The Greek threat to occupy Constantinople in late July 1922 was an attempt to force Mustapha Kemal, the leader of the Turkish Nationalist movement, to act and so end the military stalemate in Asia Minor. As well, the Greeks were urging the Allies to settle the Near East question, after the failed allied mediation attempts in February/March and June 1921 and March 1922.

This article will focus on three questions:
(1) why would the press want to report this report?
(2) Why choose the New York Times, the Times of London, Argus and The Age newspapers as sources of information?
(3) Why use the press as a primary source of information instead of archival sources-published and unpublished government documents?

The first question above will show that news or potential news is subject to four principles, which set the parameters, which the "value" of a potential news item is determined. Bonney and Wilson quoting the Galtung and Ruge article "Structuring and Selecting news", outline these four factors. They include:
"(1) The more the event concerns elite nations, the more probable that it will become a news item.
(2) The more the event concerns elite people, the more probable it will become a news item.
(3) The more the event can be seen in personal terms, as due to the action of a specific individual, the more probable that it will become a news item.
(4) The more negative the event in its consequences, the more probable that it will become a news item".

It is necessary to expand briefly on the points above. In the first two decades of the 20th Century, Britain was an elite nation because of her dominance in world affairs and also possessed a great empire. Britain fought the Ottoman Empire in World War One and imposed its peace terms with its Allied partners, France and Italy on a vanquished Turkey. The Greek threat to occupy Constantinople is a news-value event because Britain, France and Italy formally occupied that city as part of the provisions of the Treaty of Sevres and also was the capital of the Ottoman Empire under the authority of the Sultan. There was even the potential of a conflict between Greece and the occupying powers in Constantinople.

The *New York Times* of America, *the Times* of London, *Argus* and *The Age* newspapers of Melbourne, Australia were chosen for their pre-eminence and political influence in their respective nations. While Lloyd's work refers specifically to *the Age* and *Argus* newspapers, it can easily be applied to both the *New York Times* and *Times* of London\(^2\).

These publications were bold, independent, news-views, oriented journals published in open democratic societies. As important newspapers they achieved their pre-eminence in two ways. Firstly, they were journals that had attained reputation for reliability and for presenting the most convincing image of government thinking. Secondly, the elite members of society-public servants, scholars, politicians, religious and business leaders read them\(^3\).

The traditional method of writing history is to use archival sources: manuscripts, unpublished and printed documentary collections and official government publications. It was the 19th Century German historian Leopold Von Ranke who laid great emphasis on great individuals and his theory of historical knowledge rested on the factual reconstruction of events of the past\(^4\). He relied on written documents for writing his history that placed the main emphasis on the conscious deeds of political per-


sonalities. The portrayal of impersonal forces below the conscious level along with economic and sociological factors were largely excluded. Ranke emphasised the critical use of original sources and his approach influenced historians to follow his lead and look at archives with increasing rigour.

Peter Burke has challenged the traditional view of writing history. He contrasted the new history with the old one. The latter deals with the achievements of major personalities such as statesmen and generals, whereas the former investigates the activities of the neglected majority of humanity. Burke criticises the Rankean tradition for relying on official records originating from government archives at the expense of other evidence. This means that the old history imposes the view from above, while the new history seeks to examine the view from below.

Peter Burke's new history (showing "the view from below") allows newspapers to be used as a primary tool of research and allows comparisons to be made with documents ("the view from above approach"). This means that the everyday newspaper accounts of the Greek-Turkish conflict read by the general public (the view from below) can be substantiated to some extent from the documentary sources.

After the return of King Constantine to Greece in December 1920, the articles appearing in the press were largely anti-Greek in tone. It should be noted that press accounts emanating from Constantinople, Athens, Smyrna and Angora on the Greek threat to occupy Constantinople were subject to censorship by military authorities. Furthermore, the editorial page was the section where a newspaper could express its opinion or comment on a particular event.

This paper which will be divided into three parts will examine the rumours and internal situation in Greece prior to the Greek attempt to invade Constantinople, and the two Greek notes presented to Allied re-

7. Ibid., p. 6.
8. For a discussion on the theoretical study of the press see Ch. 1 in S. Stavridis, The Greek-Turkish War 1919-1923: An Australia Press Perspective, MA Unpublished RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia 1999.
representatives in Athens requesting permission to occupy the Turkish capital. The Allies refused the Greek request and took countermeasures to protect Constantinople, which subsequently disappointed the Greek Government.

(1) The Rumours and the Internal Situation in Greece

The first news reports of the Greek attempt to occupy Constantinople appeared in the London *Times* on July 29 and August 1 and the *New York Times* and Melbourne press on July 29 and 31, 1922 respectively. The newspaper headlines give the impression of disbelief, that the Greeks would be so reckless in attempting to occupy Constantinople while it was still under Allied occupation. Beneath these headlines there is an anti-Greek feeling incited by the impending rumours of a Greek assault on Constantinople.

