ARMED FORCES INTERVENTION IN POST-WAR TURKEY: A METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH OF GREEK NEWSPAPERS THROUGH POLITICAL ANALYSES

The Press as a political-social phenomenon may influence the formation of one's conscience, make or break governments and influence public opinion in a decisive way. As an institution it may play an extremely important role in the writing of a country's contemporary history. It is only recently that this last function of the Press has become the object of scientific research, resulting in the first attempts to write history using newspapers as the basic source. The present article aspires to contribute to the process of 'deciphering' the role played by the Press in the formulation or crystallisation of behaviours, political or other, vis-a-vis given facts or phenomena.

The article aims at signposting the methodological principles in the presentation by the Greek newspapers of an external affairs event and its use by the political affairs editors of these newspapers. This article was conceived in the course of study of the political game in Turkey as the prominence of the role of the army in that country became evident to the author. The actual cases of army intervention will not be dealt with here; what is of interest is the reaction of the newspapers to the three military interventions in the political life of Turkey. In date order these took place on 27 May 1960, 12 March 1971 and 12 September 1980.

The sources chosen are newspapers easily accessible to the public, of differing political persuasions; the time terminus of study is one month before and one after the date of intervention of the military. The selection of the time-span is conventional: it is in fact the period during which articles dealing with the interventions are to be found in the newspapers. It should be noted that beyond this two month period we no longer find such references as other very important world events always caused a radical shift in the focus of attention of political articles (the student demonstrations against the Japanese Prime Minister Kisi and his subsequent unseating in 1960, the Vietnam war in 1971 and the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 are examples of this radical change of focus). The material researched included ten newspapers for the
1960 intervention, seven for 1971 and thirteen for 1980. However, only three of these cover all three interventions; these are To Vima, Ellinikos Vorras and Makedonia. The research focused on articles, both signed and unsigned, that offered an analysis or evaluation of the situation.

The multifaceted crisis which preceded each military intervention, was bound to attract the interest of political analysts and always became a major matter for consideration in the analyses of the period preceding each coup. In 1960 for example, the causes of the crisis offered in the newspapers were the same as those later presented by academic research, albeit in a sketchier manner compared to the 1971 and 1980 cases that followed. There were three main causes that compelled the military to intervene in 1960: the economic crisis, attributed to Menderes' inflationary policy, government despotism (Press censorship, formation by the government of a committee of surveillance for the activities of the Opposition) and the revival of Islam. The second thematic cycle to which the pre-intervention articles belong, centres around the attitude of the armed forces and the role they will be invited (or invite themselves) to play in the developing situation. As the important role of the armed forces is a given fact ever since the death of Mustafa Kemal, it is again believed that the army will come forth with a solution.

It is between these same two poles that newspaper articles have gravitated before the 1971 intervention, albeit in a more vague manner and with less depth. The triptych "economic crisis - social protest - terrorism", used to explain the overall crisis, is presented in a general way. A new point noted is that terrorism is now assuming the character of an organised challenge to the government. However, the most central part in publications is occupied by speculation on the attitude the armed forces will adopt in the developing situation. In this case, the 1960 experience certainly plays an important role. The differentiation between moderate, higher-ranking and radical, lower-ranking officers within the armed forces, is considered to be a given fact and in this context the possible moves of each faction are being analysed, by offering the reader a presentation of their basic points.

2. Many articles during that period deal with the future attitude of the army: To Vima, 6, 10 May (the same article in I Avgi, 10 May) and 21 May; I Kathimerini, 8, 13 May; I Avgi, 7 May 1960.
3. The Press is mainly concerned with the attitude of the army towards the new de-
The same axes are to be seen in 1980, although the style they are presented in is different. The traditional citation of the causes of the preceding crisis and the pretexts used for the intervention is absent. First, two main causes of the crisis, that are by themselves new social and political phenomena for Turkey, are analysed in depth: terrorism and the Islamic revival. Terrorism especially is approached and understood in a satisfactory degree by journalists, while in parallel the connection is made to the social condition of the country; terrorism is considered to be but the 'tip of the iceberg'. Articles such as these by J. Nobecourt of *Le Monde* and E. Bartoli of the *Repubblica*, reprinted in *To Vima* (5.8.80) and *Thessaloniki* (27.8.80) respectively are two examples indicating this tendency among journalists. In the first article the activity and theory of terrorist groups (both right-wing and left-wing) is being explained by means of psychological motives; the second article considers terrorism to be the result of some acute forms of underdevelopment that appear in the country: compulsory modernisation, the identification of modernisation with industrialisation and westernisation, the rise of nationalism as a phenomenon offering a solution to some 'dead ends' reached by the Turkish society. The second thematic axis is being treated in a much more complete and all-round manner compared to publications on the 1960 and 1971 interventions. An excellent example is offered by the article by P. Stangos in *To Vima* of 17 August 1980 on the role played by Islam in the modern Kemalist state. The article locates and focuses on a series of basic points which offer the Greek reader an overall view of the role of Islam in Turkey. Basic among these are the nationalisation ['"turkisation" (sic)] of Islam that Mustafa Kemal attempted to impose on Turkey, the rise of Islam during the post-war period (in the decade following 1950), the ideology of Islamic socialism and the rapprochement between Marxism and Islamic ideology in the 1960s and finally —in the 1970s— the appearance in Parliament of an Islamic religious party of considerable electoral strength and appeal⁴.

