
L'étude véritable de la population de l'Empire Ottoman a commencé il y a un demi-siècle. C'est en effet en 1941 qu'Ömer Lütfi Barkan publie un premier article ["Türkiye'de Imparatorluk devirlerinin büyük nüfus ve arazi tahrirleri" (= Les Grands registres de recensement et de cadastre au temps de l'Empire Ottoman en Turquie), *İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuasi* 1941, (01-02), 1-40, 214-247] dans lequel il révèle les richesses et les possibilités qui recèlent les archives turques, pour conduire ce genre de recherche.


Cette seconde édition, qui couvre un demi-siècle de 1941 à 1990 (avec 464 références) incorpore les publications de la dernière décennie tout en comblant les lacunes constatées dans la première édition.

*Institut d'Études Balkaniques*

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*Balkanlar* (The Balkans), Ortadoğu ve Balkan İncelemeleri Vakfı (OBIV) Yayınları (Publications of the Centre for Middle Eastern and Balkan Studies), Istanbul 1993, pp. 300.

This is the first book published by the OBIV since it extended its research activities from the Middle East into the Balkans with the twofold aim of developing collaboration with the Balkan countries and defending the rights and liberties of the Turks and the Moslems who live in them.

It is in three parts, the first of which concerns Balkan history and comprises three studies: 1) The Balkans during the Ottoman Period (1391-1918), by the historian O. Koloğlu; 2) The Balkans between the Wars (1919-39), by Professor S. Akşin of the School of Political Sciences of the University
of Ankara and his assistant M. Firat; and 3) The Balkans after the Second World War (1945-89), by I. Gürkan, a retired lieutenant-general and Professor at the School of Political Sciences of the University of Istanbul. The second part looks at the Balkans today and also comprises three studies. The first, by the former ambassador I. Soysal, examines the Balkans today and Turkey’s position; the second is by N. Akıman, who was Turkey’s Ambassador to Athens from 1964 to 1989, and looks at Greek-Turkish relations; and the third, by Turkey’s Ambassador to Belgrade, B. Ekinci, discusses the collapse of Yugoslavia and Turkey’s stance. The third and last part of this important publication explores the subject of “the Balkans” in general and what the region means to Turkey. Again three studies, the first, by Professor I. Gürkan, discusses the geopolitical and strategic importance of the Balkans and Turkey’s position; the second, by Professor H. Sezgin of the University of Mimar Sinan, talks about the Turkish cultural heritage in the Balkans; and the third, by H. Eren, President of the Association for Solidarity with the Turks [sic] of Western Thrace, discusses the Turks and other Moslem populations of the Balkans (with demographic data) and also touches on the subject of migration. The introduction, which analyses the Turks’ presence and installation in the Balkans carries the name of the well-known historian H. İnalcık.

The history of the Balkans, according to İnalcık, is an integral part of Turkish history, because the northern and the southern Turks settled there in the sixth and the thirteenth century respectively. The Turks who came from the north, converted to Christianity and were assimilated by the Slavs, while those from Asia Minor (such as the Türkmen, led by Izzeddin Keykavus, who are known today as the Gagavuz) clung to their own religion and culture. A landmark in the Ottoman forces’ onslaught on the Balkans, H. İnalcık adds, was the capture of Adrianople, though they were also assisted by the fact that there was no power in the Balkans at that time strong enough to halt their advance. In this context, O. Koloğlu notes that some historians describe the Ottomans’ spread through the Balkans as “bloody”; he points out, however, possibly in an allusion to the war in Bosnia, that even today many nations regard force as a legitimate means of achieving their aims. The Turks differed from the Romans, the Byzantines, the Serbs, and the Bulgars, all of whom tried to conquer the Balkans, not in that their conduct was bloodier, but in that they occupied a larger area than any of the others and remained in the Balkans for longer.

O. Koloğlu observes that the first universal civilisation to have a decisive influence in the region was the Greek. The Ottomans introduced a new dispensation, a new culture. The Ottoman policy towards the Orthodox Church
was largely indicative of the Empire's Balkan character. H. Inalçık points out that the Ottomans regarded the protection of life and property as a divine injunction and the fundamental duty of the State. Furthermore, one of the principal factors which conduced to the rapid spread of Ottoman dominion was the Ottomans' tolerance and sense of isonomy. The course of Balkan history may have been interrupted by the region's conquest, but popular culture and ecclesiastical literature were preserved.

