Academicians and Science in the Secession of the Yugoslav Republics: the Constitutional and Economic Debate

1. The origin and realization of the Yugoslav idea

The idea of a community of all South Slav peoples was conceived by intellectuals in the nineteenth century who mainly lived the Croatian part of the peninsula. These learned people were known as the Illyrians, with a reference to the ancient populations that lived on the borders of the Adriatic sea long before the Slavs invaded these countries in the sixth and seventh centuries. Serbs, Croats and Bosnians built up their historical empires in the middle ages. Then, the South Slavs had been living a long time divided under the Ottoman and the Austrian Hungarian empires. With the emancipation of the Serbs from the Ottomans and the creation of a modern Serbian state, among Serbian intellectuals in the nineteenth century, the expansion of the Serbian State was the more logical and popular idea. However, the Illyrians defended the idea that Croats, Serbs and Slovenes were members of a common slav stock and this idea was carried over to the ideologues of the first Yugoslavia, as the name of the new kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes at its creation in 1918 testifies. Only a decade later, the name was officially changed into Yugoslavia, mirroring the centralist power shift pushed through by the king.

In fact, Yugoslavia had been created in 1918 essentially by the will of the Croats and Slovenes to leave the defeated Austria-Hungary. The western powers gave their consent to the new construction, though earlier during the First World War, they had both promised territorial gains to Italy and Serbia as a compensation for the collaboration on their side in the war.

1. Jugo means south in serbocroatian.
2. Already during the Balkan Wars (1912-1914), Serbia and Montenegro had invaded Albania and though expelled during the World War, they returned at the end of the war and the new Yugoslavia occupied Kosovo. Around 1920, the western allies again gave their consent to this annexation. So, along with the Slavs and many other minorities, mainly Hungarians, Austrians, and Italians, a large Albanian section was incorporated in the new state.
In the first Yugoslavia, the centralistic drive of the Yugoslav monarchy was permanently challenged by Croats and Slovenes. It finally resulted just before the Second World War in the establishment of Banovina’s or regions with a certain autonomy. Especially the Croatian Banovina was built out along historical frontiers and showed a first realization of a federalistic idea. However, the Second World War swept away these political institutions. Croatian politicians chose for an Independent State under protection of the Axis powers. Again, Croats were to be loosers as the western allies defeated the nazi’s and the communist resistance took over in Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav communists followed the model of the Russian Constitution and opted in theory for a federation of republics. In practice, they introduced immediately after the war a centralist regime. Intermingling historical and ethnic criteria, they created six republics and later after some hesitation two more autonomous regions (oblasti) in the republic of Serbia.

2. Peoples and minorities

Of crucial importance in the construction of the federation of ex-Yugoslavia and the eventual right of secession is the distinction between the so called narodi (peoples) and narodnosti (minorities). Theoretically, the minorities have an own homeland abroad, for example Albanians, Hungarians, while the peoples of Yugoslavia did not have such a reference country. The territory of these peoples formed the main constituent parts of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, as defined by the second AVNOJ (Anti-fascist Council of the Freedom Fighting Movement of Yugoslavia) on 21 November 1943. However, due to the mix of peoples on the territories and the not always clearly defined status of the peoples, the situation was much less straightforward than laid down in principle. For example, in Croatia, both Croats and Serbs were constituent peoples of the republic of Croatia under later constitutions. Likewise in 1943, something as a Bosnian people was not already defined. This was not easy as Serbs, Croats and Bosnjaks lived together intermingled and without clear territorial separation. A separate Muslim nationality was only recognized in the late sixties. In this case the role of history was taken into account. The greater part of the regions of Bosnia-Hercegovina shows a common history, there was even a Bosnian state in the late middle ages. Another problem formed the Albanians. In
the nineteenth century, as we explained, Yugoslavia was projected as the land of the South Slavs. During the Balkan Wars (1912-1914), the Slavs occupied Albania and after the Second World War Kosovo was annexed to Yugoslavia. During the Second War, Yugoslavia disintegrated, but after the war Kosovo was annexed again. Even while in the region the Albanian population grew to a large majority, they remained in the Yugoslav terminology a minority (*narodnost*), as Albanians had their home country Albania. In sum, according to its definition in 1943, it were the peoples of Yugoslavia who united into a federation. The republics were just the territories in which some peoples lived.