¹ Developing crisis. See *Ellinikos Vorras*, 4 February, 7 March; *Eleftheros Kosmos*, 11 March; *To Vima*, 31 January; *Nea Politeia*, 7 March 1971. The economic situation along with terrorism—which has taken unpredictable dimensions in the last decade— are mentioned as the causes for the crisis; *Thessaloniki*, 10 March (the same article was published after the intervention in *Eleftheros Kosmos*, 13 March); *To Vima*, 21 February; *Eleftheros Kosmos*, 14 March 1971 (again on the period before the intervention!). Cf. F. Ronneberger, "Von Atatürk bis zum 12. September 1980", *Südosteuropa - Mitteilungen* 22/2 (1982), 36 and W. Hale, "The Turkish Army in Politics, 1960-1973", *Turkish State, Turkish Society*, ed. by A. Finkel - N. Sirman, London - N. York 1990, 69-70.

⁴ On terrorism see *Thessaloniki*, 27 August; *To Vima*, 3, 5 August; *Ellinikos Vorras*,
In broad outline, the same twofold thematic division (i.e. the causes of each intervention and the role the armed forces played) is retained in articles both before and after the three interventions. However, much more material becomes available with an accompanying tendency of more in-depth analysis. The aim (or aims) of the intervention and its anticipated future course is being interspersed in the thematic range of the articles with the discussion of its causes and of the role of the army; it is not, however, always separated by what is being said for the causes of the interventions, neither does it always offer something new.

In publications dealing with the first two interventions, we note the appearance of cautious references to the ideology of the armed forces (Kemalism) in attempts to explain their general political behaviour; two such examples are the article by Ii. Makris in *Ellinikos Vorras* (15.6.60) and the G. Piazzesi article in *Thessaloniki* (22.3.71). The presentation of the factions in the armed forces is much better documented compared with other subjects. The articles by Man. Ploumidis in *To Vima* (21.3.71) and N. Mertzos in *Ellinikos Vorras* (31.3.71) give an overview of the tendencies within the armed forces, the ideology of each faction and its aims. They go beyond a mere reporting of the existence of a conservative and a radical faction. The main and most noteworthy characteristic of both articles is that although the ideology of Kemalism is supposedly common throughout the Turkish armed forces, it is in fact an umbrella under which different ideological tendencies co-habit. That is the reason —it is argued— why Kemalism has been interpreted dif-

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5. As regards the 1960 intervention, the following articles refer to causes and pretexts without making any distinction: *Ellinikos Vorras*, 2, 3, 12, 14 June; *I Kathimerini*, 29 May; *To Vima*, 28 May, 2 June; *Eleftheria*, 28 May 1960. The publications of 1971 are concentrated on the same axis: *Makedonia*, 14 March and 11 April; *To Vima*, 14, 16 March; *Eleftheros Kosmos*, 17, 24 March; *Ellinikos Vorras*, 14 March 1971. Although the aims of the intervention are not clearly mentioned, we can trace them among the priorities of the new extra-parliamentary government, which was the solution given by the officers in 1971: *Makedonia*, 28 March and 11 April; *To Vima*, 23, 28 March 1971. On the 1960 intervention see *Ta Nea*, 9 June; *Ellinikos Vorras*, 15 June 1960.
ferently by its guardians. Thus, the conservative faction (the high-ranking officers), does not include among its aims the change of the socio-political system; it simply wishes to combat anarchy and undertake reforms in accordance with constitutional provisions. The radical faction (composed of the lower-ranking officers), supports the immediate take-over of power by the army, claiming a complete failure on the part of the political leadership, captive as it is of an illiterate people, which is in turn dependent upon the landed rich. The expressed devotion of each faction to the basic principles of Kemalism is a matter of different interpretation. In addition to the above, in the articles dealing with the 1960 intervention special attention is given to the role of the army in the historical framework: the intervention is classified in terms of space and time and a cautious attempt is made to draw a parallel with other military interventions in the Middle East (e.g. in Egypt, Pakistan, Iraq) during the first post-war decades.

