COMMUNISM AND NATIONALISM IN YUGOSLAVIA

Yugoslavia is a multinational state strategically situated between East and West. Its President, Josip Broz Tito, came to power at the end of the last war not through Soviet Russian help but rather by the strength of his own well-organized Communist armed forces. These factors explain peculiar traits of Communism in Yugoslavia and contribute to a better understanding of its complexity.

After more than twenty years of Communism the old issue of nationalism erupted again in full force during the historic Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee of the LCY at Brioni in July, 1966. It came as no surprise to those who have closely watched developments in that state and the background of its Communism.

A state of approximately 99,000 square miles numbering already over twenty million people, Yugoslavia consists of six republics, inhabited by five different nationalities speaking at least three different Slavic languages, using two alphabets, belonging to three religious denominations, and having undergone historical development in two different cultural spheres, namely Byzantine and Roman.

According to the census of 1962 there were in the state: 7,806,000 Serbs; 4,293,000 Croatians; 1,589,000 Slovenians; 1,450,000 “Macedonians”; 973,000 Moslems; 914,000 Albanians; 513,000 Montenegrins; 504,000 Magyars; and 182,000 Turks. Only 317,000 were listed as Yugoslav.1

The idea of the Slav unification originated with the Croatians. A precursor of Pan-Slavism about three centuries ago was Juraj Križanić, a Catholic priest. Both Ljudevit Gaj and Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer—who envisaged

1. Statistički Godišnjak SFRJ 1963 (Belgrade, Zavezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1963), Vol. X, p. 336; Borba, November 28, 1962. Even without checking the validity of these statistics, the students of Balkan affairs know only too well that most of the official statistics in these countries are not a credible source for historians. Usually the ruling nation exaggerates its own number. It is interesting to note in Yugoslav statistics that the Moslems—although a religious group—were counted as a separate nationality.
a South Slav state stretching from the Alps to the Black Sea—during the last century, were born in Croatia. The President of the Yugoslav Committee during World War I in London and one of the founders of the South Slav state was Dr. Ante Trumbić. With other Croatian and Slovenian intellectuals he regarded little Kingdom of Serbia as the South Slav Piedmont. Their goal was a union of equal partners, a constitutional monarchy under the Karageorgevich dynasty. With the support of President Wilson, the Government of Serbia and the South Slav National Council of Zagreb founded the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on December 1, 1918. The official name Yugoslavia, or the Land of South Slavs, was adopted in 1929.

Beginnings of the Yugoslav Communist Party

The new state was predominantly an agricultural country with a rising class of industrial workers most of whom lived in former Habsburg provinces of Slovenia and Croatia. A few thousand of them were Socialists.

The Bolshevik Revolution of November, 1917, found many followers among the workers. Hundreds of Croatian and Slovenian P.W.'s—former soldiers of Austria-Hungary—participated in the Revolution and in the Civil War. One of them was Josip Broz, later to be known as Tito. Returning soldiers


brought revolutionary ideas to their native towns and villages. The Revo-
lution of a half a century ago, however, had a special impact on Montenegro
and Serbia that had long historical relations with Russia based on ethnic
and religious sentiments. 4

The national and religious animosities contributed to the temporary
rise of Communism. The Socialist Workers’ Party of Yugoslavia (Commu-
nists) was founded in Belgrade in late April, 1919. Its initiators were from
all provinces. The Second Party Congress was held in Vukovar, Croatia,
during June 20-24, 1920. The Party now accepted the “Conditions of Admis-
sion” to the Comintern and joined it. Its membership was about 65,000,
and its new name the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. A revolutionary pro-
gram along the Leninist lines was adopted, following the directives of the
Soviet-sponsored Balkan Communist Federation. 5

In the elections for the Constituent Assembly on November 28, 1920,
the CPY scored a notable success: 198,756 votes and 58 mandates for the
Skupština (Parliament) in Belgrade. This was the only time in royal Yugo-
slavia that the Communist Party enjoyed perfect legality and in a more or
less democratic manner the Party could obtain votes from Communists and
non-Communists alike. It should be noted that many of those who voted Com-
munist knew nothing about Communism. It was obvious that—for instance—
“Montenegrins and Macedonians expressed their dissatisfaction over the
Serbian regime by voting for the most radical party that was available.” 6

A month later the Government outlawed the CPY. Responding to the
subsequent Communist terrorism by a special Law for the Defense of the
State, the Government in Belgrade inaugurated a real reign of terror against
the Communist movement.

Worse than persecutions that seriously depleted the ranks of the CPY
was the internal strife within the Party. Sima Marković, a teacher from Bel-
grade—the leading Serbian Communist—was known even by Stalin as “Com-

4. Dinko A. Tomašić, “The National and Social Base of Communism in Yugoslavia” in
Press, 1957), pp. 11-30; Ante Ciliga, La Yougoslavie sous la Menace Intérieure et Extérieure
(Paris : Les Iles d’Or, 1951), pp. 18, 81, 92.

5. Pregled Istorije Saveza Komunista Jugoslovlje (Beograd : Institut za Izučavanje Radni-
čkog Pokreta, 1963), p. 61, and pp. 31-64. This is the official history of the CPY. See also
Adam B. Ullam, Titoism and the Cominform (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1952),
pp. 4-5; Slobodan M. Draskovich, Tito, Moscow’s Trojan Horse (Chicago : Regnery, 1957),
p. 65. For the program of the CPY see Dr. Sima Marković pred Sudom, 11 Decembra 1922
(Chicago : Jugoslovenska Radnička Knjižara, 1923, pp. 16-25.

rade Semich. " Marković refused to follow Lenin's instructions to exploit the unsolved nationality questions for Communist revolutionary strategy. Opposed by the Croatian Communists, who insisted on Leninist line of national self-determination, the Marković group consistently rejected the right of secession to non-Serbian peoples—a majority in the South Slav state—thus overlooking the revolutionary potentiality of the nationality question.

Comintern itself intervened. The refusal of Marković to discard his views almost completely destroyed the CPY. By January, 1924, the CPY had only about a thousand members. The Fifth Congress of the Comintern (June 17-July 8, 1924) rebuked Marković and its resolution explicitly stated that Croatia, Slovenia and "Macedonia" had the right to secede from Yugoslavia. Stalin himself, who was the foremost Soviet authority on the national question, delivered a speech during a session of the Yugoslav Commission of the Comintern on March 30, 1925. He confirmed the right of nations in Yugoslavia to "self-determination, including the right to secession."7

Marković finally capitulated at the Fourth Congress of the CPY held at Dresden, Germany, in November, 1928. Removed from Party leadership, he was admonished to Moscow where he eventually disappeared during Stalin's purges. The Party's secretaries after him were—in chronological order: Djuro Djaković (Croatian), Jovan Martinović (Montenegrin), and Milan Gorkić (Serbian). The membership of the Party was now estimated at about 2,000.

