

as state policy is usually the result of compromise and the eventual success or failure may not have been inherent in the policy. Professor Alvarez provides ample reinforcement of this thesis as he shows the American stance toward Turkey, and of course the Soviet Union, emerging from disparate bureaucratic centers. Units of the same agency were in opposition over means to achieve agreed upon ends, or agreed upon means though the ends were quite distinct. Thus the Near Eastern and African Affairs Office of the State Department (NEA) could recommend loans to Turkey for political reasons while the Office of Finance and Development Policy opposed such loans on financial-economic grounds. In another instance, NEA favored increasing the American naval presence in the Mediterranean as a sign of US backing for Ankara while the Navy Department favored the same action but primarily as a means of increasing its share of the then diminishing post-war defense budget. From this process of contention and compromise came the Truman Doctrine. «In the case of Turkey actions were rarely calculated responses by a rational, monolithic government to a particular strategic problem. Actions, more commonly, were the result of the interaction of actors and motives. Common support of a policy did not imply consensus upon the purposes or expected results of that policy. Indeed, the same actor may have possessed a variety of motives in supporting a particular action» (p. 109). In short, a variety of inputs resulted in a deceptively uniform outcome and this, one suspects, is probably the historical norm.

One also suspects that the author may have had a third idea in mind as he wrote this book. If, as he so well demonstrates, American policy towards the Soviet Union was not the result of a «rational, monolithic government», is it not possible that the policy of the Soviet Union also was not, and is not, the manifestation of a «rational, monolithic government»? It is unthinkable that in some office of the Kremlin there exists a group of bureaucrats locked in deadly struggle, not with capitalism but, with their fellow bureaucrats further down the hall? Of course this thesis is not new to students of Soviet affairs but too many people still cling to an image of the Soviet Union which holds Russia to be uniform in thought and action. Anything which might please Moscow is immediately perceived as being controlled by Moscow. Recently the President of the United States has held the Kremlin to be responsible for a very naive Nuclear Freeze movement but *Bureaucracy and Cold War Diplomacy* leads one to imagine as much confusion on the banks of the Moskva as on the Potomac.

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Δημητρίου Κιτσίκη, *Ίστορία τοῦ Ἑλληνοτουρκικοῦ Χώρου, 1928-1973* (Ἀπὸ τὸν Βενιζέλο στὸν Γ. Παπαδόπουλο), Ἀθήνα, Ἔστια, 1981, σσ. 314.

This book is a continuation of the author's earlier volume *Syngritiki Historia Hellados Kai Tourkias Ston 20 Aiona* (Athens: Estia, 1978), in which the author introduced the concept of «HellenoTurkism».

This latest volume analyzes the political developments in Greece and Turkey in the period of 1928-1973. In Part I of this volume Kitsikis reviews the concept of «HellenoTurkism» and concludes that the Greco-Turkish reconciliation under Kemal and Venizelos was more than a mere desire for friendly relations. It amounted to a mutual shift away from the West and sought the foundation of a «true Greco-Turkish confederation.» The British supported this development because they saw it in terms of a strategic realignment that could block Soviet moves in the area. Metaxas, a «real patriot» and a man of the «Eastern» party, tried to emulate Venizelos' neutralism but failed because of the negative domestic and international economic conditions prevalent at the time.

The era introduced by Venizelos and Ataturk ran into difficulties in World War II, because of Turkey's failure to come to Greece's aid during the Axis invasion and Greek suspicions over Turkey's intentions in the Aegean. In turn, the Turkish food aid program to Greece in the Winter of 1941-42, at a time of hardship in Turkey, and the war profiteering activities of some in Turkey gave rise to socio-political forces that led to the imposition of the «varlik vergisi». This tax became a tool of racial discrimination and persecution against Greeks, Armenians and Jews. Thus, the war ended up poisoning relations between Greece and Turkey, and the «Helleno Turkish Ideal» that rose to a high in 1930 sank in 1942 in the drama of the «varlik vergisi».

