and power, as well as its description of the social and political characteristics of his supporters and opponents. The former point is of particular interest for a number of reasons. First, it provides an understanding of the late President's leadership, which, according to Markides, was based on the rare combination of traditional, charismatic and legal-rational authority, with the charismatic overshadowing the other two. In addition, Makarios' authority was reinforced by the indirect control of key economic institutions in Cyprus and his ability to act as a unifier in the fragmented social and political system of the Republic. Secondly, this analysis is useful in looking into the future of Cyprus now that Makarios is gone. If certain conditions on the island made Makarios indispensable, and, as the author argues, his charismatic leadership prevented the emergence of viable political institutions and alternate leaders, what then is the future of Cyprus?

The emphasis on Makarios' charismatic leadership, its effect on the emergence of viable political institutions and alternate leaders, and the claim that he was unable to resolve the "unsolvable" problems of intercommunal relations and enosis will delight Makarios' critics who have argued that he was a "crisis leader", even though this may not have been the author's intention. Although the focus of this book is primarily on the domestic aspects of Cypriot politics the author does not neglect the international and regional context of the Cyprus dispute. But his linkage of the internal and external factors involved in this dispute does not seriously account for the policy priorities of Greece, Turkey and the United States that proved so critical in its evolution. Secondly, Markides downplays the attitudes and actions of the Greek junta toward Cyprus that made the 1974 coup almost inevitable, regardless of Makarios' actions. Thirdly, this book overlooks the fact that despite these internal and external conditions, the Cypriot government was able to reach a new conflict regulation formula through the intercommunal talks hours before the July 15 coup. This largely invalidates the thesis that Makarios was unable to resolve the "unsolvable" problems of Cyprus. Finally, evidence existing today further invalidates the author's suggested options as to what Makarios could have done, i.e. resignation—unrealistic under the circumstances in Cyprus since independence, or attempted by Cyprus and rejected by Greece, Turkey and the United States, i.e. alignment with the West and NATO in 1963-1964.

Despite these weaknesses this book should be read carefully and should be considered an important addition to the growing literature on Cyprus, as well as to the literature of ethnic conflict, partition, and transnational politics.

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The long and fascinating history of Cyprus is full of tragic episodes of which the crisis of the summer of 1974 is perhaps the most critical, for her future development, in recent history. As a direct result of the 1974 crisis one may conclude that, in 1978, while the past of this lovely island is safe and certain, the future remains obscure and not very promising. In this interesting and most informative book Mr. Laurence Stern, National Editor of the Washington Post, provides us with a richly detailed record of one of Cyprus' most cruel episodes and America's most critical diplomatic failures in recent history. The book which is divided into three parts, with an introduction, epilogue and index, traces the role of the United States in
the Cyprus situation and its effects on America's relations with Greece and Turkey. It begins with a summary of U.S.-Greek relations in the postwar years and proceeds with an account of Washington's apparent tolerance and acceptance of the April 1967 military coup in Greece and its relations and dealings with the military governments in Greece from 1967 to 1974. The book then provides an analytical study of the events that led to the Athens sponsored coup against Archbishop Makarios III, President of the Republic of Cyprus, in July 1974, the landing of Turkish troops on the island and the subsequent melancholy events bringing the account to 1977.

Early in the morning of 21 April 1967 the people of Greece were told that the Greek armed forces had decided to oust the civilian government of the nation in order to save the country from the alleged threat of "anarchy and communism". From 1967 to 1974 the foreign policy of the United States was to tolerate and even provide military aid to the dictatorships that ruled Greece. American foreign policy makers placed great emphasis on military and strategic interests rather than human rights. Washington was not concerned with human rights violations and policies of the junta in Greece, violations which were clearly incompatible with the principles and laws of the United States, and the charters of the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

