

G. I. THEOCHARIDES

Christ Anastasoff, M. A., *The Bulgarians, from their arrival in the Balkans to modern times. Thirteen centuries of history.* (With seventeen maps, a comprehensive bibliography on the Balkans, and a Bulgarian chronology). An Exposition - University Book. Exposition Press. Hicksville, New York 1977. (Pp. V-XV + 3-276. Appendices I-XII, pp. 278-346. Chronology, pp. 347-356. Bibliography, pp. 357-371. Index, pp. 373-380).

(Review Essay)

The book's title and appearance are an attempt to present it as a serious historical study. It is, however, a work of deliberate political propaganda of monstrous historical inaccuracy, intentional omissions and frequently outrageous distortion of historical fact, as I intend to make clear. Furthermore, Christ Anastasoff, who has published five similar books, is renowned for his dissemination of political propaganda on behalf of the *Bulgarian Macedonians* of America, and still dreams of the Great Bulgaria of the San Stefano Treaty. In addressing himself to an American readership, unacquainted for the most part with Ancient Greek, Byzantine and modern Balkan history, he may well succeed in convincing many people that his absurd assertions are true; those who are familiar with the facts, however, must laugh aloud, and those who are confronted with this violation of their own history must see this with rage.

But let us take a closer look at this work. The book's very dust-jacket bears two maps, printed in green, which are clearly indicative of the contents. On the front is a map of the First Bulgarian State as it was under Tsar Symeon (the Great, 893-927) extending from Rhodope in the south to the Danube in the north, and from the Adriatic in the west to the Black Sea in the east. The public is thus led to believe that in Symeon's time the Byzantine State was limited by European territory to the Thracian seaboard, Halkidiki and Greece south of Olympus. But this Bulgarian State never existed. It is a historical fact that Symeon made incursions into Byzantine territory, but he set up no state administrative services in the areas he plundered, and during his reign Bulgaria's frontiers did not expand southwards. The Byzantine Patriarch, Nicholas the Mystic, Symeon's contemporary, wrote to him in 913 that all *the West*, including Macedonia therefore, had always been under Byzantine rule and that he should not delude himself that his brigand raids had won him any Byzantine territory: "The Roman Kingdom owns the whole of the West... your

predecessors did not subjugate any part of the Roman Kingdom, nor have you (Symeon) at any time achieved such a prize” (Migne, *P. Gr.* 111, line 176).

On the back of the dust-jacket there is a map of the Great Bulgaria of the San Stefano Treaty (3rd March 1878), and within the green territory are faintly outlined Bulgaria’s borders as laid down by the Berlin Treaty (1st July 1878) and the borders of Eastern Roumelia, which Bulgaria annexed by means of a coup d’état in 1885. The Great Bulgaria of the San Stefano Treaty, however, only ever existed on the Treaty papers and was no more than a Bulgarian dream for only four months. So twice already, on the dust-jacket alone, the unsuspecting reader has been ingeniously misled regarding a supposed former Great Bulgaria which never existed as a historical fact and never took the form of a state of such territorial dimensions.

Let us look inside the book now and examine its content. It contains so many unhistorical or deliberately distorted facts that the task of correcting the distortions and re-establishing the historical truth would require a longer book than the one under scrutiny. Of necessity, therefore, we must confine ourselves to a few characteristic points.

Chapter I. We can accept as an unintentional inaccuracy the author’s statement that the Via Egnatia terminated in Thessaloniki (p. 6) and that the Goths were a Thracian tribe and the Dacians were Goths (p. 7), but not his assertion that the ancient Macedonians and Epirots were Illyrian tribes (p. 7). He says not a word about the Greek Doric tribe of Macedonians and their prehistorical descent, and this is a deliberate omission.

Chapter II. The following statement by the author proves that the omission is indeed intentional: “The name of Macedonia... originates from the name of the Illyrian tribe Macedoni... except for the name, nothing else connects the present geographic province of Macedonia with the state of Philip II and Alexander the Great. The Macedoni tribe... was assimilated in the Thraco-Illyrian mass long before the beginning of the Christian era” (p. 11). It really does require great daring to ignore all the historical and archaeological facts known about the geographical area of contemporary Macedonia—which holds the ruins of Pella, the palace of Veryina and the Macedonian tombs—and to speak of a Thraco-Illyrian mass there without fear of ridicule. If, as the writer asserts, the Macedoni tribe had already been assimilated into the Thraco-Illyrian mass in the pre-Christian era, did Paul the Apostle carry out his preaching in Macedonia in the Thraco-Illyrian tongue? And did he write his Epistles to the Philippians and to the Thessalonians in the Thraco-Illyrian

language? A further historical absurdity: "With the fall of Macedonia under Roman rule, the use of its name was forbidden, and the province was renamed Pelagonia" (p. 11). With one verbal kick, the whole Roman history of Macedonia goes flying out of the window. *Macedonia Prima, Secunda, Tertia* and *Quarta*, the Romans' original four-part division of Macedonia, is ignored, as is the great *Provincia Macedonia*, their final unification of the four parts. Which Pelagonia is this historically ignorant writer talking about?

So much for the Roman period. Now for the Byzantine period of Macedonia's history: "During the sixth century A.D., the Byzantines began to call Macedonia a province south of Plovdiv (Philippopolis), while the present Macedonia, as a geographic region, continued to be called Pelagonia" (p. 11). This, of course, is "Macedonia near Thrace", which, precisely because of the designation "near Thrace", is distinguishable from historical Macedonia, which never was called Pelagonia. Pelagonia was elsewhere. May we advise the author to do some reading about Pelagonia, e.g. Fanula Papazoglou's, *Makedonski gradovi u rimsko doba*. Skopje 1957. *Ziva Antika, Posebna Izdanja*, Kniga I, Skopje 1957, 231-256.

And now for the Slavs: "Toward the seventh century A.D., when the Slavs had taken over almost the entire Balkan Peninsula... Macedonia was also taken by the Slavs" (p. 12). The writer is referring to the small number of "Sclavinians" in Macedonia, the Strymon Slavs, Rynchini, Sagudati and Drogouviti Slavs, who settled in a Greek population and consequently were absorbed into it and in time disappeared. There were still traces of them left in 904, according to Kameniates (Kameniates, ed. Bonn, p. 496, line 5: "and some towns with mixed populations (on the plain of Thessaloniki), of which those who pay tributto the town (Thessaloniki) are called Δρογούβιται and Σαγούδατοι". But our author thinks differently: "The Slavic tribes that had settled in the ancient provinces of Moesia, Thrace and Macedonia... gradually, they were bound together into one national community—the Bulgarian" (p. 12). Exactly how this alchemy took place, all these Slavic tribes being transformed into Bulgarians, who have a quite separate history of their own, only Mr Anastasoff knows. But of course, he is not recounting historical facts, but making deliberately dogmatic assertions, secure in the knowledge that few people will be in any position to check them. He is concerned with the ignorant majority, which is also why he dares to make the following unhistorical statement: "In the ninth century, during the reign of Tsar Boris, the Slavic tribes living in the present geographic province of Macedonia were included in the composition of the Bulgarian State" (p. 12). The history of Boris-Michael is known to us, a man who was christened by the Byzantines and who welcomed Byzantine culture wholesale into Bulgaria; but how were

the Slavic tribes of Macedonia included in the then Bulgarian State without Macedonia itself, in which they lived, being also included? This is most strange! But the writer persists in his unhistorical absurdity: "The name of Thrace was applied to the region northwest from Constantinople, while the present geographic province of Macedonia was named Bulgaria". "And for many writers and authorities on the Balkans the geographic expressions 'Macedonia' and 'Bulgaria' are interchangeable" (p. 12). Splendid! Macedonia is Bulgaria and Bulgaria is Macedonia. Our author says so. But since Macedonia was and is populated by Greeks, who never were Bulgarians, then Bulgaria, which is the same place, must logically be populated by Bulgarised Greeks. Which, all joking apart, is partially true, as our author's name indicates —Anastasoff = Anastasiou— and as do many other Bulgarians' names, being Greek names with Slavic suffixes!

Now let us move on to the author's startling discovery about the Turkish occupation: "When the Turks conquered Macedonia in 1371 (note that the Turks finally and decisively conquered Macedonia with the capture of Thessaloniki in 1430), they found there a compact Bulgarian population... Gradually, there settled in the country other ethnic groups, such as Turks, Albanians and Greeks, but they were in no position to affect the assimilation of the Bulgarian population" (p. 12). He does not know what he is talking about. After the *Turks* conquered Macedonia, he says, gradually other ethnic groups came there, and these were *Turks*, Albanians and Greeks. So these peoples did not exist in Macedonia before the Turkish conquest, there were only Bulgarians, whom the Turks were unable to assimilate. *Bravo colonello!* The man's a real historian!

And now, in the same chapter, the author's final laboured conclusion: "From what has been said above, it follows that Macedonia as a geographic province in the southwestern part of the Balkan Peninsula has nothing in common with the inhabitants of the ancient Macedonian State" (pp. 12-13). Macedonia has nothing in common with the ancient Macedonian State - except, of course, that the palaces and tombs of the ancient Macedonian kings have recently been discovered there and excavated. The population of contemporary Macedonia has nothing in common with the inhabitants of the ancient Macedonian State - except, of course, that they speak the same language and share the same customs and traditions.

