In August 1920, the Treaty of Sevres that was intended to end the war between Turkey and the Entente Powers, was signed. Under its terms the Ottoman empire ceased to exist, with its Arab provinces going to Britain and France in the form of League of Nations mandates and the new Turkish state limited to the core Turkish provinces of Anatolia. Turkish finances were put under strict Allied supervision while control of the strategically important Dardanelles straits, the Aegean gateway to the Black Sea, was assigned to a Commission dominated by the British and the French. Under the same treaty, Greece acquired Eastern Thrace, the European Turkish province, up to a few miles from Constantinople and was entrusted with the administration of a sizeable enclave around Smyrna, Asia Minor’s largest city and an important seaport on the Anatolian coast of the Aegean. By a separate treaty signed at the same time Western Thrace, which had been ceded to the Allies by Bulgaria, was transferred under Greek sovereignty.

Greece was enjoying the benefits of a belated yet valuable contribution to the war effort, of a world-class leader in the face of its Liberal Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos, and of Britain’s enthusiastic support for Greek claims at the Paris Peace conference. In May 1919, Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, had taken a crucial step in strengthening Greece’s position by making the suggestion, approved by Wilson and Clemenceau, that Greek troops should be sent to Smyrna, ostensibly to protect the Christian population but in fact to prevent the arbitrary expansion of Italian influence in the region. And during the following year, at the conferences of London and San Remo, where the terms of the peace treaty were discussed, he had effectively resisted French and Italian objections to a long-term Greek presence in Anatolia.

Lloyd George’s unquestionably pro-Greek policy was adopted for a

number of reasons: 1) A strong anti-Turkish sentiment that inspired in him a determination to eradicate the Turkish presence from Europe as well as minimize Turkey’s strength and influence in world affairs; 2) His friendship, trust and appreciation of Venizelos and overall philhellenic outlook; 3) On a more pragmatic basis, sound geopolitical reasons, expertly summarized in a memorandum by Harold Nicolson, an official at the Foreign Office’s Eastern department, well-acquainted with Greek affairs: “The idea which prompted our support of Greece was no emotional impulse but the natural expression of our historical policy — the protection of India and the Suez Canal. For a century we had supported Turkey as the first line of defence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey had proven a broken reed and we fell back on the second line, the line from Salamis to Smyrna. Geographically the position of Greece was unique for our purpose: politically she was strong enough to save us expense in peace, and weak enough to be completely subservient in war.”

Evidently Britain was concerned over the possibility of a Russian attempt to disrupt its imperial communications. This could be forestalled by controlling the Dardanelles, which would prevent Russian ships from entering the Mediterranean, while at the same time allowing the British fleet to strike, if necessary, at the soft underbelly of the Russian colossus. Britain’s dominant position in the Near East could also be made more secure and less expensive with the help of a friendly but dependent regional power such as Greece.

This policy, however, was not without its critics. Prominent among them was the British military establishment, pro-Turkish and very suspicious of the Greeks’ ability to effectively subdue local resistance in Asia Minor. Their doubts multiplied when, as a result of the Greek landing at Smyrna, Turkish nationalism was aroused and initial spasmodic attempts at resisting the Allied presence were transformed into a well-organized resistance movement with a gifted leader, Mustafa Kemal. By February 1920, Kemal’s nationalist army was able to defeat a predominantly Armenian French force in Cilicia, thus casting serious doubts on the Allies’ plans to establish zones of influence on Turkish soil. According to the British military, the strength and resilience of Turkish nationa-

2. Documents on British Foreign Policy (DBFP) 1st series, vol. XII, no. 488, Memorandum by Mr. Nicolson on future policy towards King Constantine, 20 December 1920.
lism ought not to be underestimated. And as long as the Greeks remained in Asia Minor, peace in that region or indeed in the entire Middle East would not be possible. Such views were shared by the soldiers’ civilian superior, Winston Churchill, Secretary of State for War.