Following the assassination of the Croatian deputies and the death of Stjepan Radić, the President of the Croatian Peasant Party, in the summer of 1928, King Alexander introduced a dictatorship in January, 1929. A wave of persecutions of all opponents of the regime set in. Among numerous Communists who were sent to prison was also Josip Broz, a prominent leader in the Communist-led labor unions and a well-known member of the local Party organization in Zagreb. The remaining leadership of the CPY fled the country and for years operated from abroad. When in the first half of 1932, Comintern appointed Gorkić as the Political Secretary of the Party, the number of its members dwindled down to some four hundred members. The actual center of the underground CPY in the country was in Zagreb whose local organization was "from 1927 until 1937 the only larger Party organization in the whole country."8

Following the assassination of King Alexander in October, 1934, in Marseilles, France, and the downfall of the dictatorship, the Communists started to emerge as a new active political force. In December, 1934, Josip Broz became the member of the Central Committee of the CPY. After fourteen years at home, Broz went to Moscow in early 1935. Here he worked in the Balkan Secretariat of the Comintern under Georgi Dimitrov, the famous Bulgarian Communist. While Broz was in Moscow, the Seventh Congress of the Comintern took place from July 25 to August 21, 1935. It accepted, at Stalin's orders, the Popular Front policy of collaborating with non-Communist and anti-Fascist parties. Stalin also ordered a complete change of policy in regard to Yugoslavia: the right of secession was to be discarded and the integrity of the state had to be preserved. From this time on the official policy of the CPY has been: the solution of the national question can be achieved by federalization rather than destruction of Yugoslavia. This, however, was at least a partial return to the ideas of Sima Marković.

Absolutely loyal to Stalin and Comintern, Tito, as he was by now known among the Communists, gradually emerged as the new leader of Yugoslav Communism. During the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) Tito spent a great deal of time in Paris where the Central Committee of the CPY was then located. He and Gorkić were dispatching hundreds of Yugoslav Communists to the International Brigade in Spain. In the summer of 1937, Gorkić was called to Moscow, removed as the General Secretary, and subsequently liquidated. At the end of 1937, Tito was given in Moscow the position of the General Secretary, the highest position in the Party which he has held ever since. He returned to the homeland in early 1938. He reorganized, purged and completely overhauled the Party. It numbered only about 1,500 members. The top men were: Moša Pijade (in prison), Milovan Djilas, Aleksandar Ranković, and Edvard Kardelj.

Tito was a determined revolutionary who saved the Party from final disaster and succeeded in building a well-knit, unified, fighting revolutionary organization. Although confused by the Nazi-Soviet Agreement of late Au-

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December 1951), pp. 376-377; Pregled Istoriije SKJ, pp. 144, 149-159, 164-172.

9. Pregled Istoriije SKJ, pp. 177-193, 219, 235. According to this official source, some 1,300 Yugoslav Communists fought as volunteers against Franco in Spain. Some 700 were killed in action. Quite a few of the returned "Spaniard"—as they were later popularly known—became prominent leaders of Partisan units during W. W. II and generals in Tito's new armed forces. See also Vladimir Dedijer, Josip Broz Tito: Prilozi za Biografiju (Beograd: Kultura, 1955), pp. 215-, 222-241. This is a well-documented biography of Tito available also in English: Tito (New-York: Simon and Schuster, 1953).
August, 1939, the Communists were the only political organization in Yugoslavia well prepared for the events after the outbreak of World War II. At the time of the Fifth Land Conference of the CPY that met in Zagreb in October, 1940, the movement could boast of approximately 12,000 disciplined party members and some 30,000 Communists youth.\textsuperscript{10}

The Founding of a Communist State

Hitler attacked Yugoslavia on April 6, 1941. The multinational state collapsed within a few days. There followed four years of chaos, foreign occupation, and a terrible civil war. It was a tragic era that has forever left a lasting imprint on all the peoples of Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{11}

The CPY seized the opportunity. It skillfully exploited the national animosities and utilized the chaotic situation to its own advantage. The armed resistance and mass uprising led by the Communists started after the German attack on the Soviet Union in June, 1941. The prolonged guerilla warfare attracted many German divisions and thus helped the Soviet Union by relieving German pressure on the Eastern Front. By the end of 1943, Tito and his National Liberation Army were able to secure the recognition and considerable aid of Western Allies.\textsuperscript{12}

By fighting the occupiers and by promising federalization of future Yugoslavia, Tito was able to attract in his National Liberation Front various non-Communist elements. "Brotherhood and Unity" became the supreme slogan; it has remained the official credo of Tito to this very day. It was modified at the historic Second Session of AVNOJ (The Anti-Fascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia). AVNOJ was the supreme executive body of the Communist liberation movement, a base and nucleus for the future Government of Yugoslavia. Held at Jajce, Bosnia, at the end of November, 1943, it announced a future federation state of six republics with "com-

\textsuperscript{10} Dedijer,\textit{ Josip Broz Tito,} p. 262.

\textsuperscript{11} For a detailed official history, a chronology of all events during 1941-45 see \textit{Hronologija Oslobodilačke Borbe Naroda Jugoslavije} published by the Historical Institute of the Army in Belgrade, 1964. It contains 1265 pages; Also, Franjo Tudjman, \textit{Okupacija i Revolucija} (Zagreb : Institut za Historiju Radničkog Pokreta, 1963), pp. 316 with English summaries. For the developments until 1941, consult I. Avakumović's \textit{History of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia}, Vol. I, a good study based on many primary sources.

\textsuperscript{12} One phrase of the "Liberation War" is amply documented in \textit{Zemaljsko Antifašističko Vijeće Narodnog Oslobodjenja Hrvatske : Zbornik Dokumenata, 1943} (Zagreb : Institute za Historiju Radničkog Pokreta, 1964), pp. 725. Director of this Institute for the History of the Labor Movement was Prof. Franjo Tudjman, now thrown out of the party.
plete equality of Serbs, Croatians, Slovenes, "Macedonians," and Montenegrins."

By May of 1945, Tito had all of Yugoslavia under his control. In a Communist-style election, the monarchy was liquidated and on November 19, 1945, the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia was proclaimed. The Communist-dominated parliament adopted a new Constitution on January 30, 1946, modeled after Stalin's Constitution of 1936. It was now officially contended that by establishing six federated republics and issuing the new Constitution under the motto "Brotherhood and Unity," the main problem of Yugoslavia—the national question had been successfully solved for ever. Creating a separate Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina—rather than to partition this territory between Serbs and Croatians—the Communists claimed to have removed one of the main obstacles for better relations between the two peoples.

It was also asserted that the sovereignty of each nation was now realized and the principle of self-determination has been achieved. Such contentions were incorporated in the Constitutions of respective republics. Thus, for instance, the Constitution of the People's Republic of Croatia, issued on January 18, 1947, stated "that the Croatian people expressing their free will and in accordance with the right of self-determination—including the right to secession or unification with other peoples—joined the union based on principles of equality with other peoples of Yugoslavia."

