Hungarians and committed various excesses. Finally, the occupation of Budapest, the collapse of the communist regime, and the entrance of the Great Powers solved the thorny question of Hungarian-Rumanian frontiers and saved Hungary from an aggressive Rumania—the Rumania of Bratianu. Bratianu resigned on September 12, 1919, protesting that the Allies had not honored their 1916 promises. The next cabinet was that of the seven generals under the presidency of Vaitoi­anu, which was succeeded by that of the Transylvanian Vaida Voivod. Bratianu had accomplished his task of building the Greater Rumania long before the Trianon Peace Treaty was signed (June 4, 1920).

Dr. Spector's book is a clear and stimulating account of these events. There is no question that the book fulfills its purpose—to study the most brilliant Rumanian statesman in relation to his greatest achievement. The author gives us a narrative of the events, not an analysis of underlying causes; a study in diplomatic history, not a bio­graphy, or a survey of Rumania's national struggle. There is a brilliant and penetrating sketch of the personality of Bratianu (pp. 227-237). The book is richly documented (pp. 288-318) and it includes an excellent bibliography (pp. 319-352). Taken as a whole, it is a solid piece of scholarship—the only book on the subject available in English. It would be a fine idea if similar books were written, in the same language, about the other Balkan countries at the Peace Conference—especially one about the diplomacy of the Greek statesman Venizelos, with whom Bratianu had much in common.

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After the assassination of King Alexander Obrenović in 1903, the Serbian government under the leadership of the new king, Petar Kara­jdjordjević, and the Radical Party of Nikola Pašić, charted a new course for the nation. Whereas the Obrenovičes, especially Milan, had at times submitted to Habsburg domination and influence in Serbia, the new dynasty adopted a distinctly anti-Austro-Hungarian policy. This course led to the tragic events in Sarajevo in 1914.

Dr. Dimitrije Djordjević in this book has examined the initial major issue to confront Vienna and Belgrade, the so-called “pig war” or customs war of 1906-1911. This volume is the first to be published by the Istoriski Institut (Historical Institute) in Belgrade in the new series entitled “Jugoslovenske zemlje u XX veku” (Yugoslav lands in the XX century). Dr. Djordjević has produced one of the best historical works written in Yugoslavia in the post-war period.

The author's research has been most extensive and thorough. In addition to examining the published source materials—Jugoslav, Austro-Hungarian, German, English, French, Bulgarian, Turkish and
Rumanian—documentary collections, secondary accounts and even obscure newspapers, he has also used the unpublished materials in the Jugoslav, Austrian and French archives. He even obtained some material from the Russian archives.

The volume begins with a brief summary of Austro-Serbian relations in the 19th century and the development of Serbia's economy in this period. This section is followed by eight substantial chapters each of which is subdivided into appropriate subtopics. Thus the chapters deal with the causes of the customs war, the declaration of the war in 1906, the economic consequences, the conclusion of the Austro-Serbian trade agreement of 1908, the economic conditions of Serbia in 1907-1908, the annexation crisis, the Austro-Serbian trade agreement of 1910, and the social changes in Serbia during these five years. After a conclusion, there is a twenty page summary of the volume in French.

The theme which runs through this volume is the conflict between the large multinational European power, Austria-Hungary, fighting for its survival in an age of nationalism, with its small neighboring state whose political aspirations threatened both the existence of the monarchy and its economic interests in the Balkans. The conflict commenced when Serbia sought to acquire canons from France rather than from Austria-Hungary as she had done in the past. This development was followed by plans for a Serbo-Bulgarian customs union, political discussions between Montenegro and Serbia, and the adoption of the Rijeka (Fuime) and Zadar (Zara) resolutions, which brought about the first effective cooperation of Serbs and Croats within the lands of the Dual Monarchy in the form of the Serbo-Croatian coalition. This new political force in turn cooperated briefly with the Magyars in their endeavor to gain greater political independence from Vienna. The sum total of all these activities indicated that Serbia was now the center of developments which were against the wishes and interests of the Habsburgs. If Serbia were not checked immediately, the Monarchy could find itself in serious difficulties.

