With the death of the regent Antipater in 319 B.C., the empire of Alexander the Great stood at the brink of its second civil war in three years. The point was not the succession, but rather who, or whether anyone at all, would exercise authority in the name of the kings: Philip III Arrhidaios and Alexander IV Aegis. The situation was complicated. Inevitably caught up in this power struggle were the city-states of Greece, and they will play a key role in Cassander's initial struggle to gain the regency of Macedonia.

The first problem was that Philip Arrhidaios, or rather his wife Eurydice, had no desire for a regency at all and had made one attempt already at that solution, at Triparadeisos, where Antipater had thwarted her by addressing the army directly. Second, Antipater had appointed a successor as regent: Polyaenus, the son of Simmias. However, there was no precedent for a regent naming a successor as regent. The appointment was theoretically a royal one, but the situation was unique in that Alexander IV was a child of three or four and Philip Arrhidaios was generally taken as mentally incompetent: so who was to make the appointment? On Alexander's death in 323

1. Diod., 18.39 2-4. Eurydice attempted to stir up the phalanx, and almost succeeded. Only Antipater's presence prevented it.

2. The nature of Arrhidaios' incompetence has never been satisfactorily explained. Diodorus states that he had an incurable mental illness (ψυχικοῖς ... ἀνιάτους): 18.2.2. Plutarch asserts that this was due to a poison administered to him in childhood (Alex. 77.5) and though he calls him a "halfwit" (ἀτελή δὲ τὸ φρονεῖν... - Alex. 77.5) at this point, most of the language refers to him as being of "unsound mind" (οὐ φρενήρη - Alex. 10.2) and childish" (δὲν οὐδὲν νηπίου - De Fort. Alex. 337 D E). Arrhidaios was at least presentable on public occasions (e.g., Curt. 10.7.13 and 8.1) and understood what was going on around him. The problem seems to have been one of emotional self-control (see n. 42 below), rather than the retardation normally suggested. For an excellent discussion, see W. S. Greenwalt, Studies in the Development of Royal Authority in Argead Macedonia (diss., University of Virginia, 1985), 393-402.
B.C., a general officers’ conference at Babylon had decided both the issue of succession (which ultimately resulted in the joint kingship, on a compromise following a near mutiny by the phalanx) and at the same time established a kind of co-regency.

It was this situation which led to the civil war from which Antipater emerged as sole regent. In the later case, Antipater’s epimeleia was confirmed by the last formal meeting of Alexander the Great’s Macedonians at Triparadeisos in 3214. The “Grand Army”, however, was now scattered through a score of provinces, in dozens of garrisons and settlements, one remaining field army under Antigonos “the One-Eyed” in Asia Minor and even one still-rebellious force left over from the civil war. Reconstituting “the Macedonians” at this point would have been next to impossible even if the generals, governors and commanders trusted one another. In actuality, they did not trust each other, so that avenue was not open.

Third, the legal niceties aside (and those legalities were uncertain at best as well as being of no concern to anyone with the possible exception of Eurydice), there were some difficult personalities at work among the principals. Polyperchon had exercised the regency in Macedonia for Antipater during the civil war, but also was one of the most senior of Alexander’s brigadiers in both age and length of service. Antipater undoubtedly chose Polyperchon for his loyalty to the Argead House and because τιμώμενον ὑπό τῶν κατὰ τὴν Μακεδονίαν. Antipater’s hope must have been that by making the choice for the empire of someone of Polyperchon’s stature and known loyalty, he could secure a general acceptance of the new regent and thereby preclude
a renewed civil war. Antipater was wrong, but not for want of trying.

Antigonos has already been mentioned as the commander of the only “legitimate” Macedonian field army. In fact, Antigonos had not waited for Antipater’s death to begin plotting to seize authority for himself. It is doubtful that Antigonos would have accepted anyone other than Antigonos as regent. Conversely, few of the other commanders would have been enthusiastic about Antigonos. Certainly Ptolemy in Egypt refused to acknowledge either the new regency, or Antigonos’ later attempts to claim it. Finally, Cassander, Antipater’s own son, who was appointed as chiliarch and second in authority (δευτερεύοντα κατά τήν εξουσίαν) to Polyperchon, but who had been acting as regent during his father’s illness, was outraged that one not related (κατά γένος) to Antipater should take over his command (ήγεμονία).

