flict, for example, has a unique history of its own, and the contemporary context differs completely from that of Trieste. The positions of the outside Powers have hardly been conducive to peaceful adjustment, despite the character of the diplomats who have sought solutions, such as Count Folke Bernadotte and Ambassador Jarring, or Dr. Ralph Bunche. Nevertheless, as this volume well demonstrates, difficult and complex problems like that of Trieste, call for the highest type of diplomat and diplomacy if there is to be the slightest chance of success. The professional diplomat, the student, and the more general reader should take a look at this case study, for there is much to be learned from this book. President Grover Cleveland once remarked about another matter: "It is a condition that confronts us, not a theory". *Trieste 1954* bears significant witness to that point.

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Karl Newman's *European Democracy Between the Wars* is a valuable book even though the title may be slightly misleading. The author is interested mainly in those countries of central and eastern Europe where democracy, established after World War I, succumbed to fascism. While the western democracies are referred to, the book deals mainly with Germany and Austria.

Newman sees no one factor as being decisive in explaining the failure of democracy, and in this regard his work is a considerable advance over the one-cause explanations that tended to predominate before and during World War II. Particular factors relating to one country are dealt with, such as the Henlein movement in Czechoslovakia and the conservative bureaucracy and judiciary in Weimar Germany, but Newman also concentrates on general topics such as the conflict of ideologies in the period after 1919 and the lack of a broad basis of popular understanding of and participation in the infant institutions of the post-war states, such as developed in Great Britain over a period of centuries. He points to the problems of proportional representation. Certainly there is irony in the fact that the founders of the Weimar Republic thought they were strengthening democracy whereas in fact they created a situation which made it almost impossible for democratic forces to coalesce into a working majority which could effectively control and strengthen the new regime.

Newman was born in Germany and lived there until 1939 when he migrated for political reasons to the freer atmosphere of Balliol College in Oxford. Since then he has supplemented his acquaintance with central European affairs by experience in South Africa and as a professor at the University of Dacca. Pakistan. There he helped draft the Pakistan Constitution of 1956. This experience enables him to make comparisons with the new democracies of Europe after World War I. Newman has a gift for producing an example or set of statistics at the proper place to illustrate a point. For example, in dealing with the conservative political bias of the Weimar Republic's judges, he cites figures showing among other things that in cases of political murder the average length of imprisonment per murder was four months for rightists and fifteen years for leftists—striking evidence of the anti-democratic, anti-republican atmosphere of the courts of the Weimar Republic!

This book is not for the uninitiated: Newman assumes familiarity with names and events—perhaps too much so. The book is analytical and topical in its approach and not chronological.
There are one or two points on which one might take issue. If I read correctly, the author indicates that Germany was "only semi-armed" at the time of Munich and the western democracies were actually more powerful than Germany. R. A. Butler in his memoirs maintains, however, that the appeasement policy followed by his government in 1938 was justified because Britain was not prepared at that moment to go to war with Germany. British power was inferior, and the year that passed between Munich and the actual outbreak of war in 1939 was of vital importance in that British rearmament had proceeded much further in several vital respects such as air power.

On the whole, however, this book is a useful example of the work of those scholars who since World War II have attempted to reexamine the failures of democracy between the wars and to give a more sophisticated, comprehensive and satisfying explanation of them. Hopefully more work of the same sort will be done on this exceedingly complex, but fascinating topic.

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