outstanding individuals of that period, from among the Allies and the Axis alike, the author states and analyses his position. But Greece's contribution does not end there. It continued both outside the country as well as within the occupied territory. Outside Greece, the Greek army, navy and air force took part in all the Allied actions. The Greek navy even played a role in the Normandy landings in 1944. However, as the author explains, after 1941, and especially in 1943 and 1944, Greece's most important contribution to the World War was its Resistance movement, which had the support of a large part of the Greek population. Despite severe reprisals by the army of occupation, despite the tortures and the mass executions, the destruction of villages and towns, the Greek Resistance spread throughout the entire country. This meant that large numbers of the enemy forces were detained in Greece from June 1941 till October 1944, much larger than would have been necessary merely to occupy the country, which of course was a tremendous help to the Allies on the other fronts.

In conclusion, Mr Despotopoulos' work is a persuasive presentation of those elements which constitute Greece's contribution to the Allies' great struggle in the First and the Second World Wars. Even if one is already convinced of this contribution, its original and assiduous presentation in this well prepared study is constructive, and worthy of an important place in the bibliography on the two World Wars.

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This is a very important analysis of a major topic of post war international history. Although it mainly deals with the expansion of Anglo-American nuclear co-operation, the study inevitably touches upon additional aspects of the Cold War: the evolution of nuclear weapons, of their delivery systems and its impact on intra-NATO relations, the role of personalities, and the influence of events such as the Suez crisis and the Sputnik flight on the perceptions regarding the role of such armaments in the NATO framework. The book is impressively documented from both the US and the British side. This, in fact, is one of its most important advantages. Nuclear co-operation
was a crucial part of the famous Anglo-American special relationship, but its study has always been problematic due both to inadequate documentation on this delicate topic, and to the variety of subjects relative to nuclear weapons, such as military planning, financial considerations, political relations between East and West, intra-NATO balances, or internal politics of the nuclear powers. The author has made a significant breakthrough on this level.

The study focuses on the political issues connected to the bilateral nuclear relationship, rather than on its military side. The evolution of such bilateral co-operation, it becomes clear, was more important on a political and psychological, rather than purely military level, for both parties to the special relationship. Britain's aims were to maintain the status of a Great Power through the possession of nuclear weapons; to rely on US nuclear power for Britain's security and, simultaneously, to influence US policy through this co-operation; and to ensure that nuclear co-operation with the US would be kept on a bilateral basis. Such an exclusive role as the Americans' only nuclear partner would secure, according to Whitehall, Britain's leading position in the European side of NATO. Macmillan's diplomatic skills secured for Britain a remarkable degree of nuclear cooperation with the US in 1957-8.

The US, on its part, especially after 1956-7, saw co-operation with Britain as a cornerstone of the Alliance; yet the Americans also looked at the issue of nuclear co-operation in a wider NATO perspective, not merely as a bilateral question. In this context, they also had to take into account the views of the continental European members of NATO, mostly France, the influence of which Britain was trying to limit. The US itself did not welcome French ambitions to become a nuclear power. Furthermore, Washington was torn apart by its soul-searching regarding the extent of nuclear co-operation: President Eisenhower was usually in favour of sharing information about nuclear weapons with Britain, but he had to deal with the reservations of the Congress and of agencies of the US administration. The scare caused in the late 1950s by the Sputnik flight was instrumental in allowing the President's ideas to make progress.

The study also deals with the attitude of the other NATO members and with the deployment of US warheads and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles in NATO countries after 1957. It shows that the Americans underestimated European complexities regarding nuclear weapons and the IRBMs. This deployment was a fundamentally different process than the bilateral Anglo-American co-operation on nuclear weaponry. In other words, it fell short of being a "partnership". With respect to the South-Eastern flank of the alliance, the Americans, although initially interested in deployment, later
came to the conclusion that such weapons in Greece or in Turkey might be too provocative to the Soviets. The ideas of Eisenhower regarding the “flank” or advanced positions such as Greece” in which the deployment of missiles might be questionable, are indicative of how inherently exposed the position of Greece was vis-à-vis the Soviet Bloc in the first post-war period.

Therefore, the study is a valuable contribution to a topic which cannot but interest diplomatic historians, political scientists and military experts. After the end of the Cold War, the significance of Dr Melissen’s work remains undiminished, for this always is a subject of great delicacy and of wider interest.

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