DISTORTING HISTORY: CONCERNING A RECENT ARTICLE ON ETHNIC IDENTITY IN GREEK MACEDONIA*

In the May 1993 issue of the *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* XI number 1 (May 1993), pp. 1-28, "Politicizing Culture: Negating Ethnic Identity in Greek Macedonia", Dr. Anastasia Karakasidou presented a provocative analysis of what she terms the Greek state's politicization of culture in Greek Macedonia and its denial of ethnic identity among the Slavic speaking inhabitants there. Her paper purports to investigate charges that these Slavic speakers have found themselves forbidden to use their Slavic language or to engage in songs, dances, and other public activities by Greek authorities, and that this denial has resulted in the negation of their ethnic identity. Furthermore, among other things, she charges Greece with the deliberate "falsification of Macedonian history" and Greek scholars with having frequently argued their case from historical premises that are fundamentally misinformed1.

Although the author includes what amounts to a disclaimer, i.e. that her "paper was researched and written before the current crisis over the "Battle for the Name of Macedonia reached the diplomatic and public international arenas... (and that) it does *not* pretend to participate in the debate over the construction of stipulated genealogies to "national ancestors" in the distant past, nor does it wish to advocate a particular position on the current international debate surrounding diplomatic recognition of the newly independent state of former Yugoslavia." (p. 21). It is clear from the serious-

* I wish to thank Dr. Speros Vryonis, Jr., Aristide D. Caratzas, Dr. Joseph Portanova, Pyrrus Ruches, Yiorgos Chouliaras, Spyros Koutsoupakis, Dr. Peggy Voss and Athanasia Gregoriades for reading a draft of this article and making many valuable suggestions. Naturally, I alone am responsible for the positions taken and any errors that remain in the final version. I hope that this small contribution to promoting a better understanding of the "Macedonian Question" may serve as an indication to my many friends at Anatolia College and the American Center in Thessaloniki that I have not forgotten them.

1. These accusations are made in the abstract and repeated throughout her article. Concerning the "falsification of Macedonian history" by Greek scholars, see pages 7-12.
ness of the charges made against the Greek government, and from the tone of Dr. Karakasidou's analysis (that no matter what her intentions), her study takes positions on fundamental issues concerning the current political debate over Macedonian history and ethnicity. In fact, she refers directly to articles in the Greek press relating to the current political crisis.

Given the importance of the issues this paper raises, one must consider carefully the quality and quantity of the evidence she presents to support her assertions. For if she is correct, the Greek government is guilty of serious violations of human rights, and the academics who have written detailed works of scholarship in support of Greece's supposed falsification of Macedonian history have violated basic principles of historical method and analysis. However, if it can be demonstrated that Dr. Karakasidou's assertions are based upon a serious misrepresentation of the evidence, then one must conclude, based on this article, that she is assuming a political position in the guise of anthropological research.

As I hope to show, the author not only ignores large amounts of often essential documentation which contradict her assertions, but makes broad generalizations based on personal field notes of limited value and journalistic accounts without citing any documentary evidence to support them. To rely solely upon the claims of personal informants and partial documentation distorts the issues and belongs to the category of anecdotal tracts not scholarly research. In her concluding "analysis", Karakasidou abandons any pretense to objectivity and acts as an advocate for certain political views relating to one of the ethnic communities she has studied.

While primary and secondary sources relating to historical issues concerning the so-called "Macedonian Question" have not always led to general agreement, their presentation in connection with the historical and political issues the author raises are basic to any fair and objective analysis. There are a large number of authoritative studies and published sources that are essential in order to adequately deal with modern Greek ethnicity, history and politics.

Although the author refers to her study as "an anthropologically informed critique" (p. 21, note 1), she does not restrict her critique to describing the contemporary community of Florina she has studied, but takes positions

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2. For example, Gregoriades, in To Bema 21, July 1991; Lazarides in Auge 30, June 1991 and 7 July 1991; and Vakalopoulos in Macedonia, 14 July 1991. It was clear by May 1991 that the Yugoslav republic of Macedonia had begun a separatist movement. Additional references to the Greek press are cited on pages 14-17.
upon historical issues in the fields of Byzantine and modern Greek history. While the study of Hellenism has gained much from scholars who have taken an interdisciplinary approach to particular topics, a comparative approach requires a familiarity with the scholarship on the subjects being considered. In the case of the "Macedonian Question", this literature is vast, and relates to very complex historical sources relating to administration, social structures, demographics, ideology and politics. Recently, the scholarship concerning modern Greek nation-building and ethnic identification has also grown, and so anyone concerned with these much debated topics must be also familiar with this body of "theoretical" literature as well.

Dr. Karakasidou divides her article into ten sections. Let us consider each one and the evidence that she presents in support of her assertions. Her first section is entitled "A Case Study Narrative" (pages 1-4) and describes an encounter she had with a group of what she defines as "Slavo-Macedonian" speakers in an unidentified village in the highlands above Edessa. It is unclear why, since she conducted her field research in the area of Florina, she introduces her article with a description of what she was told by Slavic speakers in another area. Presumably, the same information could have been documented from her field notes from the Florina region. Perhaps this was to contrast what her Edessean informants identified as their "Macedonian language", with what she asserts all Slavic languages are referred to in "Central Macedonia" - Bulgarian. If this is the case, one wonders how Dr. Karakasidou determined that the inhabitants of the Florina region also consider their language to be Slavo-Macedonian, as she later asserts (p. 3), since all Slavic languages in Florina are referred to as Bulgarian?

The issue of the linguistic differences between Bulgarian and Slavo-Macedonian is technical and highly disputed along political lines. Upon

3. See Walter Goldschmidt, "The Cultural View of History and the Historical View of Culture", in The "Past" in Medieval and Modern Greek Culture edited by Speros Vryonis, jr. (Udena Publications, Malibu 1978) 3-12, for a discussion of the different approaches between historians and anthropologists to the study of culture; also the comments of Speros Vryonis, Jr., "Recent Scholarship on Continuity and Discontinuity of Culture: Classical Greeks, Byzantines, Modern Greeks", on pages 249-251, in the same volume where some healthy "whoring after the social sciences" is advocated; also John Haldon, "Jargon vs. the Facts? Byzantine History-Writing and Contemporary Debates", BMGS IX (1984/5) 95-132. These kind of issues have already stimulated debate within the MGSA, see the comments concerning Vassilis Lambropoulos's article in the Journal of Modern Greek Studies VII, 1 (May 1989). Full citations will be given for each reference whenever it first appears in the notes. Thereafter, an abbreviated author-title will be cited.
what basis is she making a distinction between the two languages, and what is her justification for adopting a category applied to a linguistic group identified as existing in the former Yugoslavia with one in Central Greek Macedonia? Later on, she cites only one study to support the assertion that Slavo-Macedonian is distinct from Bulgarian. One can cite studies that say the opposite it the case. She cannot point to any historical references to Slavo-Macedonian as a separate language prior to the establishment of the Yugoslav republic of Macedonia. Other scholars have shown, utilizing Greek and non-Greek sources, that the linguistic identification of the Slavic minority in Greek Macedonia has varied widely over the centuries depending on cultural and political factors. Clearly, this issue and its connection to nationality and ethnicity in Greek Macedonia alone is crucial to her study, yet this question is inadequately documented from the scholarly literature.

This is especially troubling since her “case study” makes clear that she does not understand Slavo-Macedonian herself and was relying on Greek translations. One wonders how she was able to distinguish between Serbo-Croatian, Bulgarian, Albanian, Vlach, Romanian and the Slavo-Macedonian language necessary for her identification of ethnicity and its assimilation during her field research. Without such an ability her field notes are dependent upon the accuracy of her translators or other interlocutors. Additionally, the reader is never told when and for how long she conducted her research in the Florina region other than it took place “for several years”.

Characteristically, her notes for this section do not refer to any documentation but simply explain a very small portion of her text in broad terms. This is surprising since her informants from the region of Edessa make several disturbing assertions, i.e. (in summary) that: 1) the name of their village and of all the villages in the area had been changed during the Metaxas dictatorship, 2) the Slavic inscription of their village church had been plastered over.


5. See the various works of Evangelos Kofos cited below in footnotes 7, 10 and 11.
3) at one time the men of the village were so unfamiliar with Greek that they were surprised to hear young children speak Greek in Central Greece; 4) they were ill-treated during their military service; 5) they do not understand the language used inside Bulgaria or Serbia; and 6) that during the Metaxas regime they were forced to learn Greek and punished for speaking Slavo-Macedonian.

The reader is left to wonder whether these assertions by informants who also claim to speak "the language of Alexander the Great" are isolated cases or part of a pattern that can be documented. Since Karakasidou does not accept their absurd claim concerning the identification of Slavo-Macedonian with Alexander the Great, why lend credence to their other assertions and reproduce them?

In the case of Edessa, Karakasidou should be aware that its location and role as a center for Slav separatists in the 1940's during the period of German occupation and the Greek civil war, might have something to do with the assertions of the Slavo-Macedonians she reproduced. Less than fifty years ago the region was a hotbed for separatists, and it took a full-scale war and international intervention to secure Greece's northern border. I will return to this topic later because it receives only passing mention by Karakasidou despite that it is very much a part of the subject she is studying.

