short later-day kontakia, which consists of a prooeimium and three strophes (the acrostic being ώδή) does not differ in any way from an ode of an hagiological canon. When it reached this corrupt state, the disappearance of the kontakion was virtually unavoidable. Thus only relics and fragments have survived from the earlier poetry of the kontakion, because they were given a new liturgical place as inter-ode interludes. So, a poetical genre that started with such magnificence and produced a poet as great as Romanos the Melodist, survived for many centuries within the protective framework of the Church, but dwindled and disappeared in the end, because it lacked the necessary qualities for any renovation.

The first volume of Prof. Mitsakis’ Byzantine Hymnography is a work of research and experience. Happily enough, the author is still very young and thus we can not only wish for, but also expect, the second volume of this opus which will be devoted to the poetry of the canons. This expectation brings great joy to us, but should evoke, in the author, a sense of duty, of the duty to complete this monumental work on the Byzantine Hymnography of the Orthodox Church.

University of Athens

P. B. Paschos


Professor Remington opens her book on the Warsaw Pact with a selection from Cavafy’s poem «Expecting the Barbarians», noting that «Those people» were not, in fact, a solution. She goes on to elaborate upon the ambivalence in the minds of the Soviet leadership regarding the purpose of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, offering examples in which it is clear that warding off external threats was at the center of the founders’ intentions, and others in which ideological or communitarian considerations are paramount. This ambiguity of intention, Remington observes, has contributed to the apparent schizophrenia of the WTO members, particularly of the Soviet Union, in attempting to cope with the successive challenges which the organization has faced. Complicating these two motivations, Remington adds, were divisions in the Soviet leadership and the reciprocal influences of one or another vision of the role of the WTO and the standing of its spokesman in Moscow.

As Remington demonstrates in great detail, it is not only the senior partner which has set the tone of the organization. A content analysis of speeches and position papers of all member states reveals considerable differences in the relative weight which each has given to the variety of issues facing the alliance (pp. 42-46). The importance of the WTO to the Soviet Union is illuminated in the successive attempts which the superpower has made to link the Pact with the Chinese threat. Its failure to do so indicates the strength of East European interpretations of the Pact’s geographical limitations (pp. 77, 137-140). In separate analyses of the conflicts to which these differences gave rise, that is, of the Hungarian crisis of 1956, the break with Albania, the Rumanian challenge to Soviet authority in foreign policy, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and wider matters of détente, especially those concerning normalization of relations with West Germany, Remington seeks to establish, in effect, whether the Pact had taken on a meaning beyond its temporary and convenient use as an instrument of Soviet policy and whether its role and the members’ perceptions of that role changed from one challenge to the next. These analyses are exceptionally thorough. Armed with the impressive resources of MIT’s Center for International Studies, Remington surveyed WTO documents, newspapers and radio broadcasts of the mem-
ber states as well as numerous East European periodicals and commentaries. The result is fine classical Kremlinology. By carefully exposing the circumstances prevailing in each instance of conflict, she is able to explain why the Soviet Union acted to invade Hungary and Czechoslovakia, while merely excluding Albania from the organization and negotiating with Rumania. For example, regarding the different treatment accorded to the Czechs and the Rumanians, she observes that five factors were at work (pp. 170-172): The first was the arena of conflict, domestic in the Czech case, foreign in the Rumanian. The former hit at the heart of the ideological definition of the alliance and its members, while the latter avoided it. Second was the fact that earlier conflicts did indeed condition later outcomes and that, while Rumanian-Soviet differences developed gradually and while there was always room for maneuver with the Rumanians the Czech crisis came upon the WTO all of a sudden and demanded a solution. Third, the Rumanian Party had retained its leading role, while its Czech counterpart had clearly succumbed to galloping pluralism. Fourth, the Rumanians had support from the Chinese while the Czechs didn’t even have their old «Little Entente» allies, Yugoslavia being out of the picture entirely and Rumania being isolated at the time owing to conflicts over the structure of the joint command and the question of non-proliferation. Finally, Remington notes the attitudes of the other member states in each instance: The Czechoslovak developments were regarded as a threat to the stability of other East European regimes, while Rumanian attempts to achieve limited independence in foreign policy were attractive and deemed worthy of imitation. Remington concludes (pp. 185-188) that both sides in these and the other conflicts attempted to use the Pact to their own advantage, either as a shield or as a weapon. The various challenges, of which these two are representative, were all contained to a degree by the coalition, even if did not serve to resolve them.