The 1980 publications also merit attention, as they differ in several points from such of the previous intervention years. There are some noteworthy differences in both the themes and the methodology of the publications. Some of these are: the separation between the causes of the intervention and pretexts used, mention of external and internal causes, special reference to terrorism

6. The reference on the tendencies of the armed forces regarding both cases is now evident and extensive and is combined with their role in political life, either generally or specifically: To Vima, 29 May, 5, 7, 9 June; Avgi, 29 May and 7 June; Eleftheria, 7 June; Kathimerini, 31 May and 17 June; Ta Nea, 31 May - 4 June (inquiry), 9 June 1960. In 1971 the ideology of the army attracts journalists’ attention and is examined along with its role: To Vima, 14, 16, 21 March; Ellinikos Vorras, 16, 31 March; Thessaloniki, 22 March; Nea Politia, 21 March 1971. Regarding the army’s tendencies in 1960 we mention only some articles from the rich respective bibliography: V. I. Danilov, “Le caractère du coup d’Etat du 27 Mai en Turquie”, op. cit., 9, 11 and F. Ronneberger, “Von Atatürk bis zum 12. September 1980”, op. cit., 35. For 1971 see W. Hale, “The Turkish Army in Politics, 1960-1973”, op. cit., 70-75; see also, an all-embracing assessment of the decade in H. Tufan-S. Vaner, “L’armée, la société et le nouvel ordre (a)politique (1980-1983)”, Les Temps Modernes, 41 (1984), 179-180.


8. On the motives of the intervention see Thessaloniki, 16 September; Akropolis, 12 October 1980.

9. As regards the internal causes see Avgi, 13 September; To Vima, 13, 14 September; Eleftherotypia, 13 September; Akropolis, 14 September; Vradyni, 15 September; Eleftheros Kosmos, 17 September; Ta Nea, 19 September; Exormisi, 20 September 1980. The external causes are connected with the role played by the Western countries (especially of the United States) in the intervention: To Vima, op. cit.; Akropolis, op. cit.; Vradyni, op. cit.; Exormisi, op. cit.; Ta Nea, 13, 15 September; Avgi, 14, 16, September; Rizospastis, 14 September; Eleftheros Kosmos, 20 September; Eleftherotypia, 20 September 1980.
(more) and to Islam (less)\textsuperscript{10}, the attempt to fathom the role of the western powers (U.S.A.-N.A.T.O.) in the intervention\textsuperscript{11}, and the overall global way by which the role of the army in Turkey has been treated. The Turkish army and its ideology, its intervention in politics, composition, and tendencies is viewed as a phenomenon / institution in the political life of the country\textsuperscript{12}. Another positive aspect of the period is the attempt at comparative treatment of the three military interventions\textsuperscript{13}, which is the starting-point whence the role of the armed forces in the overall (political, social, economic, cultural-ideological) life of the country is discerned.

K. Iordanidis (To Vima, 14.9.80) is the first to examine the evolution of the relations between the armed forces and the political parties post-war. The thorough knowledge of the subject, leads the above journalist first to note some new causes of the interventions, that had hitherto gone unnoticed by newspapers. In this vein, a series of causes appear for the first time in the Greek Press; such causes are for 1960 the worsening of the financial condition of the armed forces personnel in 1960 and the introduction of leftist ideals in the lower echelons of the armed forces and the increasing activity of leftist organisations aided by D.I.S.K. ("Confederation of Revolutionary Worker’s Unions") for 1971. This point aside, the existence of attempts to present an overall view of the army-political establishment relations is by itself a step forward in the evolution of the Greek Press. The article by Prof. P. Ch. in Eleftheros Kosmos (28.9.80), focuses solely on the differences of the three interventions, even though the analysis itself may be rather superficial.