However, the national question still continued to plague Yugoslavia. In addition, there were all kinds of other troubles. The country was ravaged by war and its economy was in chaos. U.N.R.R.A.'s 400 million dollars worth of food and supplies was hardly sufficient. To make things worse, the Cominform—dominated by Stalin—expelled from its fold the CPY on June 28, 1948. The basic reason was Tito's insistence on independence of his country. The Stalin-Tito break was vividly described by Milovan Djilas, who at the time was one of the leading men in the CPY hierarchy.


This break threw the CPY temporarily into a state of despair. It was, however, the best thing that could have happened to Tito and his movement. As a result of the expulsion by Cominform, Tito was able to draw in the subsequent fifteen years more than three billion dollars in economic and military aid from the West, primarily the United States. The world witnessed the rise of “National Communism,” “Many roads to Socialism,” and “Titoism” that profoundly affected not only Eastern Europe but the entire Communist World as well.

Looking at it in retrospect, it is now clear that Stalin committed a great tactical blunder by expelling Tito from Cominform in 1948. The expulsion contributed to the disintegration of the monolithic structure of Communism. Taking in account the peculiar structure of Yugoslavia and its Communism, it is questionable, however, whether Tito had any other choice but to approach the West. Historians may now speculate whether Tito would have approached the West even if he would not have been expelled by Stalin. Stalin’s move surely precipitated Yugoslavia’s new policy towards the West and terminated Yugoslavia’s “Stalinist Period” (1945-1948), and this had profound affects on Yugoslav Communism. By approaching the West and obtaining its materiel and moral support, Tito apparently saved his regime. This was in the long run a dangerous game: the exposure to the Western influences was to bring inevitably the liberalization which, in turn, contributed to the flare-up of the suppressed national question.16

To deal with many problems caused by the break with the Soviets, Tito convoked the Fifth Congress of the CPY in July, 1948. Over 2,300 delegates, meeting in Belgrade, represented some 468,000 members. Tito secured his undisputed leadership while thousands of Cominformists, including the noted Croatian Communist Andrija Hebrang, were summarily jailed or liquidated.17

was one of the leading actors in this whole drama. It was on account of this book, after his break with the Party, that Djilas was sent to prison for almost five years.


17. Pregled Istorije SKJ, p. 464; there have been persistent speculations that Hebrang was removed and then liquidated in jail for his Croatian nationalistic “deviations.” Official version of the case is presented in the book written by Hebrang’s chief investigator Mile Milatović, Slučaj Andrije Hebranga (Beograd: Kultura, 1952). Djilas describes Hebrang
The Changes in 1950's

Constantly claiming they were true followers of Marxism-Leninism, Tito and his group were receiving capitalist aid and maintaining their own position in World Communism. They certainly contributed to it many innovations in economic and political-organizational spheres. After a period of state capitalism, harsh collectivization and centralized administrative management of the economy (1945-1950) Yugoslavia slowly inaugurated far-reaching changes. The Communist leadership radically departed from the centralized socialist planning that characterizes the states of the Soviet Bloc.

In 1950 the Yugoslav Communist launched the slogan "Factories to the workers!" As one of the main participants in these moves stated: "This was the first break-through into social relations we had created after the war. It had a more far-reaching significance than we ourselves were able to realize at first." 18

It should be noted that these changes were inaugurated after the complete failure of the new Communist economic system. By the Fundamental Law on the Management of State Economic Enterprises and Higher Economic Organizations by the Workers' Collectives in June, 1950, the decentralization of the economy and the so-called social management were introduced. The main organs of this new type of management became Workers' Councils. The federal authorities were thus giving up planning and local control, retaining only general control. 19

Additional legislation was passed to continue these new trends. A Law on Planned Management of National Economy was issued on December 29, 1951, followed by laws of 1952 and subsequent two years. 20 The government maintained that by "handing over of factories to the workers and the introduction of the so-called communal system" it made possible "the policy of direct participation of the People's masses." All these measures were aimed at increased production, higher national income and a higher living standard. It was a part of a gigantic industrialization process with less stress on agriculture, a policy that did not always please the Western countries which were

in his book Conversations with Stalin as a staunch Stalinist and a man who enjoyed the confidence of the Soviets.

18. Vladimir Bakarić, "The League of Communists Today," Socialist Thought and Practice (Belgrade: July-September, 1966), Vol. VI, No. 23, p. 27. Bakarić is the leading Croatian Communist and was for many years the President of the Croatian Republic.

19. Ibid., pp. 28-29.

aiding Yugoslavia. What the Government did not openly admit was its desire to decrease the number of persons engaged in agriculture thus reducing the peasantry, traditionally opposed to this whole new ideology. It was the peasantry that by its passive and stubborn resistance broke Tito's collectivized agriculture. While in 1939 Yugoslavia's peasant population amounted to about 80 per cent of the entire population, its percentage in 1960's dropped to about 50 per cent.  

Slowly inaugurated economic self-management, organization of direct producers, social planning, economic democracy at the enterprise level with direct participation of all workers in decision making, an increasing private enterprise, and administrative decentralization were characteristic of these new changes in 1950's. Thus after early 1950's there were three levels of local government: the commune, district (srez), and republican.  

At the Sixth Congress of the CPY in November, 1952, in Zagreb the name of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was changed into the League of Communists of Yugoslavia—LCY. While the Party was losing its monolithic structure, the Yugoslav "Road to Socialism" was intensified. All these many changes necessitated a new emended Constitution in January, 1953. With Stalin's death in March of the same year, a new era set in in international Communism. Yugoslavia was now, according to the new Constitution, a Socialist Democracy. To approach and influence the masses of the people, the LCY used the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia (which has grown to about seven million members). It is a continuation of the People's Front and of the Trade Unions. Needless to say, both organizations are completely dominated by the Communists. The League thus at least pretended to give up the exclusive monopoly of political control. Judging from his articles, as they appeared during 1953, Milovan Djilas—then the Vice-President of the Republic—wanted more democratization. He criticized the practices of the new powerful bureaucracy—the New Class. He was rebuked by the League and removed from his positions. In April, 1954, he quit the Party to which he had belonged since the days of his youth. His article that appeared in the New Leader shortly after the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 and the subse-


quent publication of the *New Class* in August, 1957, were most devastating denouncements of Communism.  

The Djilas affair and his subsequent imprisonment in the same Mitrovica prison where he was jailed as a young Communist during the royal dictatorship certainly harmed Tito's prestige in the West. Temporarily released, Djilas was returned to prison in 1962 for publishing his *Conversations with Stalin*.  