3. The constitution and the right of secession

The discussed distinction has sharp consequences on the vision on the eventual right of secession. The communist regime of Tito translated the principles of the 1943 resolution on the Yugoslav federation into the Constitution of 1946 which however was to a high degree a copy of the Russian Constitution. The new Constitution asserts that the peoples associated in the Yugoslav federation, but also that they held a right to secede. This right to secede was thus reserved to the peoples, not the minorities. And not to the republics, as they were seen as administrative constructions. Moreover, at the time, this right seemed merely declarational. This was so as well for the federative nature of the construction, as a communist unitary regime was installed after World War II.

Anyhow, the right to secession was carried over to the later Constitutions, especially to the Constitution of 1974, the one that was in force at the break up of Yugoslavia in 1991.

Two qualifications should be made. First, the right to secession of the peoples was not any longer contained in the Constitution itself, but now placed in the preamble. Moreover the constitution itself carried articles that prescribed that the consent of all parties was necessary in case of secession. The beginning of the preamble of the Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of 1974 (p. 13) reads as follows:

“The nations of Yugoslavia, proceeding from the right of every nation to self-determination, including the right of secession, on the basis of their will freely expressed in the common struggle of all nations and nationalities in the National Liberation War and Socialist Revolution, and in conformity
with their historic aspirations, aware that the further consolidation of their brotherhood and unity is in the common interest, have together with nationalities with which they live, united in a federal republic of free and equal nations and nationalities and founded upon a socialist federal community of working people—the socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in which, in the interests of each nation and nationality separately and all together, they shall realize and ensure...”.

The term used here for “narodi” (Ustav, p. 37) —nations— in an authorized Belgrade translation again contributes to the confusion or at least duality of visions. In fact, “narodi” means both “peoples” and “nations”, but to my interpretation —basing myself on the spirit of the resolution of 1943, it should be translated as peoples³. Of course, this translation as “nation” allows an easier reference to historical statehood and the interpretation that republics as whole could secede. So it fits the Croatian interpretation.

Equally the term “nationalities” for “Narodnosti” has been introduced in place of “Nacionalna manjina” minorities. In fact, Yugoslav social theory did it itself since the Constitution of 1963—“a more polite but very dubious term we don’t like to use in further translations”⁴. But this is without further real political implications.

On the other hand, agreement or concensus on eventual secession is implied by Article 5 of the Constitution (p. 29):

“The territory of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a single unified whole and consists of the territories of the Socialist Republics.

The territory of a Republic may not be altered without the consent of that Republic, nor the territory of an Autonomous Province without the consent of that Autonomous Province.

The frontiers of the Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia may not be altered without the consent (Italics R.S.) of all the Republics and Autonomous Provinces. Boundaries between

⁴. A content analysis of the concept “Narodnosti” can be found in Pašić, 482.
the Republics may only be altered on the basis of mutual agreement; and if the boundary of an Autonomous Province is involved, on the basis of the latter's agreement.

One could observe now, that in the corpus of the Constitution, the focus shifted from Peoples/Nations to Republics. This is not really true however, as the first and basic article integrates both concepts:

"The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal state having the form of a state community of voluntary united nations and their Socialist Republics and of the Socialist Autonomous Republics of Vojvodina and Kosovo; which are constituent parts of Serbia..."5.

Given the Constitution of 1974, the main discussion now centered around the question whether the right of secession was "consumed" by the factual association of the peoples in the Federation of Yugoslavia in 1943.

And perhaps even more important, —due to the duality in the Constitution— the old question reappeared whether it were the peoples or republics who possessed the right to secession. This debate was of course most animated by Serbian and Croatian constitutional law specialists. If Croatia as a republic were to secede, a large part of its population, the Serbs (12%), also a constituent people of Croatia according to the Croat constitution before 1991, were alienated. Though being a minority in Croatia, the Serbs now defended that only peoples could secede, so these minorities in Croatia had the right to associate with the Serbian people in Serbia. Of course, Croatians under Tuđman defended the right of secession of the Croatian republic as a whole, mainly pointing to the constitution and a more or less fluid concept of historical Croatian statehood.