On July 24, the London *Times Near East* correspondent sent by mail to London a dispatch which was published on August 1, 1922. He reported on the rumors circulating of a Greek threat on the Turkish capital; and on the military concentration in Eastern Thrace, and on the problems encountered by Turkish Nationalists in the Ismid Peninsula. He urged the Allies to defend the neutral zone outside of Constantinople should either the Greeks or Turks violate it. There are two reasons for which this item might have been sent by mail. Firstly, the correspondent was providing background information to an anticipated event which could have had important ramifications for the British Empire; and secondly, he probably wanted to avoid having his dispatch confiscated by Allied censors in Constantinople. There is a possibility that the London *Times* correspondent was accompanied by an Allied military or High Commission official or even by a Turkish Government representative to the Greek-Turkish frontier to witness the Greek military manoeuvres.


from afar. The journalist might have been pressured or even persuaded to depict the Greeks in an unfavourable light\textsuperscript{11}.

The London \textit{Times} and \textit{New York Times} reports of July 29 which emanated from Constantinople and Sofia revealed that the transfer of Greek troops from Anatolia was being used to reinforce the Thracian front, and that General Hadjianestis, the Commander-in-Chief of the Asia Minor army, was to inspect these troops at Rodosto, a port located on the European side of the Sea of Marmora. The Melbourne press merely said that “Greek troops are passing near the Turkish border” without any further explanation\textsuperscript{12}.

The London \textit{Times} mentioned that senior Greek officers were talking about an attack on Constantinople. The correspondent interpreted the rhetoric of some high ranking Greek officers, as designed “to strengthen the morale of the troops”. The main issue was whether the Greeks were prepared to defy the Allies and occupy Constantinople, but the Greek transfer of troops could not be discounted either. In response, General Harington, the Commander-in-Chief of Allied forces at Constantinople, issued a communiqué through Reuter’s news agency stressing that the Greek violation of the neutral zone would be met by Allied force\textsuperscript{13}.

\textsuperscript{11} London \textit{Times}, August 1, 1922, p. 9. It should be noted the Allied declaration of July 28 issued by General Harington at Constantinople appeared in small print at the bottom of this news article; Robert W. Desmond, \textit{The Press and World Affairs}, Arno Press, New York 1972, pp. 117-118 and 146-147; \textit{National Archives and Records Administration, Washington DC, Records of the Department of State with the Internal Affairs of Turkey 1910-1929 867.73/6}.

F.M. Dealing, Assistant Sec at Dept State, to Washburn Crosby Co, New York, August 10, 1921. This letter mentions the difficulties of cable censorship existing in Greece and Turkey. Hereafter cited as \textit{Turkey Internal}.


\textsuperscript{13} London \textit{Times}, “Greek Military Activity. Allied Warning”, July 29, 1922, p. 9; Smith, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 277; In early May 1922, General Hadjianestis visited Smyrna to discuss his plans with Major-General A. Pallis, the Chief of Staff to former Commander-in-Chief General Papoulas, of shortening Greek defensive positions in Anatolia. This involved withdrawing Greek forces from Asia Minor and using them to occupy Constantinople. Major-Generals Pallis, Polimenakos and Kondylis regarded Hadjianestis as incompetent and resigned their commissions in disgust. See Giannis P. Kapsis, \textit{[Hamenes Patrides: Lost Homelands]}, Nea...
Unlike the London Times and the Melbourne press, the New York Times stated that the Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople were informing their Greek counterparts of their anxiety regarding the Greek concentration in Thrace. According to the New York Times with Henderson, the acting British High Commissioner at Constantinople, told the new Greek Charge d'Affaires of the inherent danger of the Greek manoeuvre in Thrace.

Both Melbourne newspapers highlighted the precautionary military and naval measures being adopted by British authorities as a precaution against a rumored Greek attack on Constantinople. These measures created the impression that Britain was in the readers’ mind, displaying and asserting its power, especially when we consider such details as “30 British warships assembled in the Bosphorus”. This impression was further buttressed in the New York Times account of “5 French battalions, 4 British and 1 Italian in Constantinople and a formidable British naval force in the vicinity”. For these newspapers it would have been madness on the part of the Greeks to attack Constantinople especially with such a menacing British naval presence that also had the potential for blockading Greece.


