

En conclusion, nous pouvons affirmer que ce livre, qui s'adresse à un large public, sera aussi très utile aux chercheurs, philologues et historiens, aux professeurs de lycée, ainsi qu'à leurs étudiants. Sa bibliographie très riche constitue un guide et un instrument de recherches fondamentales. De plus, par leur étude conjointe des événements historiques et des phénomènes culturels, M. et Mme B. apportent, à n'en pas douter, une aide précieuse aux historiens qu'intéressent plus particulièrement les XVIII^e et XIX^e s.

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Paul Constantine Pappas, *The United States and the Greek War for Independence, 1821-1828*. [East European Monographs, No. CLXXIII]. New York: Columbia University Press, 1985, pp. xvi, 190.

Americans were very receptive to the news concerning the initiation of the Greek Revolution in 1821. Since many were the direct descendants of the revolutionary colonists, American citizens expressed their sympathy for the Greek insurgents attempting to liberate their ancestral homeland from the oppressive rule of the Ottoman government, and in the light of such admiration, the expansionist nature of both 'Manifest Destiny'—the American movement westward—and the 'Megali Idea'—the Greek reconquest of all former Hellenic lands—became rather analogous. The instruments of such expansion also possessed analogous natures as both the American frontiersman and the Greek insurgent, traditionally known as a *klephtis*, were pictured in the minds of many Americans as the lone hero ranging free in a hostile environment against the constraints of a repressive government. These conceptions were perpetuated by American newspapers which, in the best traditions of 'yellow journalism', related the events of the Greek Revolution in a rather biased light, thus inspiring readers to greater efforts on behalf of the Hellenic cause. So effective was this publicity that, by 1824, Americans had raised more money in the form of charitable contributions for the Hellenic cause, than the Greek Committee of London had raised in the form of repayable loans after eighteen months of canvassing. Along these same lines, the town of Charleston, South Carolina, became the first American municipality in 1821 to donate monetary contributions for the Hellenic cause; ironically, forty years later, this same town was the site for the initiation of the American civil war over the issue of slavery. Philhellenic committees were established throughout the United States, while new towns—especially in upstate New York—were named after either Greek insurgent leaders, or ancient city-states in Greece. Statesmen and classicists alike, such as Senator Daniel Webster of Massachusetts and Professor Edward Everett of Harvard University, demanded that the United States officially acknowledge the political independence of Greece, especially since this former government readily acknowledged the independence of several republics in South America which had successfully rebelled against Spain. Such action would benefit American commerce in the Near East, especially since the Hellenic navy controlled the eastern regions of the Mediterranean Sea; however, the American government was not as enthusiastic as its citizens about recognizing the political independence of Greece.

In spite of the Philhellenic fervour amongst its citizens, the American government maintained a strict policy of neutrality towards the Greek Revolution. Because he did not

see any political correlation between the Greek and other current struggles for independence, John Quincy Adams—the Secretary of State—advised President James Monroe that American interference in the Greek Revolution might provoke the European states—especially the Holy Alliance of Austria, Russia, and Prussia—to reestablish Spanish rule in the Latin republics of South America. The Secretary of State was worried about a resurgence of European rule in the Western Hemisphere, and unlike many American citizens, did not regard the United States as Greece's only remaining hope for political salvation—a view shared by many Greek leaders with Anglophilic sentiments. Adams insisted that the American government maintain its traditional, isolationist policies, and this insistence was subsequently manifested during 1823 in a decree popularly known as the 'Monroe Doctrine'. By stating that the United States would refrain from interfering with political matters in the Eastern Hemisphere, President Monroe informed the European states that the American government would not tolerate their interference with political matters in the Western Hemisphere, and from 1823 onward, the United States maintained its neutrality towards political developments in both Europe and the Middle East. Furthermore, Adams insisted that such an important issue as the American recognition of Hellenic independence was an executive decision exclusively, and he intended to preclude the legislative branch of government from all matters of foreign policy, even though this particular issue became the topic of many heated debates in the Senate. In addition, Adams did not want to antagonize the Porte, especially in the light of the profitable American trade in the Middle East, and until Greece was actually liberated, he felt that premature recognition of Hellenic independence was a violation of International law. Even though he initially ordered an agent to Greece after assuming the presidency in 1825, Adams withheld official recognition of the Hellenic government, and merely declared a policy of 'benevolent' neutrality towards the Greek Revolution during 1825—three years after the British government had invoked the same measure. Nevertheless, American citizens and their elected officials still supported the spirit of the Greek struggle for independence.

