purpose it was written. Finally, it will be an important tool for a better understanding of the history of the old British-Greek relationship as well as for the writing of the history of the Greek people on the eve of the 1821 Revolution.


When, back in 1963, the Institute for Balkan Studies published the late Professor Xydis' book on *Greece and the Great Powers 1944-1947*, one hardly suspected the flow of titles which, from a variety of perspectives, was to wash over the subject during the following three decades. All principal authorities on the origins of the Cold War have, at some point, dipped into the Greek crisis, the British or/and American intervention and such a celebrated topic of post-war history as the Truman Doctrine. Many have contributed major monographs and articles, enriching not only the bibliography of the subject but also the great debate on the origins of the Cold War, which has long divided the pertinent scholarship on the other side of the Atlantic between "traditionalists", "revisionists" and "post-revisionists". And yet it is often acknowledged that there is still scope for a fresh approach, a different point of view; this feeling is rather validated by Robert Frazier's study.

To be sure, the author adopts a rather straightforward diplomatic historian's perspective, in the sense that he primarily relies on the diplomatic records of two of the major powers involved, Great Britain and the United States. Even this, however, is no small a task, given the sheer volume of the material available. Apparently, this study is at its best while attempting to juxtapose and reconstruct the decision-making processes in the ranks of the respective powers. In doing this, it does not miss, as it is in fact the author's stated purpose, the conflicting assessments and attitudes noticeable in both cases. It amply shows how the diverging views and varied degrees of knowledge and interest of the political leaders of the two powers and their respective diplomatic and military services can explain the twists and turns of

their wartime policies towards Greece, which, of course, had a direct bearing on certain unfortunate developments in that country. In this respect, the author dwells on the contentious issue of the return of King George II to post-war Greece, a sore point which the attitudes of Premier Churchill and President Roosevelt inflamed against the best advice of their diplomats.

Further, the book goes a long way towards clarifying the process whereby the British government came to the decision to pull out of Greece and to transfer the burden onto the United States. After painstakingly sifting through the evidence, the author clearly considers the British withdrawal the result of dire financial straits and the prevailing mood within the British Cabinet rather than a deliberate attempt to draw the Americans in. In the chapter concerning the American reaction, Frazier does indicate that the British note of 21 February did galvanise an up-to-then slow-going administration into action. He also makes out a strong case for the position that, by over-emphasising the communist threat in order to win over a predominantly Republican Congress to its new policy for Greece and Turkey, the Truman administration injected a sort of ideological overdose in its rivalry with the Soviet Union. In this sense, according to Frazier, the Truman Doctrine can be regarded as the actual declaration of the Cold War (p. 161), which now turned into a “confrontation with the Soviet Union on an ideological basis” (p. 164). At this point he offers an interpretation at variance with mainstream “post-revisionist” views, those of John Lewis Gaddis in particular, which emphasise either the Iranian crisis, in early 1946, or the outbreak of the Korean War, in June 1950.

A slightly disturbing thing about the book may not be the author’s responsibility. There is a fair number of typing, spelling and, much fewer, factual errors2, which a thorough editing should have averted. Yet those familiar with modern word-processing methods must be aware of how sophisticated technology may cheat even the most fastidious typist or editor. From a more substantial point of view, one might consider the author’s treatment of the vortex of Greek politics and their impact on Anglo-American perceptions as rather brief if compared with, say, George M. Alexander’s *The Prelude to the Truman Doctrine* (Oxford, 1982), which, however, deals with British policy only. Yet the author fully serves the main purposes of his study, that is how

---

2. For example, in the preface (p. viii) it is stated that the Greek government was reinstated in Athens in September 1944, while, of course, this happened in October; or that the Greek Constitution of 1911 was amended in 1936 in order “to give a legal basis for the Metaxas dictatorship”, whereas it was actually suspended (p. 2); or that General Gonatas was “a leader of the revolt which removed George II from the throne in 1924”, which is incorrect regarding both Gonatas’ part and the date (p. 5); or the reference to “the Venizelos governments of 1924-1935”, a point on which the author’s American sources might have misled him (p. 8).
British and American policies towards Greece were developed during the occupation and the early post-war period, how they interacted, how and why they led to the Truman Doctrine.

*University of Thessaloniki*

**YIANNIS D. STEFANIDIS**


In recent years, since the collapse of the federal structure of post-war Yugoslavia, the Macedonian Question has received a great deal of publicity, and continues to be an issue of some importance to the political leaders of the countries concerned. Wolfgang Libal’s latest book joins the multitude of publications that have set out to describe and analyse the complex parameters of the Macedonian Question over the last few years. Mr Libal is a journalist of long standing, who has been involved with Balkan issues for many years; his decision to give an account of his professional experiences is a welcome one and will certainly assist his readers’ understanding of the Macedonian Question.

At first sight, this book with its thirty-two short chapters may look like a simplified account of the subject addressed to the average reader. In the context of a problem which is bedevilled by historical arguments and political processes, an attempt to present the facts in a simple and straightforward manner can only be hailed as a constructive move. On the other hand, there is no denying that to the informed reader the very first pages seem to undertake a somewhat touristic approach to the geographical and historical aspects of the Macedonian Question. On page 7, for instance, Mr Libal states that Greece’s only means of overland access to Central and Western Europe is through the FYROM; he does not mention the route through Bulgaria and Romania. On page 15 he says that the Macedonian Question exists because various Slavonic tribes settled around Thessaloniki, which is nonsense. And the map on the front cover seems to support this simplistic approach. The choice of colours conspires to produce associations of “good” neighbours (Albania and Bulgaria) and “bad” neighbours (Serbia and Greece) “besieging” poor little Macedonia. Similar interrelationships are reflected on page 85, in the account of the situation which developed after the end of the Second World War.

I have the following general comments to make about the book as a whole.