“Books with sponsors. 1. The years of the enlightenment (1749-1821)” in Έρανιστής 12 69-70 (1975) 101-179 (reprint), is an exemplary study of the manner, problems and importance of research into the subject of sponsors.

The section of the book which deals with Bulgarian translations of Greek books is an important one: 154 Bulgarian books are enumerated, most of which are religious, ethico-didactic or educational manuals. Translations of Greek literary works are few, consisting largely of romantic, sentimental or ethico-didactic works translated into Greek from Western European prototypes. The Greek translations are consequently the intermediary channel through which these works became known to the Bulgarians. It is characteristic that of the 28 plays and short stories translated into Bulgarian (until 1853) fourteen are translated from Greek. (Cf. details and development of the subject, Afr. Alexieva, “Prevodnite povesti i romanit ot gräcki prez pärvata polovina na XIX v.—Do Krimskata vojna” (Short stories and novels translated from Greek during the first half of the XIXth century—Until the Crimean War), Studia Balcanica 8 (1974) 119-151).

M. Stojanov’s book is a genuine contribution to the study of Greek-Bulgarian cultural relations until 1878; as he himself notes, there is much still to be done towards the deeper and wider examination of this subject.

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During 1931-32 Romanian and Soviet diplomats attempted to conclude a treaty of mutual non-aggression even though at that time the two countries did not have normal diplomatic relations! Bacon’s volume is a selection of one hundred and three Romanian documents dealing with these negotiations. He has translated them from the Nicholas Titelescu collection at the Hoover Institution and has included a brief overview and analysis of their significance. Although the negotiations failed (A treaty was signed four years later under the direction of Titelescu), the story of the effort deserves the attention of serious scholars of twentieth-century Europe; and Bacon and the Hoover Institution merit our gratitude for the publication of this excellent volume. It will be a valuable aid for researchers of Eastern Europe whose direct interests lie in tangential fields and for instructors who can find facts and gain insights for their lecture notes beyond the superficial and often erroneous comments on the negotiations in the standard reference works. Bacon’s translations, organization, and presentation are well done. The one fault in the volume, perhaps, is the lack of a separate appendix listing the persons mentioned in the collection, many of whom are minor foreign office personnel.

The treaty negotiations were part of a general revision of European alliances and international perceptions at the end of the twenties and the beginning of the thirties. Pressure for negotiations between the two Eastern European neighbors came principally from Poland. The treaty was to be one of a series signed by the Soviet Union and the countries of the region in the wake of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Bacon sees the impetus for these treaties in Moscow’s desire for security in the West in light of domestic difficulties associated with economic
planning and confrontation with Japan in the Far East; Germany’s “strident... revisionism;” and Warsaw’s mistrust of French “faintheartedness” (p. 8). We may add that Marshal Pilsudski’s acerbic comments about the French found in document 55 (pp. 97-98) graphically demonstrate this latter point and also indicate a Polish mistrust of France’s rapid changes of government as another reason for seeking the Eastern alliance. On the other hand, Paris supported Soviet entente as well and along with the Poles encouraged the Romanians to come to an agreement. It seems that the major catalyst here (from the Franco-Polish point of view) is indeed German reentry into the forefront of European politics. It hardly needs to be mentioned that the German resurgence had begun with the Stresemann era, and these events were taking place before the Nazis came to power. We shall return to this point below.

The major stumbling block to the treaty was the dispute over Bessarabia. Moscow did not want a treaty which would recognise the status quo, i.e., Romanian possession of the province, and Bucarest feared the possibility of the Soviets raising the territorial question if the treaty left the door open. The argument dissolved into questions of semantics and minutiae. A possible solution was sought by avoiding the subject altogether, but it would not go away, and on this issue the negotiations foundered. Yet there is another possible element in the failure of the negotiations to which Bacon tantalizingly alludes—the actions of Nicholas Titelescu. Romania’s most famous diplomat of the era was left out of the initial stage of negotiations, then became Bucarest’s chief negotiator and finally was unceremoniously dismissed. Both as a participant and observer of the talks he hindered success with his attitudes. Bacon suggests that a good deal of vanity was involved, a view which is especially credible considering that Titelescu shortly thereafter as foreign minister came to terms with the Soviet Union.

Aside from the direct ad hoc value that this collection offers, it makes a more general contribution to the study of inter-war European diplomacy. Here is another bit of evidence that territorial and strategic, rather than ideological, considerations played the determining roles in foreign policy during this era. Of course, the Romanians are constantly referring to “Soviet” and “Russian” duplicity and mendacity, but this is just an adversary’s universal evaluation of his opponent in the Machiavellian reality of state system diplomacy. Similar judgements would undoubtedly have been made if Bucarest was facing a monarchy, a parliamentary republic, or a Christian commonwealth. Certainly the Soviet view of Romanian honesty during the period was just as unflattering. As indicated above, the major point is that Weimar Germany working to dismantle the Versailles system caused this diplomatic revolution—the renewed participation of Moscow on the diplomatic stage. Governmental forms or economic and social ideologies, i.e., Communism or the later Nazism, had much less influence on these events than contemporary rhetoric or later assessments would lead us to believe.

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