Austria assumed that she had Serbia at her mercy. Ninety percent of Serbia's exports were absorbed by the Dual Monarchy. By cutting these off, it was believed that Belgrade would succumb within a matter of weeks. The moment for action seemed propitious in other ways also. In 1905-1906 Serbia was isolated diplomatically. The only great power she could hope to rely on was tsarist Russia, which had just suffered a disastrous defeat at the hands of the Japanese. Hence she could be of little assistance to Serbia in a crisis. England still remembered the bloody assassination of 1903 and would not deal with the usurpers in Belgrade. Italy was a possible ally because of her conflict of interests with Austria-Hungary. But Italy was not England or Russia and moreover her claims conflicted with those of Serbia along the southern Adriatic coast. Germany was out to the question because of the Dual Alliance of 1879 which bound her to Vienna. Only France remained as a possible source of support. The French were how-
ever deeply involved in the Moroccan crisis. Also for France, Germany, not Austria-Hungary, was the principal adversary.

The first goal of Vienna was to block the Serbo-Bulgarian customs union, which could have far-reaching political consequences throughout the entire Balkan area. Djordjević states that Goluchowski, the Habsburg foreign minister, now launched a fight for Austria's prestige by seeking at this time to break Serbia. Thus the author states that Serbia was presented with a demand "which had the character of an ultimatum" (pp. 163-164). "We seek the integral acceptance of our demands ... no discussions about them can be carried on," wrote Goluchowski to his ambassador in Belgrade (p. 164). In their reply the Serbs were ready to yield, but only if the Austrian demands for a new Austro-Serbian customs union could be discussed. They believed that their honor would not allow them to accept the demands without a preliminary discussion. Goluchowski regarded the reply as a rejection of his terms. This development, thus, is not entirely unlike the famous ultimatum of 1914. Serbia had to yield unequivocally or face the consequences. Thus the policy of solving relations with Serbia by means of ultimatums and force, which produced disastrous results in 1914 was inaugurated in 1906 to be repeated in 1909 and again during the Balkan wars. Consequently on January 22, 1906, Austria, using the excuse that Serbian livestock was infectious, closed the door to Serbia's exports to the Dual Monarchy.

The results did not, however, follow Habsburg expectations. The Serbian political parties, with the exception of the Liberals, accepted the challenge of a customs war. There is no need to discuss the many details which are so completely and thoroughly covered in this book. The end effect was that Serbia, by way of Thessaloniki and the Danube River, found new markets in Germany, Belgium, France and Italy. Moreover, the Serbs in order to compete on these markets learned that quality was a prime prerequisite. Hence Serbian products improved. In addition, whereas hitherto the export of live animals dominated Serbia's trade, this no longer was to be the case. Instead, the Serbs exported salted and prepared meats, hams, bacon and fat products. More important, cereals replaced meat as the principal item of export.

The customs war also stimulated Serbian industry, which now was protected by tariffs from the competition of Austrian manufactured goods. Hitherto, the commercial, not the manufacturing, interests had enjoyed a special privilege in Serbia. The immediate effect on the peasant was serious. He had to adjust his production to the new demands of the market, which was a difficult and expensive process for him. Also by the exclusion of Austrian products, the peasant found himself paying more for his country's goods. It was hard for the peasant to understand the necessity of these sacrifices for the political and economic independence of his country. Of course, with the stimulus to industry, the industrial working class grew in size
and found itself confronted by the traditional problems inherent in any emerging industrial environment.

Another significant development emerges from this work. When Serbia did not succumb to economic pressure, Austria's new foreign minister, Aehrenthal, believed that the annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina, a political act, would achieve the same purpose of stifling Serbia and also of checking the strong movement for South Slav unity, which was spreading rapidly among many Jugoslavs. As the Bosnian crisis became more tense and the possibility of war emerged, Austria sought to justify this course if it should come to such an eventuality. Thus Aehrenthal provided Heinrich Friedjung, perhaps the most distinguished Austrian historian of the day, with documentary evidence to prove that the South Slav movement in the Habsburg lands was being engineered and financed by the Belgrade government. Hence, Belgrade was interfering in the internal affairs of a neighboring state. The Bosnian crisis ended peacefully, but Friedjung's evidence implicating Serbia was published. Two famous cases ensued—the Friedjung and Zagreb (Agram) trials. After extensive litigation, it was proven that Aehrenthal had given Friedjung forged evidence and Austrian policy was condemned by the European states, newspapers and public.

