and institutional continuity that has transmitted and maintained Greek identity throughout its long turbulent history'. This sort of vulgar nationalism should have no place today in any serious scholar's arsenal.

In general the authors give their own opinions second place to those of others. The book is really a survey—or better, compendium—of the existing literature on modern Greece. As such it is of doubtful value: summaries of other works are not always reliable and the authors are reluctant to pass judgement on them. Sometimes one text is cited to modify the interpretation of another, but without any indication being given of which the reader should accept (e.g. pp. 120-121). This makes it difficult to follow the authors' argument.

Nor can it be said that the text is a pleasure to read. One comes across sentences like: 'Greece's irregular and colourful landscape with its steep mountains, hills, valleys, basins, islands and coastline of 15,021 km, or 9,334 miles, never bores travellers' (p. 8). There are too many concatenations of abrupt, short sentences, each beginning faithfully with the subject of the verb (p. 71). After a while one begins to long for a little stylistic variation.

The book does have some good points. There is a lot of information on recent affairs, and students may appreciate having all this in one book. Yet a comparison with the last comprehensive survey of modern Greece, Campbell and Sherrard's *Modern Greece* (1968), does not work to the advantage of this work. Yes, it is more up-to-date, but without their predecessors' sure judgement this has made Kourvetaris and Dobratz hostages to fortune. I suspect they were aware of this themselves and became even more cautious in their judgements than might otherwise have been the case. Or is 'cautious' the right word? Referring to PASOK's claim in 1985 to have permanently reoriented the country, they comment: 'While it is too early to determine how 'permanent' the reorientation is, the road to change appears to be a Greek one with socialist elements' (p. 92). This looks suspiciously like a classic combination of truism and error. Unfortunately the book contains many other such remarks. The search for Greece's identity continues.

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Flying once from Honolulu to Saigon at the height of the Vietnam war, I noticed McGeorge Bundy, still at that time National Security Advisor but soon to be replaced by Walt Whitman Rostow, reading a copy of George Kousoulas' book on the Greek Civil war, *Revolution and Defeat: the Story of the Greek Communist Party*. Why had Bundy chosen this volume, published the year before, as reading material on an official trip to Vietnam? Because, it appeared, he thought there might be something in the American experience in Greece that could be applied seventeen years later in Southeast Asia.

At the time it seemed to me that this was a futile exercise. There was no lesson to be learned unless it was that the United States and its Vietnamese allies needed another Tito to close the Lao and Cambodian borders. In later years I decided this was too cavalier a
reaction. The Greeks and their American advisors had done a better job to achieve a happier conclusion, but what exactly accounted for the difference?

Now along comes Professor Howard Jones in a meticulously documented reexamination of the American role in the Greek civil war, to show us that there were many differences and many lessons which President Johnson and his aides might have learned from the Greek experience but chose to ignore.

A first lesson was that while some Americanization of the Greek war was unavoidable, the Truman Administration successfully resisted the pressure of those who favored introduction of U.S. combat forces and escalation of the scale of fighting. When a Joint U.S. Military Advisory and Planning Group was finally set up in November, 1947, it was comprised of ninety officers and eighty enlisted men. As of August 31, 1949, with the war nearing its conclusion but victory not yet achieved, JUSMARG was authorized a complement of 274 men but had only 191 on duty. By the end of the year the number was cut to 128. Although a far greater number of civilian advisors were attached to the aid mission, the Truman administration avoided the fatal mistake made later in Vietnam of trying to fight the war with U.S. forces. Similarly, U.S. policy, rigorously enforced by Marshall, was to resist pressure to increase the size of the Hellenic Armed Forces beyond the point that they could be adequately supported and their combat readiness assured. Neither of these precautions was observed by the Johnson Administration in Vietnam.

