Here in Austria, as in other parts of the Nazi Empire, one finds one segment of the Nazi hierarchy pitted against all the others. When the problems of Austria were brought to Hitler, he was indecisive on administrative policy. He would not define what group should rule Austria and what policy should be followed. It would almost seem that Hitler purposely let his people work against each other in the sort of survival of the fittest theory which in *Mein Kampf* he wrote was essential if the German or any civilization were to survive.

One part of Hitler's plans for Austria involved the Balkans. Economically, Hitler wanted to restore the kind of relations which once had existed between Vienna and Southeastern Europe. Many former Habsburg bureaucrats were restored to their former functions because the Germans assumed that Austrians would be better acquainted with the area than the Germans. Upon occasion, Hitler consciously revived the symbols of the dual monarchy. Once, he appeared in the white military jacket of a Habsburg general. In 1941, Hitler honored the grave of the Austro-Hungarian Commander-in-Chief, Conrad von Hotzendorf. Hitler had to revive the, for him, hated memories of the Habsburg monarchy in order to trade with Central and Southeastern Europe.

Professor Luza has thoroughly researched this book relying heavily upon Nazi archives. Consequently, there is much valuable material, not only on Austria, but there are also important insights into the decision making and foreign policy in the Third Reich. The only flaw is that Professor Luza tends to concentrate on the period of Nazi consolidation between 1938 and 1940. The later years are passed over relatively quickly. A second volume on the 1940-1945 period would have been preferable to so much condensation. Despite this shortcoming, the book is an extremely valuable addition to the literature on the Nazis.

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James Dugan, a noted author, originally conceived of *Days of Emperor and Clown* and collected the material for it but died before any manuscript was written. Laurence Lafore is a professional historian who teaches at the University of Iowa and is the author of many books such as *The Long Fuse: An Interpretation of the Origins of World War I* and *The End of Glory: An Interpretation of the Origins of World War II*. The publisher asked him to finish the project, and thus Lafore is really responsible for the book.

The book consists of the following themes: One, Fascist Italy's attack on Ethiopia as an act of naked colonial aggression; two, a synoptic history of the feudal Ethiopian Empire, undemocratic in its political nature and caught in the trauma of modernization; three, a diplomatic history of the oft-told failure of the League of Nations because of the appeasement policies of the British and French governments; four, at the same time, a brilliant and original description of the League and of the Emperor Haile Selassie as the moral and psychological spokesmen that crystallized and transformed world opinion into a democratic alliance against fascism; (it was the appearance of this "romantic internationalism" as a new political consciousness that made possible the international brigades and the will to resist fascism in Spain the following year in spite of the conservatism of the democratic governments of France and England), five, the military conquest and repressive occupation of Ethiopia which, cause and
effect, produced the resistance, the first national liberation movement that became part of World War II. In this last phase Lafore points out that the psychological and political parameters of the postwar aims of the British government were set: a reluctant acceptance of the anti-colonial goal of national liberation balanced by a desire to restore rather than reconstruct the world after the defeat of the Axis. He points to British policy in Greece in 1944-45 by way of tragic example.

Lafore reminds the reader of the ugly truth of the Italian fascist occupation, which was in full swing by 1937. The natives were treated as *Untermensch* fit for extermination in the name of racial purity. What came to the fore during the occupation was an inner fascist logic and I suggest, that the explanation that Mussolini was helplessly under the influence of Hitler when he passed the anti-semitic decrees of 1938 is, perhaps, a subtle apologia in light of fascist policy in Ethiopia.

But the theme of the book which gives unity to all its parts is the way the League and the Emperor, identified almost as one, revived and crystallized the Wilsonian sentiment that democracy, however defined, had to defend itself against the evil of fascism. Lafore points out that the crisis was extremely important in transforming a majority isolationist attitude in the United States into a neo-Wilsonian belief that democracy must be defended. This was a vital precondition for America’s benevolent neutrality and subsequent entry into the war. Though not a League member, the United States did support the boycott even in oil; it was France and England which refused to extend the boycott to energy fuels. Even Anthony Eden, British spokesman for the League, was more concerned with protecting the public appearance of the British cabinet in the face of democratic sentiment than in defending and utilizing the League as an instrument against fascism. This policy of appeasement finally split the democratic world into communist and anti-communist camps. Ironically, it was that split which had to be reconstructed in order to destroy the fascist alliance in World War II.

