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THE GREEKS OF RUSSIA AND THE GREEK AWAKENING,  
1774-1821

The Greek War of Independence against the Ottoman Empire became a *cause célèbre* in European public opinion and was the most significant diplomatic issue confronting the Great Powers in the Near East during the 1820s. The emergence of an independent Greek state in 1830 represented the first change in the map of Europe after the Congress of Vienna (1815). As such, the Greek Revolution constituted the first major breach in the Metternichean system, which had been established to preserve the political status quo and to protect legitimate rulers from liberal and nationalistic unrest.

Although the Greek War of Independence came as an unwelcome surprise to Metternich and to other heads of state in Europe, it did not occur in a vacuum or without preparation. Indeed, the Greek Revolution represented the culmination of a Greek national movement which had developed in the 18th century. Like subsequent Balkan national revivals, the modern Greek awakening was generated by internal and external forces. While opposition to Ottoman rule provided the main internal impetus, the Greeks required assistance and support from outside sources.

The most important external impetus for the Greek awakening came from tsarist Russia. As Dimitri Obolensky has clearly shown in his work *The Byzantine Commonwealth*, the Russians and the Greeks, along with the other Balkan peoples, formed a cultural unity, an association of Christian peoples linked by the bonds of Orthodoxy and Byzantine civilization. The most essential bond was the Orthodox faith, which became the cement of Byzantium and the Byzantine commonwealth<sup>1</sup>.

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1. Dimitri Obolensky, *The Byzantine Commonwealth: Eastern Europe, 500-1453* (London, 1971). The survival of the Byzantine legacy in the Danubian Principalities is the sub-

Although Obolensky ends his study with the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople and the Balkans, his concept of a religiously grounded commonwealth can be extended to the post-Byzantine era. Despite the political demise of Byzantium, the subjugation of the Greek church to Ottoman rule, and Muscovy's rise to political preeminence in the Orthodox world, the commonwealth continued to be held together by a mutual Orthodox cultural tradition. In fact, the commonwealth remained a viable cultural entity until the emergence of Balkan national rivalries in the 19th and early 20th centuries. During this period, the Orthodox commonwealth began to break up along the lines of nation-states, with ethnic nationalism gradually displacing the kindred religious consciousness that had provided a common ground for the Balkan Orthodox peoples. This was also the time when Russian-promoted pan-Slavism led many Greeks to look increasingly to the West, as opposed to their traditional protector Russia, for support of Greek national aspirations.

Prior to the centrifugal force of nationalism, however, the Orthodox faith remained the principal bond connecting the Russian and Greek worlds. Orthodoxy opened up numerous avenues of contact and interaction, such as the settlement of Greek clergymen in Muscovy, the generous alms of Muscovite state and society to alleviate the plight of the Greek church under Ottoman rule, the tsars' relationship with the eastern patriarchates, and the travels of Russian visitors and religious pilgrims to the holy shrines of the Greek East<sup>2</sup>.

Insight into the nature of Greek-Russian ties in the post-Byzantine period can be gleaned from Greek religious texts, especially the oracles and prophe-

ject of the well-known work by the Rumanian historian Nicolae Iorga, *Byzance après Byzance* (Bucharest, 1935).

2. Greek-Russian religious and cultural ties in the post-Byzantine era are treated in the works of N. F. Kapterev, *Kharakter otnoshenii Rossii k pravoslavnomu vostoku XVI i XVII st.* (Moscow, 1885), and *Snosheniia ierusalimskikh patriarkhov s russkim pravitel'stvom*, 2 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1895-98). See also the study of Boris L. Fonkich, *Grechesko-russkie kul'turnye sviazi v XV-XVII vv.: grecheskie rukopisi v Rossii* (Moscow, 1977), on the transmission of Greek religious texts to Muscovy. On Russian travelers to the Greek East see the thorough reference guide of Theofanis G. Stavrou and Peter R. Weisensel, *Russian Travelers to the Christian East from the Twelfth to the Twentieth Century* (Columbus, Ohio, 1985). For a brief introduction in English to the topic of Greeks in Muscovy see William Medlin and Christos Patrinelis, *Renaissance Influences and Religious Reforms in Russia* (Geneva, 1971) 42-50; Gustave Alef, "Diaspora Greeks in Muscovy", *Byzantine Studies* 6 (1975) 26-34; and Maria Kotzamanidou, "The Greek Monk Arsenios and His Humanist Activities in Seventeenth-Century Russia", *Modern Greek Studies Yearbook* 2 (1986) 73-88.

cies<sup>3</sup>. Two recurring themes, emblematic of Greek national aspirations, stand out in this literature: the Ottomans would eventually be driven from Constantinople, and a fair-haired people from the north (*xanthon genos*) would deliver the Greeks from Ottoman rule<sup>4</sup>. The *xanthon genos* prophecy later became part of the 18th-century *Agathangelos* legend, which also suggested that the Greeks would be liberated by a fair-haired people from the north<sup>5</sup>. Until as late as the early 1820s, the Russians were believed to be the fair-haired liberators who would help the Greeks realize their national aspirations.

Greek belief in the prophecies appeared well-grounded in view of Russian expansion in the Near East in the 18th century. Greek-Russian traditional ties assumed a military and political dimension with the development of the Eastern Question—the European question of what to do with the gradually declining Ottoman Empire<sup>6</sup>. Beginning with Peter the Great's unsuccessful Pruth campaign in 1711, religious issues became an important ingredient in Russian Eastern policy, imparting to it a sense of mission to protect Balkan coreligionists.

Russian protection of the sultan's Orthodox subjects was recognized

3. On the importance of the oracles and prophecies in Greek popular culture during the Ottoman period see Basil Laourdas, "Greek Religious Texts During the Ottoman Period", in H. Birnbaum and S. Vryonis, eds., *The Balkans: Continuity and Change* (Paris, 1972) 230-42, and Richard Clogg, "Elite and Popular Culture in Greece Under Turkish Rule", in J. Koumoulidis, ed., *Hellenic Perspectives: Essays in the History of Greece* (Lanham, Maryland, 1980) 28-31. Clogg's essay notes that "the most truly authentic aspect of Greek popular culture, yet at the same time the least tangible, was the almost universal belief in prophecies and oracles foretelling their eventual liberation". See also the study of Asterios Argiriou, *Les exégèses grecques de l'Apocalypse a l'époque turque (1453-1821)* (Thessaloniki, 1982).

4. The first prominent Greek clergyman to cite the oracles as proof of Russia's providential role as protector and liberator of the sultan's Orthodox Christian subjects was Paisios Ligaridis. His *Khrismologion*, written in 1656 during his stay in Moscow, urged Tsar Alexis to liberate Greek coreligionists from Ottoman rule. See H. Hionides, *Paisios Ligaridis* (New York, 1972) 95-98. On the prevalence of Greek belief in the legend of *xanthon genos* see the Western travel reports of Paul Rycout, *The History of the Present State of the Ottoman Empire* (London, 1682) 176, and Jacob Spon and George Wheler, *Voyage d'Italie, de Dalmatie, de Grèce, et du Levant*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1724) 1: 210-11.

5. On *Agathangelos* see Alexis Politis, "I prographomeni ston Riga proti ekdosi tou *Agathangelou*", *Eranistis* 7 (1962) 173-92.