14. New York Times, July 29, 1922, p. 1:3; Great Britain Public Record Office F.O. 424 Confidential Correspondence respecting Turkey Pt. 1 “Further correspondence respecting Eastern affairs” July-September 1922. F.O. 424/254 no. 82, Henderson [Constantinople] to Earl of Balfour, July 28, 1922. It should be noted that Harington on July 27 cabled the War Office in London reporting of his meeting with Simopoulos, the new Greek High Commissioner at Constantinople. The latter informed Harington that the Greeks were weary of the delays and financial burden of keeping the Greek army in Asia Minor and reinforcing the Thracian front was purely a defensive measure. Simopoulos assured Harington that there was no secret organisation going on for arming the Greeks in Constantinople. See FO 424/254 no. 86, Lt. Gen Sir C. Harington [Constantinople] to War Office, July 27, 1922. M. Triantafyllakos resigned as Greek High Commissioner over his personal differences with the Government. See National Archives and Records Administration, Washington D.C., Records of the Department of State relating to Political Relations between Turkey and other States 1910-1929. 767.68/279, Caffery [Athens] to Sec of State July 28, 1922. Hereafter cited as Turkey Political.

Constantine had planned the entire stratagem in order to save his throne. King Constantine was portrayed as the arch-villain by the Melbourne papers. They do not describe the actual internal political, economic and financial problems that existed in Greece. It is difficult to believe that the Melbourne press was unaware of such problems when it focussed only on matters concerning Britain. The New York Times indicated that Constantine probably allowed rumors regarding Constantinople to circulate as a means of deflecting the attention of the Greek people away from "their heavy military and financial burdens" and of pressuring the Entente into resolving the Near Eastern question.\(^\text{16}\)

However, the London Times and New York Times briefly described in their stories and editorials the machinations of certain Greek Cabinet Ministers who were pushing for the advance onto Constantinople, and the internal conditions in Greece. The Melbourne press avoided publishing this information, believing their readership would not be interested in Greek domestic politics, and so directed its attention to Constantine's designs on Constantinople.

M. M. Theotokis and Stratos, respectively, the Greek Ministers of War and the Interior, whose names appeared in a London Times report of August 15, were the main force in influencing Constantine and the Cabinet to make advance on Constantinople. The New York Times editorial of August 1 mentioned Gounaris' ploy as "a brilliant political stroke to save the situation". In fact, the British documents reveal the French Minister in Athens alluding to Gounaris, ex-Greek Premier 1921-1922 and Baltazzis', the Greek Foreign Minister, opposition to the advance on Constantinople. Furthermore Greece's internal political, economic and financial situation was becoming unbearable.\(^\text{17}\)

The New York Times and London Times referred to the internal situation in Greece from different perspectives. The latter newspaper ex-

\(^{16}\) The Age and Argus, July 31, 1922; New York Times, July 29, 1922.

plained that the Greek forced loan had contributed “to a rapid decline in King Constantine’s popularity” whereby many voters had abandoned the Royalists and countless young men were avoiding conscription into the Greek army. After visiting Thessaly, Macedonia and Epirus Mr S. C. Atchley, Second Secretary and Translator of the British legation in Athens, reported on the general unpopularity of the royalist politicians, although he claimed, King Constantine still enjoyed some support in Greece. However, the documentary evidence offers a contrary view to that of the London *Times version of events*.  

The *New York Times* on July 31 described the financial and commercial problems of the Greek Government. It outlined a monthly cost of $7 million to maintain the Greek army in the various theatres and said it hoped that the U.S. might release the balance of $33 million in credits granted to the Venizelos administration. With regard to the cost of maintaining the army, Bentinck, acting British Minister in Athens, observed that the Greek government’s main problem was that it was spending 10 million drachmas daily on the war, and he urged that “if we allow Greece to collapse a serious blow will have been dealt to our position, political, commercial and financial in the Near East”. Many British investors faced the possibility of losing millions of pounds in the advent of a Greek financial collapse.  

18. London *Times*, “Greeks and Turks”, August 5, 1922, p. 13; Kenneth Bourne and D. Cameron Watt (eds), *British Documents on Foreign Affairs series F. Vol. 5 Italy and South-Eastern Europe, July 1921 - December 1923*, University Publications of America, USA, pp. 193-194. Hereafter cited as *B.D.F.A. series F.*; Caffery pointed out that “Constantine personally seems to maintain popularity. He has made several visits recently to Venizelists strongholds in the Greek islands and has been enthusiastically received. On the other hand, nobody has a good word to say for the Cabinet; but notwithstanding their weakness. I do not believe they can be overthrown at this juncture”. See *Turkey Political 767.68/255*, Caffery, Athens to Sec of state, Washington D.C., July 25, 1922. Protopapadakis, as Minister of Finance, introduced the forced loan in April 1922 “literally forcing the Greek people to lend their government a portion of their cash holdings ... All persons possessing bank notes of 5, 10, 25, 500, and 1000 drachmas were required to appear at their nearest bank to receive new currency that was printed in two equal parts. One half, bearing the picture of the founder of the Bank of Greece, constituted legal tender and was given to the original holder. The other half, bearing the imprint of the Royal Crown, constituted a twenty-year bond at 61/2 per cent interest and was retained by the bank”. See Louis P. Cassimatis, *American Influence in Greece 1917-1929*, Kent State University Press, Kent 1988, p. 73.  

