

pretation of the causes of the Greek Civil War". The book is divided into seven chapters: part I, "The Greek Communist Party: Resistance or Revolution?", part 2, "Varkiza: Capitulation to the British?", part 3, "From Varkiza to the Seventh Congress", part 4, "The Elections of March 1946: Pandora's Box", part 5, "The Second Plenum: Textbook Revolution", part 6, "The Decision to Abstain: 'Tactical Error' or 'Decisive'", and part 7, "From Limited Self-Defence to Civil War".

The book includes a useful conclusion, chronological table, index section and bibliography. "The history of the Greek Civil War, as we have interpreted it in this book" writes Professor Vlavianos, "is the history of errors, of petty malice, of vicious intentions, of high-sounding objectives sometimes masking the lowest of motives". *Greece, 1941-49* is well written and thoroughly researched. It is a most important contribution to our knowledge and understanding of a tragic epoch in recent Greek history. The decade of the 1940 is of great importance to political, social and economic developments in Greece during the following decades. It is a period that deserves more books. Books that bring together the thinking, experiences, plans, and frustrations of all protagonists in the drama of the Greek Civil War. Professor Haris Vlavianos is to be commended for his highly significant book.

Ball State University

JOHN A. KOUMOULIDES

Christofis H. Economides, *Demythologizing the History of Cyprus in the Last 50 Years* (in Greek), Nicosia, 1993.

A review of a book on the historical developments in Cyprus is a welcome opportunity for the reader to comment on the Cyprus dilemma and to offer another perspective on the problem afflicting the people of that island Republic. Christofis Economides' book "Demythologizing the History of Cyprus in the Last 50 Years" is an attempt to deal with the historical events in Cyprus. The book includes the following: essays, studies, commentary; the author's correspondence on important developments, especially with leading political leaders and personalities; and a series of documents, speeches, and revelations on the major historical junctures during the anti-colonial struggles and the events surrounding the independence period, up to the present. Much of this historiography is familiar to the student of Cyprus history and politics.

Over the past fifty years quite a few Greek Cypriots have been involved directly or on the periphery of the struggle for emancipation from British colonialism and, in the last twenty years, from the Turkish military occupation of the northern part of Cyprus. Entire generations of leaders and ordinary people have been “wounded” or have gone without the satisfaction that their ancestral land is “free at last” from the threat of extinction. The recent experience only shows that this is not possible for the Greek Cypriot people. Nonetheless, there is a growing number of writers / activists from different ideological positions who have broken the culture of silence and are recording their own experiences and interpretations of these historical events. In this vein, the author states (on the cover page) that this is an attempt to set the record straight, for the “Cyprus public and especially the young, who are mostly uninformed or misinformed on the real issues of Cypriot history and the Cyprus problem in the last 50 years”

The book is an excellent source of reference material. It would have made reading easier had it been organized chronologically or thematically in its totality. The author makes an attempt to do so by offering some sixty pages of a “Short Review of Developments of the Cyprus problem in the last 120 years”. This extended review preempts the lengthy sections in the main body. It could have been shorter. Otherwise, the book contains useful information and a level-headed analysis—maybe too level-headed.

In the “Review” section author Economides traces the historical record of Cyprus: the origins of British colonialism and its “divide-and-rule” policy, pitting Greek against Turk, as it unfolded in the colonial administrative apparatus; the determination of imperial Britain to maintain hegemony over the island for geopolitical reasons; the two-pronged method used by the British to neutralize the demand for self-determination (enosis/union of Cyprus with Greece): (a) repression (e.g., emergency rule, 1931-1959); and EOKA (1955-1959); or (b) limited self-rule within the colonial system. As it is well-known, these policies failed because the 80 percent Greek majority of Cyprus demanded “enosis and only enosis”.