The whole of sub-section 3 (Hellenism and the Ancient Macedonians, pp. 13-15) is a patriotic delirium: "Were Philip II and his son, Alexander the Great, Greek? Are the Macedonians really of ancient Hellenic descent? Has Modern Greece a moral and ethnic claim to Macedonia? Does the acceptance

of Hellenistic culture make one a Greek? Similarly, does the acceptance of the Roman culture in the West make the Latin countries Italian?". As to whether the ancient Macedonian kings were Greeks, let the answer be given by Alexander I, the forebear of Philip and Alexander and the Argean son of Amyntas; referring to the Greeks' army camp before the battle of Plataea, he says: "I too am a Greek of the ancient race and I do not wish to see Greece enslaved, rather than free" (498 B.C. - Herodotus IX, 45 et seq. - Thucydides II, 99 et seq.). As to whether the Macedonians are of Greek descent, let the answer be given by the two Greek brothers from Thessaloniki, Cyril and Methodius, the teachers of the Slavs and an unquestionable source for any serious historian. As to whether contemporary Macedonia is still inhabited by Greeks, this is proved by their Greek language and tradition, which have survived 400 years of Turkish slavery.

The author's historical raving reaches its height now: "In the sixth century A.D., Macedonia was invaded by the Slavic-Bulgarian people. In the course of time, the Macedonians were assimilated by the Slavs and lost their language" (p. 15). In his delirium, though, he forgets that in the VIth century no Bulgarians yet existed in the Balkans, only appearing at the mouth of the Danube under Asparuch in 680 A.D., i.e. in the VIIth century. What Slavic-Bulgarian people invaded Macedonia a hundred years before the Bulgarians appeared? Needless to say, the Macedonian Greeks have "lost their language" and remained speechless only in the ignorant and insulting view of the Bulgarised Mr Anastasoff.

In Chapter III (The Roman-Byzantine World, pp. 17-21) the author's tuneless skirling is to be heard again. Here are some of the motifs: "During the sixth century, Slavic tribes had seized one by one Moesia (Northern Bulgaria, south of the Danube River), Thrace, Macedonia, Dardania, a large part of Epirus, Thessaly and the Peloponnesus. The entire region from the Danube river to the Aegean Sea and the Peloponnesus, according to Dr Constantine Jireček, the Czech historian, was called Slavonia" (p. 19). These unfounded theories of Fallmerayer's, concerning the flooding of Greece by Slavs, have been discounted for a hundred years and more and are no longer even discussed by serious historians. The writer is very *démodé* here. When he incriminates Jireček, I wonder if he is familiar with the famous "Jireček line", which passes from Alezzio on the Adriatic, between Skopje and Istip, through Niš and Sofia as far as the Black Sea? North of this line lies the area of Latin influence, on the basis of inscriptions found on the monuments; south of it Greek culture prevailed. Next movement: "The Greek emperors and patriarchs occupying

the thrones of Constantinople during that period (Middle Ages) had encroached upon the historical documents and records of Byzantium, changing and counterfeiting them, with the result that the Roman or Byzantine Empire was thus converted into a purely Greek entity” (p. 20). The Greek emperors and patriarchs of Constantinople, then, counterfeited Byzantium’s documents and records (which, I wonder, from the thousands of years of Byzantium’s existence?) thereby converting the whole Roman or Byzantine Empire into a Greek entity. How did this historic event take place, and what exactly was the Roman or Byzantine Empire before this mammoth counterfeiting? A Slavic Empire, perhaps? The reader is dumbfounded by the author’s paranoiac imaginings.

There is less harm done when he quite retrogressively considers a Greek Byzantine Emperor not to have been Greek at all: “...authorities generally agree that the dynasty of Justinus I (518-527), from which Justinian (527-565) descended, and the dynasty of Basilius I (867-886) were not Greek — neither were those of Leo V (813-820) and Romanus I (920-944)” (p. 21). Quite retrogressively, because he abides by the old history of Justinian, which is as follows: At the beginning of the XVIIth century, the Vatican librarian Nikolaos Alemanos discovered and published a *Life of Justinian*, supposedly written by a teacher of Justinian’s, one Theophilus. According to this *Life*, Justinus and Justinian were Slavs and Justinian’s real name was Upravda, which means ‘just’; he later translated it into Latin. This discovery was so precious to the Slavs that the categorical evidence of the Byzantine sources was not taken into consideration and Justinus and Justinian were accounted Slavs, not only by Slav historians but also by the Greek historian Pappariopoulos (Vol. 3, chap. 3, p. 81). No-one recalled that in the VIth century there were no Slavs on this side of the Danube. In 1883 the English historian J. Bryce was involved in research in the Vatican and at last discovered the manuscript on which Alemanos had based his *Life of Justinian*. He then proved, in an article published in the *English Historical Review* 2 (1877), 657-684, that the manuscript was a forgery, written at the beginning of the XVIIth century by a Dalmatian priest in an attempt to glorify the Slavic nation. Bryce’s evidence was so overwhelming that since then even the Slav historians have never mentioned the matter again. Our author, of course, is still living in the pre-1877 era, or pretending that he is so that he can further his own propagandist intentions. One suspects, too, that Mr Anastasoff knows that Basilius I was called Macedon because he came from Macedonia “near Thrace” and was born in Adrianople, its capital, and not because he was a Slavo-Macedonian, as our writer would rather he had been. Leo V was called Armenios because he came from Armeniaka in Asia Minor, though this does not necessarily mean that he was an Armenian.

Romanus I was called Lacapenos because he came from Lacape in Asia Minor, which was inhabited by Greeks. Let us add one of our own: Leo III (717-741) was called Isauros, though he was not born in Isauria; in fact he was born in Germanicaea in Syria, which former European historians mistook for Germanicaea in Isauria. They mistakenly called him Isauros, though he was actually a Syrian Greek.

In Chapter IV the writer relates the history of the First Bulgarian State (679-1018), as he himself would like it to have been, of course. In actual fact, historians have no definite knowledge of the Bulgarians' origins. The name 'Bulgarian' appears quite late in Byzantine sources (VIIth century) and is believed to refer to a Hun tribe, which had received this name from having lived for many years by the Volga river. Mr Anastasoff, however, fabricates a prodigious common origin for all the Bulgarian tribes, extending from the northern shores of the Caspian Sea to India and China: "The original homeland of the Bulgarians is commonly believed to have been the northern coast of the Caspian Sea, extending as far as India, Persia, and even China" (p. 23). He even knows that in 585 this homeland of the Protobulgarians', between the Don and the Volga in the north and between the Caspian and the Black Sea in the south, was called "Great Bulgaria" and had a known leader: "The leader of the league was Khan Kubrat, educated in Byzantium" (p. 23). In 585 the name 'Bulgarian' was not even known in Byzantium. According to the Miracles of Saint Dimitrios, a leader named Kubrat did exist c. 650, who led the rebelling prisoners taken by the Avars back to Byzantium and their homelands and who is believed to have been a Bulgarian; but this event took place in the VIIth century and this Kubrat was not "educated in Byzantium". (See P. Charanis, "Kouper, the Chronology of his Activities and their Ethnic Effects on the Regions around Thessalonica", *Balkan Studies* II 1970, 229-247).

In 681 an agreement was made between Constantine V and Asparuch, by which the barbarian tribe of the Bulgarians, who were very successful warriors, became a *foederatum*; that is, they settled within the frontier and in exchange for annual supplies of money and food undertook to guard their own particular section of the frontier. The Byzantines made such agreements with many barbarian tribes, but Anastasoff considers this particular agreement to be the foundation of the Bulgarian State: "A peace treaty was signed in 681 with provisions that Byzantium pay annual indemnity. And it was by this very act the new Bulgaro-Slavic State was recognised by Byzantium" (p. 24). First, the Byzantines never voluntarily recognised the establishment of any barbarian state within the bounds of their empire. And then, in 681 Asparuch and his

Bulgarians were still in the Danube delta and had not yet conquered the seven Slavic tribes of Moesia. How, then, could Byzantium have recognised a Bulgaro-Slavic State? See E. Chrysos, "Zur Gründung des ersten bulgarischen Staates", *Cyrrillomethodianum* 2 (1972), 1-7, who explains that there was no question of the founding of a state, it was simply a common agreement for the settling within the Byzantine Empire of a barbarian tribe which was paid to guard the frontier (a *foederatum*), regardless of the fact that the tribe later became hostile and waged war in order to become an independent Bulgarian hegemony.

The author gives us further unhistorical "facts"; for example, that Emperor Zeno (474-491), when confronted by an invasion of Ostrogoths in 480, called Bulgarians to his aid. Where did he get hold of these Bulgarians, since the Bulgarians were to make their appearance under Asparuch in the Danube delta 200 years later in 680 — as the author himself has already told us on p. 24, indeed referring to them as "advancing Protobulgarians". Such inconsistency can only be put down to the dizziness of patriotic fervour. The Slavs of Fallmerayer's stale old theory, which Anastasoff repeats yet again, he stily associates with the Bulgarians: "Such were the Slavs, who began the influx into the Balkan Peninsula during the fifth and sixth centuries, and later on the Bulgarians during the seventh century" (p. 24). Fallmerayer's Slavs, however, had nothing at all to do with Asparuch's Bulgarians, who settled in Moesia in 680 and lived there for some hundred years and only began warring with Byzantium and Constantine V in the VIIIth century. So there is no historical basis at all for identifying the Bulgarians of Moesia with the "Sclavinian" Slavs of Greece. Forgetting once again what he has said about Asparuch's "advancing Protobulgarians" in 680, Anastasoff says: "The Bulgarians crossed the Danube during the sixth and seventh centuries and invaded the various Slavic tribes who had already been settled in what is now Bulgaria, Thrace and Macedonia. Few in number, the Bulgarians intermarried with the subjugated Slavs and thus they were absorbed into the Slav bloodstream" (p. 26). What miracles chauvinistic propaganda can work when it has no respect for history! It can make Asparuch's Bulgarians from distant Moesia subjugate the "Sclavinian" Slavs of Macedonia and be absorbed into them, such that the Bulgarians make their historical appearance in Macedonia by the VIIth century. Is that not a fine concoction? Except that Anastasoff absentmindedly forgets what he said at the bottom of p. 24: "Under the leadership of Khan Kubrat (584-642) and later of his son, Prince Asparuch (644-701), the Bulgarians appeared in Dobrudja and Moesia, conquered the northern Slavs, and established the first Bulgarian Kingdom in 679, with Pliska as its capital" (p. 24). How then did they

“cross the Danube during the sixth and seventh centuries”, if they first appeared in Dobrudja and the Danube delta in 680? 680 is *not* the VIth century. And what Slavs, “settled in Thrace and Macedonia”, did they subjugate, when Mr Anastasoff himself has said that they “conquered the northern Slavs” — the Slavs, that is, of Moesia? Yet again, Mr Anastasoff does not know what he is talking about.

