

II as telling some Lutheran Reformers: "Go your own way" (p. 103). Protestants, of whom Mr. Ware himself was once one, are "heterodox" if not "heretics" in the eyes of the Eastern Church.

The aim of the Christian life, according to Orthodox theology, is deification (p. 236). "Man, when deified, remains distinct (though not separate) from God" (237). Deification, *theosis*, is an indication of Orthodoxy's debt to Neoplatonism. To state this as the Christian's aim, in the view of a Protestant, is to go behind the authority of the Bible and back to paganism.

Mr. Ware does not mention Plotinus and the other Neoplatonists. The *apophatic theology* associated with the name of 'Dionysius the Areopagite' (p. 72) and the doctrine that "God is Light" (p. 78) both have their roots in Neoplatonic philosophy. The term ἀποκατάστασις—the 'Restoration' of all things at the Last Judgment (pp. 265, 281)—is the very same as the one used by the ancient Stoics* for the periodic return of the cosmic cycle after the universal conflagration.

The Orthodox reverence for the Blessed Virgin Mary—Theotokos, Panaghia—is explained very lucidly (pp. 261-5). Mr. Ware does not feel called on to examine the objections that Protestant theologians would bring forward to the doctrines he sets forth. Nor does he delve back into the pre-Christian past in search of possible sources for the growth of the later tradition.

The history of Orthodoxy in Russia and the problems of religion in that country at the present time are successfully handled. Mr. Ware does well to stress the importance of Kievan Russia and its dependence on Byzantium (p. 88). He tells us that under the Turkokratia the Orthodox Church was secure—secure in "a place of guaranteed inferiority" (p. 97). A somewhat similar situation is the fate of Russian Orthodoxy under the existing political dispensation (pp. 157 sqq.). Mr. Ware is critical of the Moscow Patriarchate (p. 179). He is, however, well aware of the difficult task that the Russian Church has in surviving at all in a State so blatantly atheistic as the USSR.

Mr. Ware's book can be most warmly recommended to all those who are eager to study what an Orthodox Englishman has to say about the history, faith and worship of that branch of Christendom to which he has now been converted.

London

R. E. WITT

Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*. London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1961, 512 pp.

The transformation of the Ottoman Empire into present-day Turkey—a historical process that started toward the end of the eighteenth century and reached its decisive turning point in the twenties

* *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* II 599. 625.

of the twentieth—is both in itself as well as in world affairs a fascinating subject. Western European factors from the age of enlightened despotism, the times of the French Revolution and its Napoleonic, Egyptian and Balkan aftermath, of the Europe of the second half of the nineteenth century, with positivism, colonialism, and the “Pan” movements, converged on the Ottoman Empire, effected the conduct of the Sultan and his subjects and led to changes from above and from below to the reforms (abortive) of Selim III and (successful) of Mahmoud II; to the revolt of the Greek and other Christian subjects of the Sultan and to the concomitant growth of Turkish nationalism as a response to these revolts; to the era of the Tanzimat that climaxed in the short-lived constitution of 1876; to the culmination of absolutism and changes from above of Sultan Abdulhamid II, which engendered the Young Turk revolution of 1908; and, after World War I, to the end of the Sultanate and Caliphate, and to the establishment of the Turkish Republic, whose Western European political and economic institutions did not remain uninfluenced either by those of the USSR or of the United States, as witness etatism and, after World War II, the termination of the single-party system and the conduct of free elections.

With this most complex subject, Bernard Lewis, in his *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, deals in the main most successfully, even though the book's fundamental organization occasionally but unavoidably results either in repetitiveness or in a certain dispersal of information. After a brief introductory section entitled “The Sources of Turkish Civilization” in which the Ottoman background of Turkey is described, the author presents in chronological order the main events—political, social, and cultural—that led to the emergence of present-day Turkey, until the elections of 1950. These, it will be recalled, brought to an end the long dominance of the People's Party and to the victory of the Democrat Party—which, in May 27, 1960, was overthrown by a coup d'état that was followed by the adoption of a new constitution by referendum on July 9, 1961, and the general elections of October 15, 1961.