19. *New York Times*, July 31, 1922, 1:1; *B.D.F.A. series F. vol. 5.*, pp. 208-209. In this dispatch Bentinck, further, mentioned that Greece had great undeveloped wealth in Macedo-
Mr S. de Bilinski, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the National Bank of Turkey, who visited Greece, reported to Bentinck of the difficult financial and economic position facing Greece. As far as Greek finances were concerned, the prohibition of exporting Greek drachmas and stock shares, the increase of import duties on all luxuries and most necessities, and the attempt to stabilise the currency through a consortium of banks, had all failed. Currant and olive crops offered good prospects of earning foreign exchange but were subject to high prices for exporters.

The Royalist government wanted to get access to credits made by the Governments of United States, Great Britain and France under the Tripartite Loan of 1918, which would have allowed it to maintain its army on a war footing and to meet its financial obligations. However, the Greeks were unsuccessful in raising a loan in the British and American markets in 1921-1922. In any case, France, would have blocked any Greek moves to get access to the 1918 credits.

Furthermore, the article was accurate in stating that the remittances of $50 million from Greeks in America had greatly assisted the Greek economy in 1921. However, it does not mention that these remittances had ceased in 1922, which deprived Greece of much needed capital. While rumours of an assault on Constantinople and internal financial difficulties persisted, the Greeks had to then raise the political stakes.

(2) The Two Greek Notes and Allied Refusal

The newspapers continued their anti-Greek style of reporting on the

20. B.D.F.A. series F. vol. 5., pp. 209-210. De Bilinski had lived in Athens for many years. Around June or July 1922, while visiting Greece, he took the opportunity to interview some leading Greek personalities in Athens. There was no mention of the names of some of these prominent individuals. One can only assume that they were Cabinet Ministers, bankers and proprietors of major business firms. See B.D.F.A. series F. vol. 5, p. 208.


events that were to evolve over the following few days. The newspaper reports began to highlight the fact that the Greeks had handed diplomatic notes to Allied representatives in Athens requesting permission to occupy Constantinople. The Allies refused to countenance the Greek plan. It should be emphasized that the Melbourne press treatment of this incident was somewhat brief compared to the London *Times* and *New York Times* version of events. Nevertheless, the Melbourne newspapers did manage to portray Greece in an adverse manner and, in particular, were opposed to King Constantine.

On July 31, the London *Times* correspondent reported that press censorship regarding Greek plans over Constantinople had been very rigid in Athens over the preceding week. This could be explained by the fact that the Greek Cabinet acted in secret and attempted to conceal its real intentions, and that M. Baltazzis eventually presented two notes to Allied Ministers in Athens highlighting Greece's desire to resolve the Greek-Turkish conflict. In both notes, which were issued to the press the Greek Government promised it would await the Allies' reply before proceeding further. The London *Times* published both the Greek notes in one article, whereas the *New York Times* version appeared on July 30 and 31 and the Melbourne press on July 31 and August 1. Each newspaper reported on the Greek notes.

The Athens correspondent of the London *Times* forwarded a summary of the Greek notes to his London office without any further explanation. The first note, that of July 27, mentioned that Turkey's insistence in delaying peace forced Greece to take "some direct solution" to protect the Christians in Asia Minor from Turkish reprisals. It concluded that Greece was willing to cooperate with the Allies in arriving at a solution which would compel Turkey to stop evading the *Entente* decisions.

The first article on this matter to appear *The Age* was on July 31 and it is somewhat unclear which Greek note is being referred to, because the article is interwoven with other information. There are some clues that suggest that it refers to the first note—which is Greek willingness to

collaborate with the Allies and take some military action against Turkey. The small headline “Greek note to Allies” appearing in the Argus alerted its readers to the fact that the Greeks had given the Allies a note. The New York Times reiterated basically what appeared in the London Times regarding the first Greek note. Further, the New York Times suggested that the Greek build up in Thrace was part of a plan to assist King Constantine to fulfil his dream of occupying Constantinople. The words “obscure” in The Age, “not fully known” in the Argus, “some direct solution” in the London Times and “decisive steps” in the New York Times are ambiguous terms which conceal the Greek plans for occupying Constantinople as they appeared in the second Greek note.