In a few lines and with some arbitrary statements, the writer finishes off the history of the First Bulgarian State. For instance, he maintains that: “Under Presian (836-852) and Boris I (852-889) Bulgaria extended its limits northwest to Iber (?) river and southwest beyond Ohrid. Almost the whole of Macedonia was included in the Bulgarian State” (p. 27). Exactly when and how, and in what particular battles, the whole of Macedonia became included in the Bulgarian State, we shall never know, for no available source or writings can tell us, and Mr Anastasoff is not saying. The brigand Symeon’s (893-927) Bulgarian Empire — which never existed — is fortunately dealt with in a single sentence; and nothing at all is said about how Byzantium regained the territory which had been so opportunely siezed by Samuel (993-1014). Basil the Bulgarslayer is not worth mentioning (p. 27), it seems.

Just how little Mr Anastasoff is bothered by these inconsistencies is made clear by the following: with reference to Boris-Michael’s unsuccessful attempt to establish an independent Bulgarian Church, he admits: “Neither Rome nor Constantinople recognized an independent church for any particular nation” (p. 28). A little further on, however, he says: “Under Simeon’s successor, Peter (927-969), by order of the Byzantine Emperor Romanus I, the Patriarch of Constantinople recognized the autonomy of the Bulgarian Church. The integrity of the church continued during the reign of Samuel (993-1014)” (p. 29). It should be noted that contemporary historians are of the opinion that there was no question of a Patriarchate either in Preslava or in Ohrid, but rather there was an archiepiscopate which assumed the title of Patriarchate, without this being recognised by the East or the West (see I. Tarnanidis, *Η διαμόρφωσις τοῦ αὐτοκεφάλου τῆς Βουλγαρικῆς Ἐκκλησίας (864-1235)*. (The formation of the autocephalous Bulgarian Church), Thessaloniki 1976). With reference to Cyril and Methodius, he says: “Both of them were born in Salonica, the capital of Macedonia, St Methodius was born in 825 and St Cyril in 827; his secular name was Constantine. Their father Leon was a nobleman and a Byzantine magistrate” (p. 31). This is correct. But later, on the same page, he says: “Being of Slavic descent, both of them spoke the old Slavic language fluently” (p. 31). How could the sons of a Byzantine magi. trate and nobleman have been of Slavic descent? Mr Anastasoff does not dispute that

the Byzantine province administrated by Methodius was the Strymon region, and we are assured as much by F. Dvornik (*Les légendes de Constantine et de Méthode vues de Byzance*, Prague 1933, pp. 2-19, *Byzantinoslavica Supplementa* I), as by G. Ostrogorsky (*The Byzantine background of the Moravian Mission*, *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 19 (1965), pp. 13-16). Stilpon P. Kyriakidis, however, (*Byzantine Studies* IV, Thessaloniki 1937-39, pp. 359 et seq.) proves that there was no Slav nobility in the Strymon region at that time. Maybe this theory is nearer to the truth: Slavs had been settled by Byzantine Emperors in Bithynia too, and when Methodius resigned from the administration of his province he retired, as we know, to Polyhroniou Monastery on Bithynian Olympus — the nearest large monastery, naturally. It is hardly likely, after all, that he would have travelled from the distant Strymon region in Macedonia all the way to Asia Minor.

There are further Cyril-and-Methodian paradoxes. On p. 31 we read that Cyril heard that the Slavs (one wonders which Slavs?) were unable to understand the Holy Liturgy and the Bible and so quickly composed an alphabet "...to meet all the requirements of the Slavic or 'Glagolic' speech...". One wonders who actually spoke this "Glagolic speech", for in fact it was not a "speech" but a form of writing. The author himself admits as much: "In the old Slavic *glagol* means 'word', hence a sign that speaks". And it is not true that the brothers christianised the Khazars of the Crimea (861), who spoke a Turkish dialect which could not be represented in "Glagolic" script (p. 32: "With the help of the newly invented alphabet, the Glagolitza, they succeeded in christianizing all of the Khazars").

On p. 43 Mr Anastascff represents the founder of Bogomilism as a Bulgarian: "The movement was named after its founder, Father Bogomil, who was the first Bulgarian Christian reformer", when in fact the name Bogomil is the Slavic translation of the Greek name Theophilos. The author has just said on the same page that Armenians and Syrians had been moved to Bulgaria and Thrace by Byzantine emperors and "...among these settlers were found Manicheans, Paulicians and Massilians...", from whom, as we know, the teachings of Bogomilism originated.

From Chapter V, which describes the establishment of the Second Bulgarian State (Byzantium and the Emergence of the Second Bulgarian State, 1187-1393, p. 49-66) let us pluck a few more Bulgarian roses. Concerning the Bulgarian leader of this state, Ioannidji Kaloyan, 1197-1207, whose savagery led the Byzantines to dub him Skyloyanni (the dog), we read: "He made peace with the Greeks (1201) and then engaged (1202) in campaigns against the Serbs

(taking Nish) and against the Hungarians... The collapse of the Eastern Empire gave Kaloyan an excellent opportunity to reaffirm his dominions... At the same time he took over the whole of Macedonia". There was no "peace with the Greeks" in 1201; Mr Anastasoff probably has in mind the Helleno-Bulgarian collaboration against the Latins in 1204-1206, in the course of which the Thracian Greeks, who were subject to very harsh treatment around Adrianople in the areas where the Latin Emperor, the remaining Crusaders and the Venetians all held sway, decided to rebel and sought help from Ioannidji, the Tsar of the Wallacho-Bulgarians. Later, however, from alliance he turned to hostility, destroyed the Greek towns of Thrace, slaughtered the population of Serres and twice besieged Thessaloniki where, in the course of his second siege in the autumn of 1207, he was found dead in his army camp. The Greeks ascribed his unhoped-for death to Thessaloniki's patron Saint Demetrios, of whom portable icons still exist today depicting the Saint on horseback transfixing a fallen enemy with his spear and bearing the inscription "Skyloyannis" (see Ioakeim Iviritou, «Ἰωάννου Σταυρακίου λόγος εἰς τὰ θαύματα τοῦ Ἁγίου Δημητρίου (An account by Ioannis Stavrakios of the miracles of St Demetrios)», *Makedonika* I (1940), p. 371). These events may be read of in Alexandra Krandonelli's doctorat thesis, *Ἡ κατὰ Λατίνων ἑλληνο-βουλγαρική σύμπραξις ἐν Θράκῃ, 1204-1206* (The Helleno-Bulgarian collaboration in Thrace against the Latins, 1204-1206) Athens 1964. Concerning the destruction of Serres, see N. E. Petrovich, «Ἡ πρώτη ὀλοκληρωτικὴ καταστροφὴ τῶν Σερρῶν τὸ 1206 ὑπὸ τοῦ Βουλγάρου Ἰωαννίτζι» (The first total destruction of Serres in 1206 by the Bulgarian Ioannidji), *Serres Chronicles of the Historical and Folklore Society of Serres and Melenikos* 1953. The Bulgarian writer G. Cankova-Petrova, "Bulgaro-Grucki i Bulgaro-Latinski otnosenija pri Kalojan i Boril", *Isvestija Inst. Ist.* 21 (1970), p. 149-171, of course presents Skyloyanni as a "friend of the people".

Chapter V brings us up to the Turkish Occupation (section 6. Bulgaria under Turkish Rule, 1393-1878, p. 54 et seq.). It is a very brief account of the Turkish conquests and despite certain omissions it is satisfactory. The mere mention, however, of the Turks' abolition of the Bulgarian Archiepiscopate of Ohrid in 1767 and its bishops' subjugation to the Patriarchate of Constantinople arouses Mr Anastasoff's wrath and he slanders and reviles the Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople for two whole pages (pp. 63 and 64), and returns yet again to the subject on p. 74 and 75.

So Mr Anastasoff has briefly reviewed the ancient and medieval history of Macedonia and Bulgaria up to the Turkish Occupation and we have seen just what kind of a review it is. This is no objective historical review, but a

contemptible kind of Bulgarian political propaganda, which distorts facts and makes preposterous assertions with no historical basis whatsoever.

From Chapter VI (p. 67) onwards and the beginning of the more recent history of Bulgaria and the Balkans, it will no longer be possible to deal in the same way with the 300 or so pages which remain, without writing a whole new book and exhausting everybody's patience. So a few general observations on each chapter will have to suffice.