There were a number of imponderables with which this group had to contend. The first was the position of Olympias, who had a certain amount of sentimental authority as Philip II’s widow, Alexander the Great’s mother, and Alexander IV’s grandmother. From a self-imposed if practical exile in Epirus, she had only partially involved herself in the first struggle over the regency (i.e., the civil war) and had sat things out since Triparadeisos. The second factor was: what would happen if either Alexander IV achieved his

7. Antipater, as regent, at Triparadeisos had commissioned Antigonos to pursue Eumenes of Kardia, Perdikkas’ last associate and most successful general, who was still in arms against the regency: Diod., 18.39.7; Arr., Ta meta Alex., 9.38. Cassander, Antipater’s son, was appointed as Chiliarch and second in command to Antigonos because Antipater did not trust the old general (Diod., 18.39.7), a point borne out. Antigonos, for his part, resolved that as soon as he felt secure he would no longer take orders from Antipater or the Kings (Diod., 18.48.1).


9. Diod., 18.48.4-49.1. The Iolaid House (Antipater’s family) may have had some hereditary claim to such a position, whenever the need for a regent arose. Antipater had served in that capacity under Philip and Alexander, in fact the only person to do so. A century before, one Iolaus served as “archon” for Perdikkas II in the initial stages of the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 1.62.2). If it is the same family (and it is a family name connected to Antipater, indeed one of his sons is named Iolaus) it would put Cassander’s comment and outrage in perspective, and make it something more than sentiment.

10. Olympias had proposed a marriage alliance with Perdikkas by offering him her daughter (and Alexander’s sister), Kleopatra, in lieu of Antipater’s daughter, Nikaia: an obvious attempt to dislodge Antipater, her old rival. Perdikkas married first Nikaia, and then Kleopatra, which helped to precipitate the civil war. See Diod., 18.23.1-3; Justin, 13.6. 4-8 and Arr., Ta meta Alex., 9.20-24 and 26.
majority or Eurydice managed to assert Philip Arrhidaios' rights? The third, and the one most central here, was the role played by the Greek poleis. Following Alexander's death in 323, a coalition of Greek city-states led by Athens had tried to overthrow the Macedonian control of Greece during the short-bloody struggle of the Lamian War. Antipater, who had used a controversial policy of narrow oligarchies and Macedonian/mercenary garrisons to control Greece since the battle of Megalopolis in 331, had tightened control even more after the Lamian War by exiling the anti-Macedonian factions within the cities and using more garrisons. In fact, Macedonian or mixed Macedonian and mercenary garrisons scattered throughout Greece were an important resource in and of themselves. They were potentially important pieces in the struggle between Cassander and Polyperchon, and Greece proper became the arena for that struggle.

Remarkably, very little information exists on the dispositions of Macedonian garrisons in Greece on the death of Antipater. The only one specifically mentioned is the force at Athens, which occupied the Munychia, and that only because Cassander (either in the last days of Antipater's illness or shortly before Polyperchon took power) had changed the phrourarchos at Athens from Menyllus (Antipater's commander since 322) to Nicanor, a man apparently loyal to Cassander personally. Also, following his victory at Crannon in 322 (which ended the Lamian War), Antipater and Krateros had besieged and took by storm a number of cities in Thessaly in order to bludgeon the Greek cities into making separate peace treaties with Macedonia. They had concluded with an extended campaign in Aetolia. Though Antipater and Krateros soon pulled out and took a large army to Asia Minor in the civil war against Perdikkas, it is reasonable to presume that some garrisons were left in key positions. This certainly seems to be the case (judging from later developments) at Megalopolis under the veteran commander Damis. Further, it is equally reasonable to presume some kind of Macedonian presence,

11. For the Lamian War, see Diod., 18.8-17; Justin 13.5; Plut., Demosth. 27 and Phoc. 23-26; Arr., Ta meta Alex., 1.9-13; Paus., 1.25.3-5; and Hypereides, Funeral Oration, 1-20. 
12. Diod., 18.18.1-6 for Athens, and 7-9 for the rest of the Greek cities.
13. Plut., Phoc., 31.1 Plutarch states that this was after Antipater's death but before his death became known.
14. Diod., 18.17.7-8 for the campaign in Thessaly, which left Athens and Aetolia alone in the field. Antipater then first attacked Athens (see n. 11 supra). For the Aetolian campaign, see Diod., 18.24.1-25.5.
15. Diod., 18.71.2 Cassander later appointed Damis as epimeletes of Megalopolis (in 315): Diod., 19.64.1.
either by garrison or pro-Macedonian faction, at Argos and Corinth, which is likewise confirmed by later events.