By simply reproducing her "case study" with very little critical comment, she gives the impression that the assertions of her Edessean informants are correct. In fact, the assertion that all of their villages had their name changed during the Metaxas dictatorship is highly unlikely since this process began

in the late nineteenth century and had occurred much earlier in the south. Without knowing exactly which villages are being referred to it is impossible to comment further. But it is absolutely incorrect to give the impression that all toponymic changes were the result of policies initiated by the Metaxas dictatorship. In fact, the question of what specific policies Metaxas implemented concerning the Slavic minorities in Greece remains to be studied. If Dr. Karakasidou knows of such a study or has conducted one herself, she doesn’t cite the evidence. In any case, the policies of the Metaxas regime were considered repressive in many areas of Greece and certainly not characteristic of Greek government policies over time.

In a brief section entitled “An Overview” (page 4), Dr. Karakasidou presents her views on the meaning and importance of culture, and how culture relates to the identity of a people. Again, she does not refer to any literature on the subject. Nevertheless, her theoretical construct is fairly straightforward with the exception that she views the role of nation-builders (those from above) as destructive when viewed from below (on a local level): “from the level of everyday life and social interaction, however, it uproots families, destroying existing patterns of local life, language, and culture”. This statement betrays the bias of her orientation. She does not consider such destruction to be a problem to be studied or a thesis to be tested, but presents it as a given element of nation-building applicable in every case.

Obviously the incorporation of any population into any new state in-


8. See the literature cited by Alexander Kitroeff, “Continuity and Change in Contemporary Greek Historiography”, *European History Quarterly* IX (April 1989) 282-3; and J. G. Joachim, “Writing the Biography of John Metaxas: An Historiographical Essay”, *New Trends in Modern Greek Historiography* edited by A. Lily Macrakis and P. Nikiforos Diamandouros (MGSA, Occasional Papers 1, 1982) 135-149. Evangelos Kofos, “Macedonia and Civil Conflict in Greece” 225, (all references will be to the New York reprint) refers to the compulsory methods of assimilation by the Metaxas regime as an anomaly, that differed from and was counterproductive to the assimilation approach used by the Greek government up until that time.
spired culture will undoubtedly result in local change. But, is this change
destructive in every case? Does it always completely destroy local languages,
institutions, traditions and cultural patterns. The construct also fails to make
a distinction between formal and popular culture, a distinction that has al­
ways been important to recognize in studying Greek history. Karakasidou's
generalization certainly cannot be applied to Hellenism in mainland Greece
during the period of the Ottoman conquest, nor to modern Greece's Muslim
minority in Thrace which is thriving. On the other hand, the destruction of
Hellenism has been nearly complete in Asia Minor. A study of the historical
record would show that some change in ethnic versus national orientation
usually occurs when any people is absorbed into a foreign state, or when a
state transforms itself into a new political/cultural entity. The degree of such
change is different in each case, and also varies within the social and institutio­
nal levels of the society.

The next section, entitled "The Case of Macedonia" (pp. 4-5) seeks to
apply the "destruction theory" she has proposed. One looks in vain for any
reference to the numerous works on the "Macedonian Question" by Evangelos
Kofos, who for example, in a recent article explored the subject of national
heritage and national identity in Macedonia in detail from a historical per­
spective. Is it possible that Dr. Karakasidou wrote an entire dissertation
dealing with the Slavic minority in northern Greece without ever encountering
the work of Kofos? His classic study of the entire Macedonian controversy,
first published in 1964, is still highly regarded for its objectivity and conside­

9. Concerning the survival of Hellenism in the Greek mainland see: Speros Vryonis,
Jr., "The Greeks Under Turkish Rule", in Hellenism and the First Greek War of Liberation
(1821-1830). Continuity and Change, ed. N. Diamandouros, J. Anton, J. Petropoulos,
P. Topping (Thessaloniki, Institute of Balkan Studies, 1976) 45-58; and Apostolos E. Vaca­
lopoulos, The Greek Nation 1453-1669: The Cultural and Economic Background of Modern
Greek Society (New Jersey, 1976). Concerning the survival and increase in population
of the Muslim minority in Thrace, see: K. G. Andreades, The Moslem Minority in Western
Thrace (Society of Macedonian Studies, Thessaloniki, 1956) and the comments of S. Victor
Papacosma, Politics and Culture in Greece (The University of Michigan Center for Politi­
cal Research, Ann Arbor, 1988) 23, who states that the population of the Muslim Minority
of Thrace has grown from roughly 90,000 in 1923 to more than 120,000. Concerning the
destruction of Hellenism in Asia Minor, see: Speros Vryonis, jr., The Decline of Medieval
Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth
Century (University of California Press, 1971) and his comments in the Greek Orthodox

10. Evangelos Kofos, "National Heritage and National Identity", 229-268. This entire
issue of European History Quarterly was devoted to articles on Modern Greek nationalism
and nationality.
red basic to the examination of any aspect of this subject. How can she intelligently discuss the historical errors and supposed bias of modern Greek scholars concerning Slavo-Macedonians without referring even once to the work of Kofos? He is not only an eminent Greek scholar but an advisor to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs—his is the most appropriate example of Greek scholarship on the Macedonian Question for Karakasidou to criticize.

Kofos' 1964's work, his subsequent articles and books, and the studies on Greek nation-building published by the European History Quarterly cited above, bear directly upon the subject of Karakasidou's research, as do the many scholarly articles on Macedonian issues published in Balkan Studies, the journal of the Institute of Balkan Studies in Thessaloniki. These should have formed a point of departure for her study and supplied her with a theoretical and factual frames of reference to agree with or to dispute. Similarly, there are no references to the basic studies of aspects of the Macedonian question by Elizabeth Barker or Douglas Dakin. Instead, this additional substantial body of research based upon a wide variety of Greek and non-Greek sources is ignored, and as we shall see, highly selective studies are used.

In the “Case of Macedonia” section, Karakasidou informs the reader that 500,000 Greek refugees from Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace were resettled into Macedonia as part of the Greek government’s nation-building program in the 1920’s. Her approach to this question is characteristic:

11. Evangelos Kofos, Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia: Civil Conflict, Politics of Mutation, National Identity (Institute of Balkan Studies, Thessalonike, 1964), reprinted by Aristide D. Caratzas, Publisher, New York, 1993. An MGSA sponsored publication, Greece in the 1940's: A Bibliographic Companion edited by John O. Iatrides (University Press of New England, 1981) 52 refers to it as the “best existing source for this ticklish subject”. Kofos' scholarly contributions to this subject are too numerous to cite. See the appendix to the 1993 reprint for a selection of some of his most important articles and the references they cite for many of the rest.

12. See the index to Balkan Studies volumes 1-20 (1960-1979) ed. by Melessini Morelell-Cacouris and Thomy Verrou-Karakostas (Thessaloniki, 1984). Some of these articles have been recently reprinted in the publication Macedoniva: Past and Present (Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki, 1992).


14. Karakasidou does not cite a source for her figure of 500,000 refugees. Her reference to George Th. Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic: Social Coalitions and Party Strategies in Greece, 1922-1936 (University of California Press, 1983) should be to pages 187-88. She
First, she has not defined the area to which she is referring. Certainly, she must be aware that the geographic and administrative region called Macedonia has changed over time. It covered a different area in antiquity, the middle ages, the Tourkokratia and post-Ottoman periods. Thus, it is important to define the borders of the area to which she is attaching this geographic term (as most scholars who deal with Macedonia do)15.

On the second page of the Karakasidou article, a map of “Macedonia and the Balkan Countries” is reproduced. This map is nothing more than a illustration of what Slavo-Macedonians based in the former Yugoslav republic would consider the “legitimate” extended borders of their irredentist aspirations16. As such, it is a political statement and does not illustrate the present politico-geographic divisions of what has constituted “Macedonia” since the Second World War. Is this the Macedonian territory in which the Greek state settled refugees in the 1920’s? Of course not. The author is aware of this so she shifts terminology in her second paragraph and begins to refer to “Northern Greece” and “Western Greek Macedonia”, areas that are absent from her map of the region.

Although the author mentions the negative impact of the Greek refugee settlements upon the numerical superiority of the Slav inhabitant of the region, she fails to discuss their reaction. In fact, the Slavs considered the Greek

also makes no mention of the 1919 Convention signed by Greece and Bulgaria concerning their population exchange.


16. Compare this map to the one reproduced in the geographic volume published by the Skopje republic entitled Nasele na Mesta vo Egeiska Makedonija: Geografski, Etnicki, Istopanski Karakteristike [The Inhabited Places in Aegean Macedonia; Geographical, Ethnic and Agricultural Characteristics] vol. I (Institut za Nacionalna Istorija, Skopje, 1978) which contains a detailed, village by village demographic “justification” for designs upon northern Greek territory. A similar map was also published in “Nova Makedonija” Skopje, 1992. For an example of a properly drawn Macedonian map that takes national borders into account, see for example, Elisabeth Barker, British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War (Harper & Row, New York, 1976) 196.
refugees as interlopers and opposed their settlement and integration\(^{17}\). This enmity had dire consequences during the 1940's and added local feuds over land rights to the international conflicts of the period.

In pursuit of her "theory of ethnic destruction" she accepts that the various ethnic groups that inhabit Greek Macedonia today identify themselves as Greek. She accuses the Greek state however, of creating the minority problem in the region through its redefinition of ethnicity as nationality. It does not occur to her that this redefinition may have been part of a historical process beyond the control of the Greek state, or that it may have occurred naturally as part of a peaceful assimilation process. Even the various stages of the Greek state's assimilation policies that can be documented are ignored. She views everything that took place in Ottoman Macedonia since the nineteenth century, as part of a deliberate master plan aimed at forced amalgamation by Greek authorities. This gives her another opportunity to repeat some of the accusations made earlier by her informants in Edessa against the Greek government, which she accepts uncritically.