The author does not hesitate to state that the rejection of limited “Self-Government” prior to independence in 1959 was a mistake, a “lost opportunity”. The blame is squarely placed on the shoulders of Archbishop Makarios. “Makarios”, the author states, “even though he had many attributes, he had a major flaw which overwhelmed his advantages. Makarios believed he had the capability to win if he remained intransigent and engaged in “brinkmanship” (page K). The offer for self-government, had it been accepted, the author suggests, would have been free of the disadvantages contained in the Zurich-

London Agreements in 1959 which gave birth to the Republic of Cyprus, the hardships of the EOKA armed struggle, the executions of EOKA fighters, and the irreversible traumatized relations between the Greek and Turkish communities incurred during the armed struggle.

It is not suggested that the British were innocent bystanders in the unending Greek-Turkish struggle. Britain's policy to avoid becoming an "off-shore" island of Europe is well-known (India, Palestine, and Northern Ireland). In Cyprus, their initial strategy was to use Turkey to counteract Greek diplomacy and during the EOKA struggle they used the Turks of Cyprus as the colonial police, interrogators, torturers, and the armed militia with a license to commit acts of violence against Greek Cypriots. By 1958 the British succeeded in converting an anti-colonial struggle into a Greek-Turkish conflict, with themselves playing the "unappreciated" role of keeping the peace so the Greek and Turks will not kill each other. It was the threat of partitioning the island between Greece and Turkey (a policy pursued by Turkey and Great Britain, and supported by the United States) that forced the Greek Cypriots to accept the Zurich and London Agreements in 1959, negotiated by Britain, Turkey, and Greece, for the sake of the NATO Alliance. These Agreements, as Dr. Stanley Kyriakides points out in his classic study, "Cyprus: Constitutionalism and Crisis Government" (1968), proved to be unworkable from the very beginning because the 18 percent Turkish minority and the Turkish Vice-President had veto powers over the legislative process and the "Guarantor Powers" (Greece, Turkey and Britain) had the right to intervene in the internal affairs of Cyprus. In short, the political arrangements worked out for an "independent Republic of Cyprus" reflected more or less the power configuration within NATO, favoring British and Turkish interests. The jockeying for power among the three powers within NATO and the region and the two communities were constitutionalized. "Deadlock politics" was the norm, with both sides arming themselves.

Author Economides suggests that the Zurich and London Agreements collapsed because of Makarios' "brinkmanship" politics and "split personality" — as a religious leader committed to enosis and as political leader sworn to respect the 1960 constitutional arrangements. With hindsight, the author may be right that Makarios' personality may have been part of the problem, but it ought to be seen within the context of a larger picture: the regional and global geopolitical dynamics. This interpretation is, of course, at variance with that claim at the time and to this day by those who continue the EOKA legacy that Makarios was a traitor to the cause of enosis by agreeing for an independent Cyprus (see Photis Papafotis, *E Karpasia ston Agona tis EOKA*,

Limassol, 1993). Obviously, Makarios was in a difficult situation: blamed by the enotists for compromising too much and by the realists for not compromising enough. Despite the warnings from Athens and Ankara against overturning the Zurich and London arrangements, the author states, Makarios unilaterally proceeded to offer the thirteen points to make the Constitution workable and democratic. The author accepts the allegation made by Glafkos Clerides that "Polycarpus Georgadzis [murdered] and the present-day rejectionist leaders Vassos Lyssarides and Tassos Papadopoulos had a part in this effort; they are responsible for the overturn of the Zurich-London arrangements and the consequences" (p. K.θ).

The author's message is clear: the EOKA armed struggle, the 13 points proposed by Makarios, the inter-ethnic violence (1963-64) coupled with the intransigence and unwillingness of President Makarios to solve the ethnic conflict, set the stage for the invasion and partition of the island by Turkey in 1974. These claims no doubt have a great degree of validity. But, the immediate cause of the 1974 invasion was the coup d'état against Makarios by the Athens military government, nurtured and kept in power by NATO and the CIA. The United States policy at the time towards the "Red Priest" (Makarios) of the Mediterranean is well-known. So are the machinations of the Athens junta and its EOKA-B supporters in Cyprus, and the attacks on Makarios by the three bishops. The warnings to Makarios came from many quarters, including the author himself. His warnings that time was running out and partition was imminent are included in the correspondence. The results are well-known, including the failed diplomacy to deal with the Cyprus problem from 1974 to today. That is all history now.