A second lesson was that although the Truman Doctrine was trumpeted as the start of a global struggle against Communist aggression, the Administration quickly throttled down to rhetoric after gaining Congressional support for a program of military and economic assistance. Truman, Marshall and Acheson (who succeeded Marshall as Secretary of State at the beginning of 1949) took pains to keep Congress and the American public accurately informed and to avoid arousing exaggerated expectations of early victory. As a result, although press coverage of the Greek civil war became almost as critical of U.S. policy as it did later in Vietnam, the Truman administration never entirely lost its credibility with the American public and with Congress. In addition, by eschewing the use of U.S. combat troops and a consequent need to undertake national mobilization the administration prevented criticism of its tactics from becoming rejection of it fundamental strategy. The difference with the Johnson administration’s handling of public opinion during the Vietnam war is once again instructive.

A third lesson was that American military advisors came early to the conclusion, as Professor Jones reminds us, that “fighting in the Balkans would be primarily on the ground” and “the way to defeat guerillas was in hand-to-hand combat”. Thus air warfare never became the kind of military miracle drug in Greece that it did in Southeast Asia and never led to the disastrously mistaken belief that, however unsuccessful ground operations might be, the war could somehow be won in the air. The Vietnam numbers game—body count, truck kills, bomb damage assessment—was rarely played in Greece where the test of military success was generally recognized by Greek and U.S. officers to be the ability to hold ground and protect people. The Hellenic Air Force fought most of the air war with Spitfires, Well Mang, Harvards and Dakotas, which were poorly adapted to the requirements of close air support in the mountainous battlefields of Greece. The first shipment of U.S. Hell-Divers did not arrive until the final stages of the campaign in 1949. It says something about the realism of military planning in 1947 when we read that by the end of October of that year 500 mules had arrived from the U.S., “the first installment of many that were especially trained for mountain operations”, Professor Jones observes. A year later when the Greek
army tried to employ British Centaur tanks in the first Grammos campaign the result was a fiasco. Obviously the military effort in Greece was better calibrated to the needs of the battlefield than it was in Vietnam where our disproportionate fire power and reliance on high-tech logistics became part of the problem.

There are many other insights to be gained from "A New Kind of War", including the ironic fact that the first appearance of the so-called Greek lobby in Washington seems to have been in the form of a warning to the Administration that unless a broadly-based government was established in Athens Greek-Americans might persuade Congress to cut aid to Greece. Professor Jone's central proposition—that the Truman administration followed a flexible policy designed both to secure victory in the Greek guerrilla war and to prevent it from spreading—is more convincing than the thesis contained in his title. The tragic misconception of the Johnson administration was to believe that the civil wars in Greece and Vietnam were basically alike—were similar expressions of "a new Kind of war". They were not. The real reasons why the insurgency was defeated in Greece are that the Greek Communists were unable to fight under the banner of anti-colonialism, that they lost their principal source of aid and sanctuary when Yugoslavia broke with the Soviet Union, and that the replacement of Markos by Zachariades caused the Communists to make the fatal mistake of abandoning guerrilla tactics in favor of conventional warfare. While it is valuable to be reminded by Professor Jones that in general our policies were skillfully executed in Greece, we should not conclude from this that the Vietnam war could have been won with comparable methods. To paraphrase Tolstoy, all peaceful countries are alike; each belligerent country is at war in its own way.

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Convinced that the aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution was "the great experiment of the century", Nikos Kazantzakis made three separate journeys to Russia (from 1925 to 1930). He writes eloquently, often passionately, about his experiences.

Though Kazantzakis considered revising his work, he wisely rejected the venture, preferring the "certain spontaneous psychic sweep" of his writing—an opportunity to convey directly the very essence of "the Russian flame". Kazantzakis interprets this flame as an integral part of the "cosmogonic Force, which uses men as its carriers" to enact a specific, almost mystical purpose. This Idea, a pervasive one in the Kazantzakis œuvre, forms the philosophical epicenter of the Chronicle.

Kazantzakis begins the Chronicle with a series of questions, for he wonders what he

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