More vociferous in his objections was Edwin Montagu, the Secretary of State for India, who argued that the Allies should be careful not to impose humiliating peace terms on the Sultan who was also the highest ranking religious leader in the Islamic world. If such treatment was meted out, Moslem susceptibilities were bound to be offended, making it hard for Britain to maintain the loyalty of its many million Moslem subjects. Montagu relentlessly quoted the strong Indian Moslem reaction to illustrate his point. His cabinet colleagues were probably influenced by such views when, in January 1920, it was decided that, contrary to earlier proposals, approved by the French, Constantinople, the seat of the Sultan Khalif (his religious title) was to remain part of the Turkish state3. Even Lord Curzon, Lloyd George’s Foreign Minister, well-known for his anti-Turkish sentiments, opposed the Greek presence in Anatolia, considering it a stimulus for perpetual nationalist unrest4.

Finally, the French resented Britain’s ascendancy in the Middle East5 and wanted to safeguard their position in Turkey against nationalist resistance by making concessions in the contemplated treaty at the expense of the Greek claims. They repeatedly voiced their objection to the Smyrna clauses of the Turkish peace treaty but eventually went along with the substance of the British proposals. Among other conside-

3. More influential, however, seems to have been Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of Imperial General Staff who argued that it would be easier to control Turkey if its capital remained in Constantinople, under the guns of the Allied ships, rather than if it was moved somewhere in the Anatolian interior. G. H. Bennett, British Foreign Policy During the Curzon Period, 1919-1924, London 1995, pp. 79-80.

4. “I am the last man to wish to do a good turn to the Turks ... but I do want to get something like peace in Asia Minor, and with the Greeks in Smyrna and Greek divisions carrying out Venizelos’s orders and marching about Asia Minor I know this to be impossible”. Curzon to Prime Minister, 9 April 1920, quoted in Montgomery, p. 262.

5. Bitter about Britain’s antagonistic policies in the region, the French attributed their difficulties in controlling their Middle Eastern possessions to British conspiracies. Even in 1945, while grappling with Syrian unrest, Charles de Gaulle “expressed his regret to the British ambassador that France could not for the time being consider war with Britain”. C. M. Andrew in Uriel Dann (ed.), The Great Powers in the Middle East 1919-1939, New York 1988, p. 168.
rations, such as Britain’s goodwill and cooperation with respect to the post-war European settlement, the French must have found it impolitic to undermine the position of Venizelos, a true war-time friend and a popular figure in France whose abilities and services to the Allied cause could not be ignored.

The situation, however, changed completely when, in November 1920, Venizelos lost the election and fell from power, succeeded by the supporters of the exiled king Constantine who had frustrated the Allied war effort from 1914 to 1917 by insisting on maintaining his country’s neutrality to the conflict. Using as an excuse the return to power of a hostile government, supposedly consisting of German sympathizers, and its pledge to reinstate Constantine to the throne, the French immediately began to argue for the revision of the Greek clauses of the Treaty of Sevres which allegedly the Greeks would not be now in a position to uphold.

In the memorandum cited above, Nicolson provides a convincing if somewhat emotional explanation for the French course of action: “They (the French) have always been jealous of the prestige which we have acquired in Greece; they are jealous of our naval supremacy, our naval mission, of our important commercial interests. They are above all afraid of the preponderance which a British ‘protectorate’ over an enlarged Greece would give us in the Eastern Mediterranean. Sentimentally they hanker after the prestige which France enjoyed in the East under Louis XIV; commercially their financiers hope to secure the position at Constantinople vacated by the Baghdad railway and the Deutsche Bank; politically and practically they wish to curtail their responsibilities in Cilicia and Syria. In the first place therefore, they desire to destroy the Greater Greece created by the Treaty of Sevres and incidentally, to undermine our great influence in that country. In the second place, with anxious eyes upon Kemal and Bolsheviks, they wish to come to some

6. For instance, in January 1919 at the request of the French, Venizelos had sent troops to Ukraine to assist General Denikin’s White Russians against the Bolsheviks.
7. Foreign Office (FO) 371 General Correspondence 4683, 32, Minute by Nicolson, 24 November 1920. DBFP vol. VIII, no. 95, Notes of a conference held at 10 Downing Street between representatives of the British and French governments, 26 November 1920.
8. A tentative Nationalist-Bolshevik relationship developed later into a treaty of friendship that brought gold and military supplies to the Nationalist cause. Kemal, however
bargain with Angora, such as will give them peace in Syria and a pre-
dominant position in Turkey"\textsuperscript{9}.