Thus we are told that according to data she has collected in the area of Florina, that the Greek state's policy of assimilation deprives the area's Slavic speakers "of their status as an ethnic minority within the nation-state, the right to gain equitable access to jobs, to practice their own Orthodox religion, to speak their own language, and to educate their children in the folklore and stories of their ancestors" (p. 5). In other words, the author would have us believe that the apparatus of the modern Greek state is so powerful in the area of Florina, and that it polices individuals so completely, that these authorities prevent families from engaging in the personal activities noted above. Given her earlier comments concerning the extent of this government control, it would appear that the Slavic speakers of Florina are even monitored by the authorities while in their homes. What is Karakasidou's evidence for this supposed repression? We are not given any in her notes.

She also reports (again based on her personal field research) that 80% of the population in the undefined region of Florina she has studied consists of Slavic speakers or their descendants. Thus, it would appear that the Greek state's supposed policy of "ethnic destruction" has not been as successful as she earlier indicates, since the Slavs there are still identifiable. Perhaps it is the Greeks of Florina that have suffered "ethnic destruction", since in the census data of 1928 the Greek population of Florina was reported to have

\(^{17}\) George Th. Mavrogordatos, *Stillborn Republic*, 249.
been 61%\textsuperscript{18}. Apparently, she has also forgotten the opening paragraphs of her article where she reports that she observed Slavo-Macedonians freely speaking their language near Edessa. These informants felt so secure in their language use, that they spoke it in front of complete strangers. If they are so repressed by Greek authorities, why weren't they afraid to speak Slavo-Macedonian in front of Karakasidou and her husband?

In the next section, "Contesting culture, transforming identity: culture, state-formation and cultural revolution" (pages 5-6) Karakasidou uses two theoretical works on nation-building to bolster the “ethnic destruction” argument she posed earlier—a study concerning English state formation and the more general work by Anderson\textsuperscript{19}. Neither of these works appear to be directly applicable to modern Greek state formation, or require the level of subculture destruction which is the cornerstone of Karakasidou’s theoretical argument. However, she concludes this section by stating that: “To understand how this transformative process takes place requires a close and critical examination of changes in the enculturation process”. Her subsequent sections will show us how close and critical her examination of these supposed changes actually is.

The section entitled: “The Contest for private and public spheres: family and state in local society” (pages 6-7), is remarkable in that it contains no

\textsuperscript{18} I do not have access to the Athens, 1992 publication of the Left Movement in the School of History and Archaeology she cites: Demetres Lithoxou, “To makedoniko zetema kai e sygkrotese tou ellenikou mythou” [The Macedonian Question and the Formation of the Hellenic Myth], in Mia syzetese sten philosophike: ellenikos ethnikismos, makedoniko zetema. However, Ath. Angelopoulos, “Population Distribution of Greece Today According to Language, National Consciousness and Religion”, Balkan Studies XX (1979) 130-1, cites the same figures for Slavic speakers in Greece from the 1928 and 1951 Greek census. Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic 247, notes the differing reports of Florina’s Slavic population during the interwar period. He states that the Prefect of Florina reported that the Slavs were 49% of the population in 1930. According to League of Nations data cited by George Zotiades, The Macedonian Controversy (Society of Macedonian Studies, Thessalonike, 1961) 42, sixty-one percent of the population of province of Florina was Greek in 1928. Thus, Karakasidou would have us believe that a mass exodus of Greeks has taken place from this region since that time!

\textsuperscript{19} I note that Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London, Verso, 1983) is concerned with nationalism as a theoretical, cultural construct. He refers to modern Greek nationalism only occasionally and does not discuss it any detail. On the other hand, John A. Armstrong, Nations Before Nationalism (The University of North Carolina Press, 1982) discusses the Byzantine and Ottoman context of ethnicity and nation-building in great detail. Perhaps Armstrong’s conclusions are more relevant to ethnicity and nation-building in late Ottoman Macedonia.
references or documentation of any kind. As such it is Karakasidou's imagined application of her ethnic destruction theory to the Slavo-Macedonian family level based on her own personal speculation. We see repeated here accusations against the Greek government for its supposed prevention of Slavo-Macedonians from speaking their own language, practicing their religious ceremonies, and engaging in public or private celebrations of their culture.

If there is any point to this section, it is to call attention to the obvious notion that schools and other public institutions of the state try to impart a national vision of culture. Karakasidou's gives this rather routine aspect of Greek public institutional life a sinister air: "The authority of the state forcefully intervened in the private domain of the family, taking over responsibilities of enculturation that had previously been largely domestic" (page 7). Apparently, she is unaware of the role that Serbian, Greek, Bulgarian and Rumanian schools and cultural associations played in Ottoman Macedonia in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, not to mention most national educational systems in Europe and the rest of the world. In her imagination she views the typical Slavo-Macedonian family as being untouched by such institutions, repressive or otherwise, prior to the Greek state's involvement. Detailed accounts of the role played by competing Bulgarian, Greek, Serb and Rumanian, schools, churches and cultural associations exist. All of these states tried to influence ethnic identification in Greek Macedonia, sections of Bulgaria and the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia at one time or another20. They should form the background to Karakasidou's "scholarly analysis" of the Greek state's institutional repression of culture. In order to document these forms of supposed Greek institutional repression one would also have to cite evidence from school reports, police records and local government agencies from the region. No such evidence is cited.

Karakasidou's next section is entitled "Appropriating ethnic identity in Macedonia: academic legitimization, Greek politicians and propaganda" (pp. 7-10). It is in this section where her bias and political agenda becomes

20. See the relevant sections in Dakin, The Greek Struggle in Macedonia, especially pages 44-70, 198-210; and those in Duncan M. Perry, The Politics of Terror: The Macedonian Liberation Movements 1893-1903 (Duke University Press, 1988). Kofos describes the competing policies of the Patriarchate and the Greek government in "Macedonia: National Heritage and National Identity", 105-111. It is interesting to note that Karakasidou's information concerning Greek repression parallels that of publications published by the former Yugoslav republic's propaganda mill such as, Tosho Popovski, Makedonskoto Natisionalno Malsininstvo vo Bulgarija, Grtsija i Albanija (Skopje, 1981); or Istoriyata na Makedonskiot Narod, Kniga III, published by NIP Nova Makedonija (Skopje, 1969).
even more obvious. She begins with a simplistic and distorted summary of what can be termed the continuity thesis of Hellenic identity. She writes:

Greek scholars have maintained that the determining characteristic of the Greek nation during the Ottoman period was Orthodox religion, along with language and a common national conscience. These scholars argue that since language underwrites cultural identity and since the inhabitants of Greece (and here they include Macedonia) all spoke Greek, they shared a common cultural tradition and a common cultural memory of the "glorious history of the ancestors". In this manner they composed a nation. At the head of this nation, according to Martis (1984), was the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, whose duty it was to protect the culture and religion of the Orthodox, providing them with the possibility of preserving their national conscience. Such arguments provide the Greek nation with a "glorious past" stretching without interruption from the Classical era through Hellenistic and Byzantine times and up to the 19th century; they claim that this nation consisted of one unchanging Hellenic group with a continuous, uninterrupted ethnic history and civilization (pages 7-8).

The first thing that one is struck by in this paragraph is that such a sweeping statement could be made without any reference to who these Greek scholars are. The only person named is Mr. Nicholaos K. Martis, the former Minister of Northern Greece, who is certainly not an established scholar and has not written on the subject of Hellenic continuity. His publication on the falsification of Macedonian history, not considered a scholarly work, is the source of Karakasidou's generalization of modern Greek scholarship. In fact, Martis' semi-popular monograph contains very little information on

21. Karakasidou does not provide page references to Nicholaos K. Martis, The Falsification of Macedonian History (Athens, 1984) 79-80 where she obviously derives her information. Compare Martis' text to that quoted from Karakasidou's article: "During the years of enslavement, Hellenism maintained in some manner the character of a functioning state. Fundamental roles in this played the common spoken tongue, the cultural tradition, the memory of the glorious history of the ancestors, education, and especially religion, which all together contributed to the formation and preservation of a common national conscience... At the head of the nation was the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople, protecting the religion and culture of the orthodox nations, giving them the possibility to preserve their national conscience".
the complex continuity of Hellenism during the Byzantine and Ottoman periods. Is this work by a Greek politician the extent of Karakasidou’s knowledge of modern Greek research on Hellenic continuity and nation-building?

What is more serious than her methodology is her lack of basic knowledge concerning the scholarship on the Hellenic continuity thesis and its relationship to Greece identity formation. Anyone who discusses this question will most certainly refer to either the classic work of Paparregopoulos, that of his modern continuator, Apostolos Vacalopoulos, or to the multi-volume work, *Istoria tou Ellenikou Ethnous*, to which an international team of mostly Greek scholars contributed to in the 1970’s. For the application of the continuity thesis in Greek Macedonia, Karakasidou should have referred to a volume entitled *Macedonia: 4000 Years of Greek History and Civilization* which appeared in 1983, and was issued by the same publisher as the multi-volume series cited above. Again, an international team of Greek and non-Greek scholars contributed a series of specialized articles on a wide variety of subjects relating to Macedonian Hellenism.

These large survey volumes actually contain a synthesis of hundreds of more specialized works which have identified, edited and studied thousands of primary and secondary sources relating to the linguistic, religious, political and ethnic/“national” nature of hellenic continuity. Sometimes the result is “glorious” but more often it is tragic, complex and contradictory. What the research shows is that continuity existed in some places and not in others. Hellenism reasserted itself in many areas and assimilated many ethnic groups during its long history.

