kinship is of immense importance to planners even if its existence is acknowledged only implicitly. It would be very interesting to have comparable studies for other Balkan cities so that we might begin to have some knowledge of how differing political systems and planning programs influence the quality of urban life.

University of Massachusetts
Amherst, Mass.

JOEL HALPERN


For some three hundred and fifty years (from 1535 to 1881) there existed on the frontiers of the Habsburg domains with the Ottoman Empire a military institution known as the *Militärgrenze* (= *die Confin*), or the military border, manned almost entirely by southern Slavs. While history records many cases of military border establishments, none compared in essence with the *Militärgrenze* as to origin and development, and as to the military and social organization of the troops (*Grenzer*, *graničari*, *Granitscharen*) and their particular relation to the reigning Habsburg princes in Vienna—whom alone they considered as their masters. An original creation, the main task of the *Grenze* was to seal off Croatia and Hungary, then Austria proper, and lastly the western world from the continuous imperialistic onslaughts of the Ottomans. In addition to this primary politico-military task, the military border served as a «cordon sanitaire» in the true meaning of the words, with the duty of preventing the spread of infectious diseases from the East into Austrian territories. And when the Ottoman menace receded, the *Grenzer* remained a strong loyal force against the internal and foreign enemies of the House of Austria. All this explains the title of the book *Des Kaisers Grenzer*.

It is with the origin, development, character and significance of this unique but relatively little-known institution that Dr. Nikolaus von Preradovich (a descendent of a famous *Grenzer* family) concerns himself in this very readable book. What makes his work an interesting and worthwhile contribution is that it is not a mere account of the institution but that it discusses the *Confin* in the context of the political, social and military history of the Austrian, later the Austro-Hungarian, Empire over the entire period covered by this investigation. And, in view of the author's antecedents, the book is a remarkably objective study and evaluation of the *Grenze*. It is therefore regrettable that it is lacking in documentation, without notes and references, which is likely to irritate scholars who may want to check the evidence or refer to the sources which are only casually alluded to by the author. On the other hand, the book is enriched by two specially drawn maps of the military border in different periods, by twenty-four reproductions of contemporary illustrations of the leading organizers of the border-institution and of the various types of border-troops, with scenes of their camp-life, and by indexes of names, places and subjects.

The Austrian *Militärgrenze*, it is clear from v. Preradovich's discussion of its origin, was not a carefully planned and deliberate creation. It was the product of an urgent need for defense of the Habsburg territories against the steady incursions and devastations carried out by Ottoman raiders, the so-called «Renner und Brenner», enhanced by the vastly destructive though unsuccessful seige of Vienna by Süleiman the Great in 1529. In the absence of a standing army and Austria's dependence mainly on costly and often unreliable mercenaries under chronically poor state finances, the securing of a financially tolerable and reliable
military force for the defense of its southern provinces aroused serious concern. A number of coincidental factors coalesced, however, to bring about the formation of the military border: the flight of large numbers of Croats, Serbs and Bosnians from Ottoman oppression in the conquered Balkan lands, in Hungary and in Croatia seeking refuge in Austria and the availability of asylum in the southern devastated and depopulated areas, and the gradual realization by the central authorities that the two elements could be combined into a natural and permanent defense against the Ottoman assaults. The task of organizing the Grenze and thus attempting to save Austria and the West fell to King Ferdinand I (brother of Emperor Charles V and later himself emperor).

Although the earliest refugees (called Uskoks from the SrbCr. «uskok» = fugitive, refugee), who settled in Sichelburg (Krain, in 1535) came first directly under the authorities there, and five years later were placed by Charles V under the supervision of an appointed Kriegshauptmann to be formed into an effective organization, therewith laying the foundation for the «Krostische Militärgrenze», it was in 1538 that Ferdinand issued the highly significant «Privilegium» to Serbian refugees in Upper Slavonia in exchange for their oath of allegiance to him and for their undertaking to serve on and defend the border. This formed the basis for the direct relation of the Grenzer to the Habsburg rulers, which remained unbroken through all political and military changes that affected Austria during the entire period. The document assigned to them large areas of tax-free border land—a privilege granted only to nobility and Church—and the right to specified Turkish booty, and granted them the unconditional free observance of the Greek-Orthodox faith! As the land on the «Windische (= Warasdiner) Grenze» was generally waste and unproductive, the right to booty constituted a vital and substantial means for survival in the early period, if it is remembered that even in «peace-time» a «permanent small war» prevailed on the frontier. In time of formal hostilities, the Grenzer received «war-pay» equal to that of the regular soldiery but in return had to deliver one-third of the booty to the paymaster. The entire arrangement, observes v. Preradovich, «war eine recht unkonventionelle Verquickung von allgemeiner Wehrpflicht und Soldnertum, von Freibeuterpatent und Wehrbauernstand». Through such advantageous arrangement between king and refugees Austria succeeded in securing at a relatively low financial expenditure large numbers of highly reputed warriors for its defense, men who not only were sworn enemies of the Ottomans and of Islam but who now were interested in selfpreservation and in defending their family and property. In what apparently was their first military organization, the Grenzer were divided into groups of 200 men under their own leaders (voevods), but with the command residing in Laibach or Granz.

However, in 1557 Ferdinand I, realizing that no effective war could be carried on against the Ottomans this way, established an independent centralized command by appointing a «Selbstständigen Grenzobristen» over the leaders of the Warasdin and Croatian borders. In the ensuing centuries other more elaborate reforms of the steadily expanding frontier-institution were introduced by the ever concerned Habsburg rulers, with the view of hammering the Grenzer into an efficient and better disciplined military force. As a result, by the end of its era, the Confin, which was completely separated in administrative matters from the rest of the country, stood a bastion along the entire length of the Habsburg empire, from the Adriatic Sea to Transylvania, always ready to defend Austria and the West against Ottoman invasion.

Von Preradovich traces the evolvement of the military border and carefully analyzes the various reform measures which were necessitated over its long history, beginning with
the comprehensive «Verwaltungsstatut» for the «Warasdiner Grenze» issued by Emperor Ferdinand II in 1630 (during the Thirty Years War) and particularly the great reforms that were instituted during the reigns of Empress Maria Theresia and of Emperor Joseph II. Maria Theresia, the author points out, took a personal interest in the reforms of the Militärgrenze in appreciation of the outstanding military qualities displayed by the Grenzer and of their loyalty to her in the war of succession, when —in contrast to their use primarily in the border wars during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries— they fought valorously for Austria on all the battlefields of Europe, from Silesia to Italy. «Unter ihrer 40 jährigen Regierung», writes v. Preradovich, «gewann das Grenzgebiet geregelte Zustände. Sie legte den Grund zu einem besseren materiellen und geistigen Gedeihen der Grenze deren grosse Verdienste in Krieg und Frieden um Schutz und Verteidigung von Reich und Thron die hochhezige Monarchin wohl zu würdigen wusste. Die Schöpfung der schlagkräftigen Armee der Grenzertruppen war das Werk Maria Theresias ...». And the author remarks that in 1776, towards the end of her reign, «Dieses stehende Heer kostete den Staatssäckel weniger als ein Drittel der Linien Truppen, der regulären Armee». It must be noted however that v.Preradovich hardly paints an idyllic picture of this frontier institution. On the contrary, he does not overlook but fully recounts the numerous risings and rebellions with which the history of the Grenzer is studded —never against their masters, the Habsburgs, only against administrators who one way or another attempted to curtail their acquired and jealously guarded rights and privileges.

Von Preradovich also devotes considerable attention to the role which the Grenze played: in the nationalistic struggle in the empire during the nineteenth century under the impact of the political ideas of the French Revolution. Nationalism, he says, found on the border «einen noch besser vorbereiteten Boden als in manchen anderen Gebieten», and presents an illuminating analysis of the two competing political ideas which evolved there —Croatian «Illyrism» and «Serbism», whose center was Belgrade, with final victory going to the latter; and in the Revolution of 1848, in the victorious war in northern Italy and in the Austro-Prussian war of 1866, in which Austria's defeat meant the elimination of the House of Habsburg's influence in the Germanies. He also discusses the political changes which destroyed absolutism in Austria and led to the «Ausgleich» with Hungary, which was the basis for the formation of the Dual-Monarchy, as well as analyzing the political, social and economic transformations that brought about the dissolution of the Militärgrenze by Emperor-King Francis Joseph I in 1881 and the incorporation of the Grenzer into the standing armies of the monarchy.