Two days later, a note handed by the Greek Government to Allied Ministers’ in Athens stated that only the occupation of Constantinople would force the Kemalists to accept peace. The Greek Government requested the Allies to allow it to occupy the Turkish capital. The Melbourne press quoted unnamed British diplomats who stated that the Greek request to occupy Constantinople was a sign of Greek “impatience” and that the Allies’ lack of unanimity had also contributed to their inability to find a lasting solution to the Near Eastern problem. France and Italy would not associate themselves with an Allied ultimatum that compelled Turkey to accept the conference decisions of March 1922. The Age reported that the March decisions dealt with Turkey’s admission into the League of Nations, “the protection of minorities and the Dardanelles question”, whereas the Argus saw this arrangement as one in which “the Greeks should withdraw from Asia Minor and that sufficient territory


should be restored in Thrace to enable Turkey properly to protect Constan­
tinople". It could be argued that the Melbourne press saw the second Greek note in terms of an expression of the unresolved conference de­
cisions and Allied disunity, coupled with a Greek threat, which height­
ened the political stakes in Anatolia26.

The New York Times basically reiterated what appeared in the Lon­
don Times. It also, however, alluded to the second Greek note, on July
31, and argued that the Greek advance on Constantinople raised the po­
tential of "a terrible new outbreak of war in the Near East" and united
the Allies against King Constantine.

It also considered that whole venture could have bluff on the part of
the Greeks, and cited the Daily Herald's Athens correspondent, who had
officially been informed that Greece would not advance on Constan­
tinople without the consent of the Allies27. Responding to questions in
the Commons on July 31, Lloyd George assured his parliamentary col­
leagues that Greece had been warned of "serious consequences", and Bal­
tazzis re-affirmed that Greece had no intention of violating the neutral
zone. The press accounts portray Lloyd George as exercising firm lea­
dership in the ensuing Constantinople crisis28.

The New York Times referred to Journal des debats and Le Temps,

26. The Age, "Greek Aggression. The Threat To Turkey. Occupation of Constan­
tinople. The First Shots Fired. Greeks cross neutral zone", August 1, 1922, p. 9; Argus,
ger. Allied Attempt to Avert Bloodshed", August 1, 1922, p. 7.

Plans to Proclaim Autonomous State, Declaring Against Restoring Conquests to Turks.
Lands Troops At Rodosto. 25,000 Men With Big Guns Now At Port, Seventy Miles West
of Constantinople. Tchatalja Patrols Clash. British Troops Are Moved Up There - Athens,
Discouraged, Fears Desperate Move", July 31, 1922, 1:1 and 3; Smith, op.cit., p. 278; F.O.
424/254 no. 155; Turkey Political 767.68/260.

17 contains a summary of the House of Commons debate relating to the Greek attempt to
occupy Constantinople; New York Times, "... Lloyd George Optimistic. Tells Parliament
that Greece has Reaffirmed her undertaking not to defy the Allies. Lloyd George's Reassuring
Speech", August 1, 1922, 1:21; The Age, "The Greek Advance Britain Issues Warning.
Constantinople Must Not Be Occupied. Greek Minister Gives Assurances", August 2, 1922,
p. 9; Argus, "Warning To Greece. Powers' Grave View. Assurances From Athens. Obser­
vance of Neutral Zone. British Cruisers for Constantinople", August 2, 1922, p. 11; House
of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, vol. 157, cols. 1018-1019. Hereafter cited as H. C.
Debs.
two major French newspapers, which commented on the Greek request. Both French papers argued that Allied naval action would be sufficient to bring King Constantine to heel. *The Age* and *Argus* quoted unnamed Parisian newspapers that expressed similar sentiments to those that had appeared in the *New York Times*. At any rate, *The Age*'s small heading “Should Greek Ports Be Blockaded?” conveys a sense of apprehension, whereas the *Argus*'s “France suggests Blockade” indicates support for the French position.

In addition, all the newspapers reported that the French Government officially opposed the Greek request to occupy the Turkish capital. The French, in particular, felt great antipathy towards King Constantine. The London *Times* referred to M. Peretti della Rocca, Director of Political Affairs at Quai d'Orsay, telling M. Metaxas, Greek Charge d'Affaires, of France's opposition to the Greek request. The *New York Times* expressed French opposition in similar language. The Melbourne press referred to uncertainty on the part of “Paris officialdom” as to the Greeks' commitment not to occupy Constantinople without Allied permission.


at a time when 25,000 men were being amassed in Thrace, and claimed that the French were decidedly suspicious of the Greeks “executing their threat to occupy Constantinople”31.