In Chapter VI (Precursors of Bulgarian Self-Preservation and Awakening, pp. 67-86) the writer acknowledges that during the Turkish Occupation and until the XVIIIth century the Bulgarian people lost all trace of national consciousness. Rather than seeing themselves as a separate nation, they identified themselves completely with Orthodoxy (p. 69) and indeed, with their Greek culture, were proud to be considered Greeks (pp. 72 and 76). Mr Anastasoff attributes this sorry state to the tyranny of the Greek clergy and the Greek Patriarchate, whom he accuses of abusing their rights and, with the help of the Turkish authorities, stifling the spiritual development of the Bulgarian people (p. 74). There are Bulgarians to contradict this, however. Jordan Ivanov, the Bulgarian editor of "Bulgarian Antiquities in Macedonia", says: "The well-known instances in no way support the view that there was any deliberate attempt to hellenise the Bulgarians. The process of hellenisation was therefore natural and its success was due, as we have said, to an increased Greek bourgeoisie, to commerce, to literature and to the Church, all of which were quietly and gradually absorbed into the whole region and race". (J. Ivanov, "Gräsko-Bälgarski otnošeniya predi cärkovnata borba" [=Greek-Bulgarian relations before the ecclesiastical conflict], Sbornik v čest na Prof. L. Miletič, Sofija 1912, p. 166). See also A. A. Tahiaos, *Ἡ ἐθνικὴ ἀφύπνισις τῶν Βουλγάρων καὶ ἡ ἐμφάνισις τῆς βουλγαρικῆς ἐθνικῆς κινήσεως ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ* (The Bulgarians' national awakening and the Bulgarian nationalist movement in Macedonia), Thessaloniki 1974, pp. 22 and note 2. (Publications of the Society for Macedonian Studies. Macedonian Popular Library, 28).

The Bulgarian people's survival was due, the author says, to their professional guilds (pp. 68-69), and their awakening to the work of a monk from Hilandariou Monastery, Father Paĩsios (1722-1798), who was a novice on Mount Athos together with the Greek scholar Evyenios Voulgaris ("a hellenized Bulgarian" [p. 70], the author calls him, misled by the name). Concerning the basic and limited achievements of the sciolist Paĩsios, whose ideology amounted to little more than hellenophobia, see A. A. Tahiaos, "Idei Paisija Xilendar-skogo v svjazi s Grečeskim vežrozdeniem XVIII-go veka", *Actes du Premier*

Congrès International des Études balkaniques et sud-est européennes, VII, Sofija 1971, pp. 125-127. It is typical of Mr Anastasoff to make no mention of a contemporary and namesake of Païsius' on Athos, the Ukranian monk Païsius Velitskovskij, who founded an ascetic and philological school on Athos, which was clearly philhellenic in character. See A. A. Tahiaos, 'Ο Παΐσιος Βελιτσκόφσκι (1722-1794) και ἡ ἀσκητικοφιλογικὴ σχολή του (Paisios Velitskovskij [1722-1794] and his ascetic and philological school), Thessaloniki 1964.

Mr Anastasoff's anti-Greek propaganda also leads him to omit any mention of the fact that during the first dark centuries of Turkish enslavement, the Greeks and the Bulgarians shared their wretched plight, as the Greeks' "Secret School" shows. J. Ivanov says: "Even up to the Greek-Bulgarian ecclesiastical controversy in the XIXth century, both Greeks and Bulgarians lived harmoniously together as peoples with the same religion on whom the Turkish yoke lay equally heavily". (J. Ivanov, *ibid.*, p. 166). See also A. A. Tahiaos, "The Bulgarians' national awakening etc.", *ibid.*, p. 22 and note 2. What tyranny is Mr Anastasoff talking about then?

He also neglects to mention that after the Turkish authorities abolished the autocephalous Bulgarian Church in Ohrid in 1767, any disobedience on the part of the Bulgarian Orthodox clergy towards the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate was considered to be primarily an ecclesiastical matter, rather than a political question as the author would have it. He maintains that the Greek bishops "accused the apostles of Bulgarian regeneration of being revolutionists" and denounced them to the Turkish authorities (p. 74). As far as the Turkish authorities were concerned they were indeed revolutionaries. The author himself admits it on the next page, where he says that the first Bulgarian school, which the Bulgarians managed to open ("after centuries of Greek spiritual and educational oppression") after the Russo-Turkish war in 1829, in Gavrovo on October 2nd 1835, "...became the hearth of revolutionary teachings... as a result, the school was closed by the Turkish authorities in 1876" (p. 75). Was the school also denounced by the Greek bishops? But further on Mr Anastasoff himself says: "By the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, many Bulgarians had obtained their education in Greek schools" (p. 76). Does this indicate "Greek spiritual and educational oppression"?

But we should remind our forgetful author of the true facts. He says: "The Greek Bishop of Turnovo vehemently opposed the establishment of Bulgarian schools" (p. 74). This is barefaced slander! The absolute opposite was the case. The Bishop of Turnovo from 1821-1838 was Hilarion the Cretan, who was a great advocate of Bulgarian education; he maintained the Bulgarian school

at Svistov and founded the first Bulgarian school at Gavrovo, which was financed by Basil E. Aprilof, the son of an Epirot Greek. Concerning Hilarion, see I. S. Negarov, "Tárnovski mitropoliti v Tursko vreme", *Spisanie na Bălgarskata Akademija na Naukite*. Kniga LII. *Klon Istorico-Filologičen i Filososfsko-Obščestven* 25 (1935), 236-243. See also A. A. Tahiaos, The Bulgarians' national awakening etc., *ibid.*, p. 24 and note 1. Our author mentions nothing of all this and with respect to Aprilof, he says only: "Apriloff took the initiative of organizing a committee for opening a Bulgarian school in Gavrovo, his native city" (p. 74). But Aprilof lauded most highly his patron Hilarion, Bishop of Turnovo, and as a historian Mr Anastasoff ought to acknowledge it. The first director Hilarion appointed to the Gavrovo school was Neofit Rilski, of whom our author says, quite simply and innocently: "Neophite Rilski from Bansko was the first to take charge of the newly established school of Gavrovo in 1835" (p. 77). He is crafty enough not to mention, however, that Rilski was later appointed Professor of Slavonic at the Theological School of the Patriarchate in Halki. Concerning Neofit Rilski, see B. Penev, *Istorija na novata Bălgarska literatura III*. *Bălgarskata Literatura prez părvata polovina na XIX vek*. Sofija 1933, 470-520. See also A. A. Tahiaos, The Bulgarians' national awakening etc., *ibid.*, p. 24 and note 1. Do these writers bear witness to the indisputable facts which Mr Anastasoff refers to as "Greek spiritual and educational oppression" on the part of the Orthodox Patriarchate?

In this chapter the author attributes the delay in the awakening of the Bulgarian people's national consciousness to the fact that the Greek clergy and Patriarchate suppressed their spiritual life, rather than to their less advanced spiritual level, as was really the case. When Constantinople fell and the Turks took over Greek territory, Europe was suddenly filled with Greek intellectuals. Where were the Bulgarian intellectuals when the Turks occupied Bulgaria? "During the XVIIIth century not a single centre of purely Slavic culture and education existed in the whole of the Balkans". (A. A. Tahiaos, The Bulgarians' national awakening etc., *ibid.*, p. 16 and note 2). On the other hand, the intellectual flowering of the Greek circles extended even into purely Bulgarian areas, as Ph. Shashko asserts in "Greece and the intellectual bases of the Bulgarian Renaissance". *American contributions to the seventh International Congress of Slavists*, Warsaw, August 21st - 27th 1973. Vol. II: History. The Hague - Paris 1973, 93-121. And it is untrue that the politically fanatical but historically insignificant book written by Paisios of Hilandariou Monastery was sufficient by itself to awaken the national consciousness of a whole people. "For some one hundred years the teachings of Paisios of Hilandariou had no repercussions in Macedonia; Russian activity and Russian money were necess-

ary before Bulgarian nationalism and a Bulgarian nationalist movement came into being...". The Russian activity was set in motion by two Russian agents, the Miladinof brothers: "...what they themselves failed to achieve was achieved by their students, their agents, the young people sent to study in Russia, the activities of the Russian consuls and, above all, by Russian money". (A. A. Tahiaos, *The Bulgarians' national awakening etc.*, *ibid.*, p. 39). Concerning the life and activities of the brothers Dimiter and Constantine Miladinof, see A. A. Tahiaos, *ibid.*, p. 25-39. Our author says, quite innocently, of these two brothers: "The Miladinoff brothers of Struga, Dimiter (1820-1862) and Constantine (1830-1862), published the first anthology with Bulgarian folklore in 1861" (p. 77). His crafty silence covers a great deal.

On March 11th 1870 the Bulgarian Exarchate was established through force of circumstances (Hatti-Humayun of the 18th January 1856 for equality between Moslems and Christians following the Ottoman defeat in the Crimean War, 1854-1856) and through foreign intervention (notably the Russian Consul Ignatief in Constantinople from 1864-1877). Through the Exarchate many Bulgarians even became Catholics and naturally it was not recognised by the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, which excommunicated it on the grounds that it was schismatic. Not only was it a matter of ecclesiastical apostasy, but also the Exarchate claimed that historically Greek territory was Bulgarian, as the author himself admits on p. 81: "The question of Macedonia had thus definitely arisen for the first time in Balkan history"... "The populations of Thrace and Macedonia were as Bulgarian as those of Bulgaria"... "Thrace and Macedonia ought to be Bulgarian since the people who live there are Bulgarians". These are barefaced inaccuracies. It is from such unfounded and nonsensical claims on the part of the Bulgarians, rather than from the facts, that the so-called "Macedonian Question" has arisen, a product of Slav propaganda.

Chapter VII eulogises the Haiduti, those Bulgarian mountain brigands, as national freedom fighters. The author acknowledges that their original motivation was personal revenge rather than national liberation, as was also the case with the Serbian Haiduks and the Greek Klephts ("The Haiduti movement ... in the beginning... had no political purpose; it was not a movement with an idea of working for the liberation of their subjugated and maltreated fellow countrymen. Their chief object was retaliation — to avenge themselves on the rapacious and unrestrained Turks" p. 90), but nevertheless he proclaims the Bulgarian Haiduti and the Serbian Haiduks as national heroes, whereas the Greek Klephts remain brigands as far as he is concerned. With a certain inconsistency of thought, he says: "These popular Balkan heroes appeared in

Serbia under the name 'Haiduk', in Bulgaria and Macedonia as 'Haiduti', and in Greece under the name of 'Kleftis'. They were all national heroes then. But no, this is unacceptable in the case of the Greeks: "The word 'Kleftis' means 'thieves'" and the Greek Klephts "were true brigands and worked for their own personal gains. They did not carry out their work with the same romantic idealism as the Bulgarian 'Haiduti' or the Serbian 'Haiduks'" (p. 90). So only the Greek Klephts were brigands, whereas the Bulgarian brigands, the Haiduti, and the Serbian brigands, the Haiduks, were national heroes. Mr Anastasoff has proclaimed it. With the one difference, however, which he forgets, that the Klephts gave named chieftains and freedom fighters to the cause both before and after the Great Greek Revolution of 1821; there was no Great Bulgarian Revolution and a few of the Haiduti later continued their life of brigandage as rapacious Komitadjis.