Greek and non-Greek scholarship has recognized and described the various transformations and tensions that defined Hellenism’s survival throughout so many centuries. Not only has there been widespread agreement that the cultural experience and meaning of Hellenism has not remained static, but that its dynamic nature and ability to interact with and influence other cultures was a key element that allowed it to survive over so long a chronological period. In fact, the richness and complexity of these Hellenic mutations attracted the attention of no less an international authority on


cultural interactions than Arnold Toynbee, who devoted a lengthy volume to the subject. Although it is widely recognized that various forms of the Greek language were used by both ethnic Greeks and non-Greeks in the empire throughout the Tourkokratia, I know of no scholar, Greek or otherwise, who argues for its exclusively within the Greek lands. What most of the literature on this subject focuses on, is the survival of the Greek language from Byzantine times and how it relates to Greek ethnic survival and consciousness. A good example of this approach is Apostolos Vakalopoulos's detailed survey of Ottoman Macedonia, a work which Karakasidou either does not know or ignores. If she had used it, she would have found that Vakalopoulos documents the ethnic and linguistic diversity of Ottoman Macedonia in great detail for the period he covers. The theme of his volume is the survival of Hellenism, largely in the south, not its preeminence in any region.

If it is Karakasidou's contention that Hellenic continuity has no historical basis, then she must dismiss the body of evidence that scholars have produced to support it. While one can question whether the framework that different historians have used for its description is adequate or correct, the nature of the sources defines the validity and parameters of this framework. It is wrong to simply accuse Greek scholars of having constructed a continuity framework that does not have a high degree of validity based on the parameters defined by historical evidence, without re-examining the evidence itself. Challenges must come from informed critiques based on an understanding of the nature


of the primary sources and their contexts, not theoretical constructs that do not refer to them.

Even if one limits oneself only to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, i.e. the period of modern Greek nation-state formation, it is clear that there were always at least two main competing typologies of what the ethnic and cultural parameters of this state would be. One construct was derived from western national models which looked towards a narrow and exclusivist definition of ethnicity and culture, while the other, derived from Hellenism's multi-national Hellenistic, Byzantine and Ottoman traditions, sought to incorporate many cultures into a new Hellenic multi-ethnic state\textsuperscript{27}. Recently, Greek scholars such as Dimaras and Kitromilides have charted the precise vicissitudes of these competing views of the nature of modern Greek state formation through the study of contemporary texts\textsuperscript{28}. These texts and their studies prove that there was no uniformly accepted ideology of what shape the new state would take, but rather that various sectors of Greek society emphasized different aspects of Hellenism's cultural and political experiences to justify their political schemata. These ideological battles concerning the meaning and shape of the Hellenic continuity thesis continued well into the Twentieth Century. Even today, Hellenic identification transcends that of nationality in many diaspora communities throughout the world.

Karakasidou's deliberate misrepresentation of Greek scholarship extends even to some of the "documentation" she presents. She refers to unnamed Greek scholars who supposedly identify Byzantium as a golden age, and then goes on to misuse an article by the distinguished Byzantinist, Peter Charanis, to support her view that cultural continuity between Byzantine and modern Greek Hellenism is a perception developed by present day nationalist senti-


\textsuperscript{28} Paschalis M. Kitromilides, "Imagined Communities and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans", \textit{European History Quarterly} (April 1989) 28-9; and his, \textit{The Enlightenment as Social Criticism: Isosipos Moisiodax and Greek Culture in the Eighteenth Century} (Princeton, 1992) where references to the many works of Dimaras are cited.
ment. Having ignored and misrepresented the complex Greek scholarship on Hellenic continuity she then chooses an expansion of a speech made in 1945 at a conference on ethnic rights by Stilpon Kyriakides, to bolster this misrepresentation.

She presents Kyriakides' argument as depending upon Hellenic racial continuity and cultural superiority when in fact the opposite is the case. Her quotation relating to Herodotus' ethnic categories is taken from Kyriakides' general section on the nature of nationality and does not represent the categories of ethnicity he emphasizes. Kyriakides argues in favor of the importance of cultural consciousness, not racial continuity—a position, which although mentioned in the quotation used in Karakasidou's article, she completely ignores. In fact, Kyriakides minimizes the importance of racial, linguistic or religious continuity, positions which Karakasidou has deliberately misrepresented. In order that the reader can judge the extent of her distortion of this Greek scholar's position, I will quote the relevant sections in full. Kyriakides writes that:

And last but not least the national consciousness, the will, which may be described as the conscious knowledge of every individual that he is part of a nation, partaking to the strong groupal aspirations that bind him to the other individuals around him, creating thus the common will of all to belong to this and not to any other nation.

...This last spiritual characteristic, although considered by many as of secondary significance, must be indeed deemed as the main one upon which are based the ties which hold peoples into an unbroken spiritual and corporal entity, or, to use the expression of Aristoteles in a similar instance, as one man with so many feet, many arms and many senses.

29. Peter Charanis, "How Greek Was the Byzantine Empire?", Bucknell Review XI (3) 101-116. The point of Charanis' article was to stress the multi-ethnic and Roman, Christian and Hellenic cultural background of the Byzantine empire. He agrees with Vakalopoulos' thesis concerning the origin of modern Greek identity and concludes that the dominant feature of this civilization was Greek. He adds to these views in his subsequent articles: "The Formation of the Greek People", in The Past in Medieval and Modern Greek Culture, ed. by Vryonis, pp. 87-101 and "Romiosyne as a Concept for the Interpretation of Greek History", Byzantine Studies/ Etudes Byzantines vols VIII, XI, XII (1981, 1984 & 1985) 57-64.

To these we shall add the past of a nation as described by history, which creates the historical consciousness of the peoples and binds the individuals to the soil, the deeds and fortunes of their forefathers. This last element is a factor and a guide to the aspirations and actions of a nation with a view to a better future.

The above mentioned characteristics, however, are seldom to be found together. The historical upheavals of peoples have often caused some of these either to lose their importance or to become altogether extinct. The purity of race, for example, is seldom to be found because of inter-crossings with foreign races. All European nations of to-day have undergone such inter-breedings and none can boast nowadays of an absolute purity of blood. Germans, French, English, and Italians have assimilated a large number of peoples of other races. This, however, does not prevent them from having a strong national consciousness and their unity cannot be challenged through they are, anthropologically speaking mingled.

Even language, which is one of the main characteristics of a nation, has lost its importance...

The same thing applies also to religion. Religion has been a very important factor and often a substitute even for national feeling. Now religious dogma seems to have lost somehow its primal importance...

Even the unity of country and of state is not indispensable, Jews have been dispersed for centuries, speaking various languages and partaking of various civilizations. Notwithstanding this fact their national consciousness has always remained unshaken...

We may hence, conclude that although the loss of certain characteristics may bring a slackening of the ties which bind together a nation, they cannot completely destroy it. The only indispensable factors for the maintenance of the national unity are: common habits, i.e. common civilization; the common historical and national consciousness; the common national feeling and the common national will. When these are lost, a nation can be considered as disbanded. Although considered by many historians as merely subjective factors, they are, indeed, the main elements which form the essence of a nation. The social phenomenon we call a nation is mainly psychic, [psychological or spiritual] this being the fundamen-
tal tenor which differentiates it from the herds and swarms of animals

Similarly, Karakasidou distorts what Kyriakides has written about Hellenic continuity from a historical perspective. Her second quotation is from his conclusions concerning Byzantine civilization. Here he meant to stress that interaction between civilizations (not just Slavs—but Uzes, Hungarians, Vardiot Turks, Vlach-speaking Moglenopatsinakists, Albanians, Turks etc.) goes both ways. Interaction, not superiority is his theme. Additionally, Kyriakides wished to emphasize that linguistic influence did not only occur from the superior civilization (Byzantium) but that this dominant civilization was also influenced by others. A comparison of this concluding paragraph with that in the Greek original shows that the English translation of Kyriakides’s monograph is a summary. It is absolutely clear that this is what he means in the original Greek text.

As the statements quoted above show, Kyriakides is quite aware of the cultural and genetic diversity that has historically existed in northern Greece and seeks to identify the elements of Hellenic consciousness, not race or superiority within it. His is a broad definition of culture, even though he wrote his account to combat Bulgarian and Yugoslav territorial demands in the middle of the Greek civil war almost fifty years ago. However, I still believe that it is unreasonable and unfair to use an expanded speech from 1945 as a representative example of Greek scholarship on the position of Greece’s academic community regarding these issues today.

Karakasidou goes on to reject the notion that any continuous cultural

32. Kyriakides, The Northern Ethnological Boundaries 45-6; Kyriakides, Ta voreia ethnologika oria 48-9. Elsewhere (p. 53 in the English translation and page 59 in the Greek) he does specifically refer to linguistic interaction between Slavic and Greek, he writes: “We must reach the following conclusion: Whenever Greeks and Slavs lived together, the language that prevailed was the Slavic. Populations formerly bilingual underwent gradually a linguistic coalescence”. On occasion, Kyriakides does refer to racial characteristics, but he does so because of the sources he is using and in order to counter the arguments of his opponents. Racial continuity and Hellenic superiority are not the basis of his argument. Many of the civilizations with whom the Byzantines came into contact considered their civilization superior and consciously imitated it. The bibliography on mimesis during the medieval period is vast; I will cite only one work as an example, see: Dimitri Obolensky, The Byzantine Commonwealth: Eastern Europe, 500-1453, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1971, especially pages 272-290. Concerning the influence of Greek on Bulgarian see: A. I. Thavoris, “Greek Loan-words in Modern Bulgarian”, Balkan Studies XX, 1 (1979) 19-53.
consciousness is possible, and argues using theoretical constructs drawn from anthropology, that all nationality is constructed through the selective manipulations of social relations. Then, citing a newspaper story, she misrepresents the Greek position concerning the nature of modern Greek cultural consciousness by stating that the majority of Greek scholars equate national consciousness with ethnicity in general. In order to make her argument seem more scholarly, she also distorts what Apostolos Vabalopoulos states concerning the assimilation of the Slavs during the medieval period and the Tourkokratia in one of her notes. Her positions concerning ethnicity, cultural continuity and Hellenism are not surprising, since she has not cited any of the literature that has sought to determine the meaning of such historical terms as Hellene, Romaios (Romios), genos, ethnos, patris (patrida), Helladikos, laos, Hellas, Romaiko etc., based on the study of texts from the long historical tradition of Hellenism. Even during the last century, a pioneer in the study of modern Greek history, Konstantinos Sathas, recognized the importance of Muslim and Christian Albanian ethnicities within the framework of modern Greek history. What is needed are more studies of the demographic and cultural changes in the Balkans between Byzantium and the nineteenth century, not uninformed critiques based on abstractions and distortions.

