and moderation, a foe of adventures and adventurers, Giers sought always to preserve Russia from foreign conflicts. Like his predecessor Gorchakov, Giers supported the arguments of those who believed that Russia should avoid foreign entanglements—above all, any that might lead to war—and instead should concentrate on internal reform. He was thus a convinced proponent of the Three Emperors' Alliance (Dreikaiserbund) of Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary because he believed that it offered the best hope of security and peace to Russia. In the 1890's he accepted the policy of alignment with France for the same objectives. As the advocate of the moderate course and an honest and straightforward policy, Giers was able to offer guidance and a restraining hand to the tsars he served.

Birkbeck College
University of London

DOUGLAS DAKIN


In this excellent and readable book Dr. Botzaris shows that, although pan-Balkan ideals played a notable part in the preparation of the Greek Revolution, the eventual struggle against the Turks was, for good or for ill, conducted by Greeks alone, with no assistance from the other Balkan Christians. The final result of this heroic and hard fought conflict was the establishment of a small national state with the Arta-Volos frontier in the north—a state excluding the majority of the Greek people. This solution was in part the recognition of the military situation that had developed and in part a compromise imposed by European diplomacy. It bore very little relation to the ideas that prepared the Greek Revolution except in so far as the new kingdom was a democratic society and (in theory at least) a democratic state, much as it might be lacking in democratic institutions. As Dr. Botzaris shows, the ideas of the French Revolution greatly inspired the Greeks, above all the Greek bourgeoisie which had developed both within Greece and in the Greek communities outside. It is, however, not so much with these ideas themselves as the means to carry them into effect that Dr. Botzaris is chiefly concerned: and he shows that in the preparation of the Greek revolt attempts were made to co-ordinate the military action of the different Christian peoples and at the same time to enlist the support of Moslems in conflict with the central power.

Owing to the common tyranny under which all suffered to some degree or other, there was a tendency to unite and to think of simultaneous revolution in all parts of the Empire. Military considerations and the intermingling of the separate peoples in certain areas reinforced this tendency. But concerted action was difficult to come by. The separate Christian peoples (who were at different stages in political, economic and cultural development and for the most part
isolated from one another by geographical conditions) were developing quasi-national characteristics. The notion of a Christian nation (roum melleti) was a Turkish legal conception rather than a political ideal of the Christian subjects, and the conservative thinking of certain ecclesiastics rather than the aim of conspirators and politicians. The result was that, throughout all attempts to organise concerted action, the separate interests staked out their individual claims and these were usually written into treaties. But even then the plans thus concerted had very little durability, so that by the time the Greek War of Independence broke out precious few of the preparatory political arrangements survived and those that remained were soon to disappear. Writes Dr. Botzaris, "Durant la première année de la guerre de l'indépendance hellénique son caractère balkanique s'estompa petit à petit jusqu'a disparaître complètement." All the same, the numerous attempts to organise concerted action were, despite their ultimate failure, practical politics; and it was this realism, this ceaseless political activity, that carried the Greeks forward, that made them active conspirators instead of idle dreamers and that finally led them to the critical days of 1821. What also carried them forward was another realistic belief — realistic but never realised — the belief that in the forthcoming struggle the Balkan peoples would have the assistance of a foreign power. Conspirators like Rhegas looked towards France; but two decades later the Hetairists looked towards Russia, and but for this wishful thinking it is doubtful whether the Hetairia would have reached the point of beginning the Revolution.

The general conclusions reached by Dr. Botzaris (and the same is true of his remarks upon the lack of Balkan co-operation until the wars of 1912-13) are all rather commonplace; but what makes this book important is not so much the final conclusion as the masterly fashion in which it is reached and the concise and well-documented information imparted in the process. What Dr. Botzaris has done, while working out his particular theme, has been to provide the student with a scholarly account of the origins of the Greek revolution. His brilliant book serves a double purpose: it is a book for the specialist since it deals with an aspect of the origins of the Greek Revolution hitherto not thoroughly studied: it is also a book for the general reader, for it provides a concise and well-documented account of the preparation of the Greek revolt. It makes available to the general reader information from numerous Greek and other sources which are set out in the excellent Bibliography. Particularly valuable too are the Appendices (pp. 183-257) of selected documents illustrating various portions of the text. It is therefore a book which every University Library should possess.