In view of the most recent developments within the LCY, the writings of Djilas deserve renewed attention. They reveal many flaws of Yugoslav Communism: inefficiency, corruption, theft, unsound economic policies, to mention just a few. The events of the past two years prove how right Djilas was in some of his appraisals. No one can deny personal courage of this man. It is, however, questionable if the Djilas affair had such a historic significance as was indicated by Mihajlo Mihajlov in his article on Djilas that appeared in the United States in July, 1966. Mihajlov, born of Russian parents in Yugoslavia, a former instructor at the Faculty of Humanities in Zadar (a branch of the University of Zagreb) is a young, somewhat naive, critic of Tito's regime. A self-styled follower of Djilas, and unlike Djilas a convinced Christian, he has certainly received a great deal of publicity in the West. It is interesting to note that both Djilas and Mihajlov in their criticism of Yugoslav Communism have failed to recognize the existing national question.  

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Reconciliation with Moscow: Rising Nationalism

After Stalin's death, the reconciliation between the Soviet and Yugoslav Communists was steadily progressing. In June, 1955, Khrushchev and Bulganin came to Belgrade, apologized, paid tribute to Tito's brand of Communism and admitted their willingness to accept "Many Roads to Socialism." After the Twentieth Soviet Party Congress in February, 1956, when Khrushchev denounced Stalin, and Cominform's dissolution in April of the same year, Tito came to visit the Soviet Union. There he spent three weeks in June and was hailed as a hero, a friend, and as a man who had defied Stalin and survived successfully. However, Tito's return into the fold of Moscow was cautious and gradual. Despite the increasing friendship he still maintained his independent position within international Communism. During and after the historic Hungarian Revolt, Tito mildly denounced direct Soviet military intervention but—as evidenced by his speech at Pula on November 11, 1956—he at the same time violently attacked the anti-Communist revolution as an action of "Fascist reactionaries." Subsequently even his old-time collaborator, Djilas, was treated as such a reactionary.

The Polish and Hungarian revolts of 1956 speeded up the process of disintegration of the monolithic structure of Communism everywhere. In this new era of slow relaxation in the Soviet Union and in most parts of Eastern Europe, in the period of the "New Course" and the emerging polycentrism of Communism, re-emergences of Gomulka and rehabilitation of former "Titoists," Tito could justly boast of his increased prestige. The LCY merely continued the already inaugurated policies. There was no way back any more, for there were also evident in Yugoslavia some psychological repercussions of the bloody revolt in neighboring Hungary. In addition to these echoes from Hungary and Poland, there was the ever rising nationalism within and outside the League and the repudiation of Communism by a majority of the young people. Continued concessions seemed to be the only realistic policy. On several occasions, after the Seventh Congress of the LCY (April, 1958), Tito repeatedly stated that Yugoslav Communists have "revised their practices" but they still were "true Marxists and Leninists." Under such revised practices Yugoslavia was able to receive even American military and economic aid to build the strongest Communist army in Europe outside of the Soviet Union. Its strength was estimated at between 400,000 and 600,000 men.28

27. Vjesnik, November 12, 1956.
28. Georgej Prpic, "The New Breed Behind the Iron Curtain," America, January 2, 1965, pp. 18-20. The Seventh Congress of the LCY was held from April 22 to 26, 1958, in Ljub-
At the same time, Tito cultivated his relations with the Soviet Bloc. At the Party Conference in Zagreb, on December 12, 1959, Tito stated that the relations with the Soviets and other Communist countries were good. However, the relations with China were anything but friendly. In the rising Sino-Soviet conflict, the position of Tito was always clear: he has supported the Soviet position. He and his LCY have been constantly denounced by Peking as revisionists, traitors to Marxism-Leninism and as "lackeys of Western Imperialism."

In the process of continuing reconciliation with the Soviets, Tito and Khrushchev met even on the American soil: end of September, 1960, in New York during the spectacular presence of many Communist leaders attending the U. N. Assembly. Only a few weeks later, from November 6 till 30, representatives of eighty-one Communist Parties from all over the world gathered at a Summit meeting in the Kremlin. The split between Moscow and Peking became now wide open. Albania—a neighbor of Yugoslavia—now became the first Chinese satellite in Europe. On December 6, 1960, Tito delivered in Belgrade an anti-American speech and then, in February, 1961, embarked on one of his trips to woo the neutral countries. This time Africa was on his itinerary. He needed the support of the "non-aligned" nations, for in the beginning of September he was to play host to representatives of 25 such neutral nations at a six-day conference in Belgrade. The tone of the conference was outspokenly anti-American.*23*29 The New York Times Magazine stated after this conference that Tito led a "neutral road toward Moscow." 30

While the Bulgarian Communists repeatedly referred to the "unsolved problem of Macedonia," Enver Hoxha of Albania—now a strong supporter of Peking—ferociously denounced Yugoslavia, claiming for his country the Kosmet (Kosovo-Metohija) region. In his speech at Skopje, Tito responded to Hoxha on November 13, 1961. Two weeks later the Central Committee of the LCY at its Third Plenum endorsed the Soviet stand on Chinese Commu-
nism as expressed during the Twenty-Second Soviet Party Congress of October, 1961. By now, however, the trouble was brewing within the League itself.

In many of his speeches after 1960, Tito kept attacking national chauvinism and localism that were evident in economy, budgetary appropriations, linguistic controversies and in realms of culture and politics. Tensions grew and no one was able to hide them. In his famous speech at Split, Dalmatia on May 6, 1962, Tito frankly admitted many negative aspects of Communism in the country. He denounced nationalism and called for drastic improvements in national and economic relations of the six republics. The topic of reforms dominated the Fourth Plenum of the LCY meeting on July 22, 1962, in Belgrade. 31

Then came the friendly visit of the Soviet President L. Brezhnev in October. Tito returned the courtesy by visiting again the Soviet Union in December 1962. On December 13, he addressed the session of the Supreme Soviet, a rare honor for a foreign visitor. In his speech Tito stressed that there were only few differences between Yugoslavia and the USSR. 32 There were, however, increasing differences with the United States where the Kennedy Administration had second thoughts about its generous aid to Yugoslavia. If our aid to Tito did not flow after 1963, at least it continued to trickle. By 1963, however, American aid to Yugoslavia had been estimated at least at $2,397,000,000. 33 And by now the LCY was back in the fold of Moscow.

**After the New Constitution**

On April 7, 1963, after long discussions and preparations, the Federal People's Assembly in Belgrade adopted a new Constitution. This was already the third Constitution within seventeen years. From the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, the name now changed into the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In its very first paragraph the Constitution states explicitly "the right of every people to self-determination, including the right to

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32. *Vjesnik u Srijedu*, December 19 and 26, 1962; *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, December 14, p. 2. English translation in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. XIV, No. 51 (January 16, 1963). While Tito was in the Soviet Union *The Atlantic's* issue for December published an extensive supplement on "Yugoslavia Today" in which Fred Warner Neal in his article "Yugoslavia at Crossroads" stated (p. 77) that Yugoslavia "was no longer a police state."
secession. " There have been varied reactions—some of them critical—to this basic law of the Yugoslav Communist state and an American jurist is of the opinion that the new Constitution "gives to the omnipotent federal power a predominantly Serbian character in the same manner in which the federal power in the Soviet Union executed from Moscow is Russian." Although it stressed "Brotherhood and Unity" as well as "Voluntary Socialist Community or Peoples Equal in Rights," there has been ample evidence testifying to the fact that the new Constitution too did not solve the nationality question.

