In this study, Alfredo Breccia, from the University of Rome, has analyzed Yugoslavia’s attempt to maintain its neutrality from the outbreak of the Second World War, in September 1939, to the invasion and partition of the country by the Axis powers, in April 1941. Breccia relied on British, German, Italian, American, Yugoslav and, also, on indirect Soviet sources in analyzing the historical events surrounding the neutrality strategy of Yugoslavia. The study is a historical masterpiece par excellence, rich in detail and without losing track of policy developments.

Breccia begins his analysis with the government crisis of 4th February 1939. The structure of the study is subdivided into seven phases during which attempts were made to implement the strategy of neutrality. Breccia’s main historical finding surrounding these events is the fact that the neutrality policy dominated Yugoslav government thinking at that time. However, the same policy required Yugoslavia to find an operational modus vivendi with Italy and Germany, until it could unleash its military weight in support of its Allies. Yugoslav strategic thinking, therefore, argued for closer diplomatic links with the Axis powers. On the other hand, its strategy of neutrality necessitated even closer links with the western democracies. However, Hitler was, at that time, anxious to secure his Balkan flank. His relations with Stalin were deteriorating and his general staff was developing plans for an attack against
Greece — operation Marita, as the prelude for an invasion of Russia — operation Barbarossa.

Breccia explores further various historical developments which forced Yugoslavia to sign the Tripartite Pact with the Axis. In particular, Mussolini wanted the Yugoslavs to sign a military alliance against Greece, which they refused to do. Hitler wanted a Non-Aggression Pact and Yugoslavia was prepared to play along with it. By March 25, 1941 Yugoslavia signed the Tripartite Pact, while at the same time Britain demanded from Yugoslavia a declaration of war against Germany.

However, the signing of the Pact kept Yugoslavia out of the war as a belligerent; it was the ultimate concession in terms of tactics. It preserved the Yugoslav army, sovereignty, and territorial integrity until such time as it could throw in its lot, militarily, with the Allies, or until such time as the Yugoslavs could use to their own advantage the strategy of neutrality. This seems to be the major argument of the book.

Breccia's book is well documented; it integrates diplomatic manoeuvres with professional skill. Indeed, it is the best analysis of events surrounding the political situation on Yugoslavia from 1939-1941.

Stanford


As the title suggests, this book in hagiography rather than history, but the author, a British journalist, has written a lively account of the battle for Athens from the perspective of General Scobie and his troops. The book is filled with interesting and amusing anecdotes culled from 300 interviews conducted by the author with British survivors of the December 1944 struggle. In spite of Maule's access to General Scobie's private papers, the book adds nothing new to our knowledge or understanding of the genesis and development of the December crisis. Indeed, the book is a throwback to the early cold war years with its simplistic and erroneous thesis that Scobie faced a "massive army of fully-equipped guerrillas marching down from the mountains upon Athens, determined to take over the Government and the country". The story is more complex as the works of C. M. Woodhouse and John O. Iatrides, tempered by Dominique Eudes, make quite clear. These books remain the best guides through the tangled events of 1944-1945.

Maule's purpose is to immortalize Scobie and to honor the British rank and file who fought and defeated EAM-ELAS. He succeeds in honoring the rank and file, but Scobie's role in the defeat remains open to question. Rather than saving Greece from Communism, Scobie, according to C. M. Woodhouse's The Struggle for Greece (1976), nearly lost the battle for Athens and had to be replaced on December 11, 1944 by General John T. Hawkesworth who turned the tide against ELAS. Woodhouse argues that to save face and maintain morale Scobie was allowed to remain as titular commander. The full scope of Scobie's role will have to await a more professional examination of official documents open to research.

Although there are innumerable quotations, documentation is rare. There is no index, but the maps are useful. Aside from its anecdotal approach this book is of little value to historians and social scientists interested in this period of modern Greek history.

The College of Wooster

John L. Hondros