During the Friedjung trial, in order to exonerate itself, the Serbian government offered to permit an impartial international body to examine its archives to prove that documents used by Friedjung and which were allegedly from the Serbian foreign office archives were false. This offer was not accepted. In his book, Djordjević does not examine the Friedjung trial in detail, because it is not directly relevant to his subject. Yet, in discussing the effect of Austria's customs war and annexation policy on the other South Slav lands, he produces some most interesting material which gives credence to the Habsburg charge of Serbian intrigues in the lands of the Dual Monarchy.

In a section entitled "Jačanje nacionalne propagande" (The strengthening of national propaganda) (pp. 568-572), Djordjević begins by stating that during the customs war Serbia carried on a "national-revolutionary struggle with Austria-Hungary" relying on secret ties with its collaborators in the Monarchy. He cites a document of 1911 in which Milovan Milovanović, Serbia's foreign minister from 1908-1912, wrote that "Austria-Hungary speaks the truth when she accuses Serbia of Jugoslav nationalist intrigues, but she [Austria-Hungary] forgets that she herself directed Serbia [to this course], that she in effect compelled her [Serbia] to pursue this course." Serbia's activities were primarily directed toward Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia. When the customs war began, the Serbian government first took steps to check all actions which could give Austria any pretext for stern measures. Later this policy was abandoned. Serbian political groups again got in touch with their sympathizers in Bosnia. Once more Milovanović is cited as reporting that in 1901-1903 a cer-
tain Gligorije Jeftanović, a national worker in Bosnia, received 92,000 francs for religious-educational efforts in Bosnia. "Milovanović, as minister of foreign affairs in 1908, himself continued to give funds to Jeftanović," the author states, citing a document of June 8, 1909. The Serbian embassy in Constantinople was used to funnel funds for religious and educational activity in Bosnia. Aid was also dispensed through Belgrade, the Serbian consulate in Budapest and the Serbian bank in Zagreb. The Bosnian publications Srpska Riječ and Bosanska Vila also received subsidies from Belgrade. During the Bosnian crisis Milovanović paid the travel expenses of Bosnians who visited European capitals to protest the annexation. In 1910 Milovanović ordered his Serbian supporters in Bosnia to take part in the reception for Emperor Franz Josef, in order to prevent the breakdown of the discussions going on for an Austro-Serbian trade agreement. "Milovanović advised the Bosnian leaders that they form two wings: one opportunistic "for transactions with the authorities" and the other irreconcilable (nepomirljivo)." In 1909 and 1910 Milovanović also advised the Serbs in Austria-Hungary what policy they should adopt toward the Magyars and Khuen Hedervary. Three sources of financing were available for all these activities—from the ministry of foreign affairs, the ministry of interior and the army. In 1909 the ministry of foreign affairs, with the largest sum at its disposal, had 1,475,000 dinars for its clandestine activities.

The evidence which is produced in this volume is indeed most incriminating. In the Friedjung trial the Habsburgs used what they subsequently admitted was forged evidence. Yet they were on the right track. The evidence they wanted existed, but they did not have it. Had they had it, the condemnation of Habsburg diplomacy and judicial proceedings in Europe would not have been so severe. The Yugoslav movement might have suffered a serious setback instead of receiving the added impetus derived from the sensational trials. Thus in these early years we have the methods and tactics of 1914—Austrian ultimatums and threats of force and Serbian intrigues and subversion in a neighboring state. Since both countries were bent on these respective courses of action, one almost feels that 1914 was inevitable.

The customs war was, therefore, a major event for the two countries and for Europe as a whole. Serbia emerged triumphant. In 1878 she gained her political independence. By 1911 she had secured her economic freedom also. This gave her courage and confidence to face the Balkan wars and the final showdown with the Habsburgs. The latter in turn found themselves faced by the growth of nationalism throughout their lands and unable to find any solution of the problem except through military action. Dr. Djordjević’s book is an excellent addition to the rich and extensive literature on the origins of the First World War as well as an illuminating chapter in modern Serbian history.

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