6. See M. S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question, 1774-1923* (London, 1966), and V. A. Georgiev and N. S. Kiniapina, *Vostochnyi vopros vo vneshei politike Rossii konets XVIII-nachalo XX v.* (Moscow, 1978). For a review of Soviet literature on the Eastern Question see John R. Broadus, "Soviet Historians and the Eastern Question of the Eighteenth Century", *East European Quarterly* 15 (1981) 357-75, and Barbara Jelavich, "Recent Soviet Publications on the Eastern Question", *Russian Review* 32 (1978) 177-87.

in the vaguely worded religious clause of the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji (1774)<sup>7</sup>. More often than not, however, Russian defense of the religious rights of Greek coreligionists became an ideological cover or disguise for more tangible objectives of Russian policy, such as extending the southern frontier, acquiring additional commercial privileges in the Black and Mediterranean Seas, and gaining diplomatic leverage among Balkan Christians. Catherine II, probably more than any other Russian tsar, identified Russia with Greek aspirations for liberation and exploited the religious issue for Russian state interests. She regarded protection of coreligionists as a pretext for imperial expansion, vividly seen in her unfulfilled Greek Project which called for a revived Greek state governed from Constantinople by her grandson Constantine<sup>8</sup>.

The plight of the Greeks never determined Russian policy at the expense of more concrete military and commercial goals. Nevertheless, Russian expansion greatly facilitated the modern Greek awakening in both Ottoman-held Greek lands and Greek diaspora communities in Europe and Russia. Indeed, Russian involvement in the Eastern Question was the most significant external catalyst in the development of the Greek national movement, particularly of such key components as military resistance, political activism, commercial growth, and educational and cultural progress<sup>9</sup>.

7. This treaty and its various interpretations by the main parties involved are discussed in J. Wiczynski, "The Myth of Kuchuk Kainardji in American Histories of Russia", *Middle Eastern Studies* 4 (1967-68) 376-79; E. I. Druzhinina, "200 let kiuchuk-kainardzhiiskogo mira", *Études balkaniques* 2 (1975) 83-96; I. S. Dostian, "Znachenie kiuchuk-kainardzhiiskogo dogovora 1774 g. v politike Rossii na balkanakh kontsa XVIII i XIX vv.", *Études balkaniques* 2 (1975) 97-107; and Roderic Davison, "Russian Skill and Turkish Imbecility: the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji Reconsidered", *Slavic Review* 25.3 (1976) 463-84.

8. Catherine the Great's Near Eastern policy is discussed in Isabel de Madariaga's *Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great* (London, 1981) 187-238, 377-426. On Catherine's Greek Project see the entry by David Griffiths in *The Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History* 13 (1979) 128-32, which provides bibliographical leads, and the article by Hugh Ragsdale, "Montmarin and Catherine's Greek Project", *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* 27.1 (1986) 27-44.

9. Soviet Balkanologists underscore tsarist Russia's progressive impact on Balkan national movements. For an introduction to Soviet historiography on Balkan nationalism see I. S. Dostian, *Rossii i balkanskii vopros* (Moscow, 1972); G. L. Arsh and V. N. Vinogradov, "Balkany v mezhdunarodnoi zhizni Evropy", *Voprosy istorii* 4 (1981) 28-42; and G. L. Arsh, "Natsional'no-osvoboditel'nye vosstaniia na balkanakh pervoi treti XIX v.", *Balkanskie issledovaniia* 7 (1982) 66-72. For a counter view which emphasizes the importance of the French Revolution and Napoleon in shaping Balkan national movements see N. Iorga, *La révolution française et le sud-est de l'Europe* (Bucharest, 1934); A. Daskalakis,

Russia's frequent wars against the Ottoman Empire (1711, 1737-39, 1768-74, 1787-92, 1806-12) not only accelerated the empire's decline but also contributed to Greek resistance to the Ottomans. The wars provided an opportunity for mountain soldiers (*armatoloi*), social bandits (*klephts*), and sea pirates to engage in combat on Russia's behalf<sup>10</sup>. Like other Greek folk heroes, the exploits of some warriors, like Lambros Katsonis and Daskalogiannis, assumed mythical proportions in Greek popular culture and nourished a tradition of armed resistance to the Ottomans. Despite the fact that Russia usually left the Greeks to their fate, best seen in the Orlov expedition of 1770, the wars became an occasion for Greek-Russian military collaboration and enabled Greek forces to receive training and experience under foreign officers<sup>11</sup>. Consequently, when the Greek Revolution broke out in 1821, the Greeks had veterans who had fought under Russian auspices. Service in Russian-directed military units also brought together Greek warriors from dif-

*Rhigas Velestinlis, la révolution française et les preludes de l'indépendance hellénique* (Paris, 1937); N. Moschopoulos, *1789: Eveil des peuples. La révolution française, l'Europe centrale, et les Balkans* (Paris, 1939); L. S. Stavrianos, "The Influence of the West on the Balkans", in Barbara and Charles Jelavich, eds., *The Balkans in Transition* (Berkeley, California, 1963) 184-226; and P. Kitromilides, "Republican Aspirations in Southeastern Europe in the Age of the French Revolution", *The Consortium on Revolutionary Europe, Proceedings 1* (1980) 275-85.

10. *Klephts* were outlaws or bandits in the mountainous regions of Greece. Because of their opposition to the Ottomans, they became symbols of national resistance, and their exploits were commemorated in folk-songs and ballads. *Armatoloi* were irregular troops employed by the sultan to maintain law and order and to guard mountain passes. Both groups became the backbone of Greek military forces in the 1820s. See Dennis N. Skiotis, "Greek Mountain Warriors and the Greek Revolution", in V. J. Perry and M. E. Yapp, eds., *War, Technology, and Society in the Middle East* (London, 1975) 308-29.

The Greek classical scholar and educator Adamantios Korais noted in his *Mémoire sur l'état actuel de la civilisation dans la Grèce* (1803) the impact of the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-74 on Greek resistance: "Convinced now that their oppressors were men who could be defeated, that in fact they had defeated them by the side of the Russians, and that it would not prove impossible for them to defeat the Ottomans on their own provided they had able men to lead them, they felt in themselves for the first time a spark of pride". Korais's *Mémoire* appears in English translation in Elie Kedourie, ed., *Nationalism in Asia and Africa* (New York, 1970) 153-88. Further material on Greek participation in Russia's wars against the Ottoman Empire is found in A. Vakalopoulos, *Istoria tou neou ellinismou*, 6 vols. (Thessaloniki, 1973-82) 4: 69-75, 375-418, 427-30, 561-68, 710-28.

11. On the Orlov expedition see Tasos Gritsopoulos, *Ta orlophika* (Athens, 1967); E. V. Tarle, *Chesmenskii boi i pervaiia ekspeditsiia v arkipelag, 1769-74* (Moscow, 1954); and V. I. Sinitsa, "Vosstanie v Moree 1770 i Rossiia", *Voprosy novoi i noveishei istorii* (Minsk, 1974) 12-21,

ferent communities and regions and helped break down strictly regional attachments and loyalties. This ultimately proved crucial in the development of a broader sense of national, as opposed to locally rooted, patriotism<sup>12</sup>.

Russian Eastern policy, in addition to fostering military resistance, opened the door for numerous Greeks to acquire political experience. Russian policy directly affected the political fortunes of the Phanariots, prosperous Greek families named after the Phanar quarter of Constantinople where many of them resided. After Peter the Great's Pruth campaign, the sultan appointed Phanariots to serve as *hospodars* or governors of Moldavia and Wallachia, the two Danubian Principalities which were fast assuming strategic significance as an Ottoman bulwark against Russian and Austrian expansion. Phanariots replaced local Rumanian princes as *hospodars* until 1821, when the Greek revolt in Moldavia increased Ottoman fear and suspicion of all Greeks in Ottoman service<sup>13</sup>.

Phanariot rule in the Danubian Principalities remains an historiographical controversy. Some historians have contended that Phanariot rule did little to improve the general lot of the local population, while other scholars have focused on the efforts of specific *hospodars* who tried, within the strictures of the Ottoman ruling system, to introduce enlightened reform<sup>14</sup>. One point difficult to refute is the Phanariot contribution to education and learning, clearly seen in the founding of the Academies of Bucharest and Jassy. These two institutions accomplished a great deal in transmitting Western secular thought and culture to the Balkans and in educating prominent Greek and Balkan scholars who contributed to the national awakening of their respective countries<sup>15</sup>.