On 15 July 1974 the military government of Greece was involved in a coup in Cyprus which ousted Cyprus' President, the late Archbishop Makarios. At 5:30 a.m. on 20th July, on the pretext of "protecting" the interests of the Turkish Cypriots, Turkey invaded Cyprus by landing on the island an estimated 40,000 troops and subsequently took control of 40 percent of the territory of Cyprus, whose population is 80 percent Greeks, 18 percent Turks, and 2 percent others. Of course, reasonable people of all nationalities, religious and political philosophies strongly disagree and reject the doctrine that "the end justifies the means", as it was used by the military government of Greece in dealing with Archbishop Makarios, and was applied by Turkey in invading Cyprus and violating the rights of the people of Cyprus and territorial integrity of an independent state. "The evils of the state", the ancient Athenian statesman and poet, Solon, reminds us, "come home to every citizen". The monstrous and irresponsible policies of the junta brought great misery to thousands of people in Cyprus and melancholy days for Hellenism. The crisis in Cyprus brought chaos and complete paralysis of the Government in Greece, which, acknowledging its catastrophic failures and inability to deal effectively with the crisis which it helped to create, stepped down and invited Mr. Konstantine Karamanlis to return to Greece and assume the leadership of the state. At 2 a.m., on 24 July 1974, under most dramatic circumstances, Mr. Karamanlis returned to Athens from Paris, where he had been in self-exile since 1964, and with him returned the civil rights of the Greek people, rights and freedoms which were abolished by the junta in 1967. Thus the crisis in Cyprus and the loss of freedom for over 450,000 Greek-Cypriots in Cyprus, brought an end to dictatorship for over nine million Greeks in Greece.

It is possible that U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's antipathy to Makarios encouraged the Athens sponsored coup against the Archbishop. Mr. Kissinger was aware of the situation in Cyprus and the intentions of the junta in Athens, but did nothing to stop them. According to Mr. Stern "there is no evidence that any initiatives were undertaken by either Kissinger or Sisco to call in the Greek Ambassador to Washington, Constantine Panayotakos, to register the U.S. government's severe disapproval of any coup action against Makarios". As for the long planned Turkish invasion of Cyprus, Mr. Kissinger did nothing to dissuade the Turks from invading the island, but, as Mr. Stern points out, "Kissinger reached the conclusion, according to well-documented background accounts afterward, that the Turks this time, unlike 1964 and 1967, could not be deterred from invading". The Cyprus situation
brought Greece and Turkey on the brink of war and serious diplomatic rupture. The Turkish invasion of Cyprus could have been prevented especially by England, as the only "neutral" guarantor of the Independence of the Republic of Cyprus, as recorded in the 1960 London-Zürich agreement. If the United States and England had intervened in the summer of 1974, the terrible crisis in Cyprus could have been avoided and so too the directly related diplomatic crisis in the relations of Greece and Turkey.

The calamitous failure of the United States policy in the Cyprus situation was a profound and alarming disappointment to the majority of the American people and members of Congress. "While the United States has professed a public policy of support for democratic and constitutional principle, the unarticulated thrust of its influence has been to align itself with the politics of status quo". In the case of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey, American foreign policy was dominated by military and strategic interests rather than human rights and ethical principles. Mr. Stern writes, "In the case of Greece and Turkey the military relationships conceived in the name of NATO became the driving imperatives of foreign policy ... Toward Cyprus the American attitude was schizophrenic, with its public professions of support for the elected government headed by Makarios and its tacit support for policies and political forces seeking to assimilate Cyprus into the dominion of NATO by means of partition". In Cyprus the Nixon-Kissinger-Ford administrations failed to observe and even ignored the application of American laws—written into two statues, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Foreign Military Sales Act—explicitly forbidding the use of American arms by one ally of the United States against another. Nixon-Kissinger-Ford made perhaps their worst mistake in Cyprus by allowing and tolerating repeated violations of American moral and constitutional laws. American law was intended to be in tune with American morality. The Nixon-Kissinger-Ford disastrous policy in Cyprus was one of antipathy, indifference and a total disregard of U.S. laws. As Mr. Stern claims, Mr. Kissinger not only ignored U.S. intelligence reports and predictions of the plot against Makarios, but clearly "misjudged the stubbornness of Makarios, the territorial ambitions of Turkey, the political volatility of Greece, and the adversary temper of Congress". Members of the United States Congress and the majority of the American people took up the just cause of Cyprus and demanded that American moral and constitutional laws and ethics should be observed and applied in the conduct of American foreign policy.

The book by Mr. Stern, relying on sources ranging from field research and interviews to government documents, is finely written and well organized, bringing together and perceptively presenting materials on a subject that has had no adequate treatment. The Wrong Horse constitutes indispensable reading for all who have an interest in Cyprus and United States diplomacy in post World War II years in southeastern Europe.

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Professor Chirot has written an interesting and provocative study of Wallachia, a rather small and unknown country of Eastern Europe. Wallachia is one of the constituent provinces of present Romania, the other two being Moldavia and Transylvania. The work, as the title suggests, is a social history of Wallachia (Țara Românească), and covers a period of more than 650 years, from its formation as an independent state in the middle of the thirteenth cen-