

1914 led to war when four earlier crises within the decade had been settled without a general war. The answer to this is sought in the diplomatic exchanges of ambassadors, ministers, and monarchs and reminds us that much of the past is still with us. Time and again frustrated statesmen blame policy failure on the machinations of some other power while documents now available make clear their error; thus Germany blamed its debacle at Algeciras on British inspiration, London saw Berlin behind the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Vienna insisted that the opposition to this seizure was led by Great Britain in an attempt to weaken Germany. We are certainly aware of the conspiracy thesis but these examples point up the danger of using such as the basis for policy. With recent events in the United States in mind there is a sadly familiar sound to the demands for secrecy and the rage when confidential materials were published, but Izvolsky's susceptibility to blackmail after the Buchlau meeting was entirely the result of his own ineptitude in appearing to grant Austria territory that was still officially Turkish and, in numerous other instances, secrecy served not national interest but individual reputation. The nearly unshakable British faith in the imminence of Turkish reform is perhaps comparable to Washington's optimistic support of each successive South Vietnamese regime and the frequency with which statesmen raised the cry of "national honor" when no valid reason for action could be found gives a feeling of *déjà vu* to the present.

Professor Lee identifies a series of foci for the crises of the period. The decline of the Ottoman Empire created a situation in which the "latent great-power rivalries...and the strident nationalism of the Balkan peoples" (p. 176), determined the eastern axis of rivalry while Anglo-German tension dominated western Europe between 1909 and 1911. Permeating these were the reality of Alsace-Lorraine and Austro-Hungarian competition with Russia in the Balkans. Alsace-Lorraine may not have created confrontations between Germany and France but it did block any amicable settlements.

The Bosnian crisis resulted in a decisive loss for the Russians and provided a, "dress rehearsal for... July 1914" (p. 206). It also led directly to the Balkan Wars which came about partially because the Powers could not bring themselves to recognize the peninsular states as other than pawns of "most-interested" capitals or as the creatures of the concert of Europe. This new clash only further unsettled the region and exposed the absence of agreement between Berlin and Vienna. While preparing the draft of this agreement Vienna was overtaken by the assassination and confronted with its own internal minority problem it risked everything. As one minister expressed it, "Better a fearful end than endless fears" (p. 386). The lingering dynasticism of the Dual Monarchy juxtaposed with Balkan nationalism resulted in an irrepressible conflict. Significantly, it is suggested that had the two great alliance systems been clearly opposed in July, the guns of August might have remained silent. As it was, the alliances served to delineate two camps but were vague enough to allow each to expect desertion from or diminution of the other. Thus, Dr. Lee concludes, (p. 442):

"The reason why in 1914 war engulfed the Continent instead of being limited to two great powers... lay in the evolution over the previous crucial years of the alliance system, designed to give nations security, but operating in the end to bring all into catastrophe".

*Ithaca College*

JOHN R. PAVIA, JR.

Robert A. Kann, Béla A. Király, Paula S. Fichtner, Eds., *The Habsburg Empire in World War I*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1977, pp. xiv + 247.

The sub-title of this symposium identifies its coverage better than its title-heading, since

it covers "Esays on the Intellectual, Military, Political and Economic Aspects of the Habsburg War Effort". Its 12 chapters deal with: Part I: Domestic Affairs ("The Union of Czech Political Parties in the *Reichsrat* 1916-1918", by Victor S. Mamatey; "Leap into the Dark: The Issue of Suffrage in Hungary", by Gábor Vermes; "Mlada Bosna and the First World War", by Wayne S. Vucinich). Part II: Military Affairs ("The Habsburg Army in the First World War: 1914-1918", by Gunther E. Rothenberg; "A Unique Army: The Common Experience", by Jay Luvaa; "Contradicting Ideologies: The Pressure of Ideological Conflicts in the Austro-Hungarian Army of World War I", by Richard G. Plaschka; "Transportation: The Achilles Heel of the Habsburg War Effort", by J. Robert Wegs; "Elements of Limited and Total Warfare", by Béla K. Király). Part III: Intellectual Life ("Trends in Austro-German Literature During World War I", by Robert A. Kann; "The Turning of the World: Hungarian Progressive Writers", by Eve S. Balogh; "The German Concept of *Mittleuropa* 1916-1918 and its Contemporary Critics", by Stephen Verosta; "Americans and the Disintegration of the Habsburg Monarchy: The Shaping of an Historiographical Model", by Paula S. Fichtner).

Although there are several standard histories on the downfall of Austria-Hungary this symposium adds, here and there, some valuable details to our knowledge of this segment of history. The best contribution is probably that of Mamatey. The chapter by Verosta could have been strengthened by citing additional references available on this topic; and the same applies to the chapter by Fichtner.

City University of New York

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

Luza Radomir, *Austro-German Relations in the Anschluss Era*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1975, pp. 420 + index.

The title of this book is somewhat misleading since it does not concern itself with a traditional recounting of Austro-German diplomatic relations leading to *Anschluss*. This work fills a more basic need by answering many of the nagging questions about Nazi Germany's internal administration and foreign policy because it is primarily about Germany and Austria after the *Anschluss*. Germany's Austrian rule contained elements of both internal and foreign policy. Even though Austria was a part of the Reich by 1938, it was administered differently from the rest of the country and here was the problem of assimilation since Austrian customs and laws were very different from those of Germany. The new Nazi administration swung from trying to stamp out differences to trying to keep Austrian culture alive.

Part of this changing policy came from internal differences among the Nazis. In 1938, Hitler placed Josef Burckel, the leader of the Saar Nazis, in charge. Burckel acted as he had during and after the Saar plebiscite, and he brought many of his people from the Saar with him to help organize and control Austria as the Nazis had done in the Saar a few years before. Of course, Burckel came into immediate conflict with unhappy local Nazis who expected more power after the *Anschluss*. Burckel squeezed out local leaders like Seyss-Inquart and ruled Austria as a satrapy of his own. When Baldur Schirach replaced Burckel, the Nazi youth leader encouraged Austrian cultural independence, and sometimes directly opposed Goebbels' cultural policies. However he could not stop the growing Austrian disenchantment with German rule. Originally, most Austrians, including the Socialist leader Renner, had supported *Anschluss*. Many Austrians continued to approve of the concept of union, but disliked the way it was being administered. They felt they were an economic colony, ruled for the benefit of the Reich, with German industry profiting at Austria's expense.