The two conceptions without intermediation could not but lead to an irreversible conflict and war. The occupation of the local Serbs of the Krajina and East and West Slavonija gave a free hand to the Yugoslav

army and the Serbian nationalists to invade Croatia.

Albanians sought to circumvent the narrow definition of minority according to which they had no right to secession. They pointed to their factual majority status in population. Likewise, they pointed to political oppression and economic exploitation. Before all, they do not feel to adhere to the slav community and argue the territory of Kosovo was annexed against their will by force. They can now also argue that once Yugoslavia was broken up, the legal bounds of the definitions of majority and minority in the Yugoslav constitution are broken as well. However, legally they are now liable to the new constitution of the Federation of Yugoslavia, where Kosovo is again seen as an integral part of Serbia.

Secondary argumentations were given to justify the right to secession. In this the intellectual and academic circles mainly contributed. This is so in the first place for the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, which formulated its much cited but less read Memorandum.

4.1. The Memorandum of the Serbian Academy

In the first part of the Memorandum, the following themes are developed: the crisis of the economy of Yugoslavia, the defects of the confederal organisation of Yugoslavia following the Constitution of Yugoslavia, the privileged position and exploitative situation of the developed republics Slovenia and Croatia and the dominant position of the party in the state; the moral crisis of the political system and society. It then tries to define some principles to redress the economic, political and moral situation: introduction of rationality in the economic system, self-determination of the peoples of Yugoslavia, guarantee of human rights. In the second part, the situation of the Serbian people and state is further analysed and a new Serbian program is proposed. A recurring theme is the disadvantaged legal position of Serbia following to the Constitutional reform of 1974. Through the establishment of two autonomous provinces within the Republic of Serbia, Kosovo and Vojvodina, the Serbian republic cannot decide autonomously and has lost its sovereignty — contrary to the two autonomous regions who have assemblies with autonomous rights who can make their own decisions and contribute to the decision making on the federal Serbian and Yugoslav level.
4.2. The Croatian standpoint on the Memorandum

The most comprehensive Croatian critical comment on the Memorandum came first from emigrant intellectual circles. This is not unusual, as the Croatian academic emigrant milieu has a long tradition of producing critical accounts of the communist Yugoslav regime. The repressive stance in the country is cited by those circles for the passivity of the local Croatian intelligentsia.

The Croatian standpoint (Hrvatsko Stanovište) was articulated by the members of Croatian National Congress. As expected, they applaud the criticism of the Serbian academy on the Yugoslav system and politics. They surely disagree on the proposed policy of enhanced centralism and reject the central thesis of the Serbian Academy that Serbian economy and politics were disadvantaged and subjected to the more developed regions such as Slovenia and Croatia. To the contrary, they defend the malicious treatment of Croatian economy and policy making. They formulate their view in the aim of defending the right of the Croats on an own state, at least at that time — the criticism was published in 1987 — still integrated in a real confederation.

4.2.1. The authors, Dr Mate Meštrović and Radovan Latković, president of the executive council and president of the Hrvatsko Narodno Vijeće, first point to the adequately perceived crisis of the Yugoslav economy. But they hold the Serbian Academy misses the point when the causes of the economic debacle have to be identified. As the main reasons of the failure of the Yugoslav economy, they see in the first place statism, the command economy, the inexistence of private ownership and commercial knowledge and especially the destruction of private agriculture as the cornerstone of the economy of an underdeveloped economy such as the Yugoslavian. They reproach the Memorandum writers for ignoring the inexistence of economic liberalism and decentralization as the main causes of the Yugoslav crisis. They defend, on the contrary, decentralization and again point to the command economy, now on the level of the republics as the main reason of the economic failure. The Croats reject on their turn the proposed centralization following from the rejection of the authors of the Memorandum of the confederational tendencies of Constitution of 1974. The Croats don’t see the tendency to a confederation as anti-historic as the authors of the
Memorandum do. In fact, at this moment, the Croats plead that a proper co-ordination policy is possible, once a non-bureaucratic real confederation has been put in place. The Croats criticize especially the unitarism of the one party system and the lack of human rights, as exemplified by article 113 of the Criminal law on personal opinion and verbal delict.