How is it possible, though, that the Bulgarians staged no Great Revolution? Mr Anastasoff undertakes to tell his uninformed readership all about it. On p. 98, under the title 7, The Bulgarian Insurrection of 1876, he first presents us with the uprising in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1875, an uprising which neither was Bulgarian nor had any patriotic or liberational aim, as Mr Anastasoff admits: "The primary causes of the original rising in Herzegovina were not so much political as social and economic". He then presents as a Bulgarian Revolution a few revolutionary events in a few Bulgarian mountain villages around Tatar-Pazarjik in April 1876, though, as he says: "They were barely able to hold their own against the Turkish forces" (p. 99). In fact they were suppressed by the Turks in the usual way, by the sword, exaggerated reports of the slaughters being reported by Bulgarians to foreigners and press correspondents in Constantinople: "The priest Taleff of Tatar-Pazarjik informed them of the happenings in the area of revolt by letters sent by special courier" (p. 99). These reports, when published in English newspapers, caused a great stir on the part of the opposition party against the Prime Minister Disraeli. Mr Anastasoff has no hesitation in accusing Disraeli of forgery, since he did not help the Bulgarian cause: "Benjamin Disraeli, the Prime Minister, doubted whether such atrocities had really occurred and even resorted to *forged* telegrams from the British Ambassador in Constantinople, Sir Henry G. Elliot, to show that the stories published in the *Daily News* and *Times* were 'gross exaggerations'" (p. 101).

The last subdivision of Chapter VII (9. Americans in Bulgaria's History, pp. 102-103 — a *captatio benevolentiae* for the American readership, needless to say) contains a foreign journalistic success and a piece of Bulgarian nonsense. The Irish-American correspondent for the *London Daily News*, Januarius A.

Macgahn, who had accompanied the young American Consul in Constantinople, Eugene Schuyler, was sent, after the great uproar, in July 1876 to the Tatar-Pazarjik region to investigate the rumoured Turkish atrocities in the area which had rebelled earlier that year. From the isolated town of Batak in August he sent the *Daily News* a report full of frightful accounts of the murdered victims' decomposing corpses. Our author says: "Macgahn's letter of August 2 1876, sent from Tatar-Pazarjik and published in the *Daily News*, provoked the inevitable Russo-Turkish War" (p. 103). But he does not mention exactly what the American Consul Schuyler's official report said, Schuyler being the official government representative.

Mr Anastasoff informs us that Macgahn died in Constantinople on 9th June 1878 and was buried in Peran. In 1884 his remains were transported to America and re-buried in New Lexington, Ohio. Ten years later a memorial to him was erected bearing the inscription: "Macgahn, Bulgarian Liberator" (p. 103). But our author does not say who erected this memorial with its absurd inscription; he does not make it clear whether it was the American government or the incorrigible American Bulgarians.

Chapter VIII (The Establishment of the Third Bulgarian State, 3, 1878, pp. 105-126) reports, amongst other things, the three outstanding political events in modern Balkan history: a) The San Stefano Treaty, 3rd March 1878 (pp. 107-109), b) The Congress of Berlin and its Objective, 1st June - 1st July 1878 (pp. 109-111), c) The coup d'état by which Bulgaria annexed Eastern Rumelia on 6th September 1885 (8. Unification of Eastern Rumelia with the Principality of Bulgaria, pp. 118-120). Once again our author proves himself a poor propagandist and a poor historian.

Concerning the San Stefano Treaty he maintains in all seriousness that the vast Bulgaria (from Thessaly to the Danube and from the Black Sea to Albania), which Russia, having won the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, had constructed on paper as a Slavic satellite of her own on the way to Constantinople and the Dardanelles, had a primarily Bulgarian population: "The Great State of Bulgaria thus created was based essentially on historical and ethnic considerations; the preponderant character of the population was Bulgarian" (p. 108). Nothing could be farther from the truth. The whole history of Macedonia and Thrace has been ignored, as have the dense Greek and Serbian populations; it is a well-known fact that only the regions of what are today Serbian and Bulgarian Macedonia had a somewhat denser Bulgarian population. Mr Anastasoff does not dare to support his assertions himself with historical reasoning and statistics, but calls upon a book by a certain Oscar Brown-

ing (*A History of the Modern World*, London 1912, pp. 294-297) to plead his case for him. Concerning the San Stefano Treaty, Browning has the following absurd and unhistorical remarks to make: (p. 108) "It was by no means favorable to Russian ambition (in which case, why was it not acceptable to the Western Powers?) and, indeed, suggested the suspicion that it was drawn up by Ignatiev with exaggerated moderation (let's hear it for *moderation!* Without it Bulgaria would have had boundaries from the Carpathians down to Crete) because he knew that as soon as it was concluded it would be torn to pieces by Great Britain (which did indeed happen, possibly because of the moderation). It created a large Bulgaria, founded on knowledge of history of that country and her claim, through her energy and steadfastness, to be the dominant power in the peninsula (it is precisely because this country's history, her arrogant pretensions and Russia's aspirations were so well known that the Treaty, which surpassed even the boldest Bulgarian ambition and endangered the national interests of the Western Powers, "was torn to pieces")". The great historian continues: "The new Bulgaria received Kavala on the Aegean as a port for the exportation of her produce (by what historical and ethnological criteria, I wonder, could so utterly Greek a town as Kavala be considered Bulgarian?). She could not have been a satellite of Russia, but was far more likely to become ungrateful to the power which had created her and thus be an effective barrier to the advance of Russia towards Constantinople (it is curious that the Western Powers did not realise this)". He is also insolent: "The map of the Balkan Peninsula distributed to members of Parliament was of mendacious character... The Bulgarians were the predominant power in the Peninsula and the Greeks had no claim to consideration". Mendacious maps distributed to the members of the English Parliament! Is this possible? The Bulgarians were the predominant power in the Balkans! So predominant that they were unable to throw off the Turkish yoke, as the Greeks did. The Greeks had no claim to consideration! Who deprived them of it — their three-thousand-year history of their achievements in 1821? It is perfectly clear who is "of mendacious character". Perhaps after all this, Oscar Browning should have been awarded an "Oscar" for history: unless, of course, Mr Anastasoff would like to claim it.

The San Stefano Treaty, creating that Great Bulgaria dreamt of by Russia and seemingly by our author still, according to him solved all the problems. The problems of the Bulgarian nationalists, that is: "The San Stefano Treaty with one stroke had solved the Bulgarian question most satisfactorily. The Bulgarian people considered themselves not only liberated but also politically united" (p. 109). In actual fact, however, the San Stefano Treaty had neither

a historical nor an ethnological basis, since it took over non-Bulgarian territory and subjugated non-Bulgarian peoples, and moreover constructed by means of force and Russian arms an enormous robot-state in the service of Russia. Which is why on 1st June 1878 the Western Powers gathered in Berlin for a conference and one month later signed the Treaty of Berlin, which revised the San Stefano Treaty, divided Great Bulgaria into five parts and returned Bulgaria to its historical place. Our author laments: "England, Germany and Austria-Hungary, however, jealous of Russia's political preponderance in the Near East and fearing that the creation of a strong Bulgarian State in the Balkans would prove a mere Russian vanguard toward the Dardanelles, intervened in behalf of Turkey, and caused the convocation of the Berlin Congress for the revision of the San Stefano Treaty... In this manner Bulgaria was sacrificed on the altar of selfish interest of a suspicious Europe" (p. 110). But yet again he forgets that a couple of pages previously (p. 108) he quoted the so-called historian Oscar Browning in support of the opposite claim — that the San Stefano Treaty did not serve Russian interests, rather it was an obstacle between Russia and the Dardanelles. Now, however, he is indirectly admitting the truth.

One of the five divisions of the former Great Bulgaria, the southern part of Bulgaria, was given the name of Eastern Roumelia together with a certain administrative autonomy under a Christian governor and under the control of the Sultan. The Bulgarian military coup d'état which annexed Eastern Roumelia with the collaboration of the Porte-appointed Christian governor, took place in September 1885, was successful and was sanctioned in April 1886, despite Russian opposition. This was due to the assistance of England, which prevented any external intervention; but not because she was "now anxious to repair the political conscience of Great Britain which had been largely responsible for the partition of San Stefano Bulgaria", as Mr Anastasoff says on p. 120, but, precisely because Russia was opposed to the annexation, England was counting on a united anti-Russian Bulgaria.

With Chapter IX (The Macedonian Question: An Apple of Discord, pp. 128-150) Mr Anastasoff commences his own personal account of the conflict between the various nationalities (Bulgarians, Greeks and Serbs — and *not* just Serbs and Greeks, which implies that the conflict took place on Bulgarian territory, as the author says: "Macedonia became an arena of Serbian and Greek propaganda" (p. 128)) for dominance in Macedonia, which the Berlin Treaty had left under Turkish sovereignty. This conflict had in fact been rumbling away underground ever since the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate

in 1870, but Mr Anastasoff neglects to inform us of the ways and means by which the Exarchate infiltrated the peoples of Macedonia — particularly after the coup d'état in Eastern Roumelia in 1885 and up to the beginning of the Komitadjis' armed activities in 1894 — and what distorting effects the Exarchate's propaganda had on these peoples' national consciousness. (See Evangelos Kofos, M. A. Georgetown University, *Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia*. Thessaloniki 1964: pp. 20-22, Penetration by the Exarchate, 1885-1893, pp. 22-25, The Impact of Propaganda on the Peoples of Macedonia. Society for Macedonian Studies. Institute for Balkan Studies, no. 70).