Shortly after Polyperchon’s appointment as regent, Cassander began to lay the groundwork for establishing his own power (dynasteia). First, he began by talking with his friends in Macedonia, urging them to make common cause (koinopragia) with him. Second, Cassander sent secretly to Ptolemy to renew their philia and to request that Ptolemy dispatch a naval squadron to the Hellespont (presumably to cover Cassander’s escape and crossing). Finally, Cassander “also sent to the other commanders [άλλους ήγεμόνας] and the cities urging them to ally [συμμαχεΐν] with him”17. This last reference in Diodorus clearly refers to the Greek city-states, and equally makes it obvious that both Macedonian garrisons and sovereign cities were involved18. To avoid any further suspicion of complicity in revolt (apostasia), Cassander arranged for a hunting trip which would get him out of Polyperchon’s view and make easier his escape.

Polyperchon, in the meantime, called a council (synedrion) of his friends and with their approval issued a formal invitation to Olympias to assume the regency for Alexander IV, and live in Macedonia in regal station (basilike prostasia)19. It was a shrewd move on Polyperchon’s part, which would have given his regency for Philip Arrhidaios a little more legitimacy in the eyes of the Macedonians. The only problem was that Olympias declined, for the moment, unsure of Polyperchon himself (probably because of his long association with Antipater).

Cassander sent his friends on to the Hellespont and then, a few days later when all was ready, he too slipped away. Diodorus makes the point that Cassander was in no way dismayed by Polyperchon’s appointment, only outraged, which must reflect Cassander’s own confidence20. Antigonos welcomed his former chiliarch with enthusiasm and promises, ostensibly because of his

16. Diod., 18:49.2. For the koinopragia with his friends and the alliance with Ptolemy, see Diod., 18.49.2-3.
17. Diod., 18.49.3.
18. See, also, Rosen (supra, n. 8) for the distinction between koinopragia and idiopragia, on the one hand (i.e., personal relationships) and symmachia (implying formal relationships and hence sovereignty) on the other. For Cassander’s use of a hunting trip as a ruse to cover his escape, see Diod., 18.49.3.
19. Diod., 18.49.4.
20. Diod., 18.54.1 for Cassander’s attitude; for his departure from Macedonia, 18.54.3 and 64.1. The Marmor Parium places this in late Summer or early Autumn of 319: FGrH II B, n. 239, F13.12 (p. 1003). For his reception by Antigonos, see Diod., 18.54.3-4.
friendship with Antipater, but in reality because he wanted to stir up as much trouble for Polyperchon as possible to give Antigonos himself a free hand in his own bid for power. In the very next section, Diodorus makes clear the reasons for Cassander’s confidence. Polyperchon, once Cassander had left, called another meeting of his friends and all the leading Macedonians to assess the nature of the crisis\textsuperscript{21}. It was obvious to them that Cassander, with Antigonos’ aid, “would hold all the Greek cities”, some of which were guarded by Antipater’s old garrisons, while others were dominated by Antipater’s old friends, mercenaries and oligarchies. They also assumed that Cassander would enlist Ptolemy and Antigonos as allies; in fact, he had done that before he left Macedonia.

The one thing that emerges from this narrative is that the only area in which Cassander had any independent support was Greece itself. He was, however, at least assailable there. First, Antipater’s policies in Greece had not been popular in the cities. In fact, it was specific complaints against Antipater by the Greek cities which was the occasion for Alexander’s summons to him to come to Babylon in 324; a mission Cassander executed\textsuperscript{22}. Further, the Lamian War itself proved that the level of Greek resistance was still high and it had provoked even harsher measures by Antipater. Polyperchon’s council decided that the most effective means to counter Cassander immediately was “to give freedom to the cities throughout Greece” and to overthrow the oligarchies established in them by Antipater\textsuperscript{23}. As a result, they expected that the Greeks would flock to Polyperchon’s regency as allies.

The envoys from the Greek cities who were present (presumably at Pella) were immediately summoned and promised that democracies (\textit{demokratia}) would be reestablished in them\textsuperscript{24}. A decree was drafted formalizing this offer in the name of Philip Arrhidaios (since the synedrion had no formal status itself), and copies were given to the envoys to take back to their cities and people. The decree was in the form of a \textit{diagramma} and constitutes one of the longest “documents” in Diodorus Siculus, probably gleaned by Hieronymus of Cardia directly from the Macedonian royal archives\textsuperscript{25}. It seems to fall into two parts, stylistically. The first is a general exhortation to the Greeks, remin-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{21} Diod., 18.55.1-3.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Plut., \textit{Alex.}, 74.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Diod., 18.55.2 κατά τήν Ἑλλάδα πόλεις ἔλευθεροιν.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Diod., 18.55.4.
\item \textsuperscript{25} For the \textit{diagramma}, see Diod., 18.56. For the commentary, see K. Rosen, “Political Documents in Hieronymus of Cardia”, \textit{Acta Classica} 10 (1957) 29-30.
\end{itemize}
Cassander and the Greek City-States (319-317 B.C.)