Indeed, in one form or another, the American populace openly signified its support for the Greek Revolution. During 1825-27, two naval frigates were constructed for the Hellenic navy by a private shipbuilding firm in New York, and partial funding for this project was derived from American contributions. Unfortunately for the Hellenic cause, many unforeseen circumstances were involved with the construction of these two naval vessels because the Greek Committee of London had provided insufficient funds for this project, while the low value of Greek bonds on the London exchange—due to a successful Egyptian military campaign in Greece—forced foreign creditors to attempt the confiscation of these particular ships. Although both frigates were eventually completed, American arbitrators in New York attributed all the blame in this rather embarrassing matter to the Greek Committee of London—which had also bungled the construction of several naval vessels in Great Britain—and the Hellenic navy was subsequently obliged to sell one frigate, the *Liberator*, to the American navy in order to complete the payments on the other vessel, the *Hope*. As a result, the United States acquired a first-rate naval vessel for a very low price, while the controversy surrounding the construction of these two frigates became the only black event concerning American support for the Hellenic cause. Nevertheless, the entire matter rekindled American interest in the Greek Revolution, which had waned considerably after 1825, and Americans once again made substantial contributions to the Hellenic cause—this time in the form of humanitarian aid for both women and children, especially since the Egyptian military campaign in Greece had been rather devastating. Although only a handful of Yankee philhellenes actually

participated in the Greek Revolution, American support for the Hellenic cause took the form of charitable contributions, rather than direct military assistance, while the American experience in Greece during this era—unlike its European counterpart—was relatively devoid of silly intrigues in Greece's domestic politics. Even though the United States did not formally acknowledge the political independence of the Hellenic government until 1837, the American populace exhibited a great interest in both the Greek Revolution and the Hellenic cause due to its appreciation of those ideals, including the concept of freedom, which evolved from the classical heritage of Greek antiquity.

This study has both its good and bad points, while it is not as unique as its author portends in the book's preface. Among the best sections in this study is the chapter concerning the controversy surrounding the construction of the Greek frigates in New York; yet, the topic is hardly unexplored since such historians as Douglas Dakin and William St. Clair have presented succinct accounts on the same matter. Similarly, the author's chapters on American policy and on the Philhellenic movement in the United States are excellent accounts from the standpoints of both research and narration; however, once again, detailed works on these topics have already appeared—particularly Myrtle Cline's *American Attitudes Toward the Greek War of Independence, 1821-1828* (Atlanta: Higgins-McArthur, 1930). Further, the author's use of Greek-language sources is commendable, but much of this material remains peripheral to the book's central theme, thus such English-language materials as archival collections and newspapers remain the author's primary sources.

Nevertheless, a number of both inaccuracies and shortcomings in this work deter its more favorable aspects. In his introductory chapter, the author displays a less than sound knowledge of Ottoman history and culture, exaggerates the role of Greek merchants in Levantine commerce, and also omits many salient points about the American, as well as the European, experience in the Levant—particularly during the Greek Revolution. Points concerning American neutrality, or even isolationist attitudes, require further elaboration for the enhancement of relevant sections in this book, while misconceptions which such American statesmen as John Quincy Adams held about Hellenic, or European, matters—e.g. the military strength of the Holy Alliance—could use an explanation to inform readers about the true historical facts. Even more disappointing was the author's failure to contrast further in this book's central theme such aspects as the Philhellenic movement in the United States and in Great Britain, especially since more than one Western state found itself involved with the Hellenic cause. Nevertheless, the author has produced a credible account about the United States and the Greek Revolution—a work now added to the small corpus of works in this field of historical interest.

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W. DAVID WRIGLEY

Loring M. Danforth, *The Death Rituals of Rural Greece*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1982. ix+200 pp. \$ 30.00 (cloth) \$ 12.50 (paper).

The return of Greek-American photographer Alexander Tsiaras to his parents' village for a year-long visit in 1975-76 instigated this handsome and unique contribution to Greek ethnography. Around the superbly reproduced photographic essay of 31 plates portraying