It was under the impact of this new Constitution that the Fifth Plenum of the LCY convened in May of the same year. A visit of N. S. Khrushchev followed in August, 1963. Then Tito himself left for a lengthy trip in his role of a mediator between the East and West. This time he visited South America. On October 16, 1963, he arrived in the United States. The next day he was received at the White House by President John F. Kennedy. On October 22, Tito addressed the United Nations pleading for international peace and coexistence.

As one of the leaders of the non-aligned nations, Tito visited Finland in June, 1964. On his return trip he stopped at Leningrad to meet with the Soviet Premier Khrushchev on June 8, 1964. Little did he know at that time that Khrushchev’s days in power were already numbered. On October 14, a Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU ousted Khrushchev from his top position in the Soviet Union. The reaction in the LCY was that of surprise and shock. Such an event was even less opportune because of the deepening crisis within the League itself.

Several Slovenian high-ranking Communists were already openly criticizing the political and economic exploitation of the Slovenian Republic. Dušan Pirjavec, a leading Slovenian Marxist theoretician went on record condemning “Yugoslavism” as “national mythomania.” Nationalism was

also the topic of the interview given by the leading Communist in the Croatian Republic, Dr. Vladimir Bakarić, a member of the Central Committee of the LCY to the Belgrade weekly NIN. In an emotional discussion he denounced here false "Yugoslavism," mentioned the problem of Croatian nationalism and admitted the fact that many thousands of Croatians were living as economic emigrants or refugees in Western Europe. Later on Bakarić repeated his charges of neglect of Croatia by the Federal Government, bureaucracy, and unjust allocation of federal funds to develop Serbia and the under-developed regions at the expense of the industrially more advanced republics of Slovenia and Croatia.

On the eve of the Eighth Congress of the LCY, the Party organ released the figures of the membership of the League. On June 30, 1964, there were 1,080,041 Communists in Yugoslavia. Of these were: 422,916 in Serbia; 218,890 in Croatia; 128,487 in Bosnia-Herzegovina; 70,710 in Slovenia; 68,533 in Macedonia; 34,311 in Montenegro; and 86,194 in the armed forces. The number of Communists during the Seventh Congress in 1957 had been 758,066.

When the Eighth Congress started its sessions in Belgrade on December 7, 1964, the nationality question emerged as one of the top problems. The Congress revealed the split within the League. Tito and Kardelj openly admitted the existing economic and national crisis. In his report as the Secretary General of the LCY, Tito discussed "some special problems of the ethnic nationality groups" and stressed "the responsibility of the Communists in the suppression of nationalism." Rather than to decrease the tensions, the Congress only intensified them.

By 1965 Zagreb emerged as the center of more progressive younger forces in the LCY and of some new interpretations of Marxism. Outspoken criticism of many practices of Communism in Yugoslavia emerged from a group of philosophers around the journal of the Croatian Philosophical Society,

38. NIN, March 8, 1964.
Praxis. They have espoused what could be vaguely called Marxian Humanism. These new trends in Marxism and the appearance of M. Mihajlov’s long and critical report on his experiences in the Soviet Union, “The Moscow Summer” that was published in the Belgrade monthly Delo (February, 1965) denouncing Stalinism and Bolshevism, aroused the ire of many leading Communists including the aging President Tito.42

The organ of the League and other Communist publications responded angrily to many of these “appearances of exploitation of national and religious feelings and intolerance” and called on all Communists and non-Communists alike to strengthen “Brotherhood and Unity in everyday political practices.”43

As Tito’s pleas in his speech in Split resulted only in many solemn resolutions, but few constructive measures, by both management and workers, the Government decided in July, 1965, to sudden radical and thorough economic reforms. It ordered devaluation of the dinar and a gradual exchange of the currency (the ratio was 100 old dinars for 1 new dinar). Simultaneously prices were increased for all basic commodities. Drastic changes were ordered in all departments of national economy including the closing of “political factories—unproductive establishments in backward areas.” Thousands of workers were laid off and for many of them West Germany now became a real Mecca.44

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42. Time, February 19, 1965; both Praxis’ criticism and the Mihajlov affair have been extensively publicized by the American press. Gajo Petrović, “The Philosophical and Sociological Relevance of Marx’s Concept of Alienation,” a 25-page long report read at Notre-Dame’s conference on April 26, 1966. Petrović is one of the leading men in the Praxis group.

43. Komunist, May 27, 1965. The controversies extended even to the area of linguistics. At this time the Croatian scholars, notably Professor Ljudevit Jonke who is the foremost authority on the Croatian language, admitted the great similarity of the Croatian and Serbian languages but insisted on equality of the Croatian with Serbian under the common denominator of the official “Serbo-Croatian” which in Croatian is used as “Hrvatsko-srpski” - “Croato-Serbian.” The Croats have developed throughout centuries a literature of their own. They use the Latin alphabet and ijekavica dialect while the Serbs use the Cyrillic alphabet and the ekavica dialect. Both Slovenian and Croatian Communists maintained that their respective languages are discriminated against and that the Serbian part of the “Serbo-Croatian” is forced upon them. In Bosnia-Herzegovina—according to evidence—the Serbian language is forced upon all the people regardless of their nationality. Književne Novine, Telegram and Jezik abounded in discussions on linguistic nationalism. These controversies inevitably led to the “Deklaracija” of March, 1967, discussed at the end of this article.

44. As a result the parity of the dinar was raised from 750 to 1,250 dinars for a dollar. The general rise in prices was averaging 23 per cent. See reports in Yugoslav papers beginning with August 1, 1965; also the official pamphlet The Economic Reform in Yugoslavia (Bel-
This time the Government really meant business. The new measures were harsh for many and resulted in many repercussions and a great deal of discussion. Most important result, however, was the fact that the LCY leadership as well as rank and file became bitterly divided over many issues of the reform. In continued heated debates, the press admitted many inefficiencies, waste, duplication, theft, and graft in industry and its management. Beside the "national oppression" the second aspect of the national question was clearly evident: "the economic exploitation" as the Croatian and Slovenian Communists contended. Both Slovenian and Croatian Communists—supported by the non-Communist masses of their peoples—have complained that contributions of their republics to the national budget was way out of proportion of their population. They simply wanted to receive what they considered a just share from the budget and to see more of their money spent in their republics. 45

By 1966, the Yugoslav Communism was the most peculiar brand of international Communism. While introducing many vestiges of Western capitalism, the Government still claimed to act in accordance with Marxism. There was a fair amount of free enterprise in different areas. Foreign investments were encouraged. While hundreds of thousands of foreign tourists visited the country, many thousands of citizens of Yugoslavia obtained passports to visit the foreign countries. Many more were permitted to go to work in West Germany and other Western countries.