This is an excellent book, exceptionally well written, which will satisfy the general reader and the specialist at one and the same time.

*The Rise and Fall of the New Roman Empire* is a diplomatic history which stresses the continuity of Italian foreign policy from the first Ethiopian adventure in the 1880’s to World War II. The author traces an arc from the Dalmatian coast to the Red Sea, and another along the coast of Tunis and Libya as indicating the range of Italian vital interests. But on the one hand these interests created a structure of antagonism with France, and on the other, with the Habsburg Empire. Barclay’s primary emphasis is on the origins of and Italy’s role in World War I, and here he is at his best. He dramatically demonstrates the connection between the Bosnian Crisis and the Libyan War, expressed in geopolitical terms, between Southeast Europe and North Africa. In order to defeat the Porte for control of Tripoli the Italian navy closed the Straits, shelled Prevesa and seized the Dodecanese Islands. In contrast to Lafore’s *The Long Fuse* and to A. J. P. Taylor, Barclay stresses the Libyan war as more important than the Balkan crisis in precipitating World War I. Whatever the German-Slav antagonisms were, the Libyan war triggered the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and thus irremediably altered the balance of power. Barclay correctly reasserts the importance of Italy’s role in World War I in the Entente victory, reminds the reader of the eleven bloody Isonzo offensives and re-examines the Italian defeat at Caporetto in a justifiably sympathetic light.

What mars the book is an extravagantly jingoistic, almost histrionic tone on behalf of an Italian nationalism that would certainly be an embarrassment to the modern and brilliant school of Italian historiography. Cause and effect are thrown about most carelessly. One thinks one is keeping score at a boy’s football game. Barclay declares that Italy was “the first to develop a truly modern navy; the first to defeat the Dervishes in Africa; the first to use air-
craft as a weapon of war; the one which fought the greatest of colonial wars (Libya), which perfected the first Blitzkriegs, which dominated the continent in aviation and automotive technology for over ten years". One wonders what the author means by "greatest" with respect to the Libyan War inasmuch as he almost ignores the far more traumatic and despicable Ethiopian War. In general the reader does not know what to do with this list of achievements.

Another example is Barclay's handling of Italo-Greek relations. Greece is described as openly imperialistic with an "insatiable territorial appetite" and he uses Ciamuria or southern Albania (Northern Epirus) as an example. Claiming that only 9,000 of the 63,000 inhabitants were "linguistic" Greeks, he says that it was Italy's role to defend the remainder. On Greek relations he customarily cites Luigi Villari, a noted fascist apologist. Much more reliable figures can be found in P. Pipinelis, *Europe and the Albanian Question* (Chicago, 1963). In general, Greek demands for Thrace, the Dodecanese, Smyrna and Asia Minor are lumped together and described as imperialistic, whereas Italian claims and possessions are treated as the natural prerogatives of a great power.

The merit of the book is that in tracing the course of Italian foreign policy it stresses the very important connection between the Balkans and Africa. But the excessively nationalistic tone prevents the author from offering more subtle explanations that might have increased our understanding of this very important connection.

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While we now have the works of John A. DeNovo, Leland Gordon, James A. Field, and David Finnie, to say nothing at all of other studies of the longer story of American interest and policy in the Middle East, there has been a need for a single summary volume which would sketch the general outlines of American policy essentially from its foundations, outlining the commercial, the religio-cultural, and even the political interest in the area, and bringing the story essentially down to date. Professor Bryson has attempted such a sketch, going back to the period of the American Revolution and coming down to the Palestine conflict, the Cyprus issue, the oil and energy crisis and other problems which have disturbed the peace of that much troubled area. It is necessary to get the deeper and broader picture because the situation has been so badly misunderstood, if known at all. As Professor Bryson himself remarks, "the story of the American diplomatic experience in the Middle East is an almost forgotten saga frequently overlooked by historians", or consigned to well-concealed footnotes. One still gets the impression at times that the United States became interested in the area about 1919 and that the American interest was largely confined to support of the Zionist program in Palestine. Professor Bryson's work should disabuse the student of any such limited notion.

Essentially, the Bryson book begins I) with the American Revolution, tells the story of the conflict with the Barbary States of North Africa, the Greek struggle for independence from the Ottoman Empire (1821-1830); II) it carries through World War I and the interwar era to 1939, with the basic problem of the Open Door for American commerce and industry; III) it considers World War II as a watershed in American interest and policy in the Middle