The editorial page allowed the newspaper to express its opinion regarding the Greek threat to occupy Constantinople. It was on this page that it could pour out its anti-Greek sentiment. On July 31, the London Times regarded the Greek action as “inadmissible” and blamed Allied indecision for the uncertainty in the Near East. The Entente had to be impartial in its dealings with both the Greeks and Turks, in order to avoid sending conflicting messages which might have been interpreted by the combatants as a signal to advance on Constantinople. Only through strong leadership coupled with the maintenance of Allied unity and firm resolve were the Allies able to deal with the protagonists. The editorial concluded forcefully “in no case can the Greek designs upon Constantinople be tolerated for an instance”32.

The Age was the only newspaper in this study that did not editorialise on the Greek action. Indeed, its editorials on July 31 and August 1 focussed on more than two issues such as Canberra, butter control, cotton growing and Victorian fruit growing. The Argus, however, explained to its readers that Constantinople was a city that was always in the European spotlight and that there was an imminent crisis “that may develop alarming proportions”. Whether Greece occupied Constantinople permanently or temporarily was not at issue, but the Allies could not trust the “treacherous word” of King Constantine.

The Argus highlighted that Great Britain and France would face a religious backlash from their Moslem subjects if it “[allowed] the headquarters of Islam to be taken by the ‘infidel’”. It highlighted that the Treaty of Sevres could be modified to account for “altered circumstan-


ces" but "so radical departure from the text of the Treaty as the Greek occupation apart from the serious consequences that it would have is not to be thought of."

The *New York Times* agreed with Venizelos's assertion that it would be "national suicide" for Greece to occupy Constantinople when it knew full well that it would be at the mercy of Allied naval guns. Since Greece was diplomatically isolated, the only "spectacular possibility" for Constantine to achieve glory "would be the recovery of Constantinople". Furthermore, it argued that both Britain and France could achieve peace "tomorrow", if they were sincere. The *Entente* was hypocritical in offering "moral advice" when Christian or Moslem could be sacrificed "in order to gain their own ends without spending their own blood and money". The editorial ended in admonishing both Constantine and Mustapha Kemal. In the end, the Allies denied the Greek request and decided to take military countermeasures to protect the neutral zone.

(3) Allied countermeasures and Greek disappointment

The press reports portrayed the Allies as taking defensive measures that would allow them to protect Constantinople from a Greek attack. In addition, the news accounts gave the impression that while the Greeks might have been feigning, the Allies could not afford to be complacent either. The Melbourne papers described it as "like toying with lighted matches near a powder magazine". The papers thought that the Allies' firm resolve in dealing with the Greeks would prevent more serious pro-

33. *The Age*, July 31, 1922, p. 6 and August 1, p. 8; *Argus*, August 1, 1922, p. 6. The British Empire was facing political agitation and strife in Egypt and India in 1922. The Turkish Nationalists had forged close links with other Moslem nations: Afghanistan, Persia, Syria and Albania, countries where Moslem passions could be utilised to create problems for Britain, France and Greece. See S. R. Sonyel, *Turkish Diplomacy*, Sage Publications, London 1975, pp. 149-153.


lems in the Near East\textsuperscript{36}.

The London \textit{Times} correspondent thought the Greek advance “involved considerable risk” but doubted “whether there was ever any intention of attempting a coup de main against the wishes of the allies”. The \textit{New York Times} quoted “military and official circles in London” as dismissing the Greek advance altogether. Rumbold, the British High Commissioner in Constantinople, thought that “My own opinion is that the Greek menace to Constantinople is 50\% bluff and 50\% serious”\textsuperscript{37}.

However, whether the Greek threat was real or imaginary, the Allies were taking no chances. Several items, which have been extrapolated from the press accounts, show Allied readiness to meet such an eventuality. Firstly, all the press reports mentioned that General Harington took the essential military steps by instructing French forces “occupying the Chatalja sector to oppose any armed advance by the Greeks”. In addition, British units were transferred from Asiatic Turkey, and a Sussex battalion was dispatched from Malta to reinforce the Chatalja zone in European Turkey. The Italians placed two of their battalions under General Harington’s control\textsuperscript{38}. Furthermore, the press accounts reveal an atmosphere of cooperation and an \textit{esprit de corps} among the Allied Generals, who were ready to meet the Greek threat. A council of war attended by Allied High Commissioners, General Harington and Allied Generals and Admirals was held on July 30 to discuss various measures to protect Constantinople\textsuperscript{39}.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{36} The \textit{Age}, “Turkish Peasants panic-stricken”, August 2, 1922, p. 9; \textit{Argus}, “Matches at Powder Magazine”, August 2, 1922, p. 11.
\item \textsuperscript{39} \textit{New York Times}, “Send More Troops To Oppose Greeks. British Move Forces Across the Bosphorus and Order Warship Thither...”, August 1, 1922, 1:21; \textit{The Age}, “Turkish Peasants panic-stricken”, August 2, 1922, p. 9; \textit{The Argus}, Matches at Powder Magazine”,
\end{itemize}
Some differences of opinion among the Allies did not appear in the press. The French High Commissioner advocated the withdrawal of Greek forces to a distance of five kilometres from the frontier and recommended that the Allies take harsh measures in suppressing the Greek military mission and naval base in Constantinople. Rumbold and Balfour played down the latter French recommendation, since it had the potential of provoking a border incident.40