12. The topic of Greek military units under Russian direction is thoroughly treated in Nicholas C. Pappas, "Greeks in Russian Military Service in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries", Ph. D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1982. See also G. L. Arsh., "Materialy k istorii russko-grecheskikh sviazei nachala XIX v.", *Balkanskie issledovaniia* 8 (1982) 54-67, which includes archival information from the Russian Foreign Ministry on official Russian policy toward Greek military veterans from the Ionian Islands.

13. Prior to 1821, Phanariot rule in the Danubian Principalities was extremely tenuous, with the average tenure of a *hospodarship* lasting about 2.5 years in the 18th century. A vivid contemporary description of Phanariot intrigues to acquire and to maintain *hospodarships* is the work of the British consul in Bucharest, William Wilkinson, *An Account of the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia* (London, 1820).

14. R. W. Seton-Watson's negative picture of Phanariot rule in the Principalities, *A History of the Rumanians* (Cambridge, 1934) 126-42, should be countered with the more positive view of Phanariot rule presented in the collection of essays dedicated to Cléobule Tsourkas, *Symposium. L'époque phanariote* (Thessaloniki, 1974).

15. A. Camariano-Cioran, *Les académies princières de Bucarest et de Jassy et leurs pro-*

Several ties linked the Phanariot world with Russia. Many Phanariots sought Russian assistance for the fulfillment of their vision of a revived Byzantium which would replace the Ottoman Empire<sup>16</sup>. The Russian government, meanwhile, looked to the Phanariots as a lever of Russian influence and penetration in the Balkans, especially after the establishment of Russian consulates in Ottoman lands after 1774. Ottoman misrule in the Danubian Principalities, such as violations regarding the tenure and security of *hospodars*, often became a pretext for Russian diplomatic intervention in Ottoman affairs and for Russo-Turkish military confrontation<sup>17</sup>. Political ties between the Phanariots and Russia were enhanced by personal and social bonds. Numerous Phanariots, fearing Turkish reprisals for their pro-Russian views and activities, settled with their families in Russia, where they received land grants and pensions and promoted an expansionist Russian policy in the Near East<sup>18</sup>.

The Phanariots were not the only Greeks who benefited from Russian Eastern policy. Russia, more than any other country, beckoned as a haven where Greeks could practice their faith, develop their commercial and navigational skills, and acquire a modicum of political experience. The possibility of social and professional mobility attracted many Greeks to emigrate to Russia and to enter Russian service. Greeks rose to high-ranking positions in the army, navy, state bureaucracy, and diplomatic corps<sup>19</sup>.

*fesseurs* (Thessaloniki, 1974), and K. Th. Dimaras, "Peri Phanarioton", *Arkheion Thrakis* 34 (1969) 117-40.

16. Cyril Mango, "The Phanariots and the Byzantine Tradition", in R. Clogg, ed., *The Struggle for Greek Independence* (London, 1973) 41-66.

17. On Russian policy in the Danubian Principalities see B. G. Spiridonakis, "L'établissement d'un consulat Russe dans les principautés danubiennes, 1780-1782", *Balkan Studies* 4 (1963) 289-314; G. S. Grosul, *Dunaiskie kniazhestva v politike Rossii, 1774-1806* (Kishinev, 1975) 68-171; George Jewsbury, *The Russian Annexation of Bessarabia: A Study of Imperial Expansion* (New York, 1976) 17-29; and V. N. Vinogradov and L. E. Semenova, "Neketorye voprosy otnoshenii mezhdru Rossiei i dunaiskimi kniazhestvami v XVIII-nachale XIX v svete materialov sovetskikh arkhivov", *Balkanskie issledovaniia* 8 (1982) 6-37.

18. S. Soutzo, "Les familles princières grecques de Valachie et de Moldavie", *Symposium. L'époque phanariote* 244-52, which includes numerous references to Greek Phanariots who settled in Russia. On the flight of Alexander Mavrokordatos to Russia see Avksenti Stadnit-skii, *Gavriil Banulesko-Bodoni* (Kishinev, 1894).

19. The Greek Gymnasium in St. Petersburg, established by imperial decree in 1775 to train young Greeks for careers in Russian service, produced numerous military and naval officers as well as consuls and vice-consuls. On the school and its Greek graduates see Stephen K. Batalden, *Catherine II's Greek Prelate: Eugenios Voulgaris in Russia, 1771-1806* (New York, 1982) 25-26, 141.

Probably the most notable Greek in Russian service was John Kapodistrias, Greece's first President. Kapodistrias began his political career as Secretary of State of the short-lived Ionian Republic (1800-07), which was established and protected by Russia<sup>20</sup>. Convinced that Greek national hopes hinged on Russian support, Kapodistrias emigrated to Russia and promoted the Greek cause in Russian official and unofficial circles. He entered the Russian diplomatic corps in 1809 and eventually rose to the position of Foreign Minister, which he held from 1815 to 1822. One reason for Kapodistrias's resignation was his disappointment with the tsar's decision not to intervene militarily in the Greek crisis<sup>21</sup>.

The clearest and most direct link between Russian Eastern policy and the Greek awakening was the growth of Greek communities in Russia. These centers were part of a broad network of Greek diaspora settlements in Western and Central Europe, including London, Amsterdam, Paris, Leipzig, Vienna, Budapest, Venice, and Trieste<sup>22</sup>. The settlements in Russia, however, were unique because of the long tradition of Greek migration to that country, extending as far back as classical and Byzantine times. During the Ottoman period, Greek clergymen, men of letters, and artisans often took refuge in Russia. In addition, Greek merchants, usually associated with merchant companies in Khar'kov, Kiev, and Nezhin, became middlemen in Russia's trade with the Danubian Principalities and the Ottoman Empire<sup>23</sup>.

20. Russia's protectorate over the Ionian Islands is the subject of the works of A. N. Stanislavskaja, *Rossia i Gretsia. Politika Rossii v ionicheskoj respublike, 1798-1807 gg.* (Moscow, 1976), and *Politicheskaia deiatel'nost' F. F. Ushakova v Gretsii* (Moscow, 1983). Stanislavskaja refers to the Russian protectorate as the *ochag* or hearth of Greek independence because it was the first experiment in Greek self-rule in modern times.

21. The most complete work on the career of Kapodistrias in Russian diplomatic service is that of G. L. Arsh, which is based on Soviet archives, *Kapodistriia i grecheskoe nacional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie, 1809-1822 gg.* (Moscow, 1976). Also see E. Koukkou, *Kapodistrias, 1800-1828* (Athens, 1978) 39-58; C. M. Woodhouse, *Capodistria, Founder of Greek Independence* (London, 1973) 47-281; and Patricia Grimsted, *The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I: Political Attitudes and the Conduct of Russian Diplomacy, 1801-1825* (Berkeley, California, 1969) 226-68.

22. For an overview of the Greek diaspora communities see Vakalopoulos, *Istoria tou neou ellinismou* 2: 466-82 and 4: 157-236, 457-63, 586-90, 736-37. For an introduction in English see D. A. Zakythinos, *The Making of Modern Greece*, trans. K. J. Johnstone (Oxford, 1976) 115-39, and Deno J. Geanakoplos, "The Diaspora Greeks: The Genesis of Modern Greek National Consciousness", in N. Diamandouros and J. Petropoulos, eds., *Hellenism and The First Greek War of Liberation (1821-1830): Continuity and Change* (Thessaloniki, 1976) 59-78.

23. For an excellent picture of Greek merchant activity in the Balkans and Central Eu-

With the acquisition of the Crimea and the lands along the northern coast of the Black Sea, colonization of Russia's southern steppe could proceed with reduced fear of Tatar and Ottoman border raids. The successful integration and consolidation of the new territories would enable the Russian state to mobilize and to utilize the resources of the region<sup>24</sup>. The most attractive resources were warm-water ports and free navigation in the Black Sea. With these economic and strategic imperatives in mind, the Russian government launched an ambitious settlement program which included an attempt to attract native and foreign settlers with economic and financial incentives<sup>25</sup>.