Eventually the French and the Italians, who were also against Greek expansion in Asia Minor as it rivalled their own designs on the region, had their way. Greece was warned against reinstating the king and when their wishes were ignored the Allies imposed on Greece economic sanctions. The new regime was not recognized. The British resisted, arguing against the revision of the treaty and in favour of letting the new Greek government prove its worth before it was condemned. However, they did not persist. And on January 20, 1921 the British government came to the conclusion that the Treaty of Sevres could no longer be maintained\textsuperscript{10}. In essence, after November 1920, British policy regarding Greece and its claims on European and Asiatic Turkey was a series of concessions to the French views and an ambivalent attitude \textit{vis-à-vis} the Greek position which as time went by deteriorated while that of Kemal improved, with ample French, Italian and Bolshevik assistance. Several reasons account for this: 1) French opposition and the British desire to maintain good relations with their ally so that problems that had arisen from the Versailles' settlement could be tackled in a friendly and mutually beneficial manner. Good relations could make British ideas on how to treat Weimar Germany more acceptable to the French. 2) Britain's human and material resources were scarce due to exhaustion from the war effort and the extensive requirements of Imperial defence. It would therefore be very difficult to become involved in military action, which by now seemed the only way of helping the Greeks and upholding the treaty, without French participation. 3) The government and public opinion were deeply divided on the merits and viability of the Treaty of Sevres, with the Imperial General Staff constantly predicting the collapse of the Greek army as well as pointing out that a lenient Turkish peace would end nationalist agitation in the British-controlled oil rich Iraqi province of Mosul and in Egypt, while preventing the formation of a Kemalist-Bolshevik alliance which could be disastrous for British secur-

\textsuperscript{9} DBFP vol. XII, no. 488.

\textsuperscript{10} Cabinet Conclusions Cab23/3(21)(1) Conclusions of a meeting of the Cabinet, 20 January 1921.
4) The situation in the Near East was not a high priority for the British government. "Compared to Germany, Russia is minor. Compared to Russia, Turkey is petty", Churchill had written in 1920\textsuperscript{12}. Consequently it did not warrant and did not receive either the attention or the sacrifices that could make possible the effective support of the Greek cause. 5) British officials were themselves in doubt regarding Greece's endurance and the effectiveness of its army while at the same time recognizing the strength and potential of the Turkish nationalist movement. To safeguard their country's interests in case of a Greek collapse, which under the circumstances was not unlikely, as well as to facilitate negotiations they decided to somehow keep their options open and not completely alienate the Turks. Therefore they did not do all they could to support the Greek war effort and waited to see on which side the balance would tip.

Admittedly they fought a determined diplomatic rearguard action, disproving claims and demolishing arguments with which the French, the Turks and the Italians confronted them, in an effort to salvage, without much conviction it seems\textsuperscript{13}, as much as possible of the Greek gains.

In the London Conference of February-March 1921 where the Turkish problem was discussed, they only allowed for minor modifications of the Greek clauses in the Treaty of Sevres, which both the Greeks and the Turks rejected. Later, in June 1921, after an unsuccessful Greek military operation they considered offering Greece military and financial assistance if it accepted revised terms and the Turks rejected them, a proposal that the French would not discuss\textsuperscript{14}. They fought tooth and nail to keep Eastern Thrace out of the bargain and safely in Greek hands, al-

\textsuperscript{11} Cabinet Memoranda Cab24/2275, Memo by the Secretary of State for War on the situation in Turkey in Asia, 7 December 1920.


\textsuperscript{13} "From the moment", Lloyd George wrote to Curzon on 15 September 1922, "Greece threw over Venizelos and placed her destinies in the hands of Constantine, I realized that a pro-Greek policy in Anatolia was doomed and I have agreed with you that the best we could hope to achieve in that quarter was to secure some protection for the Christian minorities. That hope is now slender". Quoted in Harold Nicolson: \textit{Curzon: The Last Phase}, London 1934, p. 258.

\textsuperscript{14} DBFP vol. XV, no. 88. Notes of meeting relating to the Allied mediation in the Near East, held in Paris, 18-19 June 1921.
though not without self-interest since Greek sovereignty secured their own position on the European shore of the Dardanelles. And after the failure of the Greek army to decisively defeat Kemal in August-September 1921 and it becoming apparent that the Greek presence in Asia Minor could not be maintained, Lord Curzon persistently attempted to secure credible protection for the Christian minorities that were to pass again under Turkish rule.