...ding them of the "many acts of kindness" performed for them by the Argead House and condemning the recent policies of "our generals" (i.e., Antipater and Cassander). It promises to reestablish the policy of peace enjoyed under Philip and Alexander [presumably for those with highly selective memories] but more particularly: to recall those driven out or exiled "by our generals"; to restore completely all property; to proclaim a general amnesty and to insure that all restrictive measures passed against the exiles by their own cities would be declared void.

More interesting is the second part of the decree, which gets down to specifics. NOT to be recalled are the exiles of Megalopolis, Amphissa, Trikka, Pharkadon and Heraklea. Also, special provisions were made for Athens, restoring Samos to Athenian sovereignty [so much for freedom to the Greeks], but maintaining the independence of Oropus. These are the only cities named in the diagramma, and the obvious questions is "Why?" In the case of Athens, the answer is equally obvious: it is a bid for Athenian support against Cassander's garrison and probable base in Greece. A brilliant bid in that it offered Samos immediately, but held Oropus out as the reward for compliance. Megalopolis was also in Cassander's camp, as its later actions will show, so it is reasonable to presume that the other four cities were likewise held either by Macedonian garrisons or oligarchies controlled by friends of Antipater.

Nothing is known, other than this one reference, of the "exiles" of these cities, and hence we cannot tell whether the failure to restore them to the cities is more of a blandishment or a threat to Amphissa, Trikka, Pharkadon and Heraklea. As such, these references pose an interesting problem. Were they the only cities holding to Cassander? Were they particularly important cities to Cassander's camp, and if so, "Why?" Were they mentioned in the diagramma because Cassander's hold on them was weak or because they represented a specific threat to Polyperchon? Amphissa, Trikka, Pharkadon and Heraklea are not the first cities which would ordinarily leap to mind in this situation, yet they were important enough to be mentioned specifically in an albeit abbreviated version of an official document.

To answer, in part, the question of whether these were the only cities in Cassander's control: the answer is "No". Polyperchon wrote personally (after the diagramma was published) to Argos and [in an infuriatingly sparse re-

26. Diod., 18.56.4.
27. Diod. 18.56.5-6.
ference] “καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς” ordering the exile of all government leaders from
the time of Antipater, as well as confiscation of their property, and even in
some cases their execution “in order that these men, being completely stripped
of power, might not be able to cooperate with Cassander in any way”29.

As to whether or not these were particularly important cities: the answer
is that strategically, even beyond the fact that Cassander may have held them,
they were. A quick look at the map will confirm this30. The two best known
are Amphissa and Trikka (modern Trikkala). The first is a major staging point
in Central Greece, both for campaigns to the East into Boeotia or West into
Aetolia, and potentially for any armies moving either from northern Greece
or into it. Certainly, Philip II amply demonstrated this on the march to
Chaeronea in 33831. Trikka is the central point in Thessaly on the Zygos Pass
route, which comes up the Aous River from Epiros, crosses the Pindus Range
into Thessaly and comes across the upper Peneios River at Trikka. Pharkadon
sat some twenty-odd miles down the Peneios from Trikka, but also on top
of a complex of tributaries to the Peneios which run in from the South: the
Kyralios and Pamisos Rivers (from the West and Southwest, respectively,
that is to the borders of Epiros), as well as the Apidanos and the Enipeus
Rivers, which are the most important and run in from the South and Southeast
past Krannon and Pharsalos. In the case of the Apidanos, it forms part of
the route directly south to Lamia, the Spercheus River valley and the Malian
Gulf. The Enipeus is part of the eastern route to Pherae and the Gulf of
Pagasae (in fact, just south of Kynoskephalai). These names (Krannon,
Kynoskephalai, Lamia, Pharsalos, and Pherae) are enough to point out the
strategic importance of the routes for they are all the scenes of major battles
by Greek, Macedonian and Roman armies over the next three centuries either
trying to force their way South into Central Greece or to defend Macedonia
from attack from the South. Pharkadon sat on top of this complex.