The relations with the Catholic Church improved. There are a few religious papers published in Catholic areas. On June 25, 1966, the Government signed an agreement (Protocol) with the Vatican reestablishing the diplomatic relations after fourteen years. Still, over the lives of all individuals lay the shadow of the secret police, the almighty UDBA under the control of Aleksandar Ranković and his protégés. All the ghastly details were revealed after July 1, 1966. Marijan Cvetković, the Secretary of the Central Committee of LC of Croatia admitted that there were in the files of the central UDBA for Croatia the names of 1,300,000 people from this republic alone. This is almost a third of the entire population of Croatia! Ranković’s powerful machine was shadowing even the top Communists, including Tito himself. Ranković was generally considered as successor to Tito and as a man who advo-

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icated closer ties with Moscow. It is now obvious from available evidence that—supported by many Serbian members of the LCY—he sabotaged the new economic reforms. He has been accused as the representative of Serbian chauvinism who gave all important positions in the UDBA to the Serbian members of the League.

The Fourth Plenum and After

The Fourth Plenum (often referred to as "Session") of the Central Committee of the LCY under chairmanship of Tito met somewhat unexpectedly and in extreme secrecy at Tito's Adriatic residence and stronghold, the island of Brioni, off Pula, Croatia. It was a safe and well secured place for such a historic event. The day was July 1, 1966. In a dramatic move the Central Committee purged Aleksandar Ranković, the Vice-President of Yugoslavia. He was removed from all his positions. Also purged was Svetislav Stefanović, in charge of the secret police after Ranković nominally ceased to be its head about a year before. Tito accused Ranković for having made the UDBA the most powerful organization in the state and for utilizing it for chauvinistic Serbian interests. (It was later disclosed that hidden microphones, planted by UDBA, were found even in Tito's and Kardelj's apartments.) The heated discussions of July 1 and 2 by the 154-man Central Committee revealed that the real causes of the crisis were two: the nationality question, notably the Serbian-Croatian animosities; and the opposition to the far-reaching new economic reforms organized by the Ranković group.

In a way the purge at Brioni was a clash between the Party reformists and conservatives. Ranković and his supporters were accused as opponents of political and economic decentralizations, as well as political and economic liberalization. There were in the background also ideological differences. However, directly or indirectly the clash was caused by the persistent nationality question so peculiar to the Southslav state from its beginning. To appease

46. The first detailed and authoritative reports on the Fourth Plenum appeared in the LCY, Komunist, July 7, 1966, pp. 5-9; Borba, July 2 and 3, 1966; David Binder's extensive reports in New-York Times, July 2, 3, 1966, and afterwards. He reported that the first reaction in Croatia was that of relief and elation. For the first time in many years the American newspapers were willing to admit in their numerous reports from Yugoslavia the seriousness of the nationality question; see "Serb-Croat Hatreds Lurk Behind Tito's Party Purge," The Plain Dealer, July 3, 1955. For a concise analysis see also "Tito Purges Yugoslav Party," Communist Affairs, Vol. IV, No. 4 (July-August, 1966) pp. 24-25. Official English report on the "Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia," appeared in Social Thought and Practice (Belgrade: July-September, 1966), Vol. VI No. 23, pp. 103-141.
the Serbs who were aroused by the dismissal of the Serb Ranković, Tito selected as the new Vice-President of the Republic Koča Popović. Mijalko Todo­rović, another Serb, replaced Ranković as the Organizational Secretary in the Central Committee of the LCY.

The meeting at Brioni secured the continued leadership of Tito that had been contested by Ranković and his men. Beside other elements, Tito obviously had the support of the army. The meeting also announced the sweeping reforms within the Party itself leading to more decentralization. Whether it will strengthen the elements pressing for continued economic reforms, self-management, social and local control of a new streamlined and revised production, political decentralization and liberalization—remains to be seen. It is possible that Edward Kardelj, the top Slovenian Communist, and known as a moderate, will strengthen his position in the quest for succession to Tito.

Taking into account the complexities of the Balkan politics and judging from the never-ending and passionate discussions in the Komunist and all other papers, one gets the impression that the struggle between Tito and Ranković has not ended yet. Tito, opposed to all nationalist excesses, saved for the time being the idea of Yugoslav unity for which he has incessantly pleaded on innumerable occasions. It is, however, doubtful whether he eliminated the Croatian-Serbian, Slovenian-Serbian, and Macedonian-Serbian antagonisms. These continued to loom as the main problems in the complex nationality question.

Tito did not like the Western reaction to these events. Only a few days later in his speech at Brioni to the representatives of the Partisan War Veterans he bitterly attacked the implication of the Western press that he was a liberal. He is, he stated, opposed to liberalism and to "negative influences from the West." 48

Meanwhile, the great discussions abounding in prolonged soul-searching and mutual accusations continued. The Central Committees of the LC in all the republics, with more heated controversies, have held their sessions. In a speech delivered on September 4, 1966, at Murska Sobota, Tito announced—in accordance with the Brioni Plenum—a complete overhaul of the Party, a reorganization "from top to bottom." 49 This is precisely what the party organizations in the entire country have been recently working at. As Tito himself

47. Reports and articles in our and Yugoslav papers and magazines; also Komunist, July 14, and every single issue of this Party organ to this time (November, 1968).
49. Ibid., September 5, 1966, and subsequent reports in the Komunist.
had admitted that the League had the "contact with the people and the real situation," the numerous pessimistic reports in the Party press, in addition to Tito's own remarks, testify to the fact that Tito and his trusted collaborators have been desperately struggling to save the League.

In mid-August, 1966, Mihajlo Mihajlov was arrested again. The charge was the spreading of "false rumors" about Yugoslavia in the Western and exile press. He even tried to organize a legal oppositional paper. He was sentenced to a year. His trial that ended on September 24, his accusations and defense and the great deal of publicity he has been receiving in the West have proved extremely embarrassing for the regime.

An aftermath of the Brioni meeting was the Fifth Session of the Central Committee of the LCY that was held on October 5, 1966, in Belgrade. The LCY was reorganized in accordance with the new policies to facilitate the establishment of "the self-government and direct socialist democracy." The supreme authority of the Central Committee was split into two bodies: a 35-member Presidium and an 11-member Executive Committee. The office of Secretary General of the League and several secretaries of the Central Committee have been abolished. Tito became now the President of the LCY, giving up his old title which he has held since 1930's as the Secretary General. Mijalko Todorović is the new Secretary of the Executive Committee of the LCY. Presidium consists actually of Party elders while the Executive Committee is composed of younger elements. How workable and practical this will be, remains to be seen in the future.

