I. P. Pikros, Τουρκικός επεκτατισμός. Από το μύθο της ελληνοτουρκικής φιλίας στην πολιτική για την αστυνόμευση των Βαλκανίων 1930-1943 (Turkish Expansionism. From the myth of Greco-Turkish friendship to the strategy of policing the Balkans 1930-1943), Hestia Bookstore, Athens 1996, pp. 411.

The characteristics of Turkish diplomacy in their timeless repetition, reveal the clearly two-faced tactics employed by Turkey in the practice of its foreign policy beginning from the moment almost of the establishment of the Turkish Republic and continuing to this day. The existing evidence is irrefutable. Turkey negotiated her entry into World War II, in exchange for the cession of certain territories, both with England and Germany. Playing simultaneously on “two boards”, Turkey demanded not only parts of Thrace, the Crimea and the Transcaucasia, but also certain rights in Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Albania.

And how about the Allies? What was the attitude of the Allies at that time, with respect to these tactics of Turkey? Both Moscow and London agreed to negotiate with Ankara or to allow certain territorial questions—such as that of the Dodecanese—to remain open, and such, too, was the policy eventually followed by the USA.

The period between 1930 and 1943 (Greco-Turkish treaty of friendship - Capitulation of Italy), with which Pikros deals, constitutes one of the most important periods in the history of Greco-Turkish relations. It is a period of apparent appeasement in the relations of the two countries. However, behind the myth of “friendship” not only between Greece and Turkey but also between Turkey and Britain, or between Turkey and Russia, depending on circumstances, are concealed the permanent features of Turkish diplomacy (revival of the imperial past, expansionist aims at the expense of neighbouring states, penetration into the wider area of the Balkans and the Middle East), which timeless repetition shows up as constants. Conventional obligations, so far as the planners of Turkey’s foreign policy are concerned, are matters of expediency and are blatantly abjured as soon as circumstances provide “advantageous” opportunities.

Around the middle of the 1930s Turkey was negotiating, or exerting pressure in every direction—depending on who was opportunely useful to her—in order to force a revision in her favour of the status of the Dardanelles. Turkey’s diplomatic success at Montreux encouraged her to act as a regional power, while gradually widening her scope (the Aegean Islands, the Dodecanese). At the same time, she took advantage of her strategic import-
ance, which had been constantly growing as a result of international realignments. Prompted by Britain, Ankara proposed a broadening of bilateral relations with Athens. In conjunctions, however, with the agreements of 1930 and 1933, the complementary treaty of 1938 was one-sided and only ensured the interests of Turkey. The latter became the cornerstone of England’s defensive system, while Greece, pressed by England, functioned as a rampart of Turkey against the Axis forces. Later on, Turkey refused to carry out her conventional obligations towards England on the pretext of the outbreak of World War II.

The tripartite agreement of mutual assistance signed by Turkey in October 1939 with England and France, at a cost of several million pounds sterling, was seen as the first diplomatic victory of the Allies. Eight months later, however, when Italy declared war against England and France, the government of Ankara proceeded to denounce the treaty unilaterally. Furthermore, in October 1940, Turkey violated her conventional obligations towards Greece, who was resisting the Italian attack. Turkey not only did not align herself with the policy of the Allies, but also, in June 1941, signed a treaty of friendship with Germany. In spite of the pressure brought to bear on Ankara, Turkey only joined the ranks of the victors in February 1945, twelve days after the meeting at Yalta, when the guns had already ceased firing. Throughout the duration of the war, Turkey did not fail to take advantage of any opportunity that offered itself in order to extend her influence. Although unwilling to participate in the war, she volunteered to assume the role of policeman either in the Balkans, or on the oil fields of Iraq, or in the Crimea and the Transcaucasus. The expansionism of Turkey, whether covert or open, has attracted the attention of the Great Powers who, in many instances, have undertaken to actively support it.

In addition to the above, we must further point out that, while Turkey presents herself today as an ally of the USA and Israel, a report of the US State Department has brought to light in the most official way the fact that, during the Second World War Turkey provided Hitler’s Germany with raw materials, especially chromium. Without these materials the war would have ended seven months earlier, which means that hundreds of thousands of lives would have been saved, for the loss of which Turkey is responsible. The Third

1. As Pikros informed me, on page 86, line 28 of his study, after the word “and”, the date “in 1941” is missing. Also, on p. 87, line 8, the date “1940” should be changed to “1941”. It is necessary that the publisher correct these printing errors as they otherwise detract from the strength of an important argument.

Reich paid for these metals with the gold of the countries it had occupied. Considerable quantities of this gold belonged to the victims (Jews especially) of Nazi barbarism. The gold reserves of Turkey, which amounted to 27 tonnes at the beginning of the war, had risen to 216 tonnes by its end.

The fruit of long and careful research, Yiannis Pikros’ book puts forth a special view regarding the myth of Greco-Turkish friendship while revealing at the same time the complicated folds of Turkish, but also international diplomacy, which stem from the peculiar and expedient concept that “what is mine is mine, but what is yours is negotiable”.

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La présente collection de documents publiés s’appuie sur les archives politiques ainsi que publiques de l’ex-République populaire fédérale de Yougoslavie, de la République populaire de Bulgarie et de la Fédération Russe tandis que cette même œuvre constitue une référence concernant l’historiographie de la guerre civile grecque. Dans ces cadres historiographiques les documents présentés furent sélectionnés comme les plus importants selon la recherche effectuée sur place et proviennent des pays (Yougoslavie, Bulgarie, Russie) qui furent directement impliqués à la guerre civile grecque.


L’un des auteurs, Basile Kondis, professeur de l’Histoire Moderne à l’Université Aristote de Thessalonique et directeur à l’Institut Balkanique de Thessalonique (I.M.X.A.), est bien connu dans le domaine historiographique