Leaving aside the main themes of articles published, which developed on the basis of specific events, we may note some preconditions in their writing, which help us in forming some wider conclusions in relation to the function of the Greek Press. As newspapers were one of the main means of communica-

\textsuperscript{10} On Islam see Ta Nea, 19 September; I Kathimerini, 26 September 1980. On terrorism see I Avgi, 17 September; To Vima, 14 September; Makedonia, 21, 23 September 1980.

\textsuperscript{11} Ta Nea, 13 September; I Avgi, 14 September; Eleftherotypia, 15 September; I Kathimerini, 16 September; Rizospastis, 18 September; To Vima, 21 September 1980. See also what is mentioned in note 8 about the external causes of the intervention.

\textsuperscript{12} I Kathimerini, 21-22 September, 1 October; I Vradyni, 22 September; Makedonia, 25 September; Eleftherotypia, 17, 20 September; Ellinikos Vorras, 14 September; Rizospastis, 18 September; Akropolis, 21, 28 September; Thessaloniki, 15 September 1980. Cf. H. Tufan - S. Vaner, "L’armée, la société et le nouvel ordre (a)politique (1980-1983)", op. cit., 182-184.

\textsuperscript{13} To Vima, 14 September; Eleftheros Kosmos, 28 September 1980. Cf. the undoubtedly more penetrating study on the same subject by B. Karakartal, "Turkey: The Army as Guardian of the Political Order", The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes, ed. by C. Clapham - G. Philip, London 1985, 46-63.
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and the common man’s main source of information before television came to dominate the news scene, two factors could influence the use of a given news item: (a) the reading public of a newspaper with the tendencies and preferences it exhibits, since the “written press is to a large degree the echo of the ideas and preferences of its readers, rather than that of the opinions and choices of its editors”\(^{14}\); and (b) the political conditions that exist in a country; in a country such as Greece these play a decisive role as the Press never claimed to be wholly independent from or unassociated with political formations\(^{15}\).

These two parameters can explain the symptoms shown by the Greek Press. The all but complete absence of Greek political analysts or even journalists specialising in such matters, the small number of articles analysing external affairs, their poor quality, narrow viewpoint and lack of thematic variations are characteristics obvious in 1960 and 1971 (but not in 1980) and may be explained by the two factors mentioned above.

In 1960, political analysis (in its newspapers article form) was not known in Greece; newspapers did not have special associates assigned to it and the readers do not appear to have shown interest in it. For the average reader, developments in Turkey were treated in a similar manner to such in Japan or Korea. The political setting was also not ‘auspicious’. The matter in hand had a direct connection to Greek-Turkish relations, which to a large extent after 1954-55 depended on developments of the Cyprus issue\(^{16}\). However, 1960 was a period of detente for the Cyprus issue\(^{17}\). It therefore becomes obvious why the two factors that influenced the majority of articles on an event were not favourable that year for an analysis on the situation in Turkey. The event was explosive in itself; it was only from this angle that it was dealt with, in the same manner as similar events in Japan later in the year.

In the case of 1971 we note a slackening of the pace of development of the Press. This is due to the imposition of censorship by the Greek military junta, the banning of certain newspapers, and the appearance of others that were under the complete control of the regime (such as the \textit{Nea Politia})


and were therefore giving an ideological colouring to all news items. To offer some examples, the "Eleftheros Kosmos" newspaper, before the military intervention in Turkey, is of the opinion that Turkey should follow the "Greek example" as political parties are corrupt. The "Nea Politeia" puts considerable stress on the popular base the Turkish armed forces had and the corruption of parliamentary governments in Turkey, in a way which makes a military intervention appear natural and even essential. On the contrary, after the military coup and the solution given (the formation of a technocrats' government under Nihat Erim) both the above newspapers stressed that the solution is only a half-measure and that only the complete take-over of government by the armed forces could lead the Turkey out of the crisis. The readers of the newspapers, faced as they were with daily problems due to the restriction of liberties by the Greek Junta had limited interest in external affairs that did not affect the situation in Greece itself. Finally, as the Cyprus issue was again in 1971 in a period of detente\textsuperscript{18}, the political conditions were not favourable. Therefore, both factors, (reading public, political conditions) were negative for the development of political analyses during the 1960-71 period. For the period studied in 1960, newspapers include seventeen analyses articles of Greek origin (either signed or anonymous) and five reprints from a foreign source; in 1971, we have fourteen articles for each of the above categories. The changes in the Greek and foreign analyses show a shift in the preferences of the newspapers: there is a reduction in the number of Greek analysts and an increase in reprints of foreign articles, (with obvious tendencies showing complete confidence in them). In my opinion this may be explained as a phenomenon showing the decline of the Greek Press.

