Seat. Cyril Rokidis (later named Kallistratos) worked hard during 1867-1868 for an acceptable solution on the Sinai Question and in order to restore the normal relations between the Patriarch of Jerusalem and the Monastery. Kallistratos Rokidis had to overcome, at the same time, other difficulties, such as the anti-Greek policy of Ignatiev, the theft of the famous Code of Sinai by Tischendorf and the abuses of father Serafim in one of the Monastery's dependencies, all issues that deeply divided the fraternity. By August 1873, most of the issues had been resolved and relations between the Monastery and the Patriarchate of Jerusalem became normal again. However, the Monastery of Sinai entered a period of rapid decline, for reasons attributed both to a Panslavic propaganda and the uprising of the Arab-speaking populations of Egypt and the Middle East. Porfírrios (1885-1904), who succeeded Kallistratos, tried to put a hold on this decline. He administrated the financial affairs of the Monastery with great care, thereby managing to repay all debts, found a School in Rethos, establish dependencies and generally build up momentum for the Monastery; this, despite the obstacles raised by the Patriarch of Alexandria, who objected to the re-establishment of the Monastery's dependency in Cairo and disagreed over the Ambetios School, the Greek Orthodox Community School in Cairo. Porfírrios kept his title as President of the Ambetios School and reaffirmed its Greek character by appointing likely-minded teachers and professors.

At the end of his research Mr. Kontogiannis looks at a number of problems: he searches for the reasons behind the emergence of the Sinai Question, which he attributes to the ambition for greater authority which the post of the Archbishop of Sinai seemed to carry. He also discusses the Archbishops' clash with the Patriarches of Jerusalem and Alexandria; the assumption of the post of the archbishop of Sinai and the post of father superior of the Monastery by one and the same person and the conflict of jurisdictions that entailed; the lack of coordination that would have prevented the overlapping of jurisdictions between the father superior of Sinai and the Patriarchical throne, for the countries concerned; the intervention of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Eastern Patriarchates; and, the role played by Russia and the princes of Moldavia and Wallachia, with its grave effect to the ecclesiastic order.

Mr. Kontogiannis has done a superb job in bringing to light important elements which enrich our knowledge of an old ecclesiastic matter. He comments on the political implications of the question for that period and discusses the involvement of the Patriarch of Constantinople and the Patriarch of Jerusalem, in a situation that bears some resemblance to the present one. The author has used unpublished sources and has successfully combined it with what is already published. Overall, the book is an important work, rich in information about the history of Hellenism and the Orthodox Church in the Middle East and the Greek East.

Institut for Balkan Studies

Athanassios E. Karathanassis


This compilation of scholarly contributions provides an historical examination of the
politico-economic development of four Balkan States: Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. In so doing, it furnishes an analytical framework for a developmental comparison not only between two ex-communist states (Bulgaria and Yugoslavia), but also between the ex-communist Balkan States and Greece. The analysis of the individual sociopolitical developments is based upon the common denominator of historical and political legacies that shaped Balkan realities from Ottoman occupation through the inter-war period.

The first level of analysis is built on historical factors. The end of the Ottoman rule brought about the creation of small states characterized by common vulnerabilities and aspirations. First, they have been unable to resolve their security dilemmas through self-reliance. Second, they have not coped effectively with the realities of international economic competition. Third, they were unsuccessful in incorporating the whole nation in the created states or/and they incorporated a considerable ethnic minority. Fourth, they produced political elites who lacked broad popular support thus creating long periods of political dichotomy between the state machinery and the people. Finally, they produced political regimes based upon political favoritism—partitocracia.

Unable to deal effectively with mounting economic and social problems, the political elites sought legitimacy by relying on nationalism. They were often forced to compromise or give way to military dictatorships. Their modernization programs, having relied on Western educational practices which were alien to Balkan experiences, did not materialize. Reliance on nationalism, however, produced repeated wars.