33. I have not seen the newspaper article by Konstantinos Vabalopoulos so I cannot comment directly upon it. However, Karakasidou also offers a rare reference to a scholarly work by Apostolos Vabalopoulos, Origins of the Greek Nation 1204-1461 (Rutgers University Press, 1970) 2-3. Typically, she misrepresents what he states concerning the assimilation of the Slavs in Macedonia implying that he considered them completely assimilated by the Ottoman conquest. Vabalopoulos actually states that: "By the beginning of the Turkish occupation, it would appear that the total assimilation of the Slavs had been effected. This was certainly the case in southern Greece, although there may have been a few remnants in Western Thessaly and Epirus. All this is not, however, to suggest that the influence of the Slavs ceased forever. On the contrary, the peaceful penetration of parts of northern Greece, especially Thrace and Macedonia, continued until the Balkan wars of 1912-1913. These later immigrants were mostly Bulgarians who came as itinerant rural workers, building craftsmen and laborers" (pages 5-6).

34. For a recent example of this approach by a non-Greek scholar, see David Holton, "Ethnic identity and patriotic idealism in the writings of General Makriyannis", BMGS IX (1984/85) 133-160.

35. See the introductions to each volume of his Mnemeia Ellenikes Istorias. Monumenta Hellenicae Historiae. Documents ineditis relatifs a l'histoire de la Grece au moyen age, I-IX (Paris, 1880-96).

36. For a recent example of this kind of research see Anthony Bryer and Heath Lowry eds., Continuity and Change in Late Byzantine and Early Ottoman Society (Dumbarton Oaks, Washington, D.C., 1986). One should also note the work of Margaret Alexiou, The Ritual
Greek scholars familiar with these highly technical issues are always careful to distinguish between Hellenic and Helladic ethnic identification and the meaning of particular Greek institutional and ideological terms. This is why it is so very important to refer precisely to the time and place that these terms are being used based on specific textual or archaeological evidence. While there certainly have been examples of poor scholarship on the part of Greek scholars, it is incorrect and unfair to condemn everyone based on the simplistic reasoning of a few.

Having imagined that she has “deconstructed” the historical tradition of Greek scholarship, Karakasidou finally quotes a historical source concerning ethnicity in Ottoman Macedonia. This is none other than the British, pro-Bulgarian journalist Noel Henry Brailsford, who visited the area during 1903/04. The point of her quotation is to illustrate that ethnic identification among Central Macedonians was vague. However, she does not indicate who Brailsford meant by the term Central Macedonians, although it is clear from the context that he means Slavic-speakers not Greek speakers. Concerning the identification of Slavs with Hellenism, Brailsford also clearly observed that: “Under Bishops and Patriarchs it [the Orthodox Church] carried on the life of the Byzantine court, and preserved the Greek nationality with the Greek form of Christianity. It was a name which confounded Serbs, Bulgars, and Greeks under one common designation...”37. Nevertheless, he also knew that the circumstances had changed. This is why elsewhere Brailsford identified the emerging Slavo-Macedonian consciousness of his day with Bulgaria. He stated that: “The Macedonians are Bulgars to-day because a free and progressive Bulgaria has known how to attract them”, and concluded that the Slavo-Macedonians were actually Bulgarians38.

37. Brailsford, Macedonia 62.
38. Brailsford, Macedonia 103. See also the comments of Wilkinson, Maps and Politics 141-43.
The theme of his book is that the fluid nature of Slavic ethnicity in Ottoman Macedonia had solidified into a Bulgarian national consciousness that was winning over Slavs from previous identifications with Greek and Serbian nationalisms. Despite his intimate contact with Slavic peasants throughout Ottoman Macedonia, Brailsford did not find any evidence of any separate Macedonian ethnicity! On the other hand, despite his attempts to minimize the existence of any Greek villages north of Kastoria, he was also aware of the fact that the Greeks had a very strong Hellenic consciousness and that it was this fervent nationalism that led them to claim portions of Ottoman Macedonia39. Thus, we have another example of deliberate misrepresentation of the evidence by Dr. Karakasidou. Brailsford is a source for Hellenic continuity and the emergence of Bulgarian national consciousness in the region, not the existence of a Slavo-Macedonian ethnicity as she implies. She is the one who is falsifying history not Greece’s scholars.

Rather than selecting the views of one contemporary observer, Karakasidou should have compared Brailsford’s views with those of other contemporaries in order to obtain a clearer picture of what ethnicity and nationality meant to the peoples of Macedonia at the time. For example, the distinguished British historian William Miller makes this telling observation concerning ethnicity and nationality in Macedonia based on his visit to the region a few years prior to Brailsford:

Another solution of the Macedonian problem has lately been proposed. Europe has, it is said, conceded Bulgaria to the Bulgarians, and Servia to the Servians; why should she not give Macedonia to the Macedonians, either as an autonomous province of Turkey, or as an independent Balkan State? This solution, although it received the high approval of Mr. Gladstone, whose services will never be forgotten by the Balkan peoples, seems, in my humble judgement, impossible. There is no parallel between the case of

39. Brailsford, Macedonia 100, 123, 197, 200-01, 204. His prejudice against the Greeks of Macedonia is very pronounced and extends to his providing what amounts to a narrow Bulgarian interpretation of Byzantine history. At one point (p. 218) he states that the Greeks of Macedonia: “have degenerated into a race of townsmen, who form an ignoble aristocracy of talent, half clerical, half commercial, which exploits an alien peasantry that it despises”. Brailsford was writing at a time when the Greek state’s “Macedonian Struggle” was still in its early stages. In the subsequent period, the Greek inhabitants of Macedonia were mobilized to a greater degree than in 1904/5; see Dakin, The Greek Struggle 173, 250-287.
Macedonia and the cases of Servia and Bulgaria. There is no Macedonian nationality; the whole point of the difficulty in that country is that it is a medley of conflicting nationalities, which have nothing in common, except perhaps, their discontent with the existing regime.

Thus, according to Miller, ethnicity/nationality was so strong and divisive in Macedonia at that time, that he saw no solution to the region's political problems based upon any common cultural consciousness. Yet clearly, there were some people in Ottoman Macedonia who had no other consciousness other than their Christian/Byzantine identification. How can the statements of these two contemporary observers of Macedonian "nationality" both be correct? Let me suggest that Miller may have had more experience with better educated "Macedonians" and that Brailsford may have had more contact with uneducated "Macedonian" peasants. Thus, both observations may be valid, but for different levels of Ottoman Macedonia's complex society. It is clear that ethnic and national identity in Macedonia was a complicated affair, citing the views of any one primary source in isolation is distorting and deceptive.

One should also note that the British folklorist, G. F. Abbott, visited what he termed the Greek-speaking parts of Macedonia between 1900-1, where he gathered an impressive array of local traditions. These traditions, drawn from the rural inhabitants of the region should have been carefully compared to Brailsford's data and examined for information on cultural/ethnic identification. Abbott's work is a classic, and every anthropologist

40. William Miller, *Travels and Politics in the Near East* (London, 1898) 388. Brailsford, *Macedonia* 123, means the same thing when he states that: "The atmosphere of Macedonia is so poisoned with nationalism that the most enlightened patriot becomes corrupted against his will".

41. Elsewhere, Miller makes the following observation concerning "Macedonian" peasants: "Considerable sums of money are spent in the conversion of Bulgarians to the Servian nationality, for it is part of the grim irony of the Macedonian question that people are as ready to become Serbs or Bulgars for hard cash as they are in more civilized countries to vote Liberal or Conservative for a valuable consideration. American missionaries, working among Bulgarians of Macedonia, have noticed with surprise that all of a sudden their familiar disciples have changed their nationality, and blossomed out into full-blown Serbs". Miller, *Travels and Politics* 379. Brailsford, *Macedonia* 102, made a similar observation.

42. G. F. Abbott, *Macedonian Folklore* (Cambridge at the University Press, 1903). Abbott enumerates the places he visited and the various informants he gathered his information from, in detail.
who has done research on Macedonia should be familiar with it.

Greek scholars not only recognize how fluid ethnic and national identifications were in Ottoman Macedonia at the end of the Nineteenth Century, but they have also documented the Greek state’s attempts to take advantage of the fact that because of their religious affiliation, many Slavic speakers considered themselves Greek at that time. What Karakasidou has done is to confuse scholarship with politics in order to misrepresent the historical positions carefully documented by Greek historians.

In her next section, Karakasidou takes on a “court-like” approach in her attempt to condemn Greek scholarship and the Greek government’s approach to the Macedonian Question. I will consider the content of these portions of her article as a group (pages 10-19). Again, the sections are based upon largely unsupported assertions derived from her Slavo-Macedonian informants, allegedly from Florina, and selections from statements made in the popular Greek press.

