

over the whole of the period since the Petrine Reform of the 18th century. The inaccurate or unsympathetic picture of the Orthodox Church, painted by both pre- and post-revolutionary authors in Russia and by most Western scholars of both eras is one of the heavy burdens that must be lifted before the real role of the Church can be assessed, together with the enduring impact it has had upon public life in Russia. Alexeev and Stavrou join such authors as William C. Fletcher (*The Russian Orthodox Church Underground, 1917-1970*) and Harvey Fireside (*Icon and Swastika*) in the task of shedding new light on the subject.

The Great Revival has its key value in the great number of personal interviews conducted over a period of twenty years in the United States and in Europe with refugees and other personalities involved in the fate of the Church during World War II and since. Their testimonies are skillfully supplemented and verified by captured German and Soviet sources which describe the same personalities and events from official perspective. The result is a two dimensional portrait, personal and official, of the drama of reopening churches, reinstating liturgical horaria, and bringing the mysteries of the Church back to a spiritually starved people.

The book closes with an update on the continuity to the present time of the impact of the revival of the 1940s. Despite a crackdown on the Church launched by Nikita Khrushchev in 1959, the spiritual yearning persists today, as can be witnessed through the writings of such men as Solzhenitsyn, the protests of worshippers against closure of churches that reach the Western press, or the confidential communication to visitors from the outside by persons in government ministries or such prestigious institutions as the Soviet Academy of Sciences that they themselves are secret believers or that they are oppressed by the spiritual vacuum that currently pervades all facets of the earthly paradise created by the heirs of Lenin.

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Dwight E. Lee, *Europe's Crucial Years: The Diplomatic Background of World War I, 1902-1914*, Hanover, New Hampshire, University Press of New England, 1974, pp. xiv + 482.

For all its long and varied history the Balkan Peninsula has fallen from popular awareness. Today the Third World and Middle East capture the headlines while the Balkans lie relatively forgotten. Yet it was the area in which forces came together to produce what was probably the most decisive event of the twentieth century, the First World War. In every part of the globe we face problems that can be traced either directly to that cataclysm or to its by-products and it began, as we know, in the Balkans. This war continues to haunt the minds and lives of its survivors and well as the concerns of historians. What led to this extraordinary event in which so much was lost with so little lasting gain? And what was there at Sarajevo that could prompt such incomprehensible bloodshed on so massive a scale? This debate began almost as soon as the war and we have seen "war guilt" challenged by "revisionism", and then "anti-revisionism" while scholarship came to the fore as the immediacy of the event passed, tempers cooled, and archives were opened.

Dwight E. Lee has spent four decades dealing with this topic and now, with the publication of *Europe's Crucial Years*, he presents his conclusions. Covering the years 1902-1914 he fills the gap left by Langer's *The Diplomacy of Imperialism* and brings us to the fatal moment when the lamps began to go out. Focusing on the diplomatic events of these years, he establishes the global roots of the event and takes us from Manchuria to Morocco, Mukden to Agadir, but always returns us to the Balkans. His initial question is why conditions in July

1914 led to war when four earlier crises within the decade had been settled without a general war. The answer to this is sought in the diplomatic exchanges of ambassadors, ministers, and monarchs and reminds us that much of the past is still with us. Time and again frustrated statesmen blame policy failure on the machinations of some other power while documents now available make clear their error; thus Germany blamed its debacle at Algeciras on British inspiration, London saw Berlin behind the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Vienna insisted that the opposition to this seizure was led by Great Britain in an attempt to weaken Germany. We are certainly aware of the conspiracy thesis but these examples point up the danger of using such as the basis for policy. With recent events in the United States in mind there is a sadly familiar sound to the demands for secrecy and the rage when confidential materials were published, but Izvolsky's susceptibility to blackmail after the Buchlau meeting was entirely the result of his own ineptitude in appearing to grant Austria territory that was still officially Turkish and, in numerous other instances, secrecy served not national interest but individual reputation. The nearly unshakable British faith in the imminence of Turkish reform is perhaps comparable to Washington's optimistic support of each successive South Vietnamese regime and the frequency with which statesmen raised the cry of "national honor" when no valid reason for action could be found gives a feeling of *déjà vu* to the present.

Professor Lee identifies a series of foci for the crises of the period. The decline of the Ottoman Empire created a situation in which the "latent great-power rivalries...and the strident nationalism of the Balkan peoples" (p. 176), determined the eastern axis of rivalry while Anglo-German tension dominated western Europe between 1909 and 1911. Permeating these were the reality of Alsace-Lorraine and Austro-Hungarian competition with Russia in the Balkans. Alsace-Lorraine may not have created confrontations between Germany and France but it did block any amicable settlements.

The Bosnian crisis resulted in a decisive loss for the Russians and provided a, "dress rehearsal for... July 1914" (p. 206). It also led directly to the Balkan Wars which came about partially because the Powers could not bring themselves to recognize the peninsular states as other than pawns of "most-interested" capitals or as the creatures of the concert of Europe. This new clash only further unsettled the region and exposed the absence of agreement between Berlin and Vienna. While preparing the draft of this agreement Vienna was overtaken by the assassination and confronted with its own internal minority problem it risked everything. As one minister expressed it, "Better a fearful end than endless fears" (p. 386). The lingering dynasticism of the Dual Monarchy juxtaposed with Balkan nationalism resulted in an irrepressible conflict. Significantly, it is suggested that had the two great alliance systems been clearly opposed in July, the guns of August might have remained silent. As it was, the alliances served to delineate two camps but were vague enough to allow each to expect desertion from or diminution of the other. Thus, Dr. Lee concludes, (p. 442):

"The reason why in 1914 war engulfed the Continent instead of being limited to two great powers... lay in the evolution over the previous crucial years of the alliance system, designed to give nations security, but operating in the end to bring all into catastrophe".

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Robert A. Kann, Béla A. Király, Paula S. Fichtner, Eds., *The Habsburg Empire in World War I*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1977, pp. xiv + 247.

The sub-title of this symposium identifies its coverage better than its title-heading, since