Professor Remington asks early in the book how relevant a common ideology is to coalition behavior. Her answer, while indirect, is that it is very important. Discussing the Brezhnev Doctrine (p. 109), she points out that the proponents of the notions of socialist community and limited sovereignty ignored the Warsaw Pact and were in fact denying the Treaty’s provisions for non-interference in the internal affairs of the members. The Brezhnev Doctrine in fact recalled the early and unsuccessful attempts of Molotov to regard the grouping as an instrument for the consolidation of the socialist community (p.173). While Khrushchevian notions of détente dominated the early days of the Pact, its ideological importance continued to be manifest until finally it was formalized in the post-Czech invasion period. (Subsequent Soviet protestations to the nonexistence of a doctrine of limited sovereignty ought still to be regarded with scepticism). Remington confirms the significance of ideology for coalition behavior in concluding that superpowers do not give up their habits of thought merely by virtue of expanding the scope of their activities through a multilateral organization. Comparing the Warsaw Pact with the Organization of American States, Remington suggests that organizations are of little help to those who seek to disabuse superpowers of their long-held myths. One might add that it is the wise small power which recognizes the limits of organization and invokes the protective shield of ideology. To give an example, the Rumanian national anthem alone among the anthems of the East European states contains a reference to fraternal relations with the Soviet Union. It probably does not matter whether or not the relevant verse is ever sung.

The format of this book is that of a series of case studies, but inasmuch as Remington asks explicit questions about the impact of a coalition on conflict situations among its members, the reader is justified in wondering why no reference is made to the general literature
on political coalitions. Riker, for instance, suggests that coalition partners will always act to pare down their membership to the minimum necessary to achieve essential goals. The Soviet Union does appear to have acted in accordance with this precept in the Rumanian and Albanian cases. If the Soviet Union could still retain effective control in Eastern Europe with core doctrinal values, particularly those regarding the socialist community remaining intact, its leaders eventually learned a «minimum winning coalition» was bound to be less troublesome than a larger one with uncertain loyalties at the margin. Leiserson offers a complementary theory in suggesting that coalition makers strike bargains with their adversaries as well as with their partners in order to secure mutual gains. This type of behavior is evident in Soviet attempts to freeze their reluctant East German partners out of the détente negotiations. It was clearly in the interest of the Soviet Union and Poland to co-operate with West Germany rather than with East Germany. Remington calls attention to the longstanding nature of Soviet-East German differences and the attempt of WTO members to use the Pact to enforce East German compliance with coalition aims in Europe (134). Temporary restraint of one member of the coalition in the interest of the others thus had the effect of strengthening the coalition vis-à-vis its adversaries at the same time that it was co-operating with them. Clearly the barbarians can reside within the walls as well as beyond them.

Another area to which Professor Remington alludes but does not treat in detail is the importance of the geographical factor in explaining different reactions to conflicts within the coalition. With the exception of the Polish events of December 1970, Soviet policy has always been to resolve conflicts in the northern tier of East European states by invasion; even in Poland, Remington notes, there was massive economic intervention (177). Troublemakers in the Balkans, on the other hand, have been the object of negotiation or exclusion. Remington relegates to a footnote the concept of a «second strategic echelon» (60), but one wonders whether there might not be more to the matter than she concedes. The Warsaw Treaty, after all, was executed only in Russian, Polish, Czech and German (Document, p. 204). The outright exclusion of all the Balkan languages implies a clear geographical hierarchy within the alliance which existed prior to the mitigating factor of Chinese interest in East Europe dissidents. Indeed, the Chinese protested the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia as well. The Soviet Union has generally sought to achieve its goals in the Balkans by indirect means. It will be remembered, for example, that Stalin told Djilas that Yugoslavia should go ahead and swallow up Albania.

A brief note on style is in order. Remington writes well and, as she promises in the introduction, without jargon. It is unfortunate, therefore, that the book was badly proofread before it went to the printer. The number of grammatical and typographical errors which remain are inexcusable in a work of the quality—and the cost—of this one. Even the documents suffer from careless editing.

Center for International Studies
Cornell University

CYNTHIA W. FREY


This voluminous book is the fruit of many years of research covering the relatively brief span of eighteen years of history of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The author very aptly describes this period as the «most interesting» since the fall of Constantinople and the «most decisive for the future of the Patriarchate» (p. 29). It is a period in which the historical stage