Secondly, the press reports mentioned that Greek forces outnumbered the Allies. Various Allied troop figures of 4,000, 10,000 and 15,000 were quoted in the New York Times and 5,000 in The Age and Argus. The New York Times alluded to 70,000 Greek troops amassed on the Chatalja line. The London Times did not mention Allied troop numbers in its reports, other than an Allied communiqué, which indicated that Greek contingents had been increased from two to four divisions. Whatever the validity of the newspaper troop statistics, there is no doubt the Greeks had the numerical superiority in a land campaign.41 The press did not know that the Turkish War Minister was willing to place some 2,000 Turkish troops and 20,000 reservists under General Harington’s command, if required for the defence of Constantinople. Rumbold rejected such an offer out of hand.42 There is no doubt that the inclusion of Turkish troops would have boosted Allied troop numbers.

The press depicted the Greeks as provoking border incidents as part...


41. New York Times, “Allied Commander at Thracian Front”, July 30, 1922, 1:3; “Send More Troops To Oppose Greeks. British Move Forces Across the Bosporus and Order Warships Thither ... 4,000 Allied Troops in Constantinople”, August 1, 1922, 1:21; “Greek Have 70,000 On Tchatalja Front. Allied Land Forces only 10,000 but Backed by more than Thirty Warships ...”, August 2, 1922, 1:19; The Age, “Turkish Peasants panic-stricken”, August 2, 1922, p. 9; Argus, “Matches at Powder Magazine”, August 2, 1922, p. 11; London Times, “Constantinople Reassured. Allied Troops Ready”, August 2, 1922, p. 7. The French and Italian High Commissioners informed their Governments that Allied forces were insufficient to offer serious resistance to a Greek advance on Constantinople. See D.B.F.P. vol. 17., p. 902 fn. 2.

42. FO 424/254-131, Rumbold [Constantinople] to Earl of Balfour, August 1, 1922 and enclosure Lt. General Sir C. Harington to Allied High Commissioners, Constantinople, July 29, 1922.
of its military plan to destabilise the neutral zone. The press reported on two separate frontier incidents that involved the Greeks in clashes with Turkish and French forces. The clash with the French was inaccurately reported in the Melbourne press, which portrayed Greece in a negative light. The Melbourne press reports created the mistaken impression in the readers' mind that the Greeks had deliberately attacked the French in order to provoke an Allied response which, in turn, would give the Greeks the pretext to advance to Constantinople. The London *Times* refuted this story whereas the *New York Times* ignored it. In the former clash with the Turks, the Melbourne press, quoting the Paris correspondent of *Daily Chronicle* created the misleading perception that the Greeks had deliberately crossed the neutral zone to fight with the Turkish forces. No casualty figures were revealed. The *New York Times*, quoting Associated Press, merely reported on an exchange between Greek and Turkish forces which resulted in three soldiers being wounded on each side. The London *Times* reported that the Greek-Turkish clash had resulted in two Turks being wounded. It cannot be denied that Greek troops did stray into Turkish territory, but it was purely accidental and three Greek soldiers were killed.

The British documents indicate that, on August 1, General Harpending had dispatched General Mombelli, the Commander of Italian forces, escorted by British and French officers, to swap "maps with Greek corps commanders in order to ensure that the frontier is clearly defined and to
obtain an understanding that both sides shall be held back to a fixed distance and that patrols and aircraft shall not cross the line”. Baltazzis thought it prudent to withdraw the Greek forces from the frontier45.

With the easing of the crisis, the Greeks were disappointed at the Allies’ refusal to occupy Constantinople. The New York Times and Melbourne press accounts report on a Greek grievance against the Allied note of July 31 which deprived it of occupying Constantinople and which would have brought the war to an end. Both newspaper stories expressed the underlying idea that the Greeks were disappointed with the Allies. The London Times did not report anything of the Greek objection, probably thinking it was irrelevant. Subsequently, the Allies warned Greece of the serious consequences of attacking the Turkish capital46. The Greek complaint was presented to Allied diplomats in Athens in a third note on August 3, in which Baltazzis stated that “the entire responsibility for the continuance of the war falls upon the Allied powers”. This note also raised Greek, concerns that the Allied refusal was tantamount to producing “fresh calamities for the Christians of Asia Minor”.