Finally, Heraklea (obviously Heraklea Trachinia, given the clear identity
of the other three towns) was a fortified city at the opening of the Asopos
Gorge, four miles from the “Western Gate” to Thermopylai. It also controlled,

30. For convenience’s sake, my map references are to M. Cary, Geographic Background
to Greek and Roman History (Oxford, 1949), 61-73 (and especially the maps on pp. 62, 66,
and 70) and to the Grosser Historischer Weltatlas, I (Vorgeschichte und Al tertum) (Muenchen,
1972), 26-37 (“Griechenland um 333 v. Chr.”).
31. For Amphissa as the key to the Chaeronea campaign, see N. G. L. Hammond and
via the Gorge, the western end of the Anopaia path around Thermopylae and the main route south to the Kephissos River and thence to Phokis and Boeotia (on the one hand) and the route through Doris and past Mount Parnassos to Amphissa (on the other hand).

In short, these are all highly strategic sites, each sitting on the choke points of multiple converging routes. In Cassander's hands Trikka and Pharkadon could make communication between Polyperchon and Olympias (in Epirus) difficult if not impossible. Equally, Pharkadon, Heraclea and Amphissa are key points on the major inland North-South routes through Thessaly, Lokris and Phokis. Finally, Amphissa was the crucial point in mountainous central Greece for East-West communication as well (East into Boeotia, West into Aetolia): thus it sat on both axes of communication, the ultimate choke point. On their own, these places could not stop a hostile army going in any direction, at least for long, but they could force that army to go slowly and harass its lines of communication once passed. Conversely, they could greatly facilitate rapid and safe movement by a friendly army. This is probably the reason that Polyperchon singles these towns out, which brings us to the last question (of whether Cassander's hold on them was weak or they were a threat to Polyperchon). Clearly, these were points the control of which Polyperchon was at least uncertain about. Either they contained oligarchies likely to be or already openly friendly to Cassander, or actually held garrisons of Cassander, as do the only other two cities mentioned by name in the diagramma as we have it: Athens and Megalopolis.

The political maneuvers and propaganda for the rest of 319 and early 318, revolve around the situation at Athens. On hearing that Cassander had left Macedonia and that Polyperchon "was expected to come to Attica shortly with his force", Nicanor (Cassander's phourarchos) sought to secure the active support of the city. On the other hand, the Athenians thought it a wonderful opportunity to rid themselves of the Macedonian garrison at the Munychia in the bargaining between the two rival factions for the regency. By now it was early 318, and Nicanor, taking no chances, increased the mercenary force at the Munychia (which served to pitch the Athenian sentiment more or less into Polyperchon's camp). Athenian sentiment was to have little

32. Cassander's unbelievably rapid march from Tegea in late 317, to counter Olympias' seizure of Macedonia, is only explicable if he already held these key points on the route; and his securing of Thessaly with such ease on this same occasion likewise fits this explanation. See Diod., 19.35 and n. 56 (below).

33. Diod., 18.64.1-2.
effect. The Athenian envoys to Polyperchon asked for aid against Nicanor in accordance with the promises of the *diagramma*, while Nicanor took the opportunity to seize the Piraeus walls and harbor boom (assuring easy access to Cassander)34. The result was that the Athenians were much worse off than before, and knew it.

The Athenian answer was to protest to Nicanor, and they sent Phocion, Konon [grandson of the old Admiral] and Klearchos to request that Nicanor restore their autonomy "κατὰ τὸ γεγενημένον διάταγμα" (which was naive in the extreme)35. Nicanor did precisely what he should have done: he referred them to Cassander. Polyperchon, in the meantime, seemed to be having trouble getting an army down to Attica (probably the result of the cities already mentioned holding to Cassander). His only response, and even here we have to presume that Polyperchon was behind it, was a letter from Olympias to Nicanor ordering him (on no authority whatsoever) to restore the Munychia and Piraeus to the Athenians36. Shaken (according to Diodorus) by the Queen Mother's entrance into all of this, Nicanor temporized by promising everything and delivering nothing: he was waiting for Cassander37. Shortly after this, Polyperchon's son, Alexander, arrived with an army in Attica.

The Athenians were convinced that Alexander would restore the Munychia and Piraeus to them; Diodorus insists, probably with perfect hind-

34. Diod., 18.64.3-4; Plut., *Phoc.*, 32.5. Diodorus, or his main source, accuse Nicanor of duplicity (probably true), but which reflects an Athenian bias in that Nicanor was no more bargaining in bad faith than were the Athenians themselves, who were playing both sides against the middle (literally). For a general discussion of Athens in this period, with a heavily Athenian bias, see J. M. Williams, *Athens Without Democracy: the Oligarchy of Phocion and the Tyranny of Demetrios of Phalerum*, 322-307 B.C. (diss., Yale University, 1982).