On p. 129 Mr Anastasoff presents us with an analysis of the composition of Macedonia's population before the departure of the Turks in 1912. According to his very arbitrary reckoning Macedonia comprised 55% Bulgarians, 20% Turks, 10% Greeks, 5% Albanians, 5% Jews and Wallachians and 5% Gypsies and other races, and he maintains that: "The predominant group that played the major role in the affairs of Macedonia was the Bulgaro-Macedonians". Then on pp. 130-131 he presents three groups of statistics, Bulgarian, Serbian and Greek: he credits only the Bulgarian figures with authenticity and rejects the rest out of hand: "The Bulgarian statistics alone take into account the national consciousness of the people themselves" (p. 131). Fortunately he has already taken care to inform us on p. 130 that: "Owing to the different principles and methods of calculation employed, national propagandists arrived at wholly discrepant results, generally exaggerated, in the interest of their own nationality". But what else has he shown himself to be hitherto other than a "national propagandist"? And consequently what becomes of the authenticity of his own statistics and his assertion, also made "in the interest of his own nationality", concerning the dominance of the Bulgarian element ("the predominant group")?

The truth is that any statistics concerning the population of Macedonia at that period are utterly unreliable because of the mixture of nationalities and the fluid national consciousness of some of them, and because of the conflict between the various nationalities. The statistics produced by interested parties are compiled to support national claims, and those of disinterested foreigners are based on insufficient or distorted evidence. Serious historians discern three distinct population zones in Macedonia c. 1880-1890: in the north the Slavic element was predominant, though it is impossible to ascertain the extent of its Bulgarisation; in the extreme west the Albanian element predominated; and in Southern Macedonia the great majority was Greek. Between the Slavic zone in the north and the Greek zone in the south there was a mixture of polyglot peoples, who had no clearly-defined national consciousness and

whose patriotism was purely local, such that it is difficult to know whether to include them in the north or the south zone.

The Exarchate did its best to implant Bulgarian national consciousness in these intermediate peoples in order that Macedonia should appear to be Bulgarian dominated. Its propaganda had a considerable degree of success, but unsatisfied Bulgarian extremist and nationalist elements turned to more efficacious and violent methods, instigating years of bloodshed and fighting—now known as the Macedonian Struggle—through the terrorist activities of the Komitadjis. This the author presents as a spontaneous popular revolution, declaring: “The Bulgarian population of Macedonia, along with that of Thrace, set themselves to organize a revolutionary movement of their own under the order of a revolutionary central committee” (p. 134). In fact, on the contrary, I.M.R.O. (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation), which was founded in 1893 and consisted of Bulgarian extremists, did its best to instigate a revolution, whether the people wanted it or not, for an autonomous Macedonia and Thrace. But this autonomous state was to be Bulgarian, a Second Bulgarian State, and consequently, despite its multinational declarations, only “*Exarchal*” Bulgarians were accepted as members of I.M.R.O. and the organisation systematically slaughtered and murdered “*Patriarchal*” Greek and Slavophones in Macedonia.

Mr Anastasoff reveals nothing of these bloody activities; but he is betrayed by the French General Consul in Thessaloniki, M. Steeg’s report of the 3rd December 1902 to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Delcassé. Our author quotes this report on p. 137, somewhat maladroitly, for quite other reasons. Amongst other things, it says: “The adherents of the Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation are more numerous and better organised than those of the Sofia Committee and *it is this organisation to which should be ascribed the summary executions and the acts of terror which so often occur in this country*”. How hypocritical Mr Anastasoff is to present the criminal members of I.M.R.O. as ideological freedom fighters, when he says: “Their idealism and devotion to the cause of freedom and human rights deserve one’s admiration. They were true apostles and martyrs for the cause of freedom and self-determination of Macedonia” (p. 138). He means Bulgarian freedom, of course, and only Bulgarian human rights, for neither Greek nor Slavophone Patriarchals were entitled to freedom and human rights. Similar ways of thinking have made themselves felt in Macedonia in more recent years too.

The Balkan Slavs still celebrate today the propaganda-ridden “Ilinden” (the Feast of the Prophet Elijah) Insurrection on August 2nd (old style, July 20th). The insurrection took place in 1903 (6. An Attempt for Freedom — The

Ilinden Insurrection of 1903, pp. 143-150) and the author first acknowledges, somewhat ingenuously, the methods employed by I.M.R.O.: "Assassination was the only weapon the latter (I.M.R.O.) possessed and they did not hesitate to have recourse to it, *more especially against Greeks who acted as the secret police of the Turks and thus committed murder by proxy*" (p. 145). This accusation was of course a pretext for the extermination of the Greek element, for how else could Macedonia be made to appear Bulgarian dominated? He then proceeds to present this insurrection as very 'great': "...on a scale that would entitle it to be referred to as a 'great insurrection'" (p. 148), by exaggerating the numbers of skirmishes, insurgents and dead: "From the time of the uprising on August 2 until its fall November 2, there were 239 skirmishes and 994 insurgents and 5,328 Turkish soldiers killed. The total number of insurgents was about 27,000, against a Turkish army of 351,000" (pp. 148-149).

But, as the author himself admits, after the 25th August the Insurrection became defensive, rather than offensive, and on 2nd November it ended: "From 25 August onward, the revolutionists were acting purely on the defensive... After September, the fighting was very desultory, and on November 2 the Insurrection was officially declared at an end" (p. 148). How could 239 skirmishes have taken place in just three weeks of real fighting, and how could 351,000 Turkish troops have fought in the confined area of the vilayet of Vitolia, where the insurgents had taken over only three small towns, Krousovo, Kleisoura and Neveska? How much faith can one have in Mr Anastasoff's figures? In actual fact, the Ilinden Insurrection—which was conducted by a few groups of Komitadjis, who coerced or terrorised a number of Slavophone villagers into the mountain vilayets of Monastir (Vitolia) and Adrianople—lasted just three weeks before being crushed by the Turkish army. That is how 'great' it was. The town of Krousovo, inhabited by a Greek majority, was chosen by the insurgents as the "Democracy of Krousovo"; but they left it in ruins twelve days later, abandoning the Greek inhabitants to the vengeful wrath of the Turks. Of course, Mr Anastasoff does not mention this, but he adds: "Such was indeed the heroic but tragic end of I.M.R.O.'s great insurrection of 1903" (p. 149).

Chapter X (The Great Powers and the Macedonian Question, pp. 153-179) brings us up to more modern European history and relates the Great Powers' unsuccessful attempts to impose reform plan on the Ottoman Empire in an endeavour to bring peace to the strife-torn peoples of European Turkey. These plans were the first Austro-Russian plan of Vienna and the second Austro-Russian plan of Mourjeg. Mr Anastasoff continues his propagandist tac-

tics and maintains that when groups of Greeks and Serbians finally took up arms in self-defence against I.M.R.O. atrocities, they were helping the Turks against the Bulgarians (5. Greek and Serbian Bands Aid the Turks Against the Bulgarians, pp. 163-168). He says nothing of the bloody massacres of Greek and Slavophone Patriarchs by I.M.R.O. and maintains, on the contrary and in the face of all historical evidence, that the Macedonian Bulgarians "were fighting for the freedom of all nationalities" and that they "had invited all Macedonians, regardless of nationality or religion, to take their stand under the flag of liberty" (p. 164). But it is a well-known fact that their sole aim was to make Macedonia appear Bulgarian dominated by exterminating all who were not Bulgarian Exarchals, under the pretext of waging a war of liberation. The Greeks and Slavophones also desired liberation from the Turkish yoke and they would never have fought the bloody life and death war against I.M. R.O. —the famous Macedonian Struggle— if they had had a common purpose. This struggle put an end to I.M.R.O.'s systematic annihilation of non-Bulgarians and itself ended at the same time as the Young Turks' revolt (1904-1908) with an amnesty and the promise of equal civil rights for all Macedonian national groups. This promise was not to be kept, however, as the Young Turks embarked upon a relentless islamisation of the subjugated peoples, something the Sultans had not done for centuries and which led the Balkan States to gather together and to the outbreak of the Balkan Wars. Professor D. Dakin of London University has written a serious scholarly study of the Macedonian Struggle, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 1897-1913*, Thessaloniki 1966. (Institute for Balkan Studies, no. 89).

In the last three chapters of the book, Mr Anastasoff recounts the events of a) the Balkan Wars (Chapter XI: Bulgarian Wars for the Liberation of the Bulgarians in Macedonia and Thrace — the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, pp. 182-205), b) the First World War (Chapter XII: The First World War, 1914-1918, and Bulgaria, pp. 217-250) and c) the Second World War (Chapter XIII: The Bulgarians in the Second World War, 1941-1944, pp. 253-274). His historical account is accompanied by an entirely one-sided and unhistorical defence and justification of the Bulgarian viewpoint. I shall spare the reader's endurance, however, and not follow him into his distortions of Bulgarian history: let me simply give a few indications of his historical veracity.