The Greeks and other Balkan subjects of the Porte played a prominent part in the colonization schemes of the Russian government. Greek migration was understandable in view of the numerous Russo-Turkish wars and the desire of many Greeks to seek protection after supporting Russian forces. Greek communities, therefore, sprouted in such towns as Taganrog, Mariupol', Kherson, Azov, Kishinev, and Odessa. In the classical spirit then fashionable in imperial court circles, Catherine the Great named the new town of Odessa after the legendary hero Odysseus, which was also the name of an

rope see T. Stoianovich, "The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant", *Journal of Economic History* 20 (1960) 234-313. On the Greek community of Nezhin see N. K. Storozhevskii, *Nezhinskie greki* (Kiev, 1863), and M. M. Plokhinskii, "Inozemtsy v staroi malorossii", *Trudy XII arkheologicheskogo s'ezda v Khar'kove* 2 (1905) 175-409, which is based on local archives in the Ukraine and provides specific information on Greek settlers, including their place of birth, occupation, and date of settlement in Nezhin. Russian travelers frequently commented on the Greek community of Nezhin. See Dmitrii N. Bantysh-Kamenskii, *Puteshestvie v Moldaviu, Vallakhiiu, i Serbiiu* (Moscow, 1810) 182-88, and Ivan M. Dolgoruki, *Puteshestvie v Kiev v 1817 g.* (Moscow, 1870) 55-64.

24. The economic and strategic importance of Catherine II's conquests in the Black Sea area is emphasized in Marc Raeff, "In the Imperial Manner", M. Raeff, ed., *Catherine the Great. A Profile* (New York, 1972) 197-246. Several Western and Russian travelers, commissioned by the Russian Imperial Academy of Sciences, described the land, resources, and economic potential of southern Russia, a region that became known as New Russia. See *Puteshestvennye zapiski Vasil'ia Zueva ot Peterburga do Khersona v 1781 i 1782 gg.* (St. Petersburg, 1787), and P. S. Pallas, *Travels Through the Southern Provinces of the Russian Empire in 1793 and 1794* (London, 1802-03).

25. Several works deal with the colonization of southern Russia. See especially Roger Bartlett, *Human Capital: The Settlement of Foreigners in Russia, 1762-1804* (Cambridge, England, 1979) 109-42. The recent work of V. I. Timofeenko, *Goroda severnogo prichernomor'ia vo vtoroi polovine XVIII veka* (Kiev, 1984), describes the town planning schemes for southern Russia. Also helpful for studying the development of New Russia are D. I. Bagalei, *Kolonizatsiia novorossiskogo kraia i pervye shagi po puti kul'tury* (Kiev, 1889); E. I. Druzhinina, *Severnoe prichernomor'e, 1775-1806* (Moscow, 1959); and V. M. Kabuzan, *Zaselenie Novorossii* (Moscow, 1979).

ancient Greek colony that had been situated in the same location as the new town. The arrival of Greek settlers in southern Russia, when combined with older Greek centers in Kiev, Moscow, and St. Petersburg, produced a sizable Greek presence in tsarist Russia<sup>26</sup>.

Greek-Russian ties now assumed a new direction. The Russian state and the Greek communities had a mutual interest in expanding Russia's Black Sea commerce. Because of the lack of a Russian Black Sea fleet, Russia had to rely on Greek shippers, merchants, and sailors. To protect the substantial Greek role in its southern trade, the Russian government made provisions with the sultan, such as the Treaty of Commerce in 1783, permitting his Greek subjects to fly the Russian flag on their merchant vessels. This arrangement stimulated Russia's Black Sea trade and contributed to the development of a Greek merchant marine<sup>27</sup>. The Greek fleet was of major significance in the Greek War of Independence as merchant ships from the islands of Hydra, Psara, and Spetsae supplied the backbone of naval resistance to Ottoman forces<sup>28</sup>.

The opening of the Black Sea and the right to fly the Russian flag created opportunities for enterprising Greeks who expanded their markets in southern Russia and became leading carriers in Russia's grain export trade. Numerous Greek merchants established large commercial firms in Moscow, Petersburg, and especially Odessa<sup>29</sup>. Along with their navigational skills and commer-

26. Greek migration to New Russia is treated in G. L. Arsh, "Grecheskaia emigratsiia v Rossiu v kontse XVIII-nachale XIX v.", *Sovetskaia etnografiia* 3 (1969) 85-95, and the same author's *Eteristskoe dvizhenie v Rossii* (Moscow, 1970) 126-66. The research of Arsh is particularly valuable because he is able to utilize archival holdings in regional archives as well as materials from the Russian Foreign Ministry. Another useful source on the colonization of southern Russia, including the Greek presence there, is *Zapiski odesskogo obshchestva istorii i drevnostei*, the annual journal of the Odessa Society of History and Antiquities. This Society was founded in 1839 to study the archeology, history, and ethnography of the Ukraine and the Black Sea region. Russian travel literature offers another source for studying the Greek communities in New Russia. See, for example, the works of Garvriil V. Gerakov, a Russian publicist of Greek descent who traveled extensively in southern Russia during the first two decades of the 19th century, *Putevye zapiski po mnogim rossiiskim guberniiam v 1820 g.* (St. Petersburg, 1828) 116-21, 132-72, and *Prodolzhenie putevykh zapisok 1820-nachala 1821* (St. Petersburg, 1830) 24-37.

27. See the section on Greek-Russian economic ties in Arsh, "Materialy k istorii russko-grechiskikh svyazei nachala XIX v.", *Balkanskije issledovaniia* 8 (1982) 67-86.

28. On the growth of a Greek merchant marine see George Leon, "The Greek Merchant Marine, 1453-1850", in S. Papadopoulos, ed., *The Greek Merchant Marine* (Athens, 1972) 13-52.

29. See Viron Karidis, "A Greek Mercantile *paroikia*: Odessa, 1774-1829", in R. Clogg,

cial expertise, the Greeks benefited from an extensive trade network which, based on family and kinship ties, linked the Greek world to Russia and Europe<sup>30</sup>. Within this network, Odessa became one of the most vital and strategically located links. Greek merchant capital, in addition to enlightened local government in the early 19th century, helped transform Odessa from a provincial backwater into one of the leading grain emporiums in Europe, a city whose ethnic diversity and cultural life attracted the curiosity of both Western and Russian observers<sup>31</sup>.

The Greek communities in Russia also participated in the modern Greek intellectual and cultural revival, a movement which has come to be known as the Neo-Hellenic Enlightenment<sup>32</sup>. Several factors enabled the Greeks in Russia to retain a sense of national consciousness and thus to contribute to the Greek Enlightenment. The retention of a Greek national identity was facilitated by the pattern of Greek settlement in Russia. Greeks tended to

ed., *Balkan Society in the Age of Greek Independence* (Totowa, New Jersey, 1981) 111-36, which is based largely on the reports of British consuls and travelers in Odessa. See also A. Orlov, *Istoricheskii ocherk Odessy s 1794 po 1803 god. Sostavil po dokumentam khronichimisia v moskovskom arkhive ministerstva iustitsii* (Odessa, 1885) 123-27, which includes specific information on Greek merchants who traded in Odessa, and Patricia Herlihy, "Greek Merchants in Odessa in the Nineteenth Century", *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 3-4 (1979-80) 399-420. The research of Herlihy on Odessa and Russia's Black Sea commerce has culminated in her recent book, *Odessa: A History, 1794-1914* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1986), which includes sections on the Greek merchant population of that city (28, 90-95, 125-27).