35. Diod., 18.64.3. Nicanor was well connected in Athens and not, strictly speaking, a Macedonian. He was from Stagira (Diod., 18.8.3), the same city as Aristotle, and was (in fact) both Aristotle's son-in-law and the executor of Aristotle's will (Diogenes Laertius, 5.12). Finally, it had been Nicanor who delivered Alexander's decree concerning the restoration of the Greek exiles at the Olympic Games in 324. As such, the Athenians may have expected a sympathetic ear.

36. Diod., 18.65.1.

37. Diodorus states (18.65.2) that Nicanor was rightened (*phobetheis*) at the prospect of Olympias' return to Macedonia, which may well be true or another bit of propaganda. Regardless, Nicanor held on to the Munychia and Piraeus for Cassander, so he couldn't have been too frightened. For the arrival of Polyperchon's son, Alexander, see Diod., 18.64.3 and Plut., *Phoc.*, 33.1.
sight, that Alexander was already playing his own game\textsuperscript{38}. The key element, supposedly, was the friends of Antipater (including Phocion), who went to Alexander fearing the growing ugly mood among the Athenians, and persuaded Alexander to hold the forts for himself until after the defeat of Cassander. Though the charge sounds more like the later radical democratic rhetoric attainting Phocion and his friends traitors, it is clear that Phocion knew his Athenians well. In March of 318, a radical democratic slate of magistrates was put in office by the Ekklesia, while Phocion and his friends were condemned: some to exile; some to death; some to confiscation of property (which echoes Polyperchon’s orders to Argos)\textsuperscript{39}.

Phocion and his party appealed to Alexander, and a group including Phocion, Solon of Plataea and Deinarchos of Corinth, were sent on to Polyperchon (who was still on the march South)\textsuperscript{40}. This party was delayed at Elateia in Phokis when Deinarchos fell ill, which gave time for the new government of Athens to denounce Phocion and despatch an embassy of its own to Polyperchon. By chance, both groups found Polyperchon at the same time near Pharygai in Phokis, encamped with the main army and Philip Arrhidaios. Polyperchon’s first act was to order Deinarchos arrested, tortured and executed even before he spoke (which probably is a clue to where Corinth’s sympathies lay as Deinarchos had been Antipater’s man there)\textsuperscript{41}. The whole interview was a travesty. The radical democrats, led by Hagnonides, were tumultuous in their accusations; Polyperchon continually interrupted Phocion’s defense until Phocion simply gave up in disgust. When one of Phocion’s party tried to appeal, Polyperchon told him to stop lying in the presence of the King, at which Philip Arrhidaios pitched a fit and attacked the individual, one Hegemon, physically until the king was finally restrained\textsuperscript{42}. Phocion and his party were sent back to Athens under guard.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{38} Diod., 18.65.3. For Phocion’s role, see Diod., 18.65.4. Significantly, the episode is omitted from Plutarch’s, \textit{Life of Phocion} (the relevant section is 33).
\item \textsuperscript{39} Phocion was specifically deposed. See Plut., \textit{Phoc.}, 33.1-2; and Diod., 18.65.6-66.1.
\item \textsuperscript{40} Diod, 18.66.1 and Plut., \textit{Phoc.}, 33.3-4, which gives the composition of the party and its partial itinerary.
\item \textsuperscript{41} For Polyperchon’s actions, see Diod., 18.66.3 and Plut., \textit{Phoc.}, 33.5-34.1. For Deinarchos’ previous role and his particular cooperation with Cassander in the Demades affair, see Plut., \textit{Demosth.}, 31.4; Arr., \textit{Ta meta Alex.}, 9.14-15. See, also, H. Berve, \textit{Das Alexanderrreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage}, vol. II (Muenchen, 1926) no. 248 (p. 130).
\item \textsuperscript{42} Plut., \textit{Phoc.}, 33.5-7. Arrhidaios erratic behavior here (first laughing uproariously, then uncontrollably angry) may be the clue to his mental illness. Equally, Polyperchon’s curious remark about lying may have triggered an expected response in Arrhidaios (that is, Polyperchon knew it would set him off). 
\end{itemize}
Once in Athens, a hasty Assembly was called and a letter (ostensibly from Philip Arrhidaios) was read aloud in which he adjudged Phocion's party to be traitors. The subsequent trial was a foregone conclusion. Phocion and four others were condemned and executed on the same day, the 19th Day of Mounychion ironically, which was early May of 318\(^43\). A number of others, including Demetrios of Phaleron, were condemned \textit{in absentia} because they had already fled to Nicanor. These events, other than the salutory manner in which Phocion met his death, are instructive for us in two regards. First, the treatment of Deinarchos, which confirms the position of Corinth in the struggle as a supporter of Cassander. Second, it reveals the lengths to which Polyperchon would go to secure the support of the new Athenian democracy, and by extension the support of the other Greek cities.