In the second part of his book, Lewis examines four particular areas of change: community and nation—a masterful essay; state and government; religion and culture; elite and class. A brief chapter entitled “Conclusions: the Turkish Revolution” which summarizes the author's findings, brings this book to an end.

This book is less a case history of the breakdown of a multinational empire into its main ethnic components—somewhat along the lines of Austria-Hungary—than of the secularization of a powerful Muslim state in conjunction with efforts to replace it with a modern state, the society of which was predominantly agricultural and economically underdeveloped and, like China until our own times, was in a condition of quasi-colonial subservience (capitulations, extraterritoriality, etc.). Its main weak points are those of omission rather than commission or, rather, in this reviewer's view, of emphatic

balance. Thus, it contains little information on the indirect but extremely important effects of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic era *via* the Greek War of Independence and other similar expressions of nationalism in European regions of the Ottoman Empire on the growth of nationalism among the Turkish populations of this empire, even though the author recognizes the importance of this factor in his conclusions. Second, in the historical process, the combination of the features of a bourgeois revolution somewhat along French lines with one of a secessionist, territorial character could have been noted. For it had been the Ottoman and Muslim system of government which had allowed the development of a bourgeois class among the non-Muslims and, in the Balkans, among the Greeks especially. The compulsory exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey in 1923 constituted the last expression of this unusual phenomenon of a millet tending to coincide with a particular social class. If the Greek War of Independence in the early nineteenth century tended to arrest the development of a bourgeois class in the Ottoman Empire, thus preparing the ground for the assumption of such functions by outsiders during the Great Power imperialism of the second half of that century, the exit from Turkey of the great majority of Greeks under the Lausanne Convention of 1923 tended to deprive the new Turkish republic of a substantial segment of its middle class, and required efforts to build up a new one— one of Kemal's important objectives.

Two other aspects that perhaps could have been dealt with more systematically in this book: first, the respective contributions of Europe—of France, Germany and England—to the developments that affected the Ottoman Empire in its emergence into modern statehood in the nineteenth century, and, in our own century, the trend toward using as models for change Soviet and American, rather than western European, institutions. Second, this reviewer would have liked something to have been said about the effects of the emergence of a secular Turkey on other Muslim nations such as Iran, Afghanistan, or Pakistan; on Muslim peoples of the USSR; and on the Arab states; also on relations with non-Muslim neighbors of Turkey, such as the Balkan states or Israel. Thirdly, the author might have mentioned, even incidentally, the relation between Abdulhamid's Pan-Islamism, the Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turanianism of some of his subjects, and the other "Pan-" movements that flourished in the second half of the nineteenth century, when Pan-Slavism seems to have acted as a catalyzer for Pan-Germanism, Pan-Hellenism (a form of Greek irredentism), with Pan-Americanism making its appearance in the so-called Western Hemisphere.

But for these criticisms of a minor character, this book is not only excellent in the way it depicts the emergence of modern Turkey but as a case history of change from empire to modern state. In the process of change, the whole problem of form and content is nowhere

better illustrated than in the various reforms brought in from above, starting with the Tanzimat—the *Hatt-i Serif* of Gülhane of 1839, the *Hatt-i Humayun* of 1856, the Midhat Constitution of 1876—continuing with the Young Turk revolution of 1908 and manifesting itself in our own time—somewhat more faintly—after World War II. While in all these cases of change, foreign policy factors loomed large—or, to put it somewhat bluntly, an element of “window dressing” was involved, as the author himself notes—important internal pressures were, nevertheless, continually exerting themselves in favor of change, of reforms, and the adoption of these measures, while never leading to revolutionary change, tended to encourage the formulation of new demands from below and stimulated new internal pressures for the fulfillment of norms proclaimed in these measures introduced from above. Thus mimesis of forms whether willed or imposed eventually led to an alteration of the substance, even though a lag between the two often continued to remain considerable—a lag between positive legislation and customary law. In most recent times, the Cyprus riots in Istanbul and the fate of Adnan Menderes—reminding us of the fate of several Grand Vezirs during the Ottoman period—vividly illustrated such a lag as a phenomenon which has not altogether died out.