30. Western travelers often commented on the family and business networks which linked Greek merchants in Europe, Russia, and the Greek East. See, for example, Henry Holland, *Travels in the Ionians, Albania, Thessaly, and Macedonia* (London, 1815) 148-50, which noted the dispersion of four brothers in a local Greek family in Iannina: "one was settled in Iannina, another in Moscow, a third in Constantinople, and the fourth in some part of Germany, all connected in their concerns".

31. On the rapid development of Odessa see Herlihy, *Odessa*, and Frederick Skinner, "Trends in Planning Practices: The Building of Odessa 1794-1917", in Michael Hamm, ed., *The City in Russian History* (Lexington, Kentucky, 1976) 139-59. Both works include observations and impressions of 19th-century travelers who visited Odessa. That city's growth became a frequent news item in the Russian press. See *Ukrainskii vestnik* 3.1 (1816) 97-107; 8.10 (1817) 128-35; 9.2 (1818) 195-204; and *Vestnik Evropy* 97.3 (1818) 161-69; 137.16 (1824) 285-313.

32. The Greek Enlightenment is treated in the numerous publications of K. Th. Dimaras. See, for example, *La Grèce aux temps des lumières* (Geneva, 1969), and *Neollinikos diaphotismos* (Athens, 1977). G. L. Arsh, in his "Novogrecheskoe prosveshchenie v Rossiia", *Balkanskie issledovaniia* 9 (1984) 304-13, addresses the Greek Enlightenment in the context of Greek-Russian ties and raises several questions on this issue that need further investigation by scholars in the field of Greek-Slavic relations.

emigrate and to settle *en masse*, forming compact communities. Economic realities also kept the Greeks together as sailors, sea captains, and merchants found work in traditionally Greek occupations like navigation and trade. Regular commercial traffic between the Aegean and Black Sea ports enabled Greeks to maintain ties with relatives and business partners in the Ottoman Empire. Contact and interaction of this sort helped preserve a degree of national cohesion among the Greeks of Russia and sustained their concern in the fate of their compatriots under Ottoman rule.

National feeling was also fostered by the preservation and cultivation of a Greek cultural heritage. The efforts of Greek settlers to maintain their language, to promote their faith, and to build schools continued a tradition of Greek studies in southern Russia established by the learned prelates Evgenios Voulgaris and Nikiphoros Theotokis. Both had been part of the substantial migration of Greek clergy who either accompanied Greeks to Russia or came independently in hope of Russian patronage<sup>33</sup>. Building on these foundations, local merchant and insurance companies in Odessa founded the Greek Commercial Gymnasium in 1817, which offered instruction in Greek history and language, the natural sciences, German and Italian, and commerce and navigation. The success of the school was partly due to its teachers, such as K. Vardalachos, G. Gennadios, and G. Lassanis, who instilled in their students a strong sense of Greek cultural patriotism<sup>34</sup>. The importance of the Commercial Gymnasium as a center of Greek learning was recognized by both Greek and Russian contemporaries<sup>35</sup>.

33. See Batalden, *Catherine II's Greek Prelate: Eugenios Voulgaris in Russia, 1771-1806*, which also includes biographical information on the career of Theotokis in Russia. The study of Mariupol' by V. V. Latyshev, *K nachal'noi istorii Mariupol'ia* (Odessa, 1914) 14-24, contains the letters of Theotokis to the Greeks of Mariupol', urging them to utilize funds originally collected for a monastery to build a Greek school.

34. On the Greek Commercial Gymnasium of Odessa see Ch. Voulodimos, *Proti pentikontaetiris tis en Odisso ellinoemborikis skholis (1817-1867)* (Odessa 1871); N. Lentz, *Uchebno-vospitatel'nye zavedeniia iz kotorykh obrazovalsia rishel'evskii litsei (1804-1817)* (Odessa, 1903), which has biographical material (340-82) on Greek educators at the school; and Arsh, *Eteristskoe dvizhenie v Rossii* 210-17. On the contribution of K. Vardalachos to Greek learning see E. Koukkou, "Konstantinos Vardalachos, 1775-1830", *Byzantinisch-Neugriechische Jahrbücher* 19 (1966) 125-97.

35. See the description of the school by the Greek historian K. Koumas and the Russian orientalist and publicist Osip Senkovskii: E. G. Vallianatos, "Konstantin Koumas and the Philological Gymnasium of Smyrna, 1810-1819", *East European Quarterly* 6 (1973) 439-40, and O. Senkovskii, "O grecheskom uchilishche v Odesse", *Vestnik Evropy* 110.7 (1820) 202-08. For another account of the Greek Commercial Gymnasium in the Russian press

Another vehicle for promoting national consciousness was the Greek theatre of Odessa. Established in 1814, the theatre staged classical and Western plays, in addition to original works by Greek writers such as N. Pikkolos<sup>36</sup>. Performed by Greeks before a predominantly Greek audience, most plays had the patriotic objective of underscoring the greatness of classical Greece and urging all Greeks to put aside regional and social rivalries for the sake of national unity. The success of the theatre in promoting a national spirit is seen in the number of young Greeks from Odessa who joined the Sacred Battalion, a regiment of Greek students which fought in Moldavia in 1821.

Greek merchants in Russia, like their compatriots in Western and Central Europe, also helped finance Greek learning in the Ottoman Empire. For example, the list of trustees who contributed to the revival of the Academy on Mount Athos included several Greek merchants from Petersburg, Moscow, Taganrog, Odessa, and Astrakhan<sup>37</sup>. In many cases, well-to-do merchants displayed a spirit of local patriotism, donating money for schools, libraries, hospitals, and scholarships to their native communities in Ottoman-controlled Greece. An excellent example of this locally rooted patriotism was the activity of Z. Kaplanis, a wealthy merchant from Iannina who, before his death in Moscow, donated his entire fortune of 183,000 rubles to educational projects in Epirus, including the Kaplanis School in Iannina<sup>38</sup>.

Probably the most famous merchant patrons of Greek learning were the Zosimas brothers. Upon settlement in Nezhin and later in Moscow, they channeled much of their wealth toward a variety of educational endeavors in Ottoman-occupied Greece. The Zosimades, for instance, established several Greek schools which were equipped with Western texts and scientific instruments. They also gave financial assistance to Greek students in European universities and helped perpetuate the Greek faith and language by funding

see the article in the journal of the Imperial Philanthropic Society, "Opisanie bogougodnykh zavedenii v Odesse", *Zhurnal imperatorskogo chelovekoliubivogo obshchestva* 1 (1817) 254-60.

36. M. Valsa, *Le théâtre grec moderne de 1453 à 1900* (Berlin, 1900) 192-97, 221-23, and G. Zoidis, "To theatro tis *Philikis Etairias*. O rolos tou stin ideologiki proetoimasia tou 1821", in J. Irmscher and M. Mineemi, eds., *O ellinismos eis to exoterikon* (Berlin, 1968) 397-436. The essay of Zoidis is an outgrowth of his general work on Greek-Russian relations, *Patro-paradoti philia. Ellada-Rossia (oikonomikoi, politikoi, politistikoi desmoi)* (Athens, 1958).

37. K. Th. Dimaras, "I skholi tou agiou orous sta 1800", *Ellinika* 15 (1957) 153-58.

38. On the patriotic endeavors of Kaplanis see *Redkii blagodel'nyi podvig Z. K. Kaplani* (Moscow, 1809), which includes a copy of Kaplanis's will. A review of this publication, which appeared in *Russkii vestnik* 11.7 (1808) 134-40, praised Kaplanis for his commitment to the spread of Greek learning.

the publication in Russia of 5,000 Greek Bibles<sup>39</sup>. The Zosimades, however, are best remembered for their sponsorship of the monumental *Elliniki vivliothiki* (*Hellenic Library*), the multi-volume edition of the Greek classics compiled by Adamantios Korais, the most significant figure in the Neo-Hellenic Enlightenment<sup>40</sup>. Finally, the Zosimas brothers participated in several Russian educational and philanthropic projects and were instrumental in founding a chair of Greek philology at the Medical - Surgical Academy in Moscow<sup>41</sup>.