However, the British were always careful not to jeopardize the Anglo-French Alliance or find themselves alone on the side of the Greeks. They went along with the French demand not to recognize the Greek Royalist government. They maintained strict neutrality in the armed conflict and refrained from openly condemning flagrant French and Italian breaches of such policy15. And only after the Greek army's defeat and evacuation from Asia Minor in September 1922, when vital British interests at the Dardanelles were exposed, during the Chanak crisis, to immediate danger, did they seriously contemplate unilateral action against the Turks16. At the same time they mismanaged their only real trump card in the negotiations with the French, a British guarantee of the French border against German attack17, in exchange for French cooperation in the Middle East. British procrastination and excessive demands exasperated the French who eventually lost interest in the matter18.

15. For instance the French and Italian governments would not allow the Greek navy to board and search ships flying their flag suspected of contraband arms trade with the nationalists. Such activity however was undoubtedly taking place, as substantial evidence gathered by the British and Greek authorities demonstrated. Archives of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs AYE/A/5/VI(8)/10904, General Staff to MFA, 18 September 1921. FO371/7927/E6681, War Office to Foreign Office, 5 July 1922. The Papers of Lord Hardinge, University Library, Cambridge U.K., Hardinge 44, 219. (Intercepted Turkish telegram of 17 September 1921). For another breach of French trust that jeopardized the Greek war effort, the Franklin-Bouillon agreement of October 1921, see Michael Llewellyn Smith, Ionian Vision, New York 1973, pp. 240-241. For the British response see Cab23/88(21)(2) Conclusions of a meeting of the Cabinet, 22 November 1921.


17. To replace the 1919 Anglo-American guarantee that had not been ratified by Congress.

Britain's most powerful argument in its effort to uphold the Greek gains as well as safeguard its own interests with respect to the Turkish peace treaty was the military occupation by the Greek army of the regions under dispute. This would have to continue if any chance of success in the negotiations was to be preserved. Despite unmistakable signs of moral, financial and military exhaustion the Greeks were therefore encouraged to stay on and not to negotiate separately with the Turks. There was no concrete promise of British material assistance but neither was it ever made plain to them, despite repeated suggestions to that effect by Foreign Office officials, that under the circumstances such course of action was not be expected\(^\text{19}\) . In their quest for hopeful signs in an increasingly desperate situation, the Greeks chose to interpret Britain's kind words and sympathetic diplomacy as a harbinger of more substantial support. This in all probability influenced their decision to remain in Asia Minor longer than their resources permitted and eventually suffer the military and humanitarian disaster of August-September 1922.

Lloyd George's role in this sad and complex affair deserves special attention. The British Prime Minister was undoubtedly anti-Turkish and an untiring advocate of the Greek cause\(^\text{20}\) . He supported Greece against his cabinet colleagues' and his allies' doubts and helped it more than anyone else secure its considerable gains in the Turkish peace settlement. Even after the fall of Venizelos his allegiances were not affected and protected Greece from French and Italian diplomatic manoeuvres aiming at the revision of the peace settlement. He remained in touch with Greek personalities and officials, frequently over the head of the

\(^{19}\) Not even the smallest step would be taken in that direction. In March 1922 Curzon refused to suggest that the British government should endorse the Greek attempt to secure a loan in the City of London, which he could have safely done without much French opposition, on the grounds that it would encourage Greek intransigence on the eve of another Allied conference on the Turkish peace. FO371/7591/128-129. Minutes by Nicolson and Curzon, 1 March 1922.

\(^{20}\) At the peak of the Greek military effort in July-August 1921, Frances Stevenson, Lloyd George's secretary and mistress, noted in her diary: "D. very interested in the Greek advance against the Turks. He has had a great fight in the Cabinet to back the Greeks (not in the field but morally) and he and Balfour are the only pro-Greeks there ... But D. says that if the Greeks succeed the Treaty of Versailles is vindicated, and the Turkish rule is at an end. A new Greek Empire will be founded, friendly to Britain, and it will help all our interests in the East. He is perfectly convinced he is right over this, and is willing to stake everything on it". Quoted in Ionian Vision, p. 226.
Foreign Office\textsuperscript{21} and encouraged a Greek military solution to break the diplomatic impasse in March 1921 when neither the Turks nor the Greeks would agree on concessions to resolve their dispute. He tried to make the most of the Greeks’ initial successes in their ill-fated campaign to capture Ancara and subdue the nationalist movement in the summer and early fall of 1921. But his personal sympathies never brought him to the point of contradicting official British policy formulated by the majority opinion of his cabinet colleagues or of advocating drastic solutions that could probably put Britain in a difficult position.

