Kadartzis éclairent la question des lettres helléniques durant l'Aufklärung dans les Balkans.

Aussi le récit biographique de Moisiodax évolue-t-il en une étude socio-culturelle de l'Aufklärung hellénique. Iossipos Moisiodax, défenseur zélé de l'évolution de l'esprit hellénique, avait réussi à prouver que seule "la philosophie saine" pouvait contribuer au bonheur; il voulait enseigner aux jeunes grecs la manière de se la procurer. Ses efforts, suscitèrent la réaction des milieux conservateurs, qui ne mitigèrent pas pour autant son enthousiasme; au contraire, ces réactions redoublèrent son courage et animèrent ses intentions de mettre son enseignement au profit du peuple grec. Effectivement le cas particulier de Moisiodax, méthodiquement présenté par P. Kitromilidis, montre la marche intéressante de l'Aufklärung hellénique.

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With his knowledge of recent political history, Mr Despotopoulos proposes in this study to give us a documented account of the real dimensions of Greece's contribution to the successful outcome of both the First and the Second World Wars. It is a study whose originality, importance and timeliness are indicated by the very title, as well as in the prologue, where the author writes: "The book's parallel exposition of Greece's significant contribution to the outcome of the two World Wars reveals the surprising historical truth that there has never been another case of a small country like Greece furnishing such invaluable assistance to its Allies and such inestimable services to mankind".

To introduce his subject, the author provides an effective, compact and solid exposition of the major periods in Greece's recent history (from 1821 to 1940) with their principal characteristics. This introduction is a composite review of its components, both positive and negative, explaining its dilatorinesses and its failures, exalting its achievements and its grand feats. For the reader, this review is an accumulation of critical information on the political history of Modern Greece.

In the first chapter, on Greece's contribution to the outcome of the First World War, the author traces and brings to light the real and essential
features of its contribution to the Allied Forces's war against the Germanic Empires, dividing the period into two distinct parts reflecting Greece's history during the Great War. In the first part, which covers the period August 1914 - October 1915, he maintains that, although Greece was officially neutral, this neutrality was not in fact absolute. The author's re-examination of the degree of Greece's participation in the war waged by the Entente overturns the erroneous historical assessment that Greece made no contribution to the Allied effort in the early years of the Great War. Mr Despotopoulos confutes this accusation with substantial arguments. He discloses Greece's little known assistance to Serbia (two-fold aid for a period of fourteen months), despite its official neutrality: Serbia was permitted to bring supplies through the port of Thessaloniki, and Greece declared that the Greek army would attack Bulgaria in case of a Bulgarian attack on Serbia. This declaration was a considerable factor in Bulgaria's remaining neutral until October 1915. The author also stresses the immense importance of this policy to Greece's indirect contribution to the development of the overall Allied war, both on the purely military level as well as in the diplomatic field. It should however be added, in support of Mr Despotopoulos' asseverations, that this Greek policy made the Balkan front more important to the Allies, who decided that Greece should be the spring-board for their Balkan policy.

In the second part of this chapter Mr Despotopoulos demonstrates particular skill in his account of the importance of the Balkan front to the outcome of the Great War. After a brief introduction to the Greek domestic political scene, he recounts the essential elements of Greece's contribution to the achievement of Allied victory on the Macedonian front. Greece's official declaration of war against the Central Powers, on June 28, 1917, came at a time when the war in Europe seemed to have reached a standstill.

Premier Venizelos, by this time master of the political situation in Greece, made available three divisions, which took part in the great battle and Allied victory at Skra di Legen in a most impressive display of military skill. This great battle, the author stresses, reinforced the position of those who believed that it was possible to achieve on the Macedonian front decisive developments which would influence the general Allied war.

Mr Despotopoulos very rightly emphasizes this course of events, for it hastened the current of the history of the Great War. Indeed, the important Allied attack on the Macedonian Front on September 5, 1918, led to the capitulation of Bulgaria in less than two weeks. The success of this attack, the author notes, exceeded all expectation. More particularly, the collapse of the Macedonian Front had a catalytic effect both on people's willingness
to continue the war as well as on the leadership of the three Empires: the Ottoman, the Austro-Hungarian and the German. The Austro-Hungarian Empire, engaged in a fierce battle with the Italian Army, could not stand up to the armies of the Entente and its Balkan allies on its southern flank, without sufficient German forces in the area. The Ottoman Empire found itself cut off from its allies after the capitulation of Bulgaria, enabling its enemies to organize an expedition against Constantinople, with five Anglo-Greek divisions under the command of British General Milne. The German decision to capitulate when its army was still strong, was taken in view of its successive abandonment by all its allies. This was, to a great degree, the results of the Allied victory on the Macedonian Front and the capitulation of Bulgaria. The author emphasizes, with supporting evidence, that: "It can be taken as certain that, without the Allied victory on the Macedonian Front and its immediate consequences, the German political leadership would neither have decided to request an armistice nor, more important, would it have been able to impose this on the generals of the Supreme Command. The war would consequently have continued". It can also be taken as certain, the author continues, that although the Allies would still have won the war without this victory on the Macedonian Front, it would have taken six months longer. Greece’s progressive contribution to the Great War first and foremost refutes certain contentions made at the Peace Conference in 1919 that Greece was claiming much more than was warranted by its contribution to the war. The author also refutes the allegation that Greece did not help Serbia in its struggle against Austro-Hungary.