H. Inalçık remarks that some historians maintain that the new regime discriminated harshly against the Christians with the tax known as the *çizye*, and that Christians converted *en masse* to Islam in order to avoid it. Conversion to Islam occurred on a limited scale in the first two centuries, as the *çizye* registers attest, and again after the seventeenth century, when the tax was increased sharply. Basically, he says, the Christian subjects opposed the Ottoman regime by resorting to increased robbery and uprisings. In other words, according to H. Inalçık, conversion to Islam was unequivocally a social phenomenon, which arose out of the change of regime and the influence of other social phenomena.

The *Devşirme Oğlan*, who were selected from Christian families to serve in the corps of Janissaries or the seraglio, numbered on average 300 children each year until the beginning of the seventeenth century. H. Inalçık points out that children are quite innocent and their undeveloped religious awareness cannot yet enable them to choose a religion. Some historians, O. Koloğlu adds, think it barbaric to take away Christian children, convert them to Islam, and train them for integration into the state machinery. But it is a fact that many Christian families were most anxious for their children to be selected for the Janissaries, for they could thus attain the highest echelons of the Ottoman administration. Out of 215 *sadrazam*, 62 (30%) were from the Balkan Peninsula and probably of Christian origin. Conversion to Islam, adds Inalçık, occurred more in the western Balkans, in Albania, Kosovo, and Bosnia, and the converts included the Pomaks of Rhodope. O. Koloğlu agrees, pointing out that the mosaic of the Balkans was greatly enriched by the Bosnaks' and the Pomaks' conversion to Islam.

After the First World War, the peace treaties which fixed the various countries' borders created the pan-Balkan problem of the minorities, including the "Moslem Turkish minority of Western Thrace" and the "Greek Orthodox minority of Istanbul". Turks live in many Balkan countries today, Professor Gürkan points out, as do Moslems who are not of Turkish extraction, such as the Bosnaks, the Albanians, and the Pomaks, though they maintain close ties with Turkey owing to shared historical and cultural values. This is why
the Balkans are one of the main axes of Turkey’s foreign policy. Turkey’s relations with Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania are satisfactory; but with Greece and, particularly, Serbia, they are rapidly going from bad to worse.

One issue which directly concerns three Balkan countries, and is of indirect interest to a number of others, is the “Macedonian Question”. O. Kologlu tells us that the term “Macedonia” refers to the kingdom established in antiquity by Philip II, which covered present-day Northern Greece, the “Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, and “Pirin Macedonia”. Professor Gürkan adds that there was never a Macedonian state in the Balkans in subsequent centuries. Under Byzantine rule, “Macedonia” was a geographical term applied to a specific area of the Byzantine state. The region was Slavicised after the sixth century and became part of the territory ruled by the Bulgars and the Slavs. During the Ottoman period, it was divided into the vilayets of Thessaloniki and Monastir, he says, and the sanjaks of Kossovo and Service. Though it was not a wealthy region, the Greeks, the Serbs, and the Bulgarians were very interested in it for its strategic advantages. O. Koloğlu and I. Gürkan both note that it has continued to influence peace in the Balkans since 1870.

After the referendum of August 1991, I. Soysal recounts, in which 95% of the population participated, “Macedonia” declared independence in September 1991. This roused Turkey’s interest, because 100,000 Turks still live there today, and also because the mini-state controls Turkey’s communications route to the West. Greece opposed the independence of “Macedonia” and launched a campaign to inform world opinion and to dissuade other countries, apart from Turkey, Bulgaria, and Russia, from granting it recognition. It should be noted that Bulgaria does not recognise a Macedonian nation, maintaining that the “Macedonians” are all, without exception, Bulgarian. Serbia raised no objection to the declaration of “Macedonia”’s independence, and withdrew its troops, probably after consultation with Russia. However, on 31 January 1992 it recalled its ambassador from Ankara, who, a native of Skopje, had been trying to persuade Ankara to recognise “Macedonia”.