After the Greek note of complaint, the press recounted the impor-

45. D.B.F.P. vol. 17., p. 910 fn. 2-11. On August 2, M. Bentinck informed Balfour that the Greek War Minister responding to General Harington’s telegram had issued strict orders to the Greek Commanding Officer. These involved: “1. To take immediate steps to prevent every incident between troops; 2. To punish severely those responsible for incident; 3. To arrange dispositions of troops so as to prevent any repetition of such incidents”. See D.B.F.P. vol. 17., pp. 910-911. Likewise the Greek categorically denied that “reconnaissance was ever ordered or executed by cavalry or aeroplanes as stated. No cavalry crossed frontier. Severe orders have again been issued that under no pretext is anyone to cross frontier ...”. See D.B.F.P. vol. 17., p. 911 fn. 2 and Turkey Political 767.68/285. There are 2 small untitled newspaper reports in the New York Times and London Times which provide the briefest of detail regarding General Mombelli's parley with General Vlahopoulos, the Commander of Greek forces in Thrace, to establish a demarcation line between Greek and Allied troops in order to avoid frontier incidents. An official communiqué issued by Allied Headquarters published in the London Times on August 12 included more detail than those of August 4. See New York Times, August 5, 1922, 1:3 and London Times, August 4, 1922, p. 7 and “Chatalja Settlement”, August 12, 1922, p. 7.


47. Turkey Political 767.68/286, Caffery [Athens] to Sec of State, August 8, 1922; F.O. 424/254.155, Bentinck [Athens] to Curzon, August 11, 1922.
tance of the preparation of Allied naval power as a part of the Allied strategy to meet the Greek threat. It was in this domain that the Allies had a strategic advantage over the Greeks. Compared to the *New York Times* and London *Times*, the Melbourne papers hardly mentioned the British naval build up. This does not mean that the Melbourne press was oblivious to such a development. The *New York Times* and London *Times* gave prominence to British naval power. Their news accounts stated that the geographic proximity of the British navy, on “the northern shore of Sea of Marmora from Silivri to Bojado” put in a position to easily bombard the entire wing of the Greek army if it advanced on to Constantinople.

The disclosure of British naval ship numbers was designed to impress the readers with the awesome strength of British naval power. For example, the *New York Times* alluded to the battle cruisers with long range guns, six dreadnoughts and two squadrons of light cruisers taking positions\(^4\). The London *Times* article of August 1 furnished graphic detail of the locations of the British navy in Constantinople, Smyrna, Alexandria and Gibraltar and listed the ships names. This article was intended to show that British naval authorities were taking the appropriate measures to meet the Greek threat. Admiral Sir Osmond Brock, Commander-in-Chief of the British Mediterranean fleet, was mentioned as commanding the British fleet near Constantinople\(^5\). All the newspapers reported further of Rear Admiral Sir Reginald Tyrwhitt in command of the third light squadron, which was bound for Constantinople, taking provisions in Malta\(^6\).


\(^5\) London *Times*, “British Fleet at Hand. Greeks reassure Allies”, August 1, 1922, p. 10. It should be noted that Britain possessed the naval force to block the Straits and Piraeus and to inflict long term damage to Greece. See Smith, *op.cit.*, p. 280.

However, all the newspapers were unaware that the Allied Admirals had presented a joint note on August 2 to the Allied High Commissioners. In that note, they remarked that the Greek Government should be informed immediately that Greek ships would be prohibited from using the Bosphorus or waters adjacent to the neutral zone. Even the Dardanelles in their opinion should be made off limits to the Greek navy. They pronounced that “any infringement of these orders [should] be repressed by force”\textsuperscript{51}. Balfour believed that “Naval authorities at Constantinople and in the Mediterranean should be warned that they should quietly make what preparations they can to meet any emergency that may arise\textsuperscript{52}. In the end, the Allies countermeasures forced the Greeks to abandon their plans to occupy Constantinople.

In conclusion, the press was strongly anti-Greek over the Greek Government’s attempts to occupy Constantinople. It is evident that the news accounts portray the French as the chief instigators in the adoption of stern measures against the Greeks. There is also the notion in these reports that a strong British naval presence in the Near East could have easily blockaded Greek ports. The news accounts used in this chapter highlighted the Allies’ united determination to meet and resist the Greek menace, and, to some extent, they can be supported by the archival sources.


\textsuperscript{52} D.B.F.P. vol. 17., p. 912. A British War Office letter of July 26 referred to the “Army Council [requesting] the concurrence of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty ... in informing General Harington that he may rely upon the full support from the Naval Commander-in-Chief if the Greeks make move across the neutral line...”. See D.B.F.P. vol. 17., p. 912 fn. 1.