Part II of the book covers the 1943-60 period. In the case of Greece the author concludes that the two main forces advocating social change, ie. the Liberals and Communists, were «Westerners» in their outlook, much like the traditional conservative establishment represented by Papagos, the Palace and Karamanlis. Thus the conflict in Greece continued to be, as since the Byzantine era, one of «Western v. Eastern» orientation. In this phase though the «Easterners» found themselves without a party. As for «HellenoTurkism», the strides of the early 1950's were made with less enthusiasm compared to the era of Kemal and Venizelos and were supported by the U.S. for strategic reasons.

Kitsikis indicates that, with the transfer of the Dodecanese to Greece, Turkey's feeling of encirclement increased and was climaxed with the Greek endorsement of the *enosis* movement in Cyprus. Thus, while Cyprus could have become the «laboratory of HellenoTurkish confederation», Makarios with the help of AKEL destroyed that possibility.

In a parallel examination of Socialism and Communism in Turkey, the author concludes that they represent, even better than their Greek counterparts, the «Western character» of Marxism. The rise of Menderes to power confirmed the shift toward a «Western» orientation in Turkey and the abandonment of all Kemalist principles, except that of Republicanism.

Part III of this work brings these trends to their natural conclusion under the title «revolutions that failed». In the case of the Turkish revolution of 1960, the fall of Türkes from power confirmed its failure because once more power shifted to the anti-Kemalist, pro-Western parties. Comparing Karamanlis' rule (1955-63) to that of Menderes, Kitsikis proceeds to characterize it as a period of «organization», followed by a period of «disorganization» under that «wonderful actor without an ideology,» George Papandreou. Andreas Papandreou, an «excellent economist technocrat,» is seen as the only one in the Center to attack the Greek establishment and, according to the author, he and the Army were the only forces that

tried to overthrow it. Thus, Kitsikis comes to the amazing conclusion that the difference between Andreas and Papadopoulos was not over the substance or the essence of the coup of April 21, 1967, but the methods followed by the Army.

Kitsikis, in his attempt to «coolly» assess the Papadopoulos era, repeats the Tsakonas view that the Colonels were not reactionaries, but «anti-establishment children of the village», and concludes along with Dendrinis and Georgalas that Papadopoulos failed because he had no ideology and ended up being corrupted and coopted by the establishment he failed to destroy. His disappointment over Papadopoulos' failure shows clearly when he emphasizes that the dictator was an exponent of a «HellenoTurkish federation», an idea best expressed in his now famous *Millet* interview of May, 1971. The fulfillment of this ideal failed once more because of the opposition of the chauvinists and the Communists and the loss of some of its warmest supporters following the death of Patriarch Athenagoras and Panayotis Pipinelis.

The volume concludes that the «HellenoTurkish» ideal has existed since the Medieval era, long before the U.S., Russia or Britain developed interests in the region. This ideal will likely continue to exist and will be established when it is based on the true foundation of the common «HellenoTurkish civilization» and not the interests of the superpowers.

This work, like the earlier volume, is likely to evoke scepticism on the part of the reader, unless he or she happens to share Kitsikis' premise of «HellenoTurkism». I do *not*. Moreover, the assumptions he makes about the 1928-73 period are tenuous and amount to a search for examples to justify the unjustifiable. More disturbing is the author's attempt to assess the Papadopoulos era in a way that downplays its disastrous effects on Greek society and politics. His sensitivity for Papadopoulos' regime may be due to the implicit assumption that had the dictator «stayed the course» of an anti-establishment eastern populism, «HellenoTurkism» could have triumphed. Noone doubts the need for an objective treatment of the history and politics of Greco-Turkish relations. Professor Kitsikis makes a sincere effort to do so. But his effort runs astray in a futile search for a horizon that never existed and was never lost.

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U. P. Arora, *Motifs in Indian Mythology, their Greek and Other Parallels*, New-Delhi 1981.

Dr. U. P. Arora's book makes a valuable contribution to the growing field of comparative mythology. Hitherto we have been accustomed to European scholars who have approached Indian mythology after a special training in this field. Now this young Indian scholar follows the opposite path. Having a complete background of Indian mythology, he has acquired a solid knowledge of classical mythology and tradition. In his book he examines the similarities and interactions of the Indian and Greek mythologies.