owing to their astounding heroism, to survive. Alexander Ypsilantes had hoped also for assistance from the Serbs but his negotiations with Milosh Obrenovitch, though resulting in a treaty, did not finally lead to military assistance. Similarly, despite protracted negotiations, Alexander Ypsilantes failed to obtain any real support in the Danubian Principalities. Nor was any assistance forthcoming from the Albanians, who eventually threw in their lot with Khourshid Pasha, despite the alliance signed at Peta in September 1821.

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The present study is another indication of the attention Soviet historians have recently directed to the rewriting of Russia's role in the Eastern question in general and the Greek War of Independence in particular. The work of N. M. Druzhinin on the treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji published in 1955 and E. V. Tarle's work on the Crimean War published in 1950 are already quite well known by western scholars of the Eastern question. Fadeev's new book did not come as a surprise. For over a decade he has been working on the subject of Russia's policy and expansion in the south, especially in the Caucasus and the regions of the Black Sea. More precisely, his writings reflect his interests in Russian policy in the Eastern question during the first quarter of the nineteenth century.

The basic interpretation of the volume under review was expounded in an article of his which appeared in Istoricheskie zapiski (No. 54, 1955, pp. 327-342), under the title "Sotsialnoekonomicheskie predposylki vneshnei politiki tsarisma v period vostochnovo krizisa 20kh godov XIX veka". As the title of the article suggests, the main concern of Fadeev is to explore the social and economic basis of tsarist policy with regard to the Eastern question during the 1820's. It is, therefore, natural that he should begin by attacking non Marxist historians as having distorted and as continuing to distort the causes of the Eastern crisis during the period under discussion. He takes issues with such venerable western scholars as C. K. Webster and H. W. Temperley who, according to Fadeev, distorted the crisis by reducing it to a Russo - Turkish conflict for which Russia was almost exclusively responsible. He is no less critical of Russian bourgeois studies of the same subject. He accuses the well-known study of S. S. Tatishchev, Vneshniaia politika Nikolaia I (St. Petersburg, 1887) and of S. Zhigarev, Russkaia politika v vostochnom voprose (Moscow, 1896) as apologies of the reactionary foreign policy of tsarism. These studies, according to Fadeev, play down the predatory intentions of tsarist policy, while at the same time they emphasize the liberating mission of tsarism
in the Balkans and the Caucasus. In typical Soviet fashion, he relates recent historiography in the west to political developments. He maintains that falsification of the Eastern crisis continues, because in order to cover twentieth-century imperialism, western scholars emphasize the efforts which the European powers had made for the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Unjustifiably, he points out as a typical sample of this type of work F. E. Bailey's, *British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement* (Cambridge, 1942).

Fadeev does point out that the Eastern crisis in the 1820's was the culmination of forces at play since the eighteenth century when the Eastern question really assumed international proportions, and that among these ingredients were the decline of the Ottoman Empire, the rise of nationalism among the subject peoples of the Empire, and of course the rivalry of European powers for dominance in the Empire's European and Asiatic provinces. What bourgeois historians have failed to emphasize, and this according to Fadeev has been taken up with dedication by Soviet historians, are the conditions which resulted from the economic growth both in the Ottoman Empire and the European powers, and which conditions determined policy during the Eastern crisis. In this respect, the position of Russia *vis à vis* the Eastern question takes on special meaning. Fadeev mentions briefly Russia's traditional concern for security of her Southern frontier and the influence it had on Russian foreign policy, but he attaches far greater significance to conditions which resulted from the disintegration of the feudal serf system and the growth of capitalistic attitudes which compelled the ruling class of landlords and merchants to desire control of seaports in order to stimulate foreign trade. In short, the desire to control strategic places for economic reasons explains tsarist aspirations to control the Straits, exert influence in the Balkans and expand in the Caucasus.

In typical Marxist historiographic fashion, Fadeev pays his due respect to the socio-economic analysis of the Eastern question by Marx and Lenin. Consequently, in the first two chapters, which are an examination of the socio-economic basis of tsarist policy in the Eastern question, he draws extensively from their work. He achieves some success in developing his theme. After all, nobody can deny the fact that this was an age when traditional economic social as well as political institutions were undergoing changes either in the Balkans or in territories contiguous to Russia's Southern frontier. What seems unjustifiable is Fadeev's presumptuous attitude that western scholars had not discussed these developments. Bailey's book, which he singled out for criticism, devotes its first third to a discussion of the expansion of British commercial interests in the Levant and their influence on British policy in the Near East. Fadeev also seems to underestimate the importance of other forces, such as the personalities involved, which contributed to the complexity of the situation. Furthermore, important as the socio-economic forces were, they did not occupy
completely the attention of Nicholas I, who was concerned just as much with the maintenance of the status quo.

Despite the above criticism, Fadeev's work is a useful and comprehensive account of a significant period in nineteenth century diplomacy over the Eastern question. The major part of his narrative is divided into three periods. The first one covers the years 1821-1823 when the conflict was located in the Morea and the Principalities as a result of the outbreak of the Greek War of Independence. The second phase which also encompassed Egypt and Iran covers the years 1824-1827. Then he discusses the period 1828-1829 when the Russo-Turkish war and the intervention of the great powers made the entire Near and Middle East an area of contention. He concludes with a discussion on the treaty of Adrianople (1829) and its historical significance. Reading Fadeev's detail study of the Eastern crisis in the 20's, this reviewer became convinced that western scholars can benefit from the works of Soviet historians even though the former may reject the latter's Marxist interpretation of history.

Fadeev has utilized both primary and secondary sources. He consulted several standard western works on the subject, especially the ones he wanted to criticize. Yet one cannot help but notice serious omissions of works by western scholars. Concerned with socio economic developments in the Eastern question as Fadeev is, he should have consulted the admirable and instructive two-volume study of H.A.R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West* (London, 1950, 1957).

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As the subtitle suggests, the essay under review is a contribution to the study of Russian policy on Mount Athos. The author achieves his objective through a carefully documented account of the so called Georgian question. Essentially, the Georgian question, which upset the relations of Greeks, Georgians and Russians for half a century (1868-1918), consisted of claims by Georgian monks on Mount Athos over the famous monastery of Iviron, and the resistance of the Greek monks to these claims. The monastery, which originally belonged to the Georgians, had gradually passed into the hands of the Greeks and by 1868 became Greek in character and orientation. On that same year, a delegation of twelve Georgians, headed by the monk Benedict, arrived at Mount Athos. Having purchased the kell of St. John the Divine