The second level of analysis introduces the variable of socialism which replaced or supplanted nationalism. Socialist demands for rapid industrialization caused the emerging regimes of the post-war period to intensify state intervention into the economic sector an approach facilitated by weak private sectors. The application of different means and approaches had the same result—inadequate industrialization.

All of the states in question suffered from continuous external politico-economic interference, a lack of managerial and technical expertise, an underdeveloped agricultural sector, an inability to overcome the small-scale enterprise barrier, and a reliance on foreign economic assistance. For these reasons, industrialization drives did not produce legitimacy for the political elites, but instead contributed to socio-economic and demographic problems such as excessive urbanization, neglect of the rural sector, uneven economic development, excessive military spending, foreign debt, and ethnic strife. These problems overshadowed marginal industrialization successes, hence, modernization, based on industrialization, made governing more complex and more problematic. The failure of socialism to improve the living standards compelled the political elites to replace it with nationalism. Thus, the Balkans completed a full ideological circle: from nationalism, to socialism, to a mixture of the two, and back to nationalism.

As noted above, earlier reliance on nationalism produced violence and the contributions understandably raise the spectrum of renewed violence. Even though the contributors themselves avoid becoming carriers of bad omens (see page 76 related to the potentiality for violence in Yugoslavia), their work helps the reader to identify the sources of danger and to comprehend the magnitude of the problem. It therefore makes a superb contribution to comprehending the volatility of Balkan security.

Three criticisms of this otherwise excellent publication are in order. First, it does not attempt to provide explicit remedies for inadequate industrialization and modernization or for excessive nationalism. One contributor states that democratic political institution and market economies are more conducive to achieving modernization (p. 29). But he fails
to explain how does one achieve these conducive conditions or the degree they become effective in fostering modernization. This failure is significant in light of the suggestion that Greek political pluralism and market economy have not been sufficient to produce adequate industrialization and modernization in Greece.

The other two criticisms, which pertain to structural issues, are far less serious. There are no analyses of Albania or perhaps Turkey and there is no general conclusion to tie all the findings together. The reader must reread the introduction as a conclusion upon finishing the book. The editor would have done well to use the last three pages of his very good introduction as a general conclusion.

Nonetheless, Diverse Paths to Modernity in Southeastern Europe, is a timely contribution to the literature on post-communist Balkans. By examining the past, it sheds light upon possible future developments, and implicitly warns us that unless something is done to remedy the ethnic, political, and economic perpetuations in the Balkans, history may repeat itself. It is worth reading for this reason alone.

Norwich University

SYMEOH A. GIANNAKOS


The present volume, which includes a number of papers originally presented at a symposium convened by the RSP in Oxford in November 1990, reflects the growing interest displayed by social scientists — particularly historians, social anthropologists and, increasingly, specialists of international relations — in the position of non-dominant ethnic groups. These human communities, often carrying bitter memories of discrimination, constitute the most likely victims of the recent upsurge of militant nationalism following the collapse of the Soviet empire and the dismantling of the bipolar post-war system. In recent years, Greek Pontian communities in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia and Georgia, hardly pressed by local nationalisms, steadily dwindle as their members seek a better future in safer parts of the former Union or in Greece. The present exodus, the latest in a record of persecution and displacement over the past two centuries, threatens to bring to an end the millenia-old presence of this exceptionally enduring element in its ancestral settlements around the Black Sea (Pontos). The studies in this volume contribute to a new awareness of the issues involved, particularly with regard to the elements of Pontian identity (historical past and "myth", culture and language) and the problems of self-preservation and/or integration in "host" societies.

The historical background of the Pontian Diaspora, an indispensable guide to further analysis, is outlined in four studies. Anthony Bryer's paper is valuable both as a concise account of the course of Pontian Greeks from antiquity to the early 20th century, presenting data on the geography, demography and economy of Pontos, and as an attempt to construe central elements of Pontian identity under Ottoman rule and under the impact of 19th century Greek nationalism; in this latter respect, three small settlements in Pontos (Doubera, Phytiana and Tsite) are used in a quite illuminating way. In her contribution, Artemis Xan-