The thrust of Banac’s lengthy narrative comes down to demonstrating that a determined but shortsighted Serbian political leadership erected a constitutional structure that did not accommodate the concerns of the other South Slav nations. The author has his likes and dislikes for personalities and parties, as in his trenchant criticism of the Serbian National Radical Party and its leader, Nikola Pasic. Behind Banac’s treatment of this critical era in Yugoslav history is his firm belief that the South Slav nationalities could come together and cooperate fruitfully “...only if each of them was fully autonomous in its own house.” (p. 16). With the recent developments taking place in the country, perhaps this condition may now arise. Yet, the issue is not simple, as the author would no doubt agree. But is not a dark problem either. Which is all the more reason for those interested in the politics of small states to read this volume.

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While this work is primarily a study of Yugoslav Cominformism it also provides the reader with a general overview of all the factional movements which plagued the Yugoslav Party prior to 1952. At the same time its analysis of the Cominformist and Popular Front deviations amounts to a triumph of historical scholarship.

Cominformism, we learn, was basically a Serb and Montenegrin phenomenon. Percentagewise the strength of the movement was greatest in Montenegro but in absolute terms it was strongest in Serbia proper. Yet its true home appeared nonetheless to be the extended family of the Dinaric Alps. These concentrations greatly magnified the Cominformist threat to the unity of the CPY, for both Tito’s original army, the one destroyed in southern Serbia in 1941, as well as that subsequently created in the Dinarics by the Ustasha massacres, were basically Serb formations, not to mention the over-representation of the Serbs from the quondam Austrian military frontier in the ranks of the Croatian Partisans. Cominformism was thus an intra-Serbian quarrel and as many as a fifth of Party members turned out to be Cominformists at the time of the breach with Moscow in 1948.

In its effort to master this most dangerous threat the Party was thrown (1948-1952) into a spasm of control by terror, one analogous to the Great Terror which began with the forcible collectivization of Soviet agriculture in 1928. For the threat of a Cominformist underground Party guided from Moscow was greatly amplified by the massing of Soviet satellite armies deployed along Yugoslavia’s long eastern frontier. The two threats together made possible the creation by the CPY of an enormous bureaucracy controlling, in minute detail, economic as well as political life. The new controls were consolidated in 1949 by the introduction of Soviet oblasti within the republics at both state and Party levels, thus diminishing the importance of the federal organization of the country. Simultaneously camps were organized for holding Party comrades suspected of Cominformism and subjecting them to humiliation and torture from which the only escape lay in confession and conversion to Titoism, as visibly demonstrated by their enthusiastic participation in the torture of the unrepentant.
If Cominformism was a Serb heresy and a deviation on the left, Popular Frontism proved to be the rightist deviation peculiar to Croat and Slovene Partisans, a deformation against which Tito and his colleagues had had to struggle particularly during the years of Partisan resistance to Axis military occupation. Popular Frontism embodied the notion that the Partisan struggle aimed not at the seizure of sole power by the CPY but instead at the creation within Yugoslavia of parliamentary government rooted in a market economy, both within the framework of a genuine ethnic federalism. Meanwhile the Partisan movement was to be made up of an association of different entities, e.g. the Croatian Communist Party, the Croatian Peasant Party, the representation of the prechani minority, and so on, each unit retaining its internal autonomy in preparation for post-war pluralism. The legitimacy of the Communist movement among the Catholic populations of Yugoslavia depended, in Banac’s view, on the acceptability of the Popular Front.

The leader of the Croatian Popular Front was Andrija Hebrang, a man who held that a Federal Yugoslavia and a free Croatia were interdependent elements. To be sure, Hebrang found himself constantly embroiled with the supreme leader, whether he attempted to create a Partisan government in Croatia, or a regular system of courts there, or a separate Croatian news agency. In 1944, on the eve of final Partisan victory, Tito replaced Hebrang with the Party loyalist Vladimir Bakaric and, in 1948, with the final exchange of correspondence between Moscow and Belgrade he had Hebrang arrested as a traitor. The Croatian died in prison in 1949, under mysterious circumstances.

As the reader will have divined from these two key examples, With Stalin, Against Tito is a formidable work of scholarship. The bibliography is 15 pages in length. While the bulk of the sources are in Serbo-Croatian, of which Professor Banac is a native speaker, the footnotes are also home to works in Slovene, Slavo-Macedonian, Bulgarian and Russian, not to mention such non-Slavic tongues as Albanian. The Yugoslav government statistics on the strength and distribution of the Cominformists which Banac has dug up are astonishing. Striking also is his ability to exploit popular literature dealing with Party matters prior to 1952 as a reliable additional source: what could not be published as history was passed by the censors in novels and short stories.

Had this reviewer been asked beforehand, he would have thought such a work as With Stalin, Against Tito could not have been written in the reviewer’s lifetime. Future research may modify this feature or that of the Banac presentation but the analysis as a whole represents a unique accomplishment which will stand on its own.

Wayne State University Emeritus

R. V. Burks

Amikam Nachmani, Israel, Turkey and Greece. Uneasy Relations in the East Mediterranean.

Nachmani’s book begins with the premise that despite certain common characteristics shared by the three countries, a “triangle” does not exist in the region in the absence of common policies among the three states. Relations among them tend to be of the bilateral variety, involving attempts by two states to cooperate against the third. The conflict between Greece and Turkey over the Aegean and Cyprus, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the Greek