She begins by repeating the claim of her informants that there were no Greeks living in the Fiorina prior to 1912. While I do not have access to Ottoman census data from the region, the presence of a Greek population in Florina prior to 1912 has been established beyond question through the study of Ottoman documents that survive from archives in Thessaloniki and Naoussa, and from the references to Greeks by many travellers who visited the region.

43. Kofos, “Macedonia: National Heritage and National Identity”, 104-09; and his “Dilemmas and Orientations of Greek National Policy in Macedonia: 1878-1886”, in Balkan Studies XXI 2, (1980) 45-55. Even Brailsford acknowledges this in his own hostile way when he states that: “So far as there is a real Greek party among them it consists mainly of the wealthier peasants- priests, moneylenders, storekeepers, and innkeepers-...”, Macedonia 198.

44. The titles of these sections are indicative of her “court-like approach”, these are: “Greece versus the people without history: the continuing “falsification of Macedonian history”, “The plaintiffs”, and “The defendants”. Apparently she has completely forgotten her earlier assertion that the article does not seek to take a position concerning the political crisis concerning the former Yugoslav's republic name and relationship to the “Macedonian Question” within Greece.

45. For a general overview, see the article by Nicholas Svoronos on Ottoman Macedonia in Macedonia: 4,000 years of Greek History and Civilization 354-386; and Apostolos E. Vacalopoulos, History of Macedonia 1354-1833. The documents from the Ottoman archives in Thessaloniki and Naoussa have been published in Greek translation by I. K. Vasdraluelles, ed., Istorika Archeia Makedonias [Historical Archives of Macedonia] vol. I (Archeion Thessalonikes 1695-1912) vol. II (Archeion Veroias-Naouses 1598-1886) (Thessalonike, 1952, 1954). The Greek role in the economy and demographics of the region have been considerably
While it is true that the Slavo-Macedonian population in northern Greece has declined as a result of post-1912 population exchanges based on international treaties, warfare, and immigration, the Greek governments has formally recognized its existence in census registers up until the 1950's and in numerous public pronouncements since that time. The Slavophone population in Florina are Greek citizens and have all the rights and privileges guaranteed to citizens by the Constitution of Greece. It is ridiculous to claim that the Greek government is keeping their Slavic ethnicity a secret. Greece has many citizens whose languages and customs give them an ethnic identity in addition to their Greek nationality. Within Greece's cultural diversity one can find populations that maintain levels of Albanian, Italian, Turkish, Vlach, and Gypsy ethnic identification, only to name a few. However, with the exception of the unique experience of the Muslim minority in Thrace, most of these people have become Hellenized and do not formally identify themselves as anything other than Greek.

If Greece refuses to formally recognize a foreign Macedonian national consciousness within Greece, it is only because such an ethnic consciousness is an artificial construct created by a hostile neighbor with territorial aspirations. There is no such thing as a Macedonian identity, national or otherwise prior to Bulgarian and Yugoslav Communist abstractions in the 1920's and aggression in the 1940's. This is why the Greek government refers to

clarified in recent years through the study of a wide variety of documentary and narrative sources. Representative of this literature are the articles collected together in the volume edited by Spyros Asdrachas, *E oikonomike dome ton valkanikon chronon (15os-19os aionas)* [The Economic Institutionalization of Balkan Lands (15-19th centuries)] (Melissa, Athens, 1979). The absence of Ottoman census records is also sometimes compensated for by the publication and study of tax registers (Kanunnams and mufassal defters); see, John Christos Alexander, *Towards a History of Post-Byzantine Greece: The Ottoman Kanunnames for the Greek Lands, circa 1500-circa 1600* (Athens, 1985); Speros Asdrachas, *Mechanismoi res agrotikes oikonomias sten Tourkokratia* [Mechanisms of the agricultural economy during the Tourkokratia] (Themelio, Athens, 1978), and his more recent remarks in *Zetemata Istorias* [Historical Issues] (Themelio, Athens, 1983).

46. Duncan M. Perry, *The Politics of Terror* 19-20, who has studied Macedonian Liberation Movements relying primarily upon Slavic sources, writes the following about Macedonian ethnicity: "It was not unusual, during the period under study, [early 1900's] to identify a person from the Macedonian vilayets as belonging to a "Macedonian" nationality, and there is no reason to believe, on the basis of extant documents, that the Slavs of Macedonia in general used the term in an ethnic sense. Rather, occasionally, one finds it employed to identify the inhabitants of the Macedonia province, no matter what their ethnic background". H. R. Wilkinson who studied the issue from the point of view of ethnographic cartography concluded that a national Macedonian movement did not really emerge until the war years of 1940-45; see Wilkinson, *Maps and Politics* 150-152, 326.
them as Slavophone Greeks. Karakasidou is unable to produce any credible evidence of a Macedonian ethnic or national consciousness prior to this period. Even Brailsford, a source she cites, does not indicate the existence of any “Macedonian” consciousness in the region. What he found was a vague Christian consciousness based upon and reinforced by Ottoman administrative patterns and Bulgarian nationalism.

Next, Karakasidou presents a simplistic account of the nineteenth century struggle between the Bulgarian Exarchate and Greek Patriarchate which misrepresents the complexity of ethnic and national identification. She does this in order to lend historical legitimacy to her various accusations concerning Greek government policy towards the Slavic minority in northern Greece. She attempts to link Greece’s supposed refusal to allow Slavo-Macedonians to speak their own language today (which she has not proven), to this Nineteenth Century struggle.

Religious affiliation, not language, was the determining factor in Nineteenth century Ottoman Macedonia. This remained true, long after the Crimean War. Many non-Greek speaking groups—Slav, Vlach, Albanian—were identified as part of the Greek millet because of their religious affiliation with the Greek Patriarchate of Constantinople. This was also why many non-Greek speaking Christians in Ottoman Macedonia also played a role during the Greek War of Liberation47.

When in 1870, the Ottoman government allowed the Bulgarian Exarchate to establish church communities in the same territory under the jurisdiction of the Greek Patriarchate, this led to a struggle along jurisdictional grounds. Linguistic identification was not the only determining factor in this struggle, but a broader cultural identification linked to Greek, Bulgarian, Serb and Russian territorial aspirations. In fact, the Greek Patriarchate had conceded that Bulgarian could be used as a liturgical language prior to 1870 in some areas of Ottoman Macedonia48. As has already been noted, many Slavic speakers in Ottoman Macedonia remained under the jurisdiction of the Greek Patriarchate even after the schism and were called “Grecomans” as a result49.

Karakasidou also presents the policy of the Greek Patriarchate as being identical with that of the Greek state, a presentation which is highly inaccurate. True to its Byzantine tradition of ecumenicalism, the Patriarch of

47. M. B. Sakellariou, ed., Macedonia: 4,000 Years of Greek History 444-84; Vacalopoulos, History of Macedonia 584-688.
48. Dakin, The Greek Struggle in Macedonia 13-14; and his The Unification of Greece 122.
Constantinople did not promote the narrow irridentist and nationalist policies of the Greek state in Ottoman Macedonia. This conservative ecumenicalism led to conflict between the Patriarchate and the Greek government\(^{50}\). As far as the Greek government was concerned it sought to counter the nationalist approach of the Bulgarian Exarchate by using the same means. The Exarchate deliberately sought to create a Bulgarian consciousness among the Slavic speakers in Ottoman Macedonia, with Russian and Ottoman support. Its purpose was to bolster territorial claims in the region as Bulgaria began its movement towards independence, state-formation and expansion.

Typically, Karakasidou misrepresents Article X of the Ottoman firman of 1870 to which she refers. Stavrianos does not say that voting for the Exarchate was to be on the basis of language since the firman does not indicate this\(^{51}\). In fact, in the opinion of the British historian, Douglas Dakin, who wrote a detailed work on the "Macedonian Struggle", linguistic affinity was ultimately not decisive\(^{52}\).

The language issue affords Karakasidou with another opportunity to repeat her undocumented accusations of Slav repression against the Greek government. She repeats the claim that Slavo-Macedonian is a language distinct from Bulgarian and Serbian, based on her informants and the one linguistic study she cites. As I have indicated earlier, this issue cannot be decided on the basis of her Florina informants and the Friedman study. Since she does not know either language herself, Karakasidou should be more cautious in dismissing the opinions of other scholars familiar with both languages\(^{53}\). Her reference to the Greek position on this language question

\(^{50}\) Evangelos Kofos, "Patriarch Joachim III (1878-1884) and the Irredentist Policy of the Greek State", \textit{JMGS} IV, 2 (October 1986) 107-120.

\(^{51}\) L. S. Stavrianos, \textit{The Balkans Since 1453} (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965) 519: "But Article X of the firman provided that additional territories might adhere to the new church if two thirds or more of the population so voted". A pro-Serbian tract claims to quote from the text of the actual firman: "If the Orthodox population of any place over and above those already enumerated should express an unanimous desire, or if at least two-thirds of the population of such a place should express a desire to come under the authority of the Exarchate, and their desire be approved as legitimate, it shall be fulfilled". Balkanicus, \textit{The Aspirations of Bulgaria} (London, 1915) 232.

\(^{52}\) Dakin, \textit{The Greek Struggle in Macedonia} 17: "As events were to show, however, language was not the decisive weapon in this war of propaganda, ecclesiastical ties, social prestige and sheer conservatism proved to be of greater consequence. Language, in fact, did not unite the Slavs of Macedonia: in so far as it was of importance it merely divided them by subjecting them to the rival Bulgarian and Serbian propagandas".

