la Grèce du Nord, étant une région spécialement agricole exporte surtout des produits agricoles et importe des produits manufacturés.

Pour le tourisme de la région l'auteur remarque justement, qu'en dépit du fait que la Grèce attire un grand nombre de touristes, ce n'est malheureusement pas le cas pour la Grèce du Nord. Cela n'est nullement dû à un manque d'intérêt touristique de la région, mais au fait que cette dernière n'est pas encore en état d'offrir tous les confort nécessaires pour persuader les touristes de la visiter.

En concluant, l'auteur semble être optimiste pour la continuation du progrès dans la Grèce du Nord étant donné l'évolution réalisée jusqu'à présent et en plus qu'à partir du 1959 il y a un programme de développement économique, qui facilitera la croissance harmonieuse de toutes les régions de la Grèce.

L'étude du professeur Vouras, grâce surtout à la richesse du matériel statistique employé et aux détails fournis, vient sans aucun doute couvrir une lacune.

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The announcement of President Harry S. Truman before the Congress of the United States on March 12, 1947 that the United States would come to the assistance of Greece and Turkey and that it "must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures" was something more than one of the great decisions of the Truman Administration in the field of foreign policy. It was something more than a prelude to the Marshall plan, announced by the Secretary of State at Harvard on June 5, 1947. Without any doubt at all it was one of the great turning points in American diplomatic history in the period immediately following the end of the so-called Second World War, with both immediate and long-range implications for the future.

Professor Xydis has now given us the first full length account of the "prelude" to these developments. He has led us to the turning point through a detailed analysis of events in the Eastern Mediterranean, the troubled Balkan region, and war-torn Greece during the critical years of 1944-1947. Part I of his truly monumental study begins with the story of the Greek Government-in-Exile, its relations with the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the United States and the Balkan neighbors of Greece, and then moves the narrative through the Churchill-Stalin agreement relative to the Balkan region on October 9, 1944, concerning which the American Secretary of State, Mr. Cordell Hull had serious reservations. During this first phase, however, as Mr. Xydis well points out as in this general area of the war generally, the United States recognized the primacy of Great Britain's
long-standing interests. Part II delineates the seemingly slow and unsure development of American interest, roughly from the end of World War II. Greece was now definitely under threat of Communist subversion, while Turkey was put under severe Soviet pressure, not merely with regard to a new régime of the Straits, with Soviet bases in that highly strategic area, but with regard to the cession of large areas in Eastern Anatolia. Both Greece and Turkey, if Soviet plans matured into reality, were to become satellites along the lines already familiar in Eastern and Southeastern Europe. During this second phase, as the author notes, the United States, as it were, awakened to the threatening situation, of which the Communist-led revolt in Greece was but one of the symptoms. Part III essentially covers the period of the Paris Peace Conference. During this third phase (January-August 1946), the Soviet Union openly challenged the British position in Greece, despite the Stalin-Churchill agreement of October 9, 1944, brought the so-called British and Greek "threat" to the peace of the Balkans into the Security Council of the United Nations, and the United States responded to the Soviet position by establishing a significant United States naval force in the Mediterranean Sea. Ultimately it became the Sixth United States Fleet. Particularly during this period, the Greek Government presented its claims, especially, to Northern Epirus (Southern Albania) and to rectifications along the Greek-Bulgarian frontier. As Professor Xydis observes, both the United Kingdom and the United States, in the last analysis, were most reluctant to support the Greek claims, and did not do so, although they did support the right of the Greek Government to present them, particularly to the Council of Foreign Ministers. Part IV tells the story of the final development of the "Truman Doctrine," with the Greek tragedy moving towards its dénouement, in the absence of basic external assistance and the British Government announcing on February 21, 1947 that it could no longer bear the heavy burdens in Greece and Turkey alone. The end result was President Truman's historic statement of March 12, 1947. By this time, inevitable and ineluctably the United States was committed in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Mr. Xydis has given his readers a sober and accurate account, in a monumental study which will command the attention of all serious students of Balkan and Near and Middle Eastern history. He appears to have used all the available published sources for his detailed delineation of the Anglo-American position during this troubled period. But he has also used much manuscript material from the Forrestal Papers, for example, and especially from Greek sources. A very useful documentary appendix and an excellent selected bibliography, leaving aside some 200 pages of footnote annotations, close the volume. Both author and publisher are to be commended for contributing this work to a growing library on contemporary diplomatic history.

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