In the second chapter, Mr Despotopoulos furnishes a substantial and detailed review of the various stages of Greece’s participation in the Second World War, from 1940 to 1944. While the bibliography on this war is quite extensive, the author makes his contribution to this story from another point of view: Greece’s contribution to the overall War of Humanity. He begins with an objective account of the events in the war between Greece and Italy, from October 28, 1940 - April 20, 1941. Pursuing his revisionary tactics, the author maintains that this war arose principally out of the desire of both coalitions for control of Greek territory because of its strategic importance — a policy going back to the end of the nineteenth century. However, it was more directly the result of Mussolini’s policy and ambition, inaugurated immediately following the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, to rule the eastern Mediterranean and his attempt to apply this policy by seizing Greece. It was also, of course, the result of Greece’s decision to oppose him. Mr Despotopoulos very correctly mentions the various stages of the war, waged initially in the
border area between Greece and Albania and after the first few weeks in the Albanian interior, where the Greek army drove back the Italian invaders with a series of decisive victories. He then proceeds to propound the principal reasons for Italy’s failure, a failure which contributed to changing the course of the general war. In his view, the main causes were the heroic spirit of the Greek people, the fine training of the Greek army and its reinforcement after 1925 with a satisfactory number of heavy arms. He also considers significant the presence of a powerful squadron of the British Navy, shackling the Italian fleet. Another important factor was the fact that Bulgaria did not enter the war against Greece when the Italians invaded or immediately thereafter. Finally, the unexpected Greek victories in the early weeks of the war, which made a mockery of the Italian plan for a Blitzkrieg, also played a prominent role, as did the Italians’ mistaken assessment of the Greek people’s willingness to fight, based on their opposition to the government of the day.

After this thorough analysis of the Italian policy on Greece, the author proceeds to discuss its consequences: it contributed to Germany’s decision to implement the invasion and subjection of Greece it had been planning since 1940. The subjection of Greece, the author stresses, was essential not only to put an end to the many adverse (for the Axis) consequences of the Greek victories over the Italians, but also to the German decision to confront in time the danger that the British would organize a Balkan front, as they did in the First World War. And even if they did not form a new front, from Greece the British would be able to bomb the Rumanian oilfields which were so important to the German army. The war between Greece and Germany arose, of course, out of Greece’s refusal to submit to German threats. The great “Battle of Crete”, according to Mr Despotopoulos, an “aggregate of many separate battles and engagements, unprecedented and multi-facetted, waged as it was by land, air and sea, was a veritable military epic”. With the Battle of Crete, the Germans completed their occupation of Greece. The entire German campaign in Greece, considered as a whole, proved to be a Pyrrhic victory for the invader. This brief campaign contributed to delaying by six precious weeks the attack on the Eastern Front. This delay was the primordial reason for their defeat on this front and consequently for their final defeat in the Second World War.

Of particular importance in Mr Despotopoulos’ study is the chapter entitled “The historic significance of Greece’s wars against Italy and against Germany”.

Based on evidence collected from the Allied and neutral press (the Turkish press, for example), as well as from the memoirs and declarations of
outstanding individuals of that period, from among the Allies and the Axis alike, the author states and analyses his position. But Greece’s contribution does not end there. It continued both outside the country as well as within the occupied territory. Outside Greece, the Greek army, navy and air force took part in all the Allied actions. The Greek navy even played a role in the Normandy landings in 1944. However, as the author explains, after 1941, and especially in 1943 and 1944, Greece’s most important contribution to the World War was its Resistance movement, which had the support of a large part of the Greek population. Despite severe reprisals by the army of occupation, despite the tortures and the mass executions, the destruction of villages and towns, the Greek Resistance spread throughout the entire country. This meant that large numbers of the enemy forces were detained in Greece from June 1941 till October 1944, much larger than would have been necessary merely to occupy the country, which of course was a tremendous help to the Allies on the other fronts.

In conclusion, Mr Despotopoulos’ work is a persuasive presentation of those elements which constitute Greece’s contribution to the Allies’ great struggle in the First and the Second World Wars. Even if one is already convinced of this contribution, its original and assiduous presentation in this well prepared study is constructive, and worthy of an important place in the bibliography on the two World Wars.


This is a very important analysis of a major topic of post war international history. Although it mainly deals with the expansion of Anglo-American nuclear co-operation, the study inevitably touches upon additional aspects of the Cold War: the evolution of nuclear weapons, of their delivery systems and its impact on intra-NATO relations, the role of personalities, and the influence of events such as the Suez crisis and the Sputnik flight on the perceptions regarding the role of such armaments in the NATO framework. The book is impressively documented from both the US and the British side. This, in fact, is one of its most important advantages. Nuclear co-operation