The situation changes completely in relation to both the dominant themes and the articles published in 1980. The intense politicisation and political party factionalism that characterises the post-1974 period are now combined with the almost continuous state of crisis in Greek-Turkish relations, the intense interest of the reader for public affairs and the general sensitisation of the reading public to matters related to democracy (a direct result of the seven years of military dictatorship) led to an impressive increase of the political analyses, in both quantity and quality. The number of analyses, Greek-authored and of foreign origin, is now 49 and 22 respectively; in percentages, we notice a respective rise of 71.4% and 36.3% compared to 1971. The number of unsigned articles is now very limited and reprints from foreign newspapers are from sources of generally accepted validity ("New York Times, Le Monde,

\textsuperscript{18} G. Tsitsopoulos, "Oi ellinotourkikes amyntikes scheseis, 1945-1987", op. cit., 190
The Guardian). Journalists specialising exclusively on foreign reporting or political analysis appear for the first time (there was a single such example in 1971, Man. Ploumidis of To Vima). Numerous Greek journalists wrote notable analyses on the 1980 military intervention in Turkey. Among these Z. Zikou in Akropoli, R. Moronis in Vradyni, G. Kartalis, M. Ploumidis and K. Iordanidis in To Vima, Ast. Stangos in Elefherotypia, N. Mertzos in Ellinikos Verras, P. Tzermias in Kathimerini, K. Thestoridis in Makedonia all of whom tackled the subject on the level of political analysis.

The authors of these articles use both material from and the findings of other areas of learning, such as sociology and political science research. Akropolis furnishes us with a characteristic example, by reprinting a New York Times article, in which the results of research by Ahmet Taner Kislali, Professor in Ankara University are given. The object of the research was the social stratification of the Turkish armed forces, with the results pointing to the direction of lower- and middle-class origins of the largest part of the personnel. Another example of the use of similar terminology is the article by A.S. in I Avgi (17.9.80). Among other matters, the author of the article attempting to find the deeper causes of the coup, offers a sociological explanation of terrorism. According to him,

"terrorism is the disastrous result of a tumultuous process of development that is undermining the traditional ways of life and sends to the ‘misery zones’ of the big cities millions of people who are wrenched from the land (i.e. rural life), [development] destroys families, and pushes masses of young people to despair and blind, senseless rebellion".

The definition of Kemalism as an ideology—a much discussed topic in publications of the period—by an (unnamed) professor of Ankara University cited in an unsigned article in Kathimerini (21-22.9.80) is another example in this direction: Kemalism is a

"lower middle-class philosophy, which considers the Turkish nation as an ethnically and ideologically indivisible entity. Kemalism is against class development, and even more so in relation to wor-

19. See the article in Thessaloniki, 27 August on terrorism.

20. Akropolis, 28 September 1980. In a similar such research a few years later we notice the same middle-class origins among the students of the Turkish military schools; J. Brown, “The Military and Society: The Turkish Case”, Middle Eastern Studies, 25/3 (1989), 387-404.
king-class dominance. The pillars of Kemalism are the secular state, a homogeneous nation and democratic capitalism”.

A fact that contributed to the introduction of scientific terminology and conclusions in newspaper articles is the permanent co-operation with them of non-members of the journalistic profession (e.g. academics) in the role of political commentators, such as V. Filias in *Eleftherotypia*.

Another positive aspect is the thematic enrichment in covering a subject. Special envoys in Turkey interview citizens of the country and send contributions not only on matters directly related to the military intervention, but also more general such, on the situation in Turkey and so only indirectly related to the intervention. Such matters are e.g. the ‘shantytowns’ of the Turkish urban centres, or the conditions in Turkish prisons. There is also a simultaneous expansion in the choice of themes chosen and reprinted from articles in foreign newspapers. There are articles that do not belong to the usual basic themes, but to innovative aspects such as the Kurdish question or communism in Turkey.

The political conditions that existed in Greece in 1980 gave rise to some characteristics of the Greek Press which are either entirely new, or to be found in a much less pronounced form in 1960 and 1971. The change in political terminology is very obvious. Almost every newspaper refers to a ‘coup’ when describing the military intervention with numerous references to the ‘junta’ in Turkey. It should be noted here that in 1960 the intervention was labelled a ‘revolution’ by newspapers. What played a decisive role in this case was the recent Greek experience. When reading the news of the intervention in Turkey, the Greek reader was reminded of his own recent junta and reacted in a psychologically charged manner. At that time, however, the average reader could not probably know that the role of the armed forces in Turkey and Greece is markedly different. The use of the term ‘revolution’ in 1960 may be explained as an attempt by the Turkish military to present their coup as a mass movement against the Menderes government. It is notable that at least in the 1960s international academic research was also using the term ‘revolution’ to describe the 1960 coup21.