In his account of the First Balkan War, Mr Anastasoff says: "Although the Greek army was farther from Salonika than the Bulgarian Rilo division, the Turks surrendered Salonika to them" (p. 193). This is a deliberate concealment of historical truth. After the defence agreement between Greece and Bul-

garia in Sofia on 29th May 1912, a military agreement was also made on 12th September 1912 (for the text of this agreement, see Iv. E. Guechoff, *L'Alliance Balcanique*, Paris, Librairie Hachette et Cie 1915, pp. 228-234), which contained the provision that in the event of Serbian participation, Bulgaria would transfer her troops to the Thracian front — which indeed took place. Since no agreement had been made regarding the partition of Macedonia after the victory, Bulgaria treacherously sent the Rilo division south-west to take Thessaloniki before the approaching Greek troops could manage to do so. We all know of the agonised telegrams Prime Minister Venizelos sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Greek troops, Crown Prince Constantine, who had been delayed in the outlying country; and in obedience to the telegrams he entered the city. The Bulgarian troops, then, were not closer than the Greeks, and the Turks handed over the city to the latter. The Bulgarians' deceitfulness is also proved by the events which followed. Requesting and receiving permission from the Greek Commander-in-Chief to enter Thessaloniki, supposedly in order to rest, Bulgarian troops ensconced themselves permanently and demanded *de facto* joint government of the city. They were later driven out, of course, by machine-gun fire. (These events are recounted by the Greek liaison officer at the Bulgarian headquarters, Athanasios Souliotis-Nikolaidis, *Diary of the First Balkan War*, Thessaloniki 1962, Institute for Balkan Studies. See also Evangelos Kofos, *Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia*, p. 39 and p. 40).

Concerning the outbreak of the Second Balkan War, Mr Anastasoff again conceals the truth and condemns Serbia for violating the agreement and instigating the war: "Serbia now demanded the extension of her territorial claims far beyond the line agreed upon in the Bulgaro-Serbian Treaty of March 13, 1912. Serbia in fact began to claim all the territory occupied by her army" (p. 195). But the truth is otherwise. Austro-Hungary and Italy blocked the Serbian troops' advance towards the Adriatic and Albania, so that they were forced to turn south; they then occupied Monastir (Vitola) within the Bulgarian zone as laid down by the Bulgaro-Serbian treaty. On 25th May 1912 the Serbian Prime Minister made friendly overtures to Sofia regarding a revision of the Treaty for recognition of the Serbs' recent occupation of Bulgarian territory, given that Bulgaria would receive Serbian aid in the capture of Thrace rather than *vice versa* as had been formerly agreed. But Bulgaria not only rejected these proposals, ignoring the Serbian blood which had been shed and depriving her Serbian allies of any profit from the war, but then made a surprise attack on both the Serbians and the Greeks on 29th June 1913. *This* was the instigation of the Second Balkan War between the three allies. It is recounted by the Carnegie report, which Mr Anastasoff, however, does not quote to his

own advantage this time. (Dotation Carnégie pour la paix internationale. Enquête dans les Balkans: rapport présenté aux directeurs de la dotation par les membres de la commission d'enquête, Paris 1914, p. 44. See also E. Kofos, *ibid.*, p. 40, note 24). Mr Anastasoff of course denies that Bulgaria was responsible for its attack on the allies, ascribing it to an independent and arbitrary action on the part of the leader of the Bulgarian Army Staff, General Savof (p. 197). It is not important that a scapegoat was found, however. What does matter is that Bulgaria debarred any friendly concord with her allies and started a war, an action which two of her former Prime Ministers have denounced as "criminal stupidity". (See Al. Chankov in *Makedonska Tribuna*, Indianapolis, Ind. U.S.A., 18th September 1952 — Iv. Guechoff, *La folie criminelle et l'enquête parlementaire*, Sofia 1914. See also E. Kofos, *ibid.*, p. 40, note 25).

The Second Balkan War ended, as we know, with the defeat of Bulgaria and the Treaty of Bucharest on 10th August 1913, through which Macedonia was divided for the first time between Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria.

Our lamenting author uses unprovable statistics in an attempt to show that the parts of Macedonia which the treaty allotted to Serbia and Greece had Bulgarian majorities (pp. 199-201). Apart from the fact that there were many more Slavophones in the Serbian part than in the Greek part, I think enough has been said already about the value of Macedonian population statistics at that period. Mr Anastasoff's figures concerning the Bulgarians in Macedonia have been devised purely for his own diversion.

He then proceeds to accuse the Serbians and the Greeks of systematically expelling the Bulgarians from their newly-acquired areas of Macedonia and attempting to deprive them of their national identity (pp. 201-205). It is quite natural that the Bulgarians should not have enjoyed the dismantling of I.M. R.O.'s enforced Bulgarisation of the inhabitants of these areas. It is also natural that in such fanatical national struggles excesses should be committed by all sides. But it is not natural for a historian to be so one-sided and so deliberately extreme. For instance, Mr Anastasoff says nothing of such activities on the Bulgarian side.

Concerning the First World War which followed, Mr Anastasoff is silent about the atrocities committed by the Bulgarians for three whole years (1915-1918) when they were occupying Serbian Macedonia and the eastern part of Greek Macedonia, which they siezed in exchange for joining the war on the side of the highest bidder, the Central Powers (Germany, Austria and Italy). These atrocities are concealed in the brief comment: "Macedonia was therefore liberated from Serbian oppression, and a Bulgarian regime over the country established" (p. 223). Our author does not of course state just what a "Bul-

garian regime” meant to non-Bulgarians; fortunately others do: see Elisabeth Barker, *Macedonia. Its place in Balkan Power Politics*, London 1950, pp. 29-30 (The Royal Institute of International Affairs). Mr Anastasoff, then, is one-sided in his reporting of events and deliberately extreme in his accusations and his imaginary figures. He is a propagandist and not a historian.

As we know, Bulgaria was defeated in the First World War and with the Neuilly Treaty of 27th November 1919 was deprived not only of what she had already lost by the Treaty of Bucharest on 10th August 1913 but also of her outlet into the Aegean, the area between Nestos and Kavala.

Bulgaria, defeated and universally hated for her activities, was forced to sign the Neuilly Treaty, which Mr Anastasoff criticises as unfair. His censure, however, is not direct, but rather through the support of others. He quotes 1) Pro-Bulgarian reports to the American President Wilson (from American missionaries in Bulgaria, p. 288, and from an Englishman, James David Bourchier, pp. 229-230); 2) an article by Bourchier published in February 1919 in the *Contemporary Review*, addressed to the League of Nations, pp. 230-232; and 3) a speech made in the House of Lords by the opposition member Lord James Bryce, criticising the Paris Treaties of 1919, pp. 233-238.

However, these “testimonials” to the validity of Mr Anastasoff’s allegations contain ideas which are historically inaccurate; in the missionaries’ report, for example, one may read: “...from Skopia and Ochrida to Drama, the great bulk of the population is Bulgarian in origin, language and customs, and forms an integral part of the Bulgarian nation” (p. 228). This means that all the Slavophones, Greeks and non-Greeks, from Skopia to Ohrid, and all the Greeks from the Greek towns of Florina and Kastoria as far as the Greek town of Drama comprised no more than a small minority in comparison with the vast bulk of the Bulgarian population. This is not true. The towns had dense Greek populations and the Slavophones in the villages were by no means all Bulgarians. Had the demographic composition of Macedonia during that period been clear, the subject would not have occupied the attention of so many governments for so long. Mr Anastasoff’s allegations here, then, are propaganda, not history.

In Bourchier’s report to President Wilson, a) as a solution to the Macedonian Question it is suggested that Macedonia be given autonomy — which is a crafty solution that the Bulgarians have always supported as it would in time permit Bulgaria to annex the whole of Macedonia by coup d’état, as she did in 1885 to Eastern Roumelia; b) the bounds of this autonomous Macedonia are suggested as extending from the Serbian border to the Aegean and from the Bulgarian border to Albania, while “the southern frontier, extending from

Lake Castoria to the mouth of the Vardar, would also retain Nigrita and the Chalkidiki Peninsula"; and, believe it or not, c) "Salonica, which is commercially inseparable from the interior, would naturally become the capital of the new state. If this is thought impossible, a maritime outlet would still exist at Kavala" (pp. 229-230). The rogue did not spare either Halkidiki, where no Slav immigrant has ever set foot, or Thessaloniki, where no Bulgarian conqueror has ever set foot. It is unbelievable that such preposterous ideas from a bygone age should be called upon today as historical justification for Bulgaria in a book written in 1977 by a Bulgarian citizen of the modern People's Republic of Bulgaria.

Let me waive any discussion of Bouchier's article and Bryce's speech, because they both, for reasons unknown to us today, support similar preposterous Bulgarian claims. Fortunately, the victorious allies, better judges of the conditions of the time, resorted to the sure solution of an exchange of populations.

Mr Anastasoff does not mention that during the inter-war years (Bulgaria between the Two World Wars, pp. 238-250) on August 9th 1920 the Greek-Bulgarian Treaty was signed at Neuilly, the two countries agreeing to a voluntary exchange of minorities. 30,000 Greeks left Bulgaria and 53,000 Bulgarians left Greece — figures which do not include those who fled to their own countries during the First World War (16,000 Greeks and 39,000 Bulgarians). See Stephen Ladas, *The Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey*, New York, Mcmillan, 1932, pp. 122-123. See also E. Kofos, *Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia*, pp. 42-43.

In this way the problem of the Greek and Bulgarian minorities was solved and both the Bulgarian and the Greek parts of Macedonia acquired ethnic homogeneity. In addition, over 1,000,000 Greek refugees from Asia Minor also settled in Greek Macedonia after the 1922 catastrophe. Nevertheless, Mr Anastasoff declares that Greece violated the rights of the Bulgarian minority, as though there still existed a considerable number of Bulgarians in Greek Macedonia (Greece and Yugoslavia Violate the Minority Rights of the Bulgarians, p. 240 et seq.). By "Bulgarian minority" he clearly means the 80,000 or so Slavophones remaining in Western Macedonia after the exchange of minorities in 1920; it has been shown that most of these people were in fact Greeks and were considered as such by Greece with all the rights of Greek citizenship — except that they spoke Slavic. The Greek parliament, therefore, on 3rd February 1925 did not ratify the imprudent Kalfop-Politis Protocol of September 1924, which wrongly accepted that all the Slavophones of Western Macedonia were Bulgarians, and the Council of the League of Nations relieved the Prime Minister

Eleftherios Venizelos of the obligations imposed on him by the protocol. See Panayotis N. Pipinelis, *Ἱστορία τῆς ἐξωτερικῆς πολιτικῆς τῆς Ἑλλάδος, 1923-1941* (History of Greece's foreign policy, 1923-1941), Athens, Saliveros and Co., 1948, p. 27. See also E. Kofos, *Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia*, p. 49.

Still with no mention of all this, Mr Anastasoff quotes, on pp. 241-242, a letter written by the President of the International Committee for Political Prisoners on 19th January 1931, no doubt misinformed by American Bulgarians, and which was sent to the Greek consul in Washington, complaining about the Greek Government's measures to "de-Slavise" the Greek Slavophones and about the rejection of the Kalfop-Politis protocol. Complaints were made, then, in 1931 about the League of Nations' rejection of the protocol in 1925 — and Mr Anastasoff does not publish the Greek government's reply to the letter in question. Instead he quotes English translations of excerpts from Greek newspapers in 1959, describing ceremonies held in Western Macedonian Slavophone villages, in which Slavophone Greeks, who had fought for Greece in the Civil War, promised not to use the Slavic language any more (pp. 242-243 and Appendix XII-B and XII-C, which contain photocopies of the excerpts). So Mr Anastasoff is using events from 1959 as retrospective support for the assertions made in the letter written in 1931; he considers these events, which took place after the Second World War and the Civil War from 1946-49, as proof of oppression of a Bulgarian minority.

This review has indicated only selected points in the book which comprise flagrant historical inaccuracies, deliberate omissions and international distortions of facts. This does not mean that there are not many other similar points, which all together make this book propaganda rather than a historical account.

The book also has twelve appendices with diplomatic and non-diplomatic texts in support of Mr Anastasoff's deliberate distortions of the facts and his propagandist endeavours.

Let us look at Appendix III (Greek Bishops Aid the Turks Against the Macedonian Bulgarians, pp. 285-294) in which a passage from E. Kofos' book is quoted (Evangelos Kofos, *Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia*, Thessaloniki 1964, Institute for Balkan Studies, no. 70, pp. 33-35). The passage is an objective account of the Krousovo catastrophe during the Komitadjis' Ilinden Insurrection in August 1903, the awakening of the Greek government just in time to avert the loss of historically Greek Macedonia through national inaction, and also the measures which were taken to save the indubitable hellenism of Macedonia from the Komitadjis' knives as they tried forcibly to Bulgarise Macedonia. "Macedonian Bulgarians", then, is a euphemism for

the blood-stained members of I.M.R.O. Apart from this, on p. 294 Mr Anastasoff attempts in his footnotes to denigrate the historical objectivity of Koufos' narrative. Here are a few selections: Note 2: "The town of Krusovo (Krushevo) is in the district of Prilep, now Yugoslav Macedonia. Its inhabitants were Vlachs or Romanians and some of them Grecianized. Some of them were killed when the town was destroyed by Turkish artillery". So the inhabitants of Krousovo were Vlachs and Romanians, a few of them hellenised; and is it likely that the Athens government would have been worried about the slaughter of a few Vlachs and Romanians? Or is it perhaps nearer the truth to say that the whole Greek population of Krousovo was slaughtered after the Komitadjis—having forcibly incited everyone to revolt—had abandoned them after three weeks to the mercy of the Turks? Note 4: "The so-called 'Slavophone Greeks' were Bulgarian peasants who could not speak a word of Greek but who received either monthly or annual payment from the Greek bishops in Macedonia to work for the cause of hellenism". These "Bulgarian peasants" had a very loose sense of Bulgarian nationalism, in that case; and how on earth can Mr Anastasoff consider these renegades in the service of the Greeks to be Bulgarians? Just how cheap his slanderous propaganda is can be seen from the fact that in another footnote he contradicts himself: Note 6: "Had the Turkish commander of the garrison stationed in the village of Konomladi known that Pavlos Melas was quartered in a Slavophone 'Greek' home in the village of Statista...". How is it, then, that Pavlos Melas, while fighting the Bulgarian Komitadjis, was quartered in a "Slavophone 'Greek' home", if all the "Slavophone Greeks" were really Bulgarians and not Greeks at all? It is likely that he would have stayed in a house owned by Bulgarians, his enemies? Or is it that Greek Slavophones did exist? In the same note Mr Anastasoff makes another curious statement while relating Pavlos Melas' subsequent betrayal and death: "This is an eyewitness episode well remembered". Having written this in 1977, was our author really an eyewitness to the death of Pavlos Melas in 1903? How old must he be now, then? Or is he referring to another, anonymous, eyewitness? In which case, what purpose does his anonymous evidence serve?

In this same Appendix III, there follows an account of the activities and the death of the frightful Bulgarian Arch-Komitadji Trajkov, whose crimes against the Greek inhabitants of the Kastoria region the writer covers with the absolving line: "...he terrorized the Christian spies and traitors" (p. 228). He appends four photographs from the period, three of which depict great hatred but not what provoked it. One needs to read an objective history of the Macedonian Struggle—which was a life and death struggle between the Bulgarian Komitadjis and the Greek inhabitants of Macedonia—written from a neutral

standpoint (for example the English Professor D. Dakin's, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 1897-1913*, Thessaloniki 1966, Institute for Balkan Studies no. 89) if one is not to fall a victim to Mr Anastasoff's gross propaganda. It should be noted that the photograph of the Bishop of Kastoria, Yermanos Karavan gelis, taken by the Turkish authorities during a Turkish procession, in no way bears out Mr Anastasoff's explanation that this is proof of the bishop's collaboration with the Turkish authorities against the Bulgarians. As a local dignitary of the subjugated people, the bishop was obliged to take part in the public ceremonies of the ruling Turkish authorities. I shall return to the other photographs later.

Let us look at just one more appendix, No. VI: Greek Atrocities in Macedonia, 1913, pp. 308-314, in which Mr Anastasoff's maladroit and untruthful assertions boomerang back at him, and in his propagandist fervour he lets out admissions which belie all that he maintains. He says: "The Greeks, as well as the Serbians, charged the Bulgarians with massacres and destruction and appealed to the civilized world to brand the criminal conduct of the Bulgarians. But these accusations were soon after unmasked by the impartial and neutral Carnegie International Commission of Inquiry" (p. 308). A page later, however, he admits: "It is true that the Bulgarian army did commit 'massacres' in the towns of Doxato, Serres and Demir-Hissar, but these 'atrocities' were deliberately provoked by the armed Greek inhabitants of these towns attacking the retreating Bulgarian army from ambush" (p. 310). The justification for these admitted atrocities is certainly very weak; and even if it were true that these were isolated episodes, the justification would hardly suffice to explain the wiping out of whole towns. So the accusation of Greek atrocities has turned back on itself as an accusation of Bulgarian atrocities. And as far as the integrity of the "impartial and neutral Carnegie International Commission of Inquiry" is concerned, Mr Anastasoff himself destroys it in his own endeavours to support it. He says: "Certain charges were made against the integrity of the Carnegie Commission of Inquiry. Some of the members were denounced as being anti-Serbian, pro-Bulgarian or anti-Greek... The members of the Commission who were accused of partialities and prejudices were Professor Milyukoff and Dr Brailsford... The former was charged with anti-Serbian and the latter with anti-Greek attitudes" (p. 312). In defence of these two he cites a witness to their objectivity, the French President of the Commission, Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, who, of course, could hardly do anything but defend the members of his own Commission. However, the fact that our author frequently uses the reports of the Carnegie Commission indicates that at least it was not anti-Bulgarian, and in fact was probably pro-Bulgarian.

The Carnegie Commission considered the two lithographs from that disturbed period —photographs of which are reproduced on p. 291 and 292 and which reveal in a basic and unrefined way the hatred the Macedonian Greeks bore the Bulgarians for all they had suffered at their hands— to be of a Greek evzone biting the cheek of a Bulgarian soldier and a Greek soldier removing the eye of a Bulgarian soldier during battle, with the words: “These posters... reveal the depth of the brutality to which this race hatred had sunk them” (p. 310). However, these lithographs were not printed in Athens, but in parts of Macedonia which had known the brutality of the Bulgarians, and the “impartial and neutral” Carnegie Commission was not interested in finding out how this “race hatred” had come about, nor did it ever record any Bulgarian atrocities. Mr Anastasoff does not even except the then King of Greece, Constantine, and the Greek Prime Minister, Eleftherios Venizelos, from the accusations of brutality: “The conception of civilization by the Greeks, that is, those of King Constantine and Venizelos, is well exemplified by a number of well painted posters, printed and sold in the various cities of Macedonia and Greece” (p. 310). His criticism of historical personages is incomparable. Thucydides would have envied him. Brutal? Venizelos? Who at the conference for the Treaty of Bucharest fought to ease the wounds opened by the war and to prepare the way for permanent peace in the Balkans. See E. Kofos, *ibid.*, p. 40, note 26.

In conclusion, why was this book written? To show Bulgaria as a country that has been wronged throughout history, perhaps? To show that the whole of Serbian and Greek Macedonia ought by historical right to belong to Bulgaria, perhaps? But in that case, the distortions of historical truth, the deliberate omissions, the untrue assertions and the propagandist slander it contains defeat its own aims. Or perhaps Mr Anastasoff is dreaming that such aims can be achieved today; in which case, as he himself says: “With the establishment of the communist regime in Bulgaria, Sofia’s foreign policy has been to maintain peace and good-neighbourly relations with its surrounding Balkan states” (p. 260). What was the point, then, of writing this book and opening old wounds which the Balkan peoples of today wish only to forget?