

Arbeitnehmergesellschaften. Interessant, daß auch die neue Militärregierung besonderen Wert auf die Arbeitnehmergesellschaften legt.

Eines ist jedoch nach der Lektüre des Buches deutlich: 'Reintegration' ist weder bei privaten noch bei kollektiven Investitionen von Deutschtürken in der Türkei eine Alternative zu offensiver Beschäftigungs- und Integrationspolitik in der Bundesrepublik. Zu spärlich ist die Zahl der Rückkehrer und zu ungewiß bleibt die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung in der Türkei. "Wer geht, kehrt nicht so schnell zurück". Trotzdem ist Faruk Şens Buch eine wichtige Argumentationshilfe auch für ein entwicklungspolitisches Engagement in der Türkei.

WOLFGANG ESCH

Βλάχου Ἀγγέλου, *Δέκα χρόνια Κυπριακού*, σελ. 338, Βιβλιοπωλείον τῆς Ἐστίας-Κολάρου, Ἀθήναι 1980

Ambassador Angelos Vlachos has been the last Greek Consul General in Cyprus before the latter became an independent state. His stay and his activity there allowed him to meet the late Archbishop Macarios, his collaborators, General Grivas, the people of Cyprus, the Cypriot communists and their connections and thus to get a complete knowledge of their mentality and of their aims. On the other hand the author knew and knows all those Greeks who were dealing with Cyprus. He is right where stressing that the successive Greek governments were reluctant to raise the Cyprus issue as they were afraid that by so do the relations of Greece with both the United Kingdom and Turkey and even the United States could suffer. Despite this having failed to persuade the United Kingdom to negotiate Cyprus the Greek Government decided to seize 1954 the United Nations. On the other hand the Greek Government did not oppose enough the EOKA fighting which started 1955 and which the author believes did not help much independently of the heroism of those who participated in the struggle. It was then however well known that the decisions of the United Nations are never carried out as there is no machinery for this purpose except of course if the country ordered to do so is willing. That was not the case of the United Kingdom supported by Turkey and even the United States. The author is right that the request of the late Archbishop Macarios to the Eastern European countries to support Cyprus in its effort to get united with Greece was not reasonable as long as the Sowjet Union did not wish an expansion of the NATO area and as long as Cyprus is not included in the Sowjet area. The author is also right when supporting that Greece underestimated Turkish opposition. The author is also right about the tendency of the late Archbishop Macarios to handle without consideration of Greek interests, without consulting the Greek Government and presenting same very often with accomplished facts. Let me add that during the exile of Archbishop Macarios his substitute dared to demand the replacement of the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs and the worse is that the Greek Prime Minister complied in 1956. The author however does not present his views on the way Greece could avoid to be obliged to follow the initiatives of the late Archbishop Macarios.

Ambassador Vlachos deals only with the fifties and considered later developments shortly. Whilst Cyprus prospered 1960-1963 the late Archbishop Macarios started a new crisis which at last led to the catastrophe of 1974. The reader is impressed by the activities of the late Arch-

bishop Macarios, by his inconsistency, by his lack of consideration for the Greek Government and by his tendency not to stick to what he had agreed even a short time before. I have to add however that the reader is also astonished with the inability of the various Greek Governments to impose their views on the late Archbishop of Cyprus who did not have their experience not their knowledge of Greek interests and of what would serve them best. The people in Cyprus have had and I am afraid are still having the feeling that Greece has to sacrifice every thing in order to satisfy them independently of the repercussions it will have for the country. Unluckily the Greek Governments did not and do not react decisively. Let me add that I cannot share the author's views on the advantages and disadvantages of the dispatch 1964 of an enforced Greek brigade to Cyprus whose presence would most probably have prevented the 1974 disaster.

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