The above information is contained in the review section. The rest of the book is devoted to elaborating and documenting the author's view of history and involvement. There is a plethora of personal documents, conference reports, correspondence, and analysis. A review of these documents concludes that British policy objectives and Turkish partitionist plans, as it was stated above, began to converge from the very beginning of the enosis struggle. Both agreed that the status of Cyprus could not change without satisfying Anglo-Turkish interests. Hence, every move of the Greeks towards self-determination was counteracted by British and Turkish partitionist plans.

The author includes an extended section (pp. 54-101) dealing with the squabbling between the Makarios government and the British over money. Specifically, the Makarios government demanded 30 million gold pounds (with the author's help in counting it) that Britain plundered from the Cypriot people for fifty years in the form of a "tributary tax". Makarios also demanded

compensation for money extracted from the Cypriot people during the emergency rule which began with the uprising in 1931 and lasted until 1959. The author recounts the conflict with the British over the legal status of the British "sovereign bases" in Cyprus and the rights of the military personnel. Other issues dealt with in this section include the relationship between Cyprus and the British Commonwealth.

The period between the inter-communal violence, 1963-64 and 1974 is critical in the history of Cyprus. An extensive section (pp. 104-193) is devoted to this period. According to the author, Makarios missed another opportunity to solve the inter-ethnic conflict. The political crisis which engulfed Greece at the same time was not unrelated to the Cyprus problem. The sell-out of Cyprus was one of the charges against Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis. The defeat of the rightist Karamanlis government in 1963-64 was interpreted by the Greek ruling circles and the United States/NATO as a threat to Western hegemony over Greece. The mobilization of the liberal forces against NATO/CIA meddling in Greek internal affairs, for democratization, and justice for Cyprus resisted by the rightist forces and their Western allies served as catalysts for the military takeover on April 21, 1967. The military junta simply accentuated the contradictions in Greece and Cyprus. The anti-junta forces were no match to the military and police state, which was immediately exported to Cyprus. The anti-junta demonstrations in Nicosia, held during the April anniversary, were met by Greek military personnel dressed in civilian clothes and EOKA-B followers, with clubs. The Cypriot police stood on the sideline. Those involved in the anti-junta struggle had a sense of the impending dangers. The warnings went unheeded. The author includes a 1971 proposal for a "Realistic National Solution of the Cyprus Problem Before It Is Too Late". As it was stated earlier, the author claims it was another "lost opportunity". Even though the Turkish government demanded a federal solution, the author suggests the Turkish Cypriot leadership only demanded local autonomy. Makarios refused; he continued to be intransigent as in the pre-independence period (pp. 192-93). Why? The author refers to Nikos Kranidiotis and his son John N. Kranidiotis for the answer. Makarios simply did not wish to accede to the Treaty of Alliance and Guarantee which gave Turkey the right to intervene in Cyprus nor Article 185 of the Constitution which precluded enosis (and partition). Makarios was assuming that the Turkish Cypriots would eventually acquiesce to his efforts to make the Constitution workable and democratic, and that Turkey would not intervene militarily. These calculations proved to be wrong (*Ibid.*).

The last section of the book (pp. 194-548) deals with the period between

1974 to the election of President Glafkos Clerides in 1993. All the diplomatic efforts and proposals to solve the Cyprus problem through the United Nations are dealt with. The author's letters to newspapers, the various Presidents of Cyprus (Kyprianou and Vassiliou) are included. The author did not hesitate to support positions coming from the U.N. Secretary General for a solution to the problem—solutions deemed unacceptable by other political leaders in Cyprus. He focuses on the failure of the leadership (meetings between Kyprianou-Denktaş and Denktaş-Vassiliou) and the missed opportunities. The author's attacks, however, go beyond them. Vassos Lyssarides (EDEK), for example, is branded as a "rejectionist" who perpetuates the "deadlock" and the partition of Cyprus.