He encouraged the Greeks to retain their positions in Asia Minor but did not attempt to materially assist them\textsuperscript{22}. He ignored the Greek government’s invitation in March 1921 to lay down the political guarantees Greece should offer to England to facilitate the restoration of the country’s good relations with the Allies\textsuperscript{23}. He refused in February 1922 to see the Greek Prime Minister who was desperately trying to convince the British of the immediate need for assistance to prevent the collapse of the Greek Asia Minor front\textsuperscript{24}. In place of material help, he offered high-sounding speeches of praise and encouragement such as the one delivered in the House of Commons on August 4, 1922, in which he intimated that a reverse of his government’s policy of non-intervention could not be precluded\textsuperscript{25}. He did not press for recognition of King

\textsuperscript{21} See Curzon’s letter of August 1921 to Sir Edward Grigg complaining of a meeting the Prime Minister had with Rangavis, the Greek Charge d’Affairs in London of which Curzon had not been notified, “...these are the kind of things which the papers are always writing about, concerning the supersession of the Foreign Office by Number 10, and they make it very difficult for me to conduct a policy, for which I have been made largely responsible by the Cabinet, when things are being said or done of which the Foreign Office and I know nothing”. \textit{The Papers of Nathaniel George Curzon} FO800/154, 379-380, Curzon to Grigg, 9 August 1921.

\textsuperscript{22} On 30 May 1922 he told Venizelos that “he would never shake hands with a Greek again who went back on his country’s aims in Smyrna. If he was out of office he would speak freely on this point. In office he could not do so but he felt strongly that this was the testing time of the Greek nation and that if they persevered now their future was assured”. Lloyd George-Venizelos conversation quoted in Montgomery, 281.

\textsuperscript{23} DBFP vol. XV, no. 32, Interview between the Prime Minister and Kalogeropoulos (The Greek Prime Minister), 4 March 1921. AYE/A/1/1335, Baltazzis to Kalogeropoulos, 1 March 1921.

\textsuperscript{24} DBFP vol. XVII no 544 enclosure 2, Gounaris to Lloyd George, 27 February 1922. \textit{Hansard House of Commons Debates} 5s col 2376-2377, 11 December 1922.

\textsuperscript{25} \textit{House of Commons Debates}, 5s 157 cols 1997-2006, 4 August 1922. What Lloyd
Constantine and his government.

It is true that Lloyd George could not do all he intended to assist his Greek friends. His Turkish policy was not popular. Neither was his position as head of Government entirely secure, dependent as it was on the support of the Conservative Party. Indeed he paid dearly for his eagerness to go to war against Turkey to protect his country’s prestige during the Chanak crisis while there was still a chance of a peaceful resolution. This supposedly reckless behaviour added to conservative grievances leading to the repudiation of the Liberal-Conservative coalition and Lloyd George’s fall from power.

In the saga of the Turkish peace (it had been five years since the end of the war when the final settlement was agreed upon), Greece seems to be the victim of its own unbounded ambition, a small, poor, politically unstable country attempting a belated entry to the imperialists’ club. But signs were hopeful in 1919, when Turkey lay utterly demoralized and defeated, while all major powers, including the United States which was considering a mandate of a Constantinople state and Armenia, aimed at establishing their authority over parts of the defunct Ottoman Empire. Greece could therefore count on minimum Turkish resistance and a community of interest with its mighty wartime allies.

Furthermore, the single most powerful, almost sacred idea that since the creation of the modern Greek state dominated its foreign policy was Megali Idea, the liberation of all Greeks living under foreign rule. As substantial Greek populations lived in Eastern Thrace and Asia Minor, the opportunity that now presented itself to bring this policy one giant step closer to fulfillment could hardly be resisted. Conditions became less favourable later but Greece could still count on Britain’s steadfast support to maintain its position. After November 1920 the Greeks continued to nurture the hope of a more favourable British stance, ignoring obvious signs that pointed in the opposite direction. They also resisted changes in the peace terms and rejected the idea of evacuation from Asia Minor even as they were acknowledging the seriousness of their