This brings us to the question of change in a tradition-bound society. In Ottoman times, as in tsarist Russia, the urgers of change tended to divide into two schools of thought. The one, respectful of the existing framework, sought to reinterpret past traditions into modern terms, to return to the “true past,” to read into Islam and the Ottoman system certain values similar to those that were now regarded as desirable. The other school of thought wished to do away with the very framework itself and to introduce non-indigenous values by fiat. Kemal Atatürk’s regime followed the second school of thought. The Turkish revolution, in the narrowest sense of the word, was his, not his nineteenth century namesake’s, Namik Kemal’s. In the broadest sense, it represented a struggle not merely of the New against the Old, but between gradualism and, to coin a new word, “violentism.”

In the case of changes from below, the Turkish case once again reveals that mere discontent or ferment in intellectual circles is not sufficient to bring about results. Political organization is necessary and, in an absolutist environment, this means secrecy and activities of groups living in exile. And, as in the case of the Russian revolution, defeat in war precipitated the revolutionary process.

A Columbia University study carried out in Greece and Turkey in 1951 reported that “the Greeks identify fully with the West, whereas the Turks feel more insecure in their acceptance of themselves as members of the western orbit.” This may be due to a time lag in Turkish responses to the West as compared to Greece’s analogous responses. Thus, while the first Ottoman printing press was set up in 1727, a Greek press existed in Constantinople a century earlier; while the first Turkish language newspaper was published in 1831,

the first Greek language newspaper appeared in 1790 (before the Greek War of Independence) and in 1821 (during this war); while Namik Kemal began to publish a translation of Montequieu's *Esprit des Lois* in 1863, Rhigas Pheraios had made a translation of this work—unpublished—toward the end of the eighteenth century. Similar time lags exist between the first Turkish and the first Greek grammar or the use of the people's language for poetry—in 1897, as Lewis points out, Mehmed Emin published some poems entitled *Turkçe Sürler* (Poems in Turkish), "abandoning the formal language and quantitative prosody of the Ottoman court poets," while Solomos had used the Dimotiki for his poems over seventy years earlier.

Finally, for the entire world, the emergence of Turkey as a member of the state system that developed in western Europe and today embraces the entire world is of interest because it illustrates that "mellowing process" of universalist, imperialist Islam, when faced by countervailing power—a process which certain Sovietologists, with G. F. Kennan in the vanguard, believe may take place in the attitude of the USSR toward the rest of the world. As Lewis notes, the world, according to Islam, was divided into the Dar al-Islam, the House of Islam, and the Dar al-Harb, the House of War, or land under the rule of the infidels. "Between the two there was a perpetual state of war, interrupted only but truces, and preordained to end with the incorporation of the whole world into the House of Islam." But Islam recognized also a third, intermediate group, the Zimmi, the protected non-Muslim subject of the Muslim state. The story of Islam and the emergence of Turkey in the modern world indicated that even such a tripartite division of the world could not be realized. Will the West's impact on Turkey ever have a similar effect on the YSSR? No one can answer this question, but the history of Turkey provides not only a historical analogy but, perhaps, a recipe for dealing with the USSR.

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Minor remarks on Mr. Lewis's book: p. 307, the "Truman Doctrine" was in March 1947, not in May; p. 311, the editors could have noted the redundancy in the words "odd paradox." A paradox is always odd.

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Μιχαήλ Φωτεινοπούλου *Νομικὸν Πρόχειρον (Βουκουρεστίου, 1765)*, τὸ πρῶτον ἐκδιδόμενον ἐκ χειρογράφου κώδικος τοῦ Κρατικοῦ Ἀρχείου τοῦ Ἰαοῦ ὑπὸ Παν. Ἰ. Ζέπου (Ἀρχεῖον Ἰδιωτικοῦ Δικαίου 17, 1954 - 1959). [*Nomikon Procheiron des Michael Photeinopoulos (Bukarest, 1765)*, erstmals herausgegeben nach einem handschriftlichen Kodex des Staatsarchivs in Jași von Pan. J. Zepos (Archiv des Privatrechts 17, 1954 - 1959)]. Athen 1959. XII, 309 S. 8 Faksimiles.