As Professor Gürkan points out, the European Community aligned itself with Greece, under the threat of Greece’s exercising its right of veto. President Bush too, ignoring the fact that on 20 January he would be succeeded by a new president and a new party, told Prime Minister Mitsotakis in Washington in November 1992 that he would not recognise “Macedonia” unless it changed its name.

If the continuing cruel war in Bosnia were to spread to Kossovo, Vojvodina, and “Macedonia” — where circumstances are similar to those which sparked off the hostilities in Bosnia — then the rest of the Balkan countries
could well be sucked in too, with even more dangerous prospects. But, observes B. Ekinci, the future of "Macedonia" also depends to a great extent on the demands and the attitude of the republic's Albanian population in the context of developments in the surrounding region.

But the Balkans must be a source of stability, argue Professors Toprak and Halefoglu. Co-operation on both a bilateral and a multilateral basis in all spheres will benefit all the Balkan countries and will strengthen the European idea. At all events, the OBIV intends to pursue this aim in the context of democracy and respect for human rights.

My comments on the views expressed in this very commendable volume basically concern three points.

1. Referring to the settling of the Turks in the Balkans, H. Inalcık cites no sources but says that the Gagavuz were led by Izzeddin Keykavus and belonged to the Türkmen tribe, while O. Kologlu maintains that they were descended from the Petchenegs. However, according to the literature on the origins of the Gagavuz, they regarded themselves as Greek, and those who were living in Turkey as Greeks moved to Greece when the exchange of populations took place.

2. When S. Akşin and M. Fırat use the term "Moslem Turkish minority" with reference to the Moslem minority in Western Thrace, they are out of keeping with the stipulations of the Treaty of Lausanne, as also with the facts. The Treaty, as we know, referred to this particular minority in religious, not ethnic, terms, because ethnologically it consisted of Turks, Pomaks, and Gypsies. So when these two historians refer to the "Moslem Turkish" minority, they are turning the Pomaks and the Gypsies into Turks too. The Pomaks are known to be the indigenous inhabitants of the Rhodope mountains. Furthermore, Professor Gürkan actually states that the Pomaks are not of Turkish origin, while H. Inalcık and O. Koloğlu add that they embraced Islam during the Ottoman period.

3. Regarding the use of the terms "Macedonia" and "Macedonians" with respect to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and its inhabitants, I should like to make the following points. In Osmanlı Tarihi (Ottoman history), vol. 8, Ankara 1962, p. 148, the well-known Turkish historian Enver Ziya Karal says that the Ottoman administration never used the term "Macedonia", nor were the area's precise geographical limits ever established. It was not until the beginning of this century that it became generally accepted that it covered the territory of the three vilayets of Thessaloniki, Monastir, and Kossovo. Estimates of which ethnic group was in the majority differed
radically. According to the census carried out by Hilmi Pasha, the demographi
cic make-up of the geographical area of Macedonia consisted of Turks, Albanians, Pomaks, Bulgarians, Greeks, Serbs, and Vlachs.

The same demographic make-up is recorded in the eight *salname* of the *vilayet* of Kossovo published between 1879 and 1900. In fact, according to the *salname* for AH 1311 (AD 1893), pp. 220-1, the population of the *sanjak* of Skopje was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarians</td>
<td>143,917</td>
<td>53.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moslems (Albanians and Turks)</td>
<td>113,926</td>
<td>42.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greeks</td>
<td>7,016</td>
<td>2.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>1,265</td>
<td>0.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copts</td>
<td>746</td>
<td>0.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>0.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latins [sic]</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the basis of the official 1991 statistics, H. Eren reports that the population of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is now 2,300,000. Of these, 25.81% are Moslems: 18% Albanians, 4.3% Turks, and 3.4% Torbes. But, he adds, we must bear in mind that most of the Albanians abstained from voting and that, according to the census carried out by Skopje's Department of Religious Affairs, Moslems make up 50% of the FYROM's population. It is blatantly obvious that the members of this Moslem population — i.e. the Republic's Turks and Albanians — cannot be described as being of "Macedonian" origin. For that matter, Atatürk himself, who was born in Thessaloniki, the capital of Macedonia, was of Turkish and not Macedonian origin. For the same reason, it is not possible for the republic's Bulgarians, who settled on the Balkan Peninsula in the sixth century, to be called "Macedonians", the Bulgarian language "Macedonian", or the republic itself "Macedonia".

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