Greek merchant capital also played a vital role in the *Philomousos Etairia* (Society of Friends of the Muses), a philanthropic organization devoted to the promotion of Greek learning and the preservation of classical antiquities in Greece. From its inception in Vienna in 1814, the Society received financial aid from Russian and Greek sources, including the tsar and members of the imperial family; high-ranking government officials like Alexander N. Golitsyn, Minister of Public Enlightenment; and wealthy Greek merchants in Russia such as the Zosimades<sup>42</sup>.

39. Phanis Michalopoulos, *Ta giannina kai i neo elliniki anagennisi, 1648-1820* (Athens, 1930) 12-87, which describes the contribution of the Zosimades as well as Kaplanis to Greek learning in Iannina. Information on the Zosimas brothers' funding of the publication of 5,000 Greek Bibles by the Imperial Russian Bible Society can be found in the Central State Archive of Ancient Acts, Moscow (TsGADA), *fond 1184, opis' 2, delo 3472, listy 1-5*.

40. On the relationship between Korais and the Zosimades see the Greek newspaper *Logios Ermis* 9.17 (1819) 708-14 and 10.15 (1819) 455-57. Published in Vienna, the *Logios Ermis* is an excellent source for examining the contributions of Greek merchants to the revival of Greek education and learning. Some of the writings of Korais were published in Russia. See, for example, "O nyneshnem sostoianii Gretsii i stepeni ee grazhdanskogo prosveshcheniia", *Vestnik Evropy* 9.11 (1803) 214-18; *O nyneshnem prosveshchenii Gretsii* (St. Petersburg, 1815); and "Ot doktora Korai k grekam, ego sootchicham", *Vestnik Evropy* 111.12 (1820) 274-90. The editor of *Vestnik Evropy*, Mikhail T. Kachenovskii, underscored the Korais-Zosimas partnership and the generous patronage by the Zosimades of Greek education when he noted that "in ancient Greece monuments would be erected to the Zosimades with the inscription: 'To benefactors of the fatherland'. But in Ottoman-occupied Greece, unfortunately, no such monuments will be erected". Kachenovskii's comments appeared in an article on the revival of Greek learning, "O sostoianii slovesnosti i nauki u nyneshnykh grekov", *Vestnik Evropy* 42.1 (1809) 34-36.

41. On the Russian dimension of the philanthropic activity of the Zosimas brothers see *Zhurnal departamenta narodnogo prosveshcheniia* 2.8 (1821) 508-09; *Moskovskii telegraf* 12.24 (1826) 242-46; and *Russkii biograficheskii slovar'* 7 (1916) 471-72.

42. The existence and aims of the *Philomousos Etairia* were publicized in the Russian press. See *Vestnik Evropy* 83.20 (1815) 299-300, and 88.13 (1816) 76-79. On Russian patronage of the *Etairia* see E. Koukkou, *Kapodistriias kai i Paideia, 1800-1822. I Philomousos Etairia tis Viennis* (Athens, 1964) 117-21, 165-76, and her article on the generous donations and assistance of Roxandra Sturdza-Edling, "La comtesse R. Stourdza-Edling et sa contribu-

John Kapodistrias, Russia's Foreign Minister, played a crucial role in the activity of the *Philomousos Etairia* in Russia. Throughout his career in the Russian diplomatic corps, Kapodistrias tried to link Greek national aspirations to Russian Eastern policy. Convinced that education was the safest means to improve Greek social and political conditions in the Ottoman Empire, Kapodistrias patronized Greek scholars who came to Russia and encouraged the foundation of Greek schools in southern Russia. His role in organizing the collection of donations for the *Philomousos Etairia* was thus a natural extension of his cultural patriotism.

Kapodistrias's position as Foreign Minister, in addition to his close association with Alexander I, proved instrumental in securing tsarist support for the educational endeavors of the Society. Aware of the need to counter British-sponsored educational initiatives in Athens and the Ionian Islands, the tsar thought that Russian patronage of Greek education would bolster his image as the protector of the Greeks. Moreover, the tsar's piety and religiosity in the last decade of his reign explain his favorable attitude towards the benevolent goals of the Society. He was also encouraged by Kapodistrias's espousal of a religiously grounded education emphasizing moral enlightenment instead of political activism. Both the tsar and his foreign minister feared the potential explosiveness of Balkan, especially Greek and Serbian, national aspirations. They thus hoped that educational activity, if directed by enlightened Orthodox clergy and supported by Russia, would deflect Greek national feeling from the specter of insurrection. Russian support of Greek revolutionary plans would have run directly counter to Russian policy of upholding the established order of legitimacy in Europe and the Balkans and of maintaining cordial ties with the Porte. The tsar approved the *Philomousos Etairia* all the more because its leading organizers in Russia, such as the Greek cultural patriot Alexander Sturdza who served in the Russian Foreign Ministry, supported Russian official policy and opposed liberal and national movements which threatened to incite revolution against the established order. With endorsement by the tsarist government and with patronage from Russian and Greek sources, the Society achieved some of

tion à l'éducation des étudiants hellènes en Europe", *Symposium. L'époque phanariote 175-87*. The sister of the Greek cultural patriot Alexander Sturdza, R. Sturdza-Edling participated in a number of philanthropic and charitable endeavors in Russia during the early 19th century. She also wrote a valuable firsthand account of the formation of the *Philomousos Etairia* in Vienna: "Iz zapisok grafini Edling. S neizdannoi frantsuzskoi rukopisi", *Russkii arkhiv* 4 (1887) 423-40.

its educational goals, in particular the funding of Greek students attending European universities<sup>43</sup>.

For an increasing number of Greeks, education and enlightenment were not enough to satisfy their national hopes. Advocates of armed insurrection channeled their desire for change toward the *Philiki Etairia* (Society of Friends), a secret political organization founded in Odessa in 1814 by three obscure and impoverished Greek traders, Emmanuil Xanthos of Patmos, Athanasios Tsakalov of Iannina, and Nikolaos Skouphas of Epirus. The basic objective of the *Philiki Etairia* was the liberation of Greeks from Ottoman rule and the establishment of a nation-state with its capital in Constantinople. For most Greek historians, the *Philiki Etairia* was a truly national organization, recruiting members from all regions within the Greek world and from nearly all social groups in a society becoming more complex and stratified on the eve of 1821. Within the *Etairia*, social class interests and regional loyalties were submerged beneath the common patriotic purpose of liberating Greece<sup>44</sup>. For several other scholars, the *Etairia* was a "premature national coalition" which failed to bridge the regional, social, cultural, and political differences of its diversified membership. The *Etairia* and the ensuing Greek Revolution reflected the deep divisions within Greek society, which eventually triggered civil war and factionalism during the struggle for independence in the 1820s<sup>45</sup>.

The *Philiki Etairia*, in addition to its foundation in Odessa, became

43. The most thorough treatment of the contribution of Kapodistrias to Greek education and learning during his service career in Russia is the work of Arsh, *Kapodistriia i grecheskoe natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie* 124-69, which benefits from extensive use of Soviet archival materials. On the intercession of Kapodistrias on behalf of Greek scholars in Russia see the article by Arsh, "Grecheskii uchenyi D. Godelas v Rossii", *Balkanskii issledovaniia* 6 (1980) 161-72.

44. See the Greek accounts by Ioannis Philimon, *Dokimion istorikon peri tis Philikis Etaireias* (Nafplion, 1834); Takis Kandiloros, *I Philiki Etaireia* (Athens, 1926); and Emmanuil Protopsaltis, ed., *I Philiki Etaireia. Anamnistikon tevkhos epi ti 150etiridi* (Athens, 1964). The activities of the *Etairia* are recorded in detail in the memoirs of one of its founders, E. Xanthos, *Apomnimonevmata peri tis Philikis Etaireias* (Athens, 1845).