\(^{53}\) Brailsford, \textit{Macedonia}, 101 states that: "Language teaches us very little. The differen-
is based on an article in the tabloid magazine *Tachydromos*, a source that can hardly represent any Greek position on this question of linguistics. *Tachydromos* should never be cited for anything other than an example of modern Greek popular culture—her example is therefore not worthy of serious comment.

The author continues to repeat her usual allegations, based on her Slavo-Macedonian informants and little else. Again we hear about the excesses of the Metaxas dictatorship and all sorts of repression of minority rights by subsequent governments. In order to bolster her "court-like" style, she presents examples of what Greek politicians and "analysts" have recently written about the Slavo-Macedonian problem in the Greeks press. Apparently, she has forgotten that her article is supposed to be an anthropologically informed critique. Her purpose is to ridicule the Greek government's concerns over supposed Slavo-Macedonian links to foreign states and disloyal irredentist activities. However, citations from the Greek press should always be used with caution, since Greek journalism is often influenced by party politics and does not usually reflect more balanced official government positions. Greece's many newspapers represent all manner of extremes, and one can "document" almost any assertion on Slavo-Macedonians or anyone else based on this kind of evidence alone.

What is more to the point, is what Karakasidou has not done in these sections of her article, that is, to provide a historical context for the Greek government's policy towards and concerns about the Slavic minority in northern Greece. Her references to the Greek press are not provided with any contextual basis except for her very limited discussion of the pre-1919 irredentist struggle. In fact, it can be demonstrated that it is not true that "most Slavo-Macedonian activists have never sought to secede from Greece or to change the country's borders in any way" (pp. 13-14) as she asserts, if one studies the historical record.

While one could repeat the various accusations of Slavo-Macedonian disloyalty that have been published in the Greek press, such "documentation"
would prove nothing. However, several Greek and non-Greek scholars have carefully documented the past political activities of the Slavic minority of northern Greece utilizing a wide variety of primary sources. I have already alluded to some of these published studies during several portions of my analysis. Although, one should read them to gain a full understanding of the dimensions of the historical context and political problems that this issue has forced upon the Greek government, I will summarize some of their conclusions here in order to illustrate their importance. Obviously, this overview will distort the complexity and fluidity of the changing situation in northern Greece during the twentieth century, but at least I hope it will supply some of the missing context.

The Slavic minority of northern Greece have never acted as a uniform block with regard to “Macedonian” ethnicity, Bulgarian, Rumanian and Serbian nationality, communism, or Greek cultural/national consciousness. Even at the turn of the century, like most Balkan peasants, many of these Slavo-Macedonians continued to maintain a local (their village, or group of villages) and religious (Christian/Muslim/Jewish) identification. Since Greek was the language of faith and Hellenic culture was still dominant in the Christian millet, anyone who aspired to advancement within this millet would obtain some level of this language and culture.

As we have seen, this situation began to change towards the end of the Nineteenth century. The irredentist aspirations of Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Rumania all played a role in constructing ethnic and national identifications among this population. Even persons in the same village opted for differing identifications and changed them as the need arose. All three Balkan states utilized the power of church, educational and cultural institutions to influence ethnic/national identification in Ottoman Macedonia. Even Russia played a role in its effort to promote Pan-Slavism. Peaceful methods of persuasion finally gave way to intermittent warfare that only came to a temporary end with the armistice of World War I. During this period, what was to become the Slavic minority of northern Greece, took various sides in the struggle, but largely supported Bulgarian irredentism. This pro-Bulgarian sentiment

54. The overview has been distilled from the following studies: Those of E. Kofos, *Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia*; “The Impact of the Macedonian Question on the Civil Conflict in Greece”; “The Macedonian Question: The Politics of Mutation”; and “National Heritage and National Identity in Nineteenth-and Twentieth-Century Macedonia”; G. Th. Mavrogordatos, *Stillborn Republic* 246-252; and Joseph S. Roucek, *Balkan Politics: International Relations in No Man’s Land* (Stanford University Press, 1948). Concerning the 1940’s see the additional citations in note 6, above.
did not disappear when Greece won control over the area during the wars of 1912-13.

The territorial settlements of the Balkan Wars and the First World War shattered Bulgaria's dream of a greater Bulgaria that would include all of what was Ottoman Macedonia. Unfortunately, at the end of these conflicts, Bulgaria refused to accept the territorial settlement imposed upon it and continued to support terrorist activities.

The Bulgarian-Greek Convention of 1919/20 allowed for the voluntary movement of minority populations between the two countries. Much of the Greek population of Bulgaria chose to repatriate to Greece. A significant number of Slavs remained in northern Greece largely under the instructions of the Bulgarian Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO). The followers of this organization had committed many atrocities against the Greek population of northern Greece during the Balkan Wars and the Bulgarian occupation of Eastern Macedonia in 1915-18. Since its establishment in 1893, IMRO had called for a separate Macedonian entity either within Bulgaria or as an autonomous state.

In the 1920's the settlement of Greek refugees in the regions of Florina and Edessa added to the resentment of the Slavs living there and stimulated more conflict between the area's Greek and Slavic population. From the Slavic point of view, land that should have been theirs was handed over to refugee outsiders. Thus, local issues over land combined with Bulgarian propaganda to alienate large portions of this Slavic minority from the Greek Venizelist government.

By the 1930's IMRO's left wing had come to an accommodation with the Bulgarian Communist party. This accommodation sought the creation of a united and independent Macedonia within a Communist Balkan Federation. The policy was modified but largely accepted by the KKE, the Greek Communist party, during the same period. Some of the Slavs living within the border regions of Florina and Edessa supported this pro-Bulgarian communist program and this may be the reason why the Metaxas regime imposed a series of harsh measures upon the region. The incompetence and short-sightlessness of these unusual assimilationist measures made the resentment already present because of the land issue regarding Greek refugees, even worse. The policies of the dictatorship drove even more of the Slavs of the region into the pro-Bulgarian and communist camps.

With the Second World War, the pro-Bulgarian factions among the Slavs of northern Greece were able to take revenge upon their Greek neighbors. Bulgaria directly occupied eastern portions of Greek Macedonia, and
made every effort to incorporate areas such as Florina and Edessa as well. Advantages were given to any Slavs who expressed pro-Bulgarian sympathies, and armed intervention was used to convince Greeks to leave. Towards the end of the German occupation, Bulgarian officers were able to extend their jurisdiction directly into Western Greek Macedonia and conduct a reign of terror upon their perceived enemies.

This is how a well-known American Balkan specialist described the situation:

Towards the end of 1943, the [Macedonian-Bulgarian] Committee of Kastoria was in dissolution, largely as the result of the Italian surrender. Many of its members had joined EAM (Greek National Liberation Front), taking their weapons with them. Kaltseff, a Bulgarian officer ... used those who remained to reinforce the Okhrana who in Greek territory—in the regions of Kastoria, Edessa, and Florina—numbered nearly a thousand armed men recruited from the Slavophone population of Greek Macedonia.

Kaltseff, who took his instructions from Sofia and from the BMPO [the Vatresna Makedonska Revolucionna Organizatsia], suggested to the Germans that the whole population of Greek Macedonia should be armed. The Germans and Sofia then supplied the arms which were distributed by the agents of BMPO; many Slavophone peasants were recruited by force. Officers of the Bulgarian Reserve were appointed chiefs, under Kaltseff, of the Okhrana, in the districts of Edessa, Florina, Kastoria, and Yennitsa.

About the middle of 1943, EAM created a special force of its own, named SNOF (the Slaviomacedonski Nationalen Osvoboditel Front), the Slav-Macedonian Liberation Front, recruited from among the Greek Slavophones. Collaboration between the Bulgarian-controlled Okhrana and the EAM controlled SNOF followed upon an agreement that Macedonia should become autonomous. Patriotic Greeks in the ranks of EAM were reported to the Germans or Italians; many were executed but none of the pro-Bulgarian members were molested. Many Bulgarian Communists were appointed to commands in EAM and—by agreement with KKE, the Greek Communist Party—executed Greek patriots who had joined EAM, especially professional people, police officers, and priests, if they refused to support the political purpose of KKE or opposed the demands of the Slavophone members for Macedonian autonomy.
on the charge of being "Fascists" or "Reactionaries".

The special task assigned to SNOF by EAM was to represent the Greek Slavophones and to organize a Slav-Macedonian administration. The Macedonians who had a grievance against the Greeks now had the opportunity to exact vengeance, as well as to work and fight for Macedonian autonomy.55.

Supsequent research has shown that the policies of EAM were more complex than is indicated above, but on the whole the assessment of the situation he presents was correct. Many of the Slavs of northern Greece were directly involved either by choice or circumstance in movements for autonomy and the overthrow of the Greek government. This was the situation, when it became clear to Bulgaria that it had lost the war and would have to give up the territory it had seized in Greek Macedonia. Then, the initiative for Macedonian autonomy passed to the Yugoslav communists under Tito.

Recently released documents prove that the genesis for a Yugoslav dominated Macedonian republic was crafted with the approval of Stalin. The plan fit in well with Soviet ambitions in the Balkans before the breakdown in Yugoslav-Soviet cooperation. In August 1944, Marshal Tito and 125 Macedonian delegates met in southern Yugoslavia and proclaimed the creation of an autonomous Macedonia with federal Yugoslavia. Thus, Yugoslavia replaced Bulgaria as an active supporter of the separatist movements of Slavo-Macedonians in northern Greece.

