

organization of the material. The author finds it necessary to backtrack quite frequently and insert brief historical reviews that take the reader from the pre-WW II years to the early seventies on problems and reforms in trade and finance for both the East and the West.

Similar treatments of international trade and finance problems in the Eastern bloc can be found in the works of Western writers on the socialist economy. Dr. Zwass' book, however, carries the seal of first-hand, rich practical experience which he acquired in his capacity as a representative of Poland in the Moscow secretariat of the CMEA and with the International Bank for Economic Cooperation (IBEC) between 1963 and 1968. This is especially noticeable in the discussion of the institutional arrangements for the handling of money and credit matters in the CMEA countries. The role of the IBEC and the International Investment Bank is discussed in detail and these institutions are contrasted to their counterparts in the West.

This comparative approach is also used throughout the first part and helps to bring into better focus the discussion, in the last two chapters, of "monetary steering instruments of East-West" and the potential of monetary cooperation of the two trading blocs. In these chapters, after a detailed discussion of the payments procedures involved in clearing and switching operations and credit for East-West settlements, the author points to the trend towards multilateralisation of payments between the East and the West. These developments seem to be "pressing towards the integration of the monetary system". But this would require modification of the present international monetary system as well as substantial reforms in the CMEA countries.

In summarizing his outlook for the future, Zwass sees that a great deal of work and concessions from both sides will be necessary in order to capitalize on the "lively monetary and credit relations that have emerged between the CMEA countries and the West" in recent years.

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V. Mehta, *Soviet Economic Policy. Income Differentials in USSR*, New Delhi, 1977, pp. 134.

The analysis of economic conditions and of economic achievements in the Soviet Union faces tremendous difficulties because economic data are treated as classified material. It follows that Mr. V. Mehta who is Indian, could not check what an information he got but this did not prevent him as long as he knows Russian (he is referring to books and articles published in same) to present a picture of income differentials in the Soviet Union. Everybody, and particularly those who have had the opportunity to visit the Soviet Union, knows that income differentials are substantial, particularly when including in comparisons goods and services supplied in naturam, to those who get preferential treatment. If these differentials increase or decrease is a matter of minor importance as long as those who do not belong to the group with privileges face tremendous difficulties to satisfy vital needs. Mr. V. Mehta is supplying well-known data about income differentials in cash without mentioning, however, what is referred "in naturam", and what it is impossible for the man in the street to get. Queues, black market deals even if openly carried out in the streets of the big cities, strenuous efforts to get admission to the shops accepting only western currencies where prices are 80 % lower than in the shops where payments are carried out in rubles and the desire to buy abroad even in the Eastern bloc countries, constitute proofs that 60 years after the October revolution and despite

the substantial results of developments achieved in the last two decades before World War I, Gerschenkron believes that then were achieved the highest rates of development ever noticed in the whole world, did not allow the Soviet Union to secure satisfactory living conditions for all its inhabitants.

As it was to be expected income differentials favour those whose efforts are considered by those in charge as more important from the general point of view. As those supplying services and those producing agricultural commodities are at the bottom of the income ladder it is not astonishing that services are so poor in the Soviet Union and that the latter has developed into a great importer of foodstuffs whilst before 1914 Russia was Europe's granary.

The author does not hide that the lowest income is rubles 60 (\$79) but insists on additions whenever the job is considered useful for the whole country or whenever it is carried out in areas whose development is a target of the country's policy. He also insists on the services which are rendered there without pay whilst forgetting that the same applies in many cases in the West. The author believes, but is not able to prove it, that the income differentials are bigger in the West than in the Soviet Union. He also states that marxism does not insist on full equality of incomes because this discourages efforts to improve output both quantitatively and qualitatively. The reader of this book does not get a hint if the author has ever been in the Soviet Union and it follows that very often he is not persuasive as he ought to be if he had visited the Soviet Union with open eyes. Let me end by mentioning the author's insistence that some prices in the Soviet Union have been somewhat reduced without, however, any improvement of the chances of diversification independently of the scarcity of housing.

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Wassilij Alexeev and Theofanis G. Stavrou, *The Great Revival, the Russian Church under German Occupation*, Minneapolis, Minnesota, Burgess Publishing Company, 1976/77. pp. xvi+ 229.

This new book about the Russian Orthodox Church during the dark days of World War II is a welcome addition to the scant literature available on the subject. The work stands in sharp contrast to Soviet Studies on the role of the Church during the War and in contrast to the scabrous displays that one finds in "museums of atheism", located in former church buildings in Novgorod, Kiev, and Leningrad. From the official Soviet point of view the Church treacherously welcomed the Nazi invasion, fully conscious of the sinister implications of Nazi ideology, and joined with the invader to stab the people in the back. Alexeev and Stavrou lay that myth aside as they systematically unfold evidence that, despite scorching persecution visited upon the Church in the 1920s and 1930s, a deep residue of faith persisted and that *any* force that would have alleviated the suffering of believers would have been welcome. The people suffered equally under Communists and Nazis. Both despotic ideologies were forced to recognize the persistence of faith in Orthodoxy and eventually to allow it to surface so they could use it against each other. Whichever of them had showed favor to the Church would have had the support of the people. In the end, both were forced to permit the Church to revive.

The Great Revival also helps to counter a long established anti-Orthodox prejudice among scholars in the West. The image of the Church depicted in Richard Pipes' *Russia Under The Old Regime* as a decadent and dying institution since the 19th century loses its credibility in the face of this work. It is a step in the direction of a badly needed reassessment of the Church