45. The research of George Frangos provides illuminating insights on the national characteristics and social composition of the *Philiki Etairia*: "The *Philiki Etairia*: A Premature National Coalition", in *The Struggle for Greek Independence* 87-103. Additional information on the social diversity and complexity of Greek society on the eve of 1821 can be gleaned from Richard Clogg, ed., *The Movement for Greek Independence, 1770-1821: A Collection of Documents* (London, 1976), and from Stephen Batalden, "John Kapodistrias and the Structure of Greek Society on the Eve of the War of Independence: An Historical Essay", *East European Quarterly* 13 (1979) 296-314.

extremely active in Russia. The Society developed close ties with Greek communities in Moscow, Petersburg, Odessa, Taganrog, Kherson, Kishinev, and other towns in southern Russia. The *Etairia* within Russia, similar to its activity in the Ottoman Empire, attracted members from a broad cross-section of Greeks, including military veterans who had fought in Russia's wars against the Ottomans, Greek teachers at the Commercial Gymnasium in Odessa, and prominent Phanariots like Alexander Mavrokordatos Phiraris and the Ypsilantis brothers. The bulk of the Russian-based recruits, however, were traders and merchants. Most of them struggled to eke out a living for their families and thus had little or nothing to lose by supporting calls for armed insurrection against Ottoman rule in Greece. It is also clear that numerous prosperous and well-established merchants in Russia supported the revolutionary plans of the *Philiki Etairia*. Nikolaos Patzimadis, the wealthy Greek merchant of Moscow, became a member of the Society's directing committee, while Ioannis Amvrosios of Odessa, one of the merchant founders of the Commercial Gymnasium, actively supported the *Etairia* both before and after 1821. Additional merchant patrons of the Society included Zois Zosimas and the Rizaris brothers of Moscow, Ioannis Varvakis of Taganrog, and Dimitrios Inglezios of Odessa<sup>46</sup>.

The *Philiki Etairia* was connected to Russia not only by its organizational work on Russian soil but also by the prevalent misperception that the tsarist government fully endorsed the revolutionary goals of the Society. This misperception was fostered in part by the numerous Greeks in Russian diplomatic service, especially consuls and vice-consuls in the Near East, who joined the Society<sup>47</sup>. The illusion of tsarist support was also based on rumors that Kapodistrias was associated with, if not an actual member of, the Society. As a Greek cultural patriot serving as Russian Foreign Minister and a man of social prestige and diplomatic experience who had direct access to the tsar, Kapodistrias was held in esteem by most Greeks. They tended to view the tsar's high regard for him as a sign of Russian identification with the Greek cause. The presumed membership of Kapodistrias was thus seen by many

46. The research of Arsh, *Eteristskoe dvizhenie v Rossii* 167-346. provides in depth coverage of the recruiting and other activities of the *Philiki Etairia* in Russia, with numerous references to Greek merchants who either joined the *Etairia* or supported it with financial contributions. More research along the lines of Arsh and Frangos will shed further light on the social composition of the diversified membership of the *Etairia*.

47. Arsh, *Eteristskoe dvizhenie v Rossii* 189-97, 224-25, 250, 265, and D. Oikonomidis, "O Philikos Giorgios Levendis" *Peloponnisiaka* 2 (1957) 58-90.

Greeks as a concrete indication that the Russian tsar and government tolerated and probably supported the *Philiki Etairia*. The myth of Kapodistrias's involvement with the conspiratorial organization was further sustained by his efforts to improve the status of the Greeks through diplomacy and education.

In addition to these factors, Kapodistrias's implication with the *Philiki Etairia* stemmed from his close association with the *Philomousos Etairia*. Both Societies were often confused with one another in the minds of many contemporaries. This indeed was understandable in view of the two organizations' similar names and their common objective of improving the lot of the Greeks, albeit by the very different paths of education and revolution. Confusion was also spawned because several members of the *Philiki Etairia* contributed to Greek education and enlightenment. For example, the Greek Commercial Gymnasium and the Greek theatre in Odessa propagated a spirit of political activism largely as a result of the efforts of G. Lassanis, teacher, playwright, and member of the secret political organization. Furthermore, several members of the *Philiki Etairia* implicated Kapodistrias by deliberately using the *Philomousos Etairia* as a smoke screen for insurgent preparations in the Ottoman Empire. Kapodistrias was not aware that in the secret code of the *Philiki Etairia* "to found a school" often meant "to prepare the revolt"<sup>48</sup>. Despite the misperceptions fostered by this confusion, Kapodistrias continued to support Greek educational endeavors in the Ottoman Empire, even after his discovery in 1820 that the educational organization had frequently been used as a cover for insurgent activity.

In 1817 and again in 1820, Kapodistrias rebuffed Greek attempts to secure his leadership of the *Philiki Etairia*. On both occasions, he asserted that the secret political *Etairia* could expect no help from himself or the Russian government. Kapodistrias also disavowed rumors and innuendos of his alleged involvement in the *Philiki Etairia*<sup>49</sup>. During a visit to his native Corfu in 1819, he deflated the hopes of Greek patriots by cautioning them that time, patience,

48. Arsh, *Kapodistriia i grecheskoe natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie* 189-93, and N. Botzaris, *Visions balkaniques dans la préparation de la révolution grecque, 1789-1821* (Paris, 1962) 94-95.

49. The attitude of Kapodistrias toward the *Philiki Etairia* is well treated in Arsh, *Kapodistriia i grecheskoe natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie* 170-212; Koukkou, *Kapodistrias, 1800-1828* 101-10; and C.M. Woodhouse, "Kapodistrias and the *Philiki Etairia*, 1814-1821", in *The Struggle for Greek Independence* 104-34. All three accounts agree that while Kapodistrias knew about the *Etairia*, he refused to become its leader and refuted all rumors of his association with it.

providence, and church-directed education, not armed insurrection, would improve the lot of the Greeks<sup>50</sup>. In strongly worded notes to Russia's ambassador to the Porte, Grigorii A. Stroganov, and to Russian consuls in the Ottoman Empire, such as A. Pini in Moldavia and Wallachia, S. Destunis in Smyrna, and I. Vlasopulos in Patras, Kapodistrias unequivocally denounced the *Philiki Etairia* for misrepresenting his name and urged an end to conspiratorial intrigues<sup>51</sup>. Kapodistrias also wrote to K. Vardalachos, his long-time friend from the University of Padua and an influential teacher at the Commercial Gymnasium in Odessa, encouraging him to convince young Greeks of the folly and danger of the *Etairia's* revolutionary intentions<sup>52</sup>.

Kapodistrias's disavowal of the conspiratorial *Etairia* was based on his belief that cultural and educational growth, not revolt, was the safest means to implement social and national change. A premature revolt, he feared, would have dire repercussions for the Greeks, whom he considered unprepared politically for national independence. Kapodistrias's moderation was also grounded in the reality of his delicate position as a Greek patriot who helped formulate and direct tsarist foreign policy. Kapodistrias did not want to endanger his official status by joining or supporting a secret society bent on upsetting the political status quo, particularly in view of the tsar's commitment to the Concert of Europe and his condemnation of revolts in Spain and the Italian peninsula in 1820-21. By retaining the confidence of the tsar, Kapodistrias believed that he could be of direct benefit to the Greek cause. He could seek continued Russian patronage for Greek education and enlightenment; he could also urge an aggressive policy in defense of the sultan's Orthodox subjects. Kapodistrias realized that another round of Russo-Turkish conflict was probable because of several unresolved issues, such as the status of the Danubian Principalities. In the immediate aftermath of a future Russo-Turkish war, according to Kapodistrias's political calculations, the Greeks might achieve autonomy if not full independence.