This radical reorganization of the Party is indicative of the never-ending changes in Yugoslav Communism. It is at crossroads and it is in a serious crisis. It will be wrong to imply that everything it has done was wrong. Its achievements should not be slighted or underestimated. It has raised the standard of living and made improvements in many fields. All these revolutionary changes in political, social, economic and cultural realms have been

50. Mihajlo Mihajlov, "Elaborat o osnivanju otvorenog opozicionog štampanog organa u S.F.R.J.," a mimeographed 13-page document circulated by Mihajlov and issued in Zadar on December 24, 1965. One copy is in the possession of this writer. Later his sentence was increased to four years.


52. The entire issue of Komunist, October 6, 1966, deals with the reorganization of the LCY; Yugoslav Life, Vol. XI, No. 11 (Belgrade, November, 1966), p 1. Newsweek magazine published a long analysis of these recent developments in the issue of October 17, 1966: "Tito's Yugoslavia: Is it Communism," pp. 49-54. Prof. Zbigniew Brzezinski's opinion here on the reorganization of the LCY is that it is "contradictory and unworkable."
accomplished at the expense of tremendous sacrifice. And "the revolution is still going on," as Vladimir Bakarić recently stated.53

According to him and other Communist leaders, creation of socialist relations in society, of a new Socialist Democracy, as expressed in social self-management, has been the most spectacular achievement of this peculiar Communism. Their official attitude is that self-management realizes the national sovereignty of these different peoples. Whether these antagonistic nationalities are willing to recognize this is another question. For there is still in existence the question of nationalism. It is now stronger than ever. Tito has been repeatedly denouncing "separatists" and "class enemies" who would like "to destroy the state." He and the high-ranking Party officials continuously attack nationalisms of several nationalities that have crept into all areas: economic, party politics, culture, and even historiography.

There are indications that Ranković's dismissal was interpreted in Serbia as an attack on Serbian interests. The atmosphere in Belgrade, according to many reports, is charged and explosive. Was it for these reasons that in December of 1966 Tito pardoned Ranković, or was this a sign of Tito's wavering? The Croatian Communists interpreted it as Tito's move to appease the Serbs.

Late in the same month violent anti-American demonstrations were staged in major cities of Yugoslavia.54 Yugoslav Communism may be mellow, but it is still as anti-American as ever in spite of all the aid it has received from the United States. More interesting than reports on these demonstrations was the news—a few days later—that on December 31, 1966, Milovan Djilas was released from Mitrovica prison.

A heavy blow to the economic reform movement was the death of Boris Krajger, a leading Slovenian Communist, only second to Edvard Kardelj, and generally known as the "father of the economic reform." He and his son were killed a few days after the New Year's Day, 1967, in a auto accident on an icy road near Belgrade.

A heavier blow than Krajger's death was, however, an event that took place on March 16, 1967, in Zagreb. Judging from its repercussions and significance it was a historic event that has provoked the greatest political storm in many years. On that day at a meeting of many Croatian scholars and writers, many of whom were university professors, linguists and men of great

reputation, the now famous Deklaracija was signed. The "Declaration on the Name and the Status of the Croatian Literary Language" was signed by representatives of eighteen scholarly institutions and organizations, some of which are affiliated with the Croatian University in Zagreb and the Academy of Sciences and Arts. One of the institutions was Matica Hrvatska, the oldest Croatian literary publishing society which since its inception in 1842 has contributed a great deal to the Croatian culture. More than 130 individuals signed this document. Among them were some seventy members of the LCY including the old-time Communist member of the Central Committee and the leading Croatian writer, Miroslav Krleža, a close friend of Tito.

The Declaration, invoking "the principle of national sovereignty and complete equality" stated that

the national name of the language spoken by the Croatian nation is of paramount importance, because it is the inalienable right of every people to call its language by its own national name, irrespective of whether in a philological sense this language is shared in its entirety or through a separate dialect by another people.55

There are three major Slavic languages recognized in Yugoslavia: Slovenian, Serbo-Croatian, and "Macedonian." The Declaration denounced the discriminations against the Croatian language in government, press, television and various political organizations. Under the guise of the Serbo-Croatian language, a pure Serbian language was being imposed, a fact that has antagonized many elements in Croatian-speaking territories. Consequently, the Croatian cultural and scientific institutions and organizations which are the signatories of this declaration, demanded "to clearly and unequivocally establish through Constitutional provision the equality of the four literary languages: the Slovenian, Croatian, Serbian and Macedonian." Paragraph 131 of the Constitution of the SFR of Yugoslavia should be changed and include Croatian as a separate and distinct language along with Serbian, Slovenian and "Macedonian."56


There ensued a furious reaction of the League of Communists, of Tito himself, the official press and especially Serbian elements in the Party. They denounced the Declaration as "nationalistic deviation" and a political act against the idea of "Brotherhood and Unity." In his speech at Priština on March 26, Tito called the signatories "anti-Socialist elements" and "separatists" who dealt a blow with "the knife in the back" to the national unity. Of those who signed the Declaration, 34 party members were punished and ten were expelled from the LCY. Miroslav Krleža, to the surprise of everybody, quit his party membership, thus provoking a great sensation among the masses of his countrymen. Several of the prosecuted university professors are already teaching at foreign universities having thus joined a real exodus of disillusioned and embittered intellectuals and professionals from the country.

The furor over the Declaration has not abated yet. Its significance is emphasized by the fact that even numerous Croatian Communists openly identified themselves with the national feeling of the masses of people. For this is not a mere linguistic controversy. It is a spontaneous clash between the Croatian and Serbian nationalism within the ranks of the Communist movement. The Croatian Communists and their non-Communist supporters are not alone in this confrontation as the Slovenian Communists too expressed their solidarity against what they call centralism of Belgrade and the Serbian domination of Croatian and Slovenian affairs. It is also well known that Macedonian, Montenegrin and Albanian Communists are openly opposed to the Serbian leadership in the party and state.

It is surprising that Vladimir Bakarić, who was expected to be one of the signers of the Declaration, came out against it and in the session of the Central Committee of the LC of Croatia in Zagreb on April 19 furiously denounced "the nationalistic deviations" and "excesses" of his comrades and good personal friends. What the real reasons are behind his decision to join the pro-Yugoslav and unitarian forces is not clear. He attacked in his speech the "hotbeds of Croatian nationalism": Matica Hrvatska, Matica Iseljenika Hrvatske (an organization that cares for the Croatian immigrants around the world), and the Institute for the History of the Workers' Movement whose director was Professor Franjo Tudjman, one of the top Croatian Communists and a former general in the Yugoslav Army. Tudjman did not sign the Declaration but nevertheless because of his "nationalistic deviations" expressed in his writings, he was expelled from the LCY and removed as the director of the same Institute. 57

57. Komunist, April 20, 1967, pp. 6, 12; the entire issue deals with this great and historic controversy.
The tense situation, provoked by the Declaration of March and its repercussions, has continued throughout the years 1967 and 1968. With all his denunciations, Tito could do little to restore the unity. On May 17, 1967 only eight days before his seventy-fifth birthday he was for the fifth time elected President of the republic. Mika Špiljak, a Croatian, was elected the new president of the Federal Executive Council (premier), while Milentije Popović, a Serb, replaced Kardelj as the new president of the Federal Assembly. Many changes in the top federal positions are now based on the rotation system. However, all these changes and events—even including the fact that on April 18, 1967, Mihajlov received another prison term of four and a half years, for having spread propaganda against the state—could hardly diminish the nationalistic controversies raging throughout all sectors of the country.