George was actually trying to do was divert the Greeks’ attention from Constantinople which at the time they were half-heartedly attempting to capture to ease their position vis-à-vis Kemal. But Constantinople was under Allied occupation and the Allies’ own major asset in negotiating with the Nationalists. Cab/23/36/no 59(195) Note of Conversation, 10 Downing Street on the situation at Constantinople, 9 August 1922.
situation. The century-old nationalist dream, now at the threshold of its fulfillment was too powerful to abandon. In addition, the government's fear of loss of prestige and power, the people's nationalist fervor, concern for the Christian minorities, weak military leadership, erratic diplomatic service, unbridgeable political divisions, the Royalists' war guilt complex that handicapped relations with the Allies and the lack of a charismatic figure such as Venizelos at the country's helm virtually eliminated any chance of more prudent decision-making that might have saved Greece and its people some of their agony and pain.

As it happened, with the Treaty of Lausanne Greece relinquished all claims on its briefly held Turkish possessions and undertook the enormous burden of providing for more than a million Greeks who were made to abandon their ancestral homes in Turkey. The spectacular success of this process never entirely offset the deep sense of sorrow and frustration that the Asia Minor disaster left on the conscience of the Greek nation.

CHRONICLE OF EVENTS

30 October 1918: The armistice of Mudros is signed. Turkey surrenders to the victorious Allies.

January 1919: The Paris Peace Conference begins with the Prime Minister of Greece Eleftherios Venizelos attending to present the Greek claims.

May 1919: Wilson, Clemenceau and Lloyd George authorize the landing of Greek troops at Smyrna, in Asia Minor.

February 1920: Turkish Nationalist troops defeat French army in Cilicia.

March 1920: Allied occupation of Constantinople.

June-July 1920: Greek troops attack and disperse Turkish nationalist forces threatening Allied positions along the Asiatic

26. More than once the Greek Charge d'Affairs in London exaggerated the positive in his despatches giving his government the wrong impression, perhaps as an instinctive reaction to hopeless circumstances. See for example the following British intercepts of his telegrams, with accompanying comments by Foreign Office officials: FO/371/6078/p. 51B, Rangavis to Baltazzis, 26 January 1921 (intercepted); FO371/6078/p. 46, Minute by Nicolson, 3 February 1921. FO371/6078/P. 160 Rangavis to Greek Legation (Paris) 15 February 1921 (intercepted FO371/6078/p. 157, minute 19 February 1921.
coast of the Sea of Marmara. They subsequently occupy Eastern Thrace.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 1920</td>
<td>The Treaty of Sevres is signed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>November 1920</td>
<td>Venizelos loses the election in Greece and falls from power. He is succeeded by a Royalist coalition.</td>
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<td>December 1920</td>
<td>King Constantine returns to the Greek throne. Allies impose financial sanctions on Greece.</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 1921</td>
<td>British Cabinet concludes that Treaty of Sevres cannot be maintained.</td>
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<tr>
<td>February-March 1921</td>
<td>London Conference: Greek and Turkish representatives refuse to accept slightly modified peace terms.</td>
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<tr>
<td>March-April 1921</td>
<td>Greek military operation in Asia Minor fails to dislodge nationalist forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July-September 1921</td>
<td>Major Greek military advance fails to reach Ankara, the Turkish Nationalist capital.</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 1921</td>
<td>Franklin-Bouillon agreement is signed. The French surrender Cilicia to the Nationalists.</td>
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<tr>
<td>November 1921</td>
<td>The Greeks agree to authorize the British to negotiate on their behalf less favourable peace terms.</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 1922</td>
<td>Greeks attempt to occupy Constantinople. Strong Allied reaction.</td>
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<tr>
<td>August-September 1922</td>
<td>Turkish offensive. Greek front collapses. Greek forces leave Asia Minor in retreat. Revolution in Greece. Venizelist officers in power. King Constantine abdicates and leaves the country.</td>
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<tr>
<td>September 1922</td>
<td>Turkish troops harass British positions on the Asiatic shores of the Dardanelles. The Chanak Crisis. Britain ready to go to war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1922</td>
<td>The Mudania armistice is signed. Allies to retain their Positions for the time being. Greece agrees to return Eastern Thrace to Turkey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 July 1923</td>
<td>The Treaty of Lausanne is signed.</td>
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*University of Macedonia, Greece*