introductory text on Yugoslavia and the Yugoslavs. In an academic setting, the book can be supplemented with more detailed and specialized works. However, its great value is its broad, contemporary sweep across the Yugoslav scene which synthesizes a number of diverse elements into a meaningful whole.


This is really a rather short book, and could probably have been condensed into one article. The print is fairly large, the spacing between lines is wide, the margin are broad, and there are only 135 pages of text. The maps in the appendix are not very clear or useful, and the ethnic map on page 139 is printed upside down. The text is organized into two main parts, "Domestic Aspects" and "International Implications;" however, the focus seems to be primarily on Chapter 7, "The Military Implications..." This focus seems to be confirmed through acknowledgements to nine military specialists in the preface. Nonetheless, the book does not really add to the general body of knowledge on Yugoslavia, and does not compare favorably with a similar book which came out almost simultaneously by Andrew Borowiec with the same title, _Yugoslavia After Tito_, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977). The Ra’anan book seems to have been written almost entirely from English sources, and lacks the authenticity and comprehensiveness of the Borowiec book, which uses numerous Yugoslav sources and personal interviews in Yugoslavia to support the material. Also, the Borowiec book is much better written, which is understandable since he is a professional journalist with several awards for international reporting, whereas Ra’anan was only a graduate student at the time he wrote his book.

Part I, dealing with the domestic aspects of Yugoslavia, shows a fair grasp of the ethnic or nationality problem of Yugoslavia. There is a quick summary and survey of the territorial composition and ethnic groupings, which is supplemented by the ethnic map (Appendix 1) and the table of gastarbeiter (roots Appendix 2). However, this quick summary would have benefitted from some prewar, wartime and postwar maps delineating the political division of Yugoslavia, and the wartime partition, annexation and occupation. The references to the wartime collapse of Yugoslavia (pp. 3, 98) did not seem to fully comprehend the historic political causes and effects, which were some of the principal reasons for creating a federal state after the war. Another extremely important point which does not receive adequate treatment is the informal postwar division of influence in the Balkans between Churchill and Stalin in Moscow on October 9, 1944:
Rumania
Russia 90%
Others 10%

Greece
Great Britain (with USA) 90%
Russia 10%
Yugoslavia 50-50%
Hungary 50-50%
Bulgaria
Russia 75%
Others 25%

Winston Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. 1953), pp. 227-228. This agreement became the essential basis of the postwar settlement in the Balkans, and by and large has been adhered to by the Soviet Union with the notable exception of Hungary. However, the 50-50% split over Yugoslavia was a fairly realistic assessment of the interests of the major powers in the Balkans, which is relevant even today.

Part II deals with the international implications of Tito passing from the scene. This is a tour d'force of the various military possibilities in terms of external intervention by conventional warfare, and internal subversion through the exploitation of ethnic, ideological and political divisions in Yugoslavia. While an interesting intellectual exercise the analysis seems to underestimate several important factors. First, despite their internal divisions, the Yugoslavs are passionately devoted to Yugoslavia, and will fight to preserve their territorial integrity, political independence and national sovereignty at all costs, and against all comers. This was partially manifested on June 28, 1948 when Stalin excommunicated Tito from Marxism-Leninism and expelled Yugoslavia from the Cominform. Proletarian internationalism was totally subordinated to Yugoslav nationalism, and has remained so ever since. Second, that the United States, and NATO could not afford to allow Yugoslavia to be invaded or subverted. It would strategically outflank Greece and Turkey, and unduly expose Italy. The remark by President Carter in October 1976 (p. 130) to the effect that the United States would not come to the assistance of Yugoslavia if the Soviet Union invaded, was probably just an unfortunate misstatement. He subsequently corrected that impression with more careful statements in January and May 1980 at the time of Tito's illness and death, when he said that "America will continue its longstanding policy of support for Yugoslavia and do what it must to provide that support". Third, the four main scenarios outlined in Chapter 10 seem to place undue emphasis upon the potential for ethnic conflict, the Brezhnev Doctrine for possible Soviet intervention, and the Sonnenfeldt Doctrine of possible American acquiescence. None of these possible consequences outlined in these scenarios has come to pass. Almost three years after Tito's death the country seems to be relatively stable and secure, with the League of Communists, the security police (UBDA) and the military in firm control. Also, the political context and costs of Soviet intervention into or subversion of Yugoslavia have greatly changed since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (December 1979) and the Soviet suppression of Poland (December 1981).

In summary, while this book is an interesting survey of the various military possibilities or scenarios of what might occur after Tito's death, it lacks depth and credibility. By comparison, the Borowiec book is much better balanced, sensitive and perceptive of the historical, cultural and political dimensions of Yugoslavia.

University of New Hampshire, Durham
David L. Larson