times act in "the national(ist) interest" by "targeting Turkish diplomatic officials" (p. 168).

London

MARK DRAGOUMIS


Despite the supposedly close cultural relations between the two countries, very little has been written about Greek-Serbian relations either in Greece or in Serbia or the former Yugoslavia. This also applies to the First World War, one of the most crucial stages in the development of their bilateral relations, which was characterised by great expectations, hopes, and demonstrations of friendship, love, and mistrust and hostility too. It is a period that has never been fully studied, whether owing to technical problems (the difficulty of access to the two countries' state archives) or by scholarly or political choice. So, although studies exist of Greek-British, Serbian-British, Greek-French, and Serbian-French relations during the Great War, Greek-Serbian relations have been examined only with reference to isolated issues —such as the transportation of the Serbian army from Corfu to Thessaloniki, for instance— and mainly on the basis of British, French, or German sources. So this latest book by Miladin Milošević breaks fresh ground in that it focuses exclusively on the diplomatic relations between Greece and Serbia in this particular period.

In this period of Greek-Serbian relations, there is one fundamental reference point around which most of the issues revolve, including the collaboration between the two states. This is the Greek-Serbian Mutual Defence Agreement of 1913, which was drawn up in response to Bulgarian expansionism and to consolidate the two signatories' interests in the Balkans, with the co-operation of Romania and the tolerance of the Great Powers. The most important consideration in the diplomatic activity in the early years of the conflict was the question of Greece's obligations towards its ally Serbia, which had been the first to enter the fray, when Austro-Hungary declared war on it. With the collapse of Serbia, followed by the transfer of the Serbian political and military leadership to Greece (Corfu), together with most of the Serbian army (Corfu and then Macedonia) and large numbers of non-combatants (Corfu, Athens, Volos, Thessaloniki, e.t.c.), new questions arose that were conditioned either by the perception of the alliance between the two countries (which never officially ceased to exist) or by Athens' relations with the Allies.
In his Introduction, Milošević makes a chronological presentation of his subject, starting with a brief account of Greek-Serbian diplomatic relations in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, and including a list of the two country’s respective chargés d'affaires in Athens and Belgrade in the same period (pp. 12-16).

Chapter One, “The War and the Testing of the Alliance” (pp. 19-76), examines the first year of the war and the attitude of the two governments both to it and to their alliance. Serbia sought assistance even before Austro-Hungary declared war; but Greece refused, citing on the one hand the nature of the alliance, which it held to be directed solely against Bulgaria, and on the other their mutual interests, which required that Greece should for the time being remain neutral and the port of Thessaloniki free for the passage of Serbian supplies (28-37, 40-57, 72-6). Milošević also looks into the conflict within the Hellenic government (55-7), the Dardanelles crisis (57-60), the Entente’s Balkan policy (60-6), and the attitude of Romania (66-72).

Chapter Two, “Diplomacy at the Start of the War” (pp. 77-146), discusses the idea of a separate peace in Serbia and Greece at the end of 1914 (77-80). This was Vienna’s first diplomatic approach towards Serbia, via Athens, with a view to closing off a front that was not developing favourably for the Central Powers (78). The author then looks at the concessions made to Bulgaria by Serbia, Greece, and Romania with a view to bringing it into the Allied camp (81-8) and Greece’s renewed refusal to help Belgrade in expectation of the Austro-Hungarian assault (88-96). Venizelos maintained that the Greek people would fight on Serbia’s behalf against Bulgaria, but not against Austria; in other words, he recