the Parties and the governments of Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and the Vojvodina, as well as in the federal governmental and Party services. It was generally known beforehand that Serbs and Montenegrins predominated in the officers’ corps of the People’s Army, the UDB-a and the major Belgrade banks, but this new data will lend greater substance to the continuing complaints of the Croats and the Shiptars, which have been the loudest, to the effect that nothing has changed since the days of the Karadjordjevich monarchy.

With becoming modesty Cohen characterizes his findings as preliminary in character. I find them something more, as the application to his census data of a large sample test for the significance of a sample proportion will show. In the following table, prepared for present purposes, critical $Z$ represents the degree of Serbian-Montenegrin overrepresentation at the .01 level of probability. The chances that this level of overrepresentation could have occurred by chance are only one in a hundred. $N = 285,968$ and includes Party cadres, government bureaucrats, industrial managers, the technical intelligentsia, the physical scientists, the natural scientists and the literary and artistic intelligentsia, as reported in the 1971 census. The returns are given by ethnic group and by republic.

Preponderance of Serbs and Montenegrins within Yugoslav Political Elites*
(Critical $Z$ at .01 level of probability = 2.58)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Unit</th>
<th>Z for Party Functionaries</th>
<th>Z for Legislative and Government Personnel</th>
<th>Z for Total Elite</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federation</td>
<td>11.16</td>
<td>16.73</td>
<td>49.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>7.78</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B &amp; H</td>
<td>6.39</td>
<td>6.31</td>
<td>6.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vojvodina</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>6.06</td>
<td>35.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>4.72</td>
<td>13.05</td>
<td>66.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The calculations are courtesy of Professor John M. Matilla, Department of Economics, Mayne State University.

Except in one case, where no overrepresentation of Serbs and Montenegrins appeared, all the $Z$s were larger than critical $Z$ by anywhere from 2.3 to 25.8 times!

On the other hand, it is not entirely clear what would happen to the Yugoslav Federation were the Serb and Montenegrin preponderance to be eliminated.

Wayne State University

R. V. BURKS


The purpose of Bruce R. Kuniholm’s *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East* is to consider the struggle for power between Britain, the United States, and Russia in the
"Northern Tier" of the Near East—Greece, Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan—immediately following World War II. The author argues that the role of this area, as a whole, has been little understood and that this role had greater influence in total American foreign policy formulation than has been assumed. The experience of the United States in confrontation with Russia in the Near East, he claims, became the basis for American policy elsewhere, in Europe and Asia.

Kuniholm begins his book with a long introductory essay on each of the three countries—Greece, Turkey and Iran—which he is studying (Inexplicitly, the author ignores Afghanistan after his original inclusion of that country in the "Northern Tier"). These essays contain a short historical background usually commencing with a critical event in the course of the subject country's national aspiration: in the case of Turkey the event was the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774, in the case of Greece it was the winning of independence from the Turks in the early nineteenth century, and in the case of Iran it was the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. After a condensed history which concentrates primarily on foreign pressures and diplomatic attempts to resist these pressures, the essays then become a detailed account of each country's circumstances in World War II, their involvement with the powers fighting the war and their efforts, futile in the case of Greece, not to become a battleground. Included in these chapters are the negotiations over the immediate and post-war roles of Turkey, Greece, and Iran by the Allies in various conferences, as well as the basic attitudes of each power as to its own interest in the region. Kuniholm concludes that, while the British and the Russians were interested in all three countries, the United States was primarily concerned about Iran. Further, he claims that the United States took positions based upon principle while the two other belligerents practiced power politics.

The background essays occupy nearly one-half of the book and vary in sources from which they came. The author, for example, relies heavily on secondary sources in the chapter on Greece but uses mostly primary, archival material in the United States in the chapter on Iran. The question then arises as to whether so much space should be devoted to introductory material, given its availability elsewhere. While the backgrounds are important for understanding the immediate post-war events, their inclusion in such detail makes the book really into a two-volume one.

The second part of the book describes the evolution of the Cold War from the Yalta Conference to the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine. Kuniholm traces the gradual realization by Harry Truman that the principled approach of Franklin D. Roosevelt was inadequate for the "Northern Tier" in view of the Soviet's plan for the area and that reliance upon non-State Department advisors was too chancy. Convinced that the Soviets must be frustrated before the Near East suffered the same fate as Eastern Europe, Truman, using the State Department, became tougher in negotiations with the Russians, although he still was unwilling to guarantee the security of Iran, Greece, and Turkey. While the American and British positions had become much clearer, they were not yet identical.

Next, Kuniholm discusses the various crises, beginning with Iran, which occurred in 1946. These crises revealed the limitations of United Nations' actions in preventing Soviet expansionism and fostered a determination to resist this expansionism, by force if necessary, on the part of the United States. The determination, expressed in a policy of firmness, along with a Soviet belief that its aims had been accomplished in Iran and that Turkey was the next target, helped move the Soviets out of Iran. Kuniholm believes, contrary to the views of revisionist historians, that the American responses to the Soviet challenge in Iran was both cautious and realistic. He also thinks, however, that the success was too easy and skewed
American conceptions about possible future success in policy vis-a-vis the Soviets.

Kuniholm concludes his book with a short analysis of the Truman Doctrine. Again, his account is balanced and diplomatic. Agreeing that the doctrine was necessary, Kuniholm defends Truman who

...was not pulling British chestnuts out of the fire. He was not acting primarily on the basis of economic imperatives (which were important) or cynically in the context of domestic politics, nor was he overreacting to events in Greece, which by themselves, admittedly, were ambiguous.

On the other hand, Kuniholm believes, with Clark Clifford, that Truman’s speech overstated the particular crisis and failed to answer questions about the strategic importance of Turkey and/or Greece. The latter omission he blames on the temper of the times which would not tolerate discussion of military problems so soon after an extensive war. He also thinks that the speech created a myth of Communist action which had a pernicious effect in the United States in the 1950’s and which confirmed Truman’s perceptions of the way the world worked, leading him to view Korea as Greece. The Truman Doctrine and Public Law 75 did finally signal the merging of British and American views about the Near East and did make concrete commitments to both Greece and Turkey, thus marking the final step from words to action.

The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East does not contain many new findings or novel conclusions. Most of the materials used in the book will be familiar to students of the area, particularly the books of C.M. Woodhouse and William McNeil on Greece. Most of the conclusions have been expressed before by defenders of President Truman and the State Department. What, perhaps, is new is the attempt to discuss the East-West conflict in terms of the Near East as a whole instead of in terms of individual states and to relate events in Iran to those in Greece and Turkey (It appears to the reviewer that Iran was the major interest of Kuniholm whether through personal connection or through recent prominence in the news). Kuniholm does make a convincing case that the region should be studied as an entity because of the interconnectedness of the countries in the minds of American policy-makers.

Kuniholm, on the other hand, makes a less convincing case for his assertion that the experiences in the “Northern Tier” had wider significance in the Cold War. Although he sets this premise at the onset, he does not demonstrate it in any great detail. Perhaps this could be done in a later book.

History Department
Ball State University
Muncie, Indiana

Dwight W. Hoover


The title of this work is indeed appropriate to the contents of the book. Only under such a general and non-descript heading could the disparate essays that make up this book be subsumed. The editor’s claim to the contrary, there is little that ties these pieces together.