What made possible the centuries-long existence of the Confin which was manned mainly by Serbs and Croats, and, with the extension of it to the eastern parts of the empire («Banater Grenze», «Siebenbürger Grenze»), also by Germans, Hungarians, Rumanians and others? Two main factors contributed to it: the regular replenishment of the Grenzer ranks by their own progeny and by recruitment of Serbs and other refugees who continuously streamed into the border areas, and the unique southern Slav institution — the Zadruga. Von Preradovich gives a lengthy economic-sociological account of this institution and the important role it played in the survival of the military border. The Zadruga («great family» or «household-community»), consisting of grandparents, children and grandchildren all living under the same roof was essentially a patriarchal society, with the ultimate decision-making authority residing in the head of the family. Every member enjoyed the full protection of the household against all threats and dangers, which was of vital importance under the prevailing insecurities on the border. It also made it possible for members of the family
to serve and be away on active military duty for long periods of time without severely affecting the economic well-being of the other members of the household-community. The Zadruga thus readily integrated in the general organization of the Grenze and facilitated a permanent military force without placing an excessive burden on state finances and on the general population of the country. In this connection, v. Preradovich quotes the remarks of a contemporary observer of the different parts of the military border, each organized in accordance with local customs and habits, which is worth repeating here: «Bei keiner dieser Völkerschaften gedieth das Grenzsinstitut in solcher Weise als bei den Serben und Kroaten, wo nicht bloss natürliche Anlage und Neigung dem Kriegsdienste günstig waren, sondern wo auch in der Institution der Hauskommunion die Basis zur Entwicklung des militärischen Permanenzdienstes sich vorfand, ohne welche Grundlage dieser Dienst für das Grenzvolk zur unerträglichen Last werden musste».

In the last two paragraphs of the text v. Preradovich takes issue with the Serb and Croat critics (and, one may add, with their sympathizers) and rejects their accusations: that the Militärgrenze had produced only a raw soldateska, that the men were degraded to unwilling instruments of militarism, that the border had served to suppress all political freedom, that the Slavs were subjugated to the service of Germanism, and that the elimination of the border-institution was the triumph of the free spirit of the modern era. «Dass die Granitscharen nicht in einem Institut für höhere Töchter lebten», responds v. Preradovich, «darüber besteht kein Zweifel. Wenn aber von Freihet gesprochen wird, so ist diese in der vojna kraina erheblich besser gepflegt worden als an vielen anderen Orten - beispielsweise in der jugoslawischen Königsdiktatur». Or in today's Yugoslavia!

An institution like the Militärgrenze could not have survived over three and a half centuries had it not been of advantage to both the hundreds of thousands of Slav refugees from Ottoman oppression and to the Habsburg rulers. The historical record shows that it was. And that the views of the modern Serbian critics of Austria were not shared by earlier generations of Serbs and their leaders is attested to by an extremely interesting episode in the relations between Serbs and Austria, which is generally not known to historians and which is conveniently overlooked or suppressed by Serbs and their sympathizers: Kara-George's offer to Emperor Francis I in 1804 to place the entire Serb nation under Habsburg rule. Von Preradovich discusses this event in some detail as well as the sorry story of rejection of this offer by the monarch on grounds of political morality —an action that has been decried by Austrian (including v. Preradovich) and other writers on the subject. Although we will never know the answer the question may be asked: had Austria accepted the offer, would there have been a Sarajevo with all its catastrophic consequences?

Brooklyn, New York

ARTHUR LEON HORNIKER


This study—a collection of essays by several American scholars—is a comparative critical analysis of the growth, character, and nature of Russian nationalism, tracing its origins from a variety of literary sources. Specifically, it examines the writings of the Russian writers, poets, and novelists of the last century to the present: from Pushkin, Gogol, Turgenev, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, and the Symbolist poets, to Solzhenitsyn and other con-