It was precisely at this point that Cassander sailed into the Piraeus with thirty-five ships and four thousand soldiers, while Polyperchon was still in Phokis working his way South\(^44\). That finally prompted Polyperchon to action; he brought his army of 20,000 Macedonian infantry, 4000 allies, 1000 cavalry and 65 war elephants immediately into Attica. However, Polyperchon was at once faced with a critical shortage of supplies, and was forced to divide his forces. He left only enough men with his son, Alexander, as could be supported by Attica, while he took the majority of the army into the Peloponnesos. As Thessaly, Macedonia and Boeotia were major grain growing regions, this amply demonstrates that Polyperchon was having problems in Northern and Central Greece: the supplies were simply not getting through to him. The only logical explanation is that the choke points at Trikka, Pharkadon, Herakleia and Amphissa were holding things up, as we have no mention of Polyperchon achieving any success against them.

If Polyperchon was having trouble elsewhere, things went much better for him at first in the Peloponnesos. While Cassander secured the island of Aegina and attacked Salamis, Polyperchon called a \textit{synedrion} of the delegates from the cities to discuss alliance, which demonstrates that most of the cities were at least holding themselves aloof. Polyperchon precipitated things by ordering that all magistrates appointed by Antipater be put to death and autonomy (clearly defined as any anti-Cassander government) be established\(^45\).

\(^{43}\) Plut., \textit{Phoc.}, 34.1-35.1; Diod., 18.66.3-67.6.

\(^{44}\) Diod., 18.68.1-2 for Cassander's arrival and Polyperchon's position: and 18.68.3 for Polyperchon's forces, critically short of supplies and his withdrawal into the Peloponnesos.

\(^{45}\) Diod., 18.69.3-4 for both Polyperchon's orders and their results.
Diodorus reports that many cities did just this: massacres occurred, others were driven wholesale into exile and the governments recovering their "autonomy" entered into alliance with Polyperchon. All that is except Megalopolis, which conducted a census, turned out an armed force of 15,000 to man the walls and prepared for a siege. The command of Megalopolis was under one Damis, who had campaigned with Alexander in Asia and India, but is otherwise unknown. Polyperchon brought down his whole force, invested Megalopolis with two fortified camps, wooden towers and a palisade.

The siege of Megalopolis itself need not concern us directly, other than to note that it was a complete fiasco for Polyperchon. Even though his sappers breached the massive defenses, destroying three great towers and their connecting curtain walls, Polyperchon was unable to take the city. Polyperchon then left part of his army at Megalopolis to continue the siege, while he went off ἐκέραυνος ἄνυγκαλος ἄριστος part of which was to send Cleitus the White and the fleet to interrupt Cassander's communications at the Hellespont. That, too, was ultimately a failure and brought Lysimachus in on Cassander's side.

The failure at Megalopolis had far reaching consequences. By now it must have been late summer or early autumn of 318, and Diodorus states that αἱ πλείσται τῶν Ἑλλήνων πόλεων ἀριστέραν τῶν Βασιλέων πρὸς Κάσανδρον ἀπέκλιναι. The radical democracy at Athens even opened negotiations with Cassander and, after several conferences over the winter of 318/17, reached a settlement establishing φιλία καὶ συμμαχία with Cassander. The terms drew the difference between Polyperchon's and Cassander's approaches, and were undoubtedly meant to be taken precisely that way by Cassander: there was no confisation of property; reneuvres were un-

46. For the preparations, see Diod., 18.70.1-4; 18.71.2 for Damis' role in all this.
47. Diod., 18.70.5-72.9 for a full account of the siege.
48. See Diod., 18.72.1 for the quote, and 18.72.2-9 and Polyaen., 4.6.8-9 (which is full of erroneous detail) for Cleitus' naval mission. For an excellent general discussion of this and seapower's role for Macedonia under Cassander (and the first three Antigonids), see K. Boraselis, Das hellenistische Makedonien und die Aegais (Muenchener Beitrage fur Papyrusforschung und antiken Rechtsgeschichte, 73), Munich, 1982.
49. Diod., 18.75.2. Cassander's naval commander at the Hellespont was Nicanor (the phrouarchos from Athens), whose ambitions resulting from this victory got the better of him during Cassander's first military expedition to Macedonia in 317. Nicanor wound up being put on trial for treason, was convicted and duly executed: Diod., 18.75.1 and Polyaen., 4.11.2.
50. Diod., 18.74.2-3. For a full discussion of the chronology, see S. Dusanic, "The Year of the Athenian Archon Archippus II (318/17)", BCH 89 (1965), 128-141.
touched; a moderate oligarchy based on a property qualification of ten *minai* was established and Cassander named Demetrius of Phaleron to head the government. The only revenge taken on the opposing faction was the condemnation of those radicals who had killed Phocion, but as Plutarch states the condemnation and execution of Hagnonides was done at the instigation of the Athenian people, while the only other two to die were victims of Phocion's son in a private act of vengeance. In other words, Cassander sponsored no wholesale massacres of his political opponents nor mass numbers of exiles. He even promised to return the Munychia and the Piraeus to Athenian control when the war with the Kings was concluded, which, if insincere, at least came from the man who held them.