There is no need to discuss here the protracted struggles and tragedies that took place during the Greek civil war during the late 1940's. It is sufficient to mention that as the military fortunes of EAM/ELAS waned, it came to rely more and more on manpower provided by the Slavophones living along the Yugoslav border nearest their supply lines. These special SNOF units largely consisted of Slavophones from northern Greece who wished to incorporate this territory into a separate Macedonian state. When Tito closed his border to the Communist revolutionaries in 1949, many of the Slavs of northern Greece retreated and found refuge in the new Yugoslav republic of Macedonia. From there they continued to agitate for the fulfillment of their dream of a united Macedonia.

Despite their defeat, the Communist states of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia continued to press for border changes in Greek Macedonia throughout the 1950's. Many of the Slavs who remained behind in Greek Macedonia bore

the stigma, rightly or wrongly, of having supported foreign occupation and the separation of Greek Macedonia from the Greek state. Much bloodshed had been spilled among Greek and Slav neighbors in the region. In the politically charged atmosphere of post-war Greece, local vengeance combined with Cold War politics. It was for this reason, that these regions continued to be particularly sensitive for the Greek government and why troops had to be stationed near them to protect the borders.

The brief summary I have provided constitutes some of the well documented historical context for the present crisis concerning the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the Slavic minority of northern Greece. Obviously, the memories and issues that were at the forefront of the Greek government's struggle for survival barely fifty years ago, are relevant to the issues of minority rights that Dr. Karakasidou has raised in her article. It is my understanding that the Greek government refuses to use the technical term "minority" in connection with the Slavs that remain in Florina, because of diplomatic considerations. This necessity has been forced upon it because the technical recognition of minorities within Greece has allowed Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to claim authority over Greek territory in the past.

Given the circumstances I have outlined above, it is understandable that abuses of minority rights may have occurred in some of the villages in which Karakasidou has done her field research. Local vengeance is a Balkan phenomenon, and there may have been cases of local Greek officials who have abused their authority. However, it is also clear that such abuses cannot be documented using the testimony of unnamed local informants whose motivation may be related to the protracted acrimony that expresses itself as irredentist nationalism. Certainly, such testimony cannot be used blankly to condemn the Greek government and the academic community as a whole.

A more "scholarly" approach to these questions should have included not only the historical context, but also a critical analysis of the findings of international and governmental organizations on minority rights within Greece. While these sources are not always reliable or objective, they provide

some basis for comparison with accounts in the popular press and official Greek documents. This kind of professional analysis however, falls under the purview of international lawyers and political scientists not historians and anthropologists. Most historians recognize the limitations imposed upon their study of contemporary events because of governmental restrictions over diplomatic and other official documents. As I have indicated elsewhere, even the documentary evidence for the study of the policies of the Metaxas regime concerning Slavs in northern Greece is not as available as it could be. When one tries to deal with rapidly changing issues of one's own day with incomplete and biased information, a one-sided journalistic account is often the result. It is difficult to obtain reliable material for an objective analysis of Balkan history for the last thirty years.

Finally, there is at least one indication that Dr. Karakasidou has exaggerated the extent of Greece's supposed Slavo-Macedonian repression. This evidence comes from Stoyan Pribichevich, a well-informed Yugoslav-American, who wrote a recent book on Macedonia from the perspective of Skopje. Since this source is hostile to Greek views concerning the existence of a Macedonian consciousness and ethnicity, its perspective cannot be attributed to Greek propaganda. I will quote the most relevant portions:

In 1961 the president of the Macedonian government held an international press conference in Skopje. I asked about the situation of the Macedonian Slavs in Greece; he replied that they were exposed to "extermination", because they were being forced to renounce their language and to emigrate. The Yugoslav press did not publish this statement, but the French press did. An exchange of recriminations between Athens and Belgrade ensued, and I decided to see for myself. The Greek ambassador in Belgrade advised me to go to Athens. There the Greek foreign minister, Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza, organized a trip for me in the border of northern Greece (Greek Macedonia)...

The Greek foreign minister, in his office in January 1962, explained the "Macedonian question" to me as follows. International recognition of a national minority implies the admission of a foreign

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a specialist in Balkan affairs who studied at London University and Skopje University, then Yugoslavia.

57. Stoyan Pribichevich was for many years Associate Editor of Fortune, and a frequent contributor to Foreign Policy Association publications. He was a Time correspondent during World War II, at one point representing the American Press in Tito's headquarters.
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territorial claim, and Greece will never sign a treaty regarding the protection of a Macedonian-Slav minority. Such a treaty would imply the right of foreign supervision and intervention on Greek territory. Besides, Macedonian Slavs are not a nationality. In Yugoslavia, in twenty years or so, there may be created a Macedonian nation in the fullest sense of the word. "That is their affair", he said. In Greece, it is different...

In 1962 I took off in a government jeplike station wagon for Kastoria, near the Albanian frontier...

My official driver said he was a Bulgar, and we conversed in Bulgarian and Serbian (the two languages and the Macedonian being similar) in restaurants and with policemen on our way to Kastoria. He took me to a restaurant in Kastoria whose owner told me in Macedonian Slav that he was a Makedonec. He spoke to me freely and repeatedly in his Macedonian Slav before his Greek customers. He refused to do so on the following day in front of tax collectors who had come to inspect his books and he later protested in Greek against being addressed by me in Serbian. Later he spoke in Macedonian again.

Florina lies in an immense lush valley below the forbidding, snow capped Yugoslav frontier mountains. Markos’ guerrillas never conquered this town either, but they controlled all the surrounding hills, where as late as 1962 shepherds were maimed or blown to pieces in the still uncleared minefields. On Sunday mornings you could hear songs of soldiers marching outside Florina to the sound of drum beats and bugle calls, while the town square still displays two cannon pieces captured from the guerrillas. No one in Greek Macedonia is allowed to forget who won the guerrilla war.

On market day, which is Saturday, you can see many Macedonian Slav costumes and hear much Macedonian Slav talk in the Florina marketplace. And you can see and hear Macedonian Slav peasant women discussing the various items for sale and their prices in the Florina shops. Unlike the Yugoslav Macedonian female costumes, the costumes of the Slav women in Greek Macedonia are rather on the somber side and show little diversity. In front, women regularly wear heavy, ruglike aprons, black or of another dark color, with vertical red stripes. White kerchiefs cover their heads and chins. Occasionally you will notice elegant sleeveless coats with tight waists and embroidered borders.
In the Florina district prefect's office I talked to two Aegean Macedonian returnees from Yugoslavia, who had come to receive a Greek government loan to develop their land. They had been led away at the age of six and said, in Macedonian Slav in the presence of the prefect, that they had been treated well in Yugoslavia and given good food and good schooling...

Many Macedonian Slavs, however, live in the countryside outside Edessa. On market day (Saturday) they stream into town in their costumes and you can overhear much Slav. As in Florina, I saw Slav “repatriates” in Edessa, this time not former children but former Slav guerrillas returned from abroad and receiving agricultural loans. Also in Edessa I found confirmation of the fact that urbanization aided Hellenization: a physician, born Slav, spoke Slav and Greek but felt himself to be a Greek; his peasant mother who lived with him spoke only Slav and felt herself to be a Slav.

My observations and conclusions concerning Greek Macedonia were as follows:

Most “Slavophones” proclaimed themselves “Macedonians” to me. Some said they were Bulgars. One emphasized that he was a Greek in front of government tax officials. Almost all spoke Slav before Greek officials...

Yugoslavia lost the civil war in Greece. She can now realistically demand only elementary human rights for the Aegean Macedonians: free use of their language and freedom from racial and economic discrimination. Despite certain pressures and incidents, the general toleration of the Macedonian Slav language and the apparently fair distribution of social security benefits and agricultural loans which I observed could provide the basis for a lasting Yugoslav-Greek understanding on the “Macedonian” question...

I ask the reader to compare the observations from 1962 quoted above, by someone who did not need a translator to communicate with Slav infor-

58. Stoyan Pribichevich, Macedonia Its People and History (The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1982) 237-38, 242-44, 247. I have not quoted from a section entitled: “Slav Villages under Greek Language Oaths” (pp. 245-47) since the author had no first-hand experience concerning these oaths. However, he does report that when he visited some of these villages in which language oaths were allegedly administered in 1962, he heard Slav being spoken.
mants in Edessa, Kastoria, and Florina, to the tone and content of Dr. Karakasidou's "field research". While one cannot accept the observations of any single observer as conclusive, those of Pribichevich should at minimum, cause us to question the objectivity of Karakasidou's many assertions concerning Greek government repression. The differences are even more striking, when one considers that Pribichevich relates observations from his visit to the region only a dozen years after the end of the Greek Civil war, while Karakasidou gathered her information in the late 1980's. Either Greece has become less tolerant of Florina's Slavic population since 1962, or as I have tried to show, Dr. Karakasidou's article misrepresents the situation.

I believe that the many discrepancies, omissions and misrepresentations to which I have called attention in my analysis of this article speak for themselves. Their number and pattern make it obvious that despite what she says, her study is a polemic disguised as anthropology.

59. The pattern continues to the end of her article. For example, on page 25, footnote 37, she claims that Greek history books mark no reference to the Slavic Macedonian Ilinden Revolt against the Turks on 2 August 1903. This is clearly not the case, since the revolt is discussed in *Macedonia: 4,000 Years of Greek History and Civilization* 472-3, and other Greek history books. Even Greek junior high school books mention the revolt, see Vas. Vl. Sphyroeras, *Istoria neotere kai synchrone* (Organismos ekdoseos didaktikon vivlion, 3 gymnasiou, Athens, 1991) 273-4. I owe the observation concerning the 1903 revolt to Dr. Speros Vryonis Jr.