most helpful. Finally, there was the element of sheer "luck".

The volume includes some basic documents concerning the Trieste question: (A) Memorandum of understanding between the Governments of Italy, the United Kingdom, the United States and Yugoslavia; (B) Letter from President Eisenhower to Marshal Tito, delivered in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, by Ambassador Robert D. Murphy; (C) Letter of Instruction from Acting Secretary of State W. B. Smith to Ambassador Thompson, January 28, 1954; (D) Announcement of Agreement, Department of State Press Release, October 5, 1954.

Dr. Campbell raises the question as to whether the principles applied in the Trieste problem could be applied to other issues, like those of Cyprus, Kashmir, and the Arab-Israeli conflict, among others. While all problems embody varying elements, and therefore call for varying techniques, the answer must surely be a qualified "yes". The Arab-Israeli con-
flict, for example, has a unique history of its own, and the contemporary context differs completely from that of Trieste. The positions of the outside Powers have hardly been conducive to peaceful adjustment, despite the character of the diplomats who have sought solutions, such as Count Folke Bernadotte and Ambassador Jarring, or Dr. Ralph Bunche. Nevertheless, as this volume well demonstrates, difficult and complex problems like that of Trieste, call for the highest type of diplomat and diplomacy if there is to be the slightest chance of success. The professional diplomat, the student, and the more general reader should take a look at this case study, for there is much to be learned from this book. President Grover Cleveland once remarked about another matter: "It is a condition that confronts us, not a theory". Trieste 1954 bears significant witness to that point.

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Karl Newman's *European Democracy Between the Wars* is a valuable book even though the title may be slightly misleading. The author is interested mainly in those countries of central and eastern Europe where democracy, established after World War I, succumbed to fascism. While the western democracies are referred to, the book deals mainly with Germany and Austria.

Newman sees no one factor as being decisive in explaining the failure of democracy, and in this regard his work is a considerable advance over the one-cause explanations that tended to predominate before and during World War II. Particular factors relating to one country are dealt with, such as the Henlein movement in Czechoslovakia and the conservative bureaucracy and judiciary in Weimar Germany, but Newman also concentrates on general topics such as the conflict of ideologies in the period after 1919 and the lack of a broad basis of popular understanding of and participation in the infant institutions of the post-war states, such as developed in Great Britain over a period of centuries. He points to the problems of proportional representation. Certainly there is irony in the fact that the founders of the Weimar Republic thought they were strengthening democracy whereas in fact they created a situation which made it almost impossible for democratic forces to coalesce into a working majority which could effectively control and strengthen the new regime.

Newman was born in Germany and lived there until 1939 when he migrated for political reasons to the freer atmosphere of Balliol College in Oxford. Since then he has supplemented his acquaintance with central European affairs by experience in South Africa and as a professor at the University of Dacca, Pakistan. There he helped draft the Pakistan Constitution of 1956. This experience enables him to make comparisons with the new democracies of Europe after World War I. Newman has a gift for producing an example or set of statistics at the proper place to illustrate a point. For example, in dealing with the conservative political bias of the Weimar Republic's judges, he cites figures showing among other things that in cases of political murder the average length of imprisonment per murder was four months for rightists and fifteen years for leftists—striking evidence of the anti-democratic, anti-republican atmosphere of the courts of the Weimar Republic!

This book is not for the uninitiated: Newman assumes familiarity with names and events—perhaps too much so. The book is analytical and topical in its approach and not chronological.