The rewards for this moderation came later in the Spring of 317, when Cassander made his first military expedition to Macedonia, Diodorus notes that many of Cassander's countrymen (πολλούς ... τῶν ἐγχωρίων) came over to Cassander, as did the "Greek Cities", specifically because Polyperchon had lacked energy "in representing the Kings and his [Polyperchon's] allies", whereas Cassander "treated all fairly and was energetic in carrying out his affairs". Aside from the expedition on which he was currently occupied, all of Cassander's actions demonstrating this energy and fairness occurred over the previous two years in dealing with the Greek cities. Those actions were obvious counterpoints to the judicial murders, political massacres and exiles, and massive property confiscations at Polyperchon's orders in 318.

The expedition to Macedonia undoubtedly occurred during Polyperchon's absence in Epirus that Spring (317), where he was desperately trying to convince Olympias to throw in with him. Eurydice used the opportunity presented by Polyperchon's absence (as he had given her "the administration of the regency") to assert Philip Arrhidaios' nominal power by sending Polyperchon a letter announcing that Philip Arrhidaios was appointing Cassander as regent (which was totally within his legal prerogative). Cassander, in two years, had won his point about his ability and the regency, though that very success brought Olympias in on Polyperchon's side and the game was to continue for fifteen more years.

51. Diod., 18.74.3.
52. Plut., Phoc., 38.1.
53. Diod., 18.75.2.
54. On Polyperchon, see Diod., 19.11.2; on Eurydice's position, see 19.11.1.
55. Justin, 14.5. See, also, Rosen, "Political Document" (*supra* n. 25), 75.
56. The naming of Cassander to the regency was the deciding factor for Olympias. She
A review of these events reveals several interesting points, and demonstrates several traits which will be present throughout the rest of Hellenistic Greek history. First, the struggle for the regency of Macedonia occurred entirely in Greece and the Aegean Basin, at this stage at least; in effect, the control of Greece Proper became the key to the control of Macedonia, and was to remain so down to the Roman occupation. Second, whereas over the previous twenty years coalitions of Greeks at Chaeronea (in 338), Megalopolis (in 331) and Crannon (in 322) had acted to resist Macedonian control, from now on they will merely react to outside initiatives as part of a greater power struggle among the Successors to Alexander and the monarchies they founded; in effect, the Greek city-states had become pawns in the game of empire. That, too, remained true down to the Roman occupation, which turned the game into a Roman one. Nevertheless, pawns or no, the Greek poleis were essential elements in Cassander's road to power, and remained so in his struggle to hold Macedonia. Finally, the call to Greek liberty, to freedom and autonomy which harkened back to the first part of the Fourth Century, became a propaganda cliche acted out upon the Greek city-states by greater outside forces, in their own power struggles amongst themselves. As with the other factors, this feature lasted down through Rome's organization of Macedonia as a province (in 147/6) and, hence, became one of the leitmotifs of the Hellenistic Age.

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marched to Euia in Dassaretis, along with Polyperchon and the Epirote army. Arrhidaios' army deserted him, and Olympias preceded to run amok settling up old scores and hatreds. On Euia's location, see Ptolemy 3.13.32; on Olympias' action, see Diod., 19.11.2-9; Justin, 14.5.10; Pausanias, 1.11.3-4 and 35.6 as well as 8.7.7; and Aelian, V.H. 13.36. Though Cassander was back in power in Macedonia within weeks, it took him until the Spring of 316 to mop up the centers of resistance. Even then, he wasn't secure until the Spring of 302, when he probably assumed the kingship; see W. L. Adams, "The Dynamics of Internal Macedonian Politics in the Time of Cassander", Archaia Makedonia, vol. III, 17-30.