The American press and periodicals which so far have paid little attention to the existence of various nationalities and the nationality question in Yugoslavia were forced under the impact of these events to recognize them. One of such periodicals generally cautious in evaluating the situation in Yugoslavia and not unkind to Tito, admitted even the possibility that Tito’s state would fall apart; that the land of the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes and Macedonians “is too various to be ruled from Belgrade unless the ruler has great prestige and a strong police force; and “that the party in Yugoslavia is with internal strife and in danger of breaking up.” Many comments of the European press have been even more pessimistic.

Had it not been for the Arab-Israeli conflict, of June 1967, Tito would have made some progress—during this time of crisis—at least in international affairs. However, as soon as the war between Israel and the Arabs broke out, Tito hastened to Moscow to join there the representatives of the Communist countries in denouncing on June 9, 1967, Israel as the aggressor. Subsequently Yugoslavia broke off diplomatic relations with Israel. It is apparent that some of Tito’s close collaborators had some second thoughts as to the advisability of this step which has evidently damaged Yugoslavia’s prestige in many quarters of the world. At about the same time, the units of the Soviet fleet visited the Adriatic ports in Dalmatia.

Some years ago Milovan Djilas called in his writings for “the withering away of the party.” No one can deny that the process of “withering away”

58. East Europe, Vol. 16, No. 4 (April, 1967), p. 1; see also in the same issue, Ilija Jukić, “Tito’s Last Battle,” pp. 2-11 which is a good analysis of the last year’s developments in Yugoslavia. For the most recent developments—especially during 1967—the author has also used the issues of the English-language bulletin Yugoslav Facts and Views, published by the Yugoslav Information Center in New-York.
has affected the party and that monolithic structure of the LCY has been shattered for good. The inability to solve the nationality question has made it inevitable. Tito was seventy-six in the spring of 1968. He is still clinging to the idea of "Brotherhood and Unity." He is trying to save the unity of the country which he created in 1945 and which he has considered as his life work.

The divergent interest of several republics have proved too strong for the party to contain. It is believed that only Tito with his prestige—which has been recently waning—is capable of holding the country together. The future depends much on the success of the reforms. Ranković, who was removed in the summer of 1966, was representative of the anti-reform, conservative and pro-Serbian element. It is generally believed that he enjoys the support of the Soviets. His dismissal has aggravated Moscow. In the past few months his supporters have become more aggressive and are openly denouncing and persecuting the "nationalistic" elements in Slovenia and Croatia, two centers of the reforms and decentralization.

Meanwhile the outspoken supporters of decentralization have been increasing their demands. They want almost complete economic and cultural independence from federal control of Belgrade. They would like to see Slovenian and Croatian soldiers to serve in their respective republics. Originally the Macedonian, Slovenian and Croatian Communists and their supporters envisaged their future with the Serbs and the rest of the population only on the basis of complete equality that excludes hegemony by any nationality. This equality is guaranteed by the Constitution. However, the practice has proved that for instance the Croatian language, history and culture—to mention only a few—have been suppressed in Croatia and especially in mixed territory of the Bosnian republic. This in addition to economic policies—because of all the processes of political democratization—have caused these nationalities to increase their demands for more independence in economy and political life.

It is, of course, impossible to foresee the outcome of these developments. The most critical stage of the problem can be expected after demise of Tito. Who will be his successor? what will happen after Tito is gone, and will his successors be able to preserve the unity of the country? No one can answer these questions now. If the present trends continue, it is possible that some day in the future Yugoslavia would become a confederation of six republics. Then some of the republics might decide on their complete independence. This would mean the end of Yugoslavia and of Communism in that part of Europe.
Whatever is going to happen there, it should be a peaceful solution, for it should be hoped that all these peoples have learned something from their troubled past. On the eve of the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the South Slav state, the foreign world is watching with great interest the country at the crossroads. The present trends cannot fail to have a great impact not only on that country but on the whole Communist world.

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Events in East Europe happen over night. Striking developments take place before one can anticipate them. The whole situation in the country of the South Slavs—now on the eve of celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of its existence—has become somewhat different, since this article was written. On August 21st, 1968 the Soviet Union and its allies of the Warsaw Pact invaded and occupied Czechoslovakia, a democratic Communist ally of Yugoslavia. Tito and his regime had rendered their wholehearted support to Dubcek, a Slovak liberal Communist leader in Czechoslovakia. Rumania, too, came to Dubcek's aid. Both Tito and Ceausescu were in Prague before the Soviet tanks thundered throughout the streets of the defiant country.

After the Soviet occupation of the country of Czechs and Slovaks, the Kremlin put under an extreme pressure both Yugoslavia and Rumania. Tito called under arms 200,000 reservists and has repeatedly stated that if the Soviet should invade the country, he, the Communists, the soldiers, and the people would go to the mountains like in the last war to fight against the invaders. In view of the present different problems, this seems highly improbable in spite of the fact, that a great majority of the people are opposed to the Russians. The Central Committee of the LCP has met. There is a state of emergency in Yugoslavia. Tito has approached even the dreaded imperialist America for help.

One should bear in mind, that A. Ranković, whom Tito had "purged," some two years ago, is a pro-Moscow man. According to the all press reports he is now under strict control. There are other elements—allies of Ranković—who would in Serbia support eventually a Soviet invasion—to get rid of the "Croatian boss" of Yugoslavia, the "pro-Western" J. Broz-Tito. The rumors in the Western world have it, that Yugoslavia could be, in view of this new situation, partitioned, according to the old Churchillian "Fifty-Fifty" proposition of World War II, Western parts to belong to an American area and
Eastern parts to the Soviets. Another rumor has it, that the Soviets are very interested in the so-called "Macedonian Question" and that they would just love to upset the equilibrium in the Balkans—to threaten Greece and the West in the Mediterranean—by establishing an independent Macedonian Republic at the expense of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and possibly Greece.. At the time of this writing it is impossible to predict what is going to happen in the near future in Yugoslavia. Is Yugoslavia under the imminent Soviet threat? Is Bulgaria going to invade south-eastern parts of the country? Is the U.S.S.R. really to undertake an air-born invasion of the Chinese beachhead in Europe—Albania? All observers in the West, and the peaceful neighbors of Yugoslavia, only hope that if there are any real serious problems, they are going to be solved in a peaceful and democratic manner that will satisfy all the interested parties.