Having provided a concise introduction dealing with the Ottoman Empire and its subject peoples, Dr. Botzaris gives a cautious and well-balanced account of Rhegas. For Rhegas, who drew his ideas from the West, the ruling Turks occupied a position similar to that
of the aristocracy in France and he envisaged a reformed regime in which all the Balkan peoples, Turks as well as Christians, would live in freedom according to the precepts of the *Right of Man* and under a Constitution similar to the French Constitution of 1793. Of Rhegas's political activities, however, very little is known and it is even probable they were less than is often supposed. It is not certain whether Rhegas formed an *Hetairia* which was truly organised for subversive action. His particular *Hetairia* may well have consisted only of a few friends and notable associates; and he may well have assumed (and not without good cause) that the military conditions necessary for a revolution already existed and that what was needed to bring about a general upheaval among the potential rebels of the Empire was a lead from France in fulfilment of the revolutionary declaration to give assistance to all oppressed peoples. Among these rebels was Pasvanoglou, Pasha of Vidin, with whom Rhegas was certainly in touch and who was opposed to the centralising policy of Sultan Selim III. But though the great Pashas like Pasvanoglou (and Ali Pasha of Janina) might in certain conditions weaken the Turkish authority, yet they were tyrants, who, if too successful, would destroy that freedom which the Greeks and other Christians enjoyed under Turkish rule and would jeopardise the hopes of Phanariots like Constantine Ypsilantes, who wished to retain the Empire and yet transform it into a modern, liberal and federated State. No wonder then that the Phanariots placed greater hopes in the Christian Slavs than in the Moslem Pashas.

Dr. Botzaris goes on to give a concise account of the growth of Ali Pasha's power, of his wars against the Souliotes and of his intricate relations with the Greeks, the Serbs and other Turks. Likewise he traces in some detail the negotiations between Greeks and Slavs and the policy of Constantine Ypsilantes towards the Serbs when they revolted in 1804. Of particular interest is the discussion of Ali Pasha's relations with the *Filike Hetairia* whose origins and antecedents are admirably traced, full use having been made of the standard work by Kandiloros (1926). In dealing with this astounding organisation, Dr. Botzaris explains how and why it remained almost exclusively Greek, although in its plans for action it assigned rôles to the Serbs, Montenegrins, Bulgarians, Vlachs and Albanians. (It is interesting to note that not much importance was attached to the Danubian Principalities). All these plans (they are taken from Philimon) are set out in detail and the reorganisation of the *Hetairia* by Alexander Ypsilantes (who became its chief) is vividly described. As Dr. Botsaris goes on to show, the *Hetairia* set great store by Ali Pasha's rebellion and decided to support him in some measure, encouraging him to continue the struggle by giving him to understand that the *Hetairia* had Russian support—which was quite untrue. It was indeed Ali Pasha's rebellion which made a Greek Revolution a matter of practical politics and which led to its initial success. The premature collapse of Ali Pasha placed the Greeks in jeopardy, although they managed,
owing to their astounding heroism, to survive. Alexander Ypsilantes had hoped also for assistance from the Serbs but his negotiations with Milosh Obrenovitch, though resulting in a treaty, did not finally lead to military assistance. Similarly, despite protracted negotiations, Alexander Ypsilantes failed to obtain any real support in the Danubian Principalities. Nor was any assistance forthcoming from the Albanians, who eventually threw in their lot with Khourshid Pasha, despite the alliance signed at Peta in September 1821.

Birkbeck College
University of London

DOUGLAS DAKIN


The present study is another indication of the attention Soviet historians have recently directed to the rewriting of Russia's role in the Eastern question in general and the Greek War of Independence in particular. The work of N. M. Druzhinin on the treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji published in 1955 and E. V. Tarle's work on the Crimean War published in 1950 are already quite well known by western scholars of the Eastern question. Fadeev's new book did not come as a surprise. For over a decade he has been working on the subject of Russia's policy and expansion in the south, especially in the Caucasus and the regions of the Black Sea. More precisely, his writings reflect his interests in Russian policy in the Eastern question during the first quarter of the nineteenth century.

The basic interpretation of the volume under review was expounded in an article of his which appeared in Istoricheskie zapiski (No. 54, 1955, pp. 327-342), under the title "Sotsialnoekonomicheskie predposylki vnesheie politiki tsarisma v period vostochnovo krizisa 20kh godov XIX veka". As the title of the article suggests, the main concern of Fadeev is to explore the social and economic basis of tsarist policy with regard to the Eastern question during the 1820's. It is, therefore, natural that he should begin by attacking non Marxist historians as having distorted and as continuing to distort the causes of the Eastern crisis during the period under discussion. He takes issues with such venerable western scholars as C. K. Webster and H. W. Temperley who, according to Fadeev, distorted the crisis by reducing it to a Russo-Turkish conflict for which Russia was almost exclusively responsible. He is no less critical of Russian bourgeois studies of the same subject. He accuses the well-known study of S. S. Tatishchev, Vneshniaia politika Nikolaia I (St. Petersburg, 1887) and of S. Zhigarev, Russkaia politika v vostochnom voprose (Moscow, 1896) as apologies of the reactionary foreign policy of tsarism. These studies, according to Fadeev, play down the predatory intentions of tsarist policy, while at the same time they emphasize the liberating mission of tsarism