Whether one agrees or not with the author's message on solving the Cyprus problem or his claim of a series of "lost opportunities" presented to the Greek Cypriots in the last 59 years is not the issue here. This is history. The author, however, deserves credit airing his views on Cypriot historiography.

Whatever has been said and written over the past fifty years is of little value to the present crisis: the Turkification of 37 percent of Cyprus. Whatever options existed in the past twenty or fifty years, as the author states, are no longer. It seems that the only lesson the Greek Cypriot leadership learned from this history is that it did not learn anything. The problem remains. The survival of the Greek Cypriots in their ancestral land is at stake, especially when all traces of Greek civilization have been eradicated from the occupied zone. Ten, twenty, or fifty years from now, the "Turkish" population of Cyprus will equal if not overwhelm the Greek Cypriots. And the "Hellenic Center" (Athens) is incapable of defending Cyprus. The "war of words" by Prime Minister Andreas Papandreu on his (victory) statement in the last election, that a repetition of the "Attila" in Cyprus will mean war, is not enough. We are still dealing with the first Attila of 1974, not the next one. Neither the symbolic military planes flying over Cyprus are reassuring. At the moment, war is not an option. The only individuals who romanticize armed struggle are those left over from the EOKA period or their progeny who gather and sing the Greek national anthem, read poems, listen to a speech by an EOKA leader, and praise General George Grivas. They do more than that: they distribute maps of Greece with Northern Epirus, Eastern Thrace, Smyrna, Constantinople, and Cyprus. Those who disagree are branded "traitors".

One cannot suggest either that the political line followed since 1974 has produced results. If the argument can be made (as Economides does) that the refusal of the Greek Cypriot leadership to make the necessary compromises

at opportune moments before (or even after) 1974 was a mistake, can the same claim be made for the last twenty years? Witness how the Greek Cypriot leadership has been making one concession after another at the United Nations. If the Greek Cypriots were missing every opportunity, what opportunities were missed in the last twenty years? The negotiations have been conducted in a way that one side makes concessions, and these concessions become the basis for the next round of negotiations. Since the Greek Cypriots have proved that they are willing to make one concession after another, the pressure is on them. Witness the principle position taken by President Clerides against any meetings with Rauf Denktash unless he agreed to a federal solution, bi-zonal, with political equality between the 18 percent and the 80 percent, one citizenship, and one international personality*. No sooner than he finished making the statement, he agreed to have a series of unofficial meetings in late October 1994 without preconditions. These too accomplished nothing.

The Turkish strategy has been clear all along: a "two-state" solution, with political equality between the two communities. President Clerides' proposal for an acceptable solution to the Cyprus problem cited is music to Denktash' ears. The "facts on the ground" will determine the final solution. The 70-30 percent solution, if it ever materializes, would require minor territorial adjustments. The transferring of the "dead zone" to Greek control would more or less solve the territorial dispute. The United Nations' clerks are busy drawing territorial lines on someone else's ancestral land. The constitutional issues appears to have been settled: political equality. If what President Clerides is promoting is a bi-zonal, federal, 70-30 percent territorial division of Cyprus, with political equality, and the Turkish side does not agree to such terms, who among us would dare, in the name of realism, suggest to the leadership of Cyprus to agree to worse terms demanded by the Turkish leadership because the alternative is "partition"?

*Department of Political Science
The William Paterson College of New Jersey*

GEORGE GREGORIOU

* Glafkos Clerides' statement/address at the U.N. General Assembly, October 3, 1994, p. 7. See also Clerides' letter to the U.N. Secretary-General Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, dated 7th September 1994