Kapodistrias's opposition to the goals of the *Philiki Etairia* and his efforts to dislodge rumors of his association with it failed to produce the desired results. Appeals to influential Greeks and to Russian diplomats and consuls

50. The address of Kapodistrias to the Greeks during his visit to Corfu in 1819 appears in English in *The Movement for Greek Independence, 1770-1821* 131-36. See also Woodhouse, *Capodistria. Founder of Greek Independence* 198-205, and Koukkou, *Kapodistrias, 1800-1828* 89-96.

51. Arsh, *Kapodistriia i grecheskoe natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie* 184-86, 198, 288-92.

52. *Ibid.*, 194-96, 292-96.

could not prevent continued revolutionary activity. Indeed, Kapodistrias alone could not have stemmed the tide because Greek insurgents and activists believed what they wanted to believe regardless of his attempt to clarify his stance. Moreover, the specter of Kapodistrias's and Russia's support, although it provided another incentive for revolutionary activity, was hardly the primary catalyst for the development of a broad-based opposition movement rooted in Greek social, economic, and political realities in the Ottoman Empire. In short, the Greeks would have most likely staged a revolt with or without Kapodistrias's presence in Russia and rumors of his direct involvement with the *Philiki Etairia*.

When Kapodistrias refused to lead the conspiratorial organization, Greek activists turned to Alexander Ypsilantis, member of a prominent Phanariot family who was a general in the Russian army and an aide-de-camp of the tsar<sup>53</sup>. Kapodistrias, aware of this new development, warned Ypsilantis to avoid the conspiratorial designs and intrigues of the revolutionary organization. Although there is some controversy on the issue, it appears that Kapodistrias did not inform Alexander I of the basic objective and general intent of the *Philiki Etairia*<sup>54</sup>. In view of the tsar's growing fear of revolution in Europe and his desire to maintain cordial relations with the Porte, Kapodistrias probably thought that silence was the prudent choice. He fully recognized that even if the tsar supported the cause of Greek liberation, he would have considered the *Philiki Etairia*, with its masonic-like ritual and organization, yet another manifestation of a widespread subversive campaign bent on undermining the social and political order in Europe. Kapodistrias feared that the tsar might then crack down hard on all Greek nationalistic activity in Russia, including education and enlightenment. Moreover, Kapodistrias believed that if the sultan discovered the intentions of the *Philiki Etairia*,

53. See the entry on the Ypsilantis family by James Farsolas in *Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History* 45 (1987) 35-46, and the article by G. L. Arsh, "Ipsilanti v Rossii", *Voprosy istorii*, no. 3 (1985) 88-101, which also has been published in English in *Balkan Studies*, no. 1 (1985) 73-90.

54. For an adequate discussion of this controversy see Woodhouse, "Kapodistrias and the *Philiki Etairia*, 1814-1821", 120-31, and Arsh, *Kapodistria ii grecheskoe natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie* 205-10. Kapodistrias recorded in his autobiography his own version of his encounter with A. Ypsilantis in 1820. The autobiography, written in 1826 after Kapodistrias's resignation as Foreign Minister, remains a useful source for his career in Russian service: "Aperçu de ma carrière publique, depuis 1798 jusqu'à 1822", *Sbornik russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva* 3 (1868) 163-292, which also appears in Greek translation in *Avtobiographia tou I. Kapodistria*, 3rd ed. (Athens, 1971).

the ensuing Ottoman reprisals would have dire consequences for Greek commercial and nationalistic activity in the Ottoman Empire.

After Ypsilantis accepted the leadership of the *Philiki Etairia*, the center of insurgent preparations shifted from Constantinople and the Danubian Principalities to southern Russia. Ypsilantis, an ardent Greek patriot, recruited members and collected funds for arms and supplies from numerous Greek communities. With Kishinev as his headquarters, Ypsilantis corresponded with leading Greeks and with Serbian and Rumanian leaders. He also drafted fiery proclamations, urging Greeks to participate in the upcoming liberation struggle<sup>55</sup>.

Above all, Ypsilantis and the *Philiki Etairia* made the decision to begin the insurrection in the Danubian Principalities rather than the Peloponnesus. The Principalities were adjacent to southern Russia, and the *Etairia* could count on support from Phanariot Greeks and other influential Greeks in the region. Ypsilantis was also convinced that once the revolt began, the tsar would be forced to act. A Greek insurrection would trigger Ottoman reprisals and Ottoman violations of Russo-Turkish treaties, thereby prompting the intervention of Orthodox Russia on the Greeks' behalf<sup>56</sup>. Ypsilantis's proclamation, issued after he crossed into Moldavia from Bessarabia, expressed the hope that insurgent Greeks would receive support from a "Mighty Empire" defending Greek interests<sup>57</sup>. Because Ypsilantis had a distinguished service record in the Russian army, further credence was attached to the widespread misperception that Russia endorsed the conspiratorial activity of the *Philiki Etairia*. The acceleration of insurgent preparation in Russia made the position of Foreign Minister Kapodistrias all the more tenuous, especially since his arch-nemesis Metternich missed no opportunity to discredit him before the tsar by implicating him with revolutionary unrest brewing in Europe and the Balkans<sup>58</sup>.

By 1821, therefore, the Greeks had become the beneficiaries of the dichotomy

55. Arsh, *Eteristskoe dvizhenie v Rossii* 245-96, covers the insurgent preparations of Ypsilantis in Russia.

56. Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries* (Cambridge, England, 1983) 206-09.

57. The proclamation of Ypsilantis, "Fight for Faith and Fatherland", appears in English in Clogg's collection of documents, *The Movement for Greek Independence, 1770-1821* 200-03.

58. The intrigues of Metternich against Kapodistrias are discussed in Grimsted, *The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I* 249-55, and Woodhouse, *Capodistria, Founder of Greek Independence* 151-59, 178-99, 253-57,

tomy of tsarist policy. Although opposed to social and political change from below, official Russia had helped foster a revolutionary situation among the Greeks in the Ottoman Empire. Russian expansion in the Near East rendered protection to Greek coreligionists, many of whom served in the Russian army, navy, state bureaucracy, and diplomatic corps. Some Greeks rose to high-ranking positions in these branches of state service. More significantly, Russian Eastern policy created favorable conditions for the development of key components of the Greek national movement, including military resistance, commercial growth, educational advances, and political activism. The tsarist regime, although it defended the reactionary objectives of the Concert of Europe, implemented policies that not only promoted Greek enlightenment but also contributed directly to revolutionary activity. Education, be it in Western or Central Europe, Russia, or Ottoman lands, instilled a critical spirit among politically minded Greeks and helped prepare them for political action and the regeneration of modern Greece.

Ironically, imperial Russia had thus contributed to a national movement which, aside from the common bond of Orthodoxy, represented the ideological antithesis of Old Regime Russia—the modern age of liberalism and nationalism ushered in by the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars. Because of Greek-Russian historical, religious, and cultural bonds and because of Russia's impetus to the Greek awakening, many Greeks clung to the belief that the Russian government stood squarely behind the Greek cause, including the revolutionary plans of the *Philiki Etairia*. Shortly after the appearance of Ypsilantis in Moldavia, Kapodistrias wrote to the Russian ambassador in Constantinople, G. A. Stroganov: "All Greeks, who are in a position to think and to act, are born and raised with the *idée fixe* that Russia protects them for the sole purpose of driving the Turks from Europe"<sup>59</sup>. This misperception supplied one of the many factors which hardened Greek opposition to Ottoman rule and helped create a revolutionary crisis in the Balkans. Although condemned by Alexander I and later by Nicholas I, the Greek Revolution found broad support in Russian official and unofficial circles, as evinced in the Russian philhellenic movement of the 1820s<sup>60</sup>.

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59. Arsh, *Kapodistria i grecheskoe natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie* 212.

60. Russian philhellenism is treated in Theophilus C. Prousis, "Russian Cultural Response to the Greek War of Independence (1821-1830)", Ph. D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1982.