Among the human rights, the Croats count the right on self-determination of a people and the right to secession from an existing state, as they hold it was formally provided by the Constitution. They even find an argument in the Memorandum that says that the sovereignty of peoples' comes forth from the free will of the peoples'.

The Croats criticize the authors of the Memorandum as they fall in a contradiction when they both point to the confederative character of the federation and to the unitarism vested in the organs of the communist party. For the Croats, the Memorandum constantly oscillates between objective and correct observations on the defections of the state and economy of Yugoslavia and wrong contradictory thesis about its causes and remedies. The policy proposal of the Serbian Academy to implement an integral, democratic federalism is felt by the Croats as a return to unitarism and hegemony of the serbian people over the other nations and minorities.

4.2.2. Especially critical are, expectedly, the Croats on the so-called inferior economic and political status of Serbia in the federation. On the contrary, they defend the inferior political and economic status of Croatia, both in the first monarchical Yugoslavia and in the second Yugoslavia under the communist regime of Tito.

4.2.2.1. The situation in the first Yugoslavia.

The Croats reject the thesis of the Memorandum that the Serbs did not have a privileged position in the first Yugoslavia. The Croatian counterarguments are essentially based on a prewar study of Rudolf Bičanić. He studied the economic performance and political representation of Croatia in the first Yugoslavia. He points for example on the under-representation of the Croats in the top functions of the army. Further, the monopoly position of the Crown and Belgrade milieu in the first Yugoslavia are cited. This political domination led to economic exploitation. This was also done by economic policy measures such as an undervaluation of the dinar and the unjust tax policy that favoured the Serbian economy. For example, the taxes on the agricultural estates
should have been twice that of the rate in Serbia. The same was true of the taxes on houses. All this was true at least to 1928. Among other economic indicators, as key argument, the Croats point to the following indexes to show to the constant fall of the Croatian economy and the concordant rise of the Serbian economy between 1925 and 1971: in industry, the part of Croatia in 1925 of 33% fell to 18% in 1971; on the contrary, the part of Serbia rose from 20% in 1925 to 35% in 1971. A similar trend could be perceived in banking and commerce. The Croatian standpoint concludes that Serbia surpassed in 1971 the level of development of Croatia, and that Croatia fell back to the 1925 level of Serbia.

4.3. The Serbian answer to the Croatian standpoint

The Serbian Academy tried to produce a comprehensive answer to all criticisms launched on the Memorandum. It directed special attention to the assertions to the Croatian Standpoint and both criticized its basic orientation and its arguments concerning the relative economic position of Serbia and Croatia in the first and second Yugoslavia. First, it condemns the separatist aspirations of the Croatian “Anti-memorandum”. Then it tries to reject some allegations of the Croatian “Anti-Memorandum” concerning the subjugated and dependent status of Croatia both in the economic and political field. We reproduce here the main statements. In the Memorandum, the Serbian Academy had argued that following the Constitution of 1974, the political and economic system of Yugoslavia evolved towards a confederation. The unity of the economic system was destroyed and local national economies fell into inefficiency. The Croatian Standpoint answered there was no real confederation, but eight state bureaucracies. In turn, it pleaded for what was a real confederation. It added that it was the natural course of history that peoples or nations acquire their own state. The Serbian Academy finally rejects this view, arguing that a confederation necessarily will lead to separation; moreover, the efficiency of the economy requires a unified policy. The offer of Slovenia and Croatia on 4 October 1990 to form a loose confederation is characterized by the Serbian Academy as only a transitional strategy in order to reach independence. The Serbian Academy reaffirms its viewpoint that nationalism and separatism will lead to disintegration and is an anti-historical trend itself. What is needed is a so called program
of integral, democratic federalism. It rejects the view of the Croats that the Serbians are on an isolated way characterized by Grand-Serbian nationalism.