We may include in the same frame of reference the search for the role of

the U.S. in the Turkish military coup; this search may be explained either by means of a mental connection with the Greek junta, or by the easily discernible anti-Americanism of Greek society of the time. The new turn taken by Greek-Turkish relations during the 1970s (after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, the Turkish claims in the continental shelf and operational control of the Aegean Sea and the related matter of Greece’s return to the military wing of N.A.T.O.) have caused a considerable demand in the newspapers for material on Turkish affairs; this demand, it is true, focuses not so much on the comprehension of the actors and rules of the political game in Turkey, but rather on relations between the two countries. This connection at times became an absolute necessity for the authors of newspaper articles. G. Karatlis (To Vima, 13.9.80), V. Vassileiou (I Vradyni, 22.9.80), Ast. Stangos (Eleftherotypia, 13.9.80), P. Paraskevopoulos (Eleftherotypia, 15.9.80), N. Mertzos (Ellinikos Vorras, 21.9.80) all refer in their analyses the consequences of the Turkish coup on Greek-Turkish relations. They all agree that no improvement may be expected, as the military had never declared in favour of a different policy; on the contrary, even before the intervention, they always were in a position to influence the formation of policy towards Greece: the Chiefs of Staff of the three branches of the armed forces were always included in the membership of the Turkish “National Security Council”, which was in charge of defence and external policy planning and formulation.

Finally, all the data we included in the parameter we named ‘political conditions’ should be read in conjunction with the ideological leanings of each newspaper. The existence of political leanings, that may at times be simply a party line, openly accepted by the newspaper is a sign of the times. It also causes a specific brand of political analysis to appear with its own accompanying ‘verbal arsenal’. To cite some examples, for the Rizospastis (official organ of the “Greek Communist Party”) the army intervention in Turkey was the fulfilment of an American desire and aimed at serving the N.A.T.O. interests in the area; the opposition newspapers on the other hand charged the government with failure to condemn the coup. The only other similar case for 1960 was I Avgi, the only independent left-wing newspaper, which quite easily compared the Menderes regime with Greek governments (see article of 29.5.60). For obvious reasons this phenomenon does not appear in 1971.

On its own and viewed as a source of history, the material found in Greek newspapers on military interventions in political life is inadequate for a historical analysis. The reason is the limited amount of inquiry for events
in the neighbouring country. The two preconditions we set above in order to interpret the picture shown by newspapers in the three years are of considerable benefit. The presentation of the 1960 and 1971 interventions is general, on the whole in agreement with the conclusions of foreign political scientists (e.g. when pointing out the causes of each intervention), but rather superficial when discussing the role of the armed forces in Turkish political life. The reading public of the time was not interested in events taking place in Turkey, as the political conditions were not ‘favourable’ with the Cyprus question—the perennial ‘barometer’ of Greek-Turkish relations—in both years in a period of détente. In 1980 matters appear much better in the direction of availability of fuller analysis, as well as an improvement in all other areas. The Greek reading public is now sensitised in matters of democracy due to its own recent experience with the Greek junta; in addition to this, bilateral relations have now reached a critical point. In the post-1974 era, the ‘wind of freedom’ that blows in the Greek Press (with the abolition of censorship and the legislative measures taken to ensure the freedom of the Press) help it to improve in quality and evolve. At the same time it shows that to a considerable degree all Greek newspapers align themselves with one or another political line, or even with a party line. However, even in 1980 analyses, the critical differences between the three interventions are not adequately stressed. In this manner the role of the Turkish armed forces in the country’s life could become more obvious. The military is promoting an ideology; the question is how—consciously or unconsciously—consistent is the army itself with its ideology? How strong are the different tendencies within the army and what interests do they serve? Is this another, a ‘heretical’ view of Kemalism or is it something different? What is the connection between the armed forces and the people? How independent can political parties be? How different is the army in Turkey and Greece? The answer to this question could avert, for example, the identification of the “Greek colonel’s junta” with the “Turkish General’s junta”. The answer to the above and other similar problems were not given by Greek newspapers.