Casting into doubt the picture of a so-called privileged position of Serbia, painted by the Croats, the Academy gives a detailed account of some of the Croatian allegations. It points to the fact that in the highest ranks, the Yugoslav leaders such as Tito, Kardelj or Bakarić were as anti-Serbian as they were eventually anti-Croatian. The Academy describes this policy as an inheritance of the interwar Cominformist policy that stigmatized the Serbian bourgeoisie as hegemonistic in order to destroy the social order. A federal viewpoint was inherited by Tito and it functioned with the aim to keep Serbia powerless. The main trick was to constitute two independent provinces within the republic of Serbia. Especially the Constitutions of 1974 made these provinces to states in the state. Moreover, the federalization of Yugoslavia allowed an anti-Serbian coalition. Croatia — itself a victim of the communist policy during the Croatian spring — joined this anti-Serbian coalition. The Academy accuses the writers of the Croatian standpoint to subscribe to an old communist viewpoint by defending the thesis of the hegemony of the Serbs.

Finally, economic exploitation of the Croats by the Serbs is refuted. The Academy characterizes the data of the Croatian viewpoint, largely based on the book of Rudolf Bičanić as passed. Moreover, his methodology is biased by using the wrong indicators and base years. This was argued by at least two books of Serbian authors who easily refuted Bičanić’s theses, but were largely ignored by the economic profession. Moreover, in a book written after the Second World War, Bičanić himself seemed to ignore his earlier results. The Serbian Academy in its answer to the Croatian Standpoint holds that the only reliable disaggregated statistics are those adjusted for industry from 1938 by the Economic Institute. This is the year Bičanić’s book appeared and thus he “ignored” them. According to these figures, the growth of industry in Croatia was 1.9 times faster than in Serbia proper. Moreover, whereas in Croatia (including Slavonia and Dalmatia) 481,000 dinars per 1000 habitants were invested, it was only 281,000 in Serbia including Vojvodina (but without Srem) (Mihailović, 1995, 35). We also learn in the answer that per capita GNP of Croatia quadrupled between 1947 and
1971, contradicting the claim of the Croatian standpoint that the position of Croatia had declined. All this proves according to the Serbian Answer that Croatia showed a higher growth rate than Serbia.

Though the conclusion and statements of the Serbian Academy seem trustworthy, according to our opinion not much can be concluded so far from the scanty data of the Answer to the Croatian Standpoint. Data are not complete, the methodology is unexplained and indicators that should not be compared are compared. On another place however, some longer explanation was given concerning the criticism on the Croatian figures (Mihailović, 1995, 60-76). The main target is now the former president of the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts, the Croatian Academician Jakov Sirotković. He rejected the disaggregation and adjustment of statistics on industry from 1938 by the Economic Institute of Serbia as "statistics juggling" and fell back on Bičanić's figures. So, the criticism of the Academy returned to Bičanić's results. Sirotković himself wrote that Serbia proper at the beginning of the postwar period lagged behind by 20% in terms of per capita GNP. Earlier, he concluded that "Obviously in former Yugoslavia (before the Second World War) Serbia did not lag behind in any respect". The Academy finds here a proof for a contradiction, the more so if not Serbia proper, but the whole republic is taken into account. The Academy then reveals that Serbia's per capita was 94.6% of the Yugoslav average in 1947, seeing in it a proof of its economic underdevelopment which moreover continued in the postwar period. In fact, Sirotković essentially centers on the period after the Second World War. He tries to prove that Croatia lagged behind in relative terms while Serbia had an above average and privileged development. He cites indices of the GNP for a 35 year period, from 1952 to 1987, (at 1972 prices) from which can be seen that Serbia had indices above and Croatia indices below the Yugoslav average. The Academy criticizes these projections on two essential points. If per capita data are given, the situation is reversed. Moreover, the selection of the base year is critical. The selection of 1952 is unhappy, as the 1952 showed exceptional drought and causing the formation of GNP at a lower level especially in agricultural economies. Secondly, in 1952 ended an unfavourable period for Serbia because of obligatory government purchases of agricultural products, the dismantling and reallocation of industrial plants and the partial suspension of investment activities during the
Cominform crisis. According to statistics of the Federal Statistical Office, in the period 1947-1952, the GNP in Croatia increased by 17.5% (per capita 12.8%), while in Serbia only by 1.3% (per capita -5.1%). In 1947, Croatia had a GNP that was 10.3% greater than that of Serbia, in 1952 it was 31.2% greater. In 1952, the level of per capita GNP in Croatia with 4,074 dinars was 68 dinars higher than in Serbia. If then 1947 is taken as a base year for the afterwar development, it is clear that also the relative development of Serbia lagged behind this of Croatia, both in absolute and per capita terms. (See Appendix, Table 1).

Sirotković argued in relative terms, while it seems more logical to the Academy to compare absolute levels. It then can be shown that Croatia, starting already from a slightly higher level expands considerably its advantage in the period 1947-1988. The per capita income span widens. (See Appendix, table 2). The Academy stresses further that when the levels of development are compared for one year, for example in 1988, in current prices and not in constant prices, the span even more widens. (See Appendix, table 3). Not comparing to the average of Yugoslavia, but to the rest of the territory again stretches the differences.

Another aspect of the problem lies in the fact that a quarter of the Serbs lives outside Serbia. The Memorandum had argued that Serbs in Croatia lived in the least developed parts. Sirotković contradicted this by arguing that 80% of them lived and worked in urban areas. The Answer reproduces statistics of Kosta Mihailović (1990) for 1981 showing that the per capita income of the Serbs in Croatia was 13.7% lower. (Appendix, table 4).

The Academy concludes this section of the economic debate by observing that Slovenia and Croatia in 1947 accounted for 34.7% of the population of Yugoslavia and 39.9% of its GNP, whereas in 1988 they had 28.1% of its population and 44.8% of its GNP. With a constant share in the population of 41.5%, Serbia's share in GNP declined from 39% in 1947 to 35.5% in 1988.

It further points to the observation that the title and subtitle of chapter six of Sirotković's book, "The economic background of the War against Croatia. From the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy in 1986 to armed secession in 1991", reveal the intentions of the author.

In a similar way, arguments are exchanged about the privileged position of the developed economies benefitting from exports, better
terms of trade protective tariffs, etc. Figures on the relative development of employment are another important topic. Again the differences between absolute and per capita figures seem the knot of the discussion. Finally, the indicators on per capita investment in the social sector are discussed and identified as the main cause of the slower growth of Serbia than Croatia. Labour productivity and greater efficiency of investment are refuted as the main causes of the higher growth of Croatia.

4.4. Conclusion

One can conclude out of the discussion that both parties do all to select those data and methodology that suit their goals the best. They are good in pointing to the wrong methodology of the opponent and in bringing in new uncomparable data. Due to lack of data, clarity of methodology and a mass of heterogeneous allegations, it is very difficult for a third party to make a "last judgment". Nevertheless, in strictly economic terms, the Serbian thesis seems relatively more plausible. But after all, both parties neglect the fact that an economic system is a synergic system and not a zero-sum game. And once the Serbian Academy goes on the policy and strictly political tour, its arguments seem suspect and not valid from a purely economic point of view. Moreover, to explain the so-called disadvantaged economic position by the inheritance of the Tito regime of Cominformist attitudes, for example, nearly testifies of a paranoiac imagination. Of course, the degree of ideologization in the Yugoslav intelligentsia is much higher, given the long term training in marxist thought, even under the new born dissidents and nationalists. In fact there is some remarkable dissonance between the uttermost rationality in discussing some minor items and the facility with which some general theses are underwritten. It is amazing how on the one side a clear program of Serbian renaissance is vigorously defended and on the other refuted that the Memorandum should be nationalistic and be imbued by a Great-Serbian ideology. While it is stressed that the Serbs in Croatia live in an underprivileged economic situation, and that a secession of republics leaves them unprotected, the implication of a Serbian reaction is refuted. In this way the Serbian Academy anyhow contributed to the growing nationalist climate in the country and gave an intellectual and academic rationale to the Serbian-nationalist program.
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APPENDIX

Table 1: GNP indices of Yugoslavia, Croatia and Serbia (at 1972 prices).

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Per Capita</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFRY</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>484</td>
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<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>536</td>
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<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>701</td>
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Table 2: GNP per capita, absolute levels in dinars, 1972 prices.

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<td>SFRY</td>
<td>3,460</td>
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<td>Croatia</td>
<td>3,610</td>
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<td>3,274</td>
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Table 3: Per capita GNP in 1988.

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<tr>
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Table 4: Per capita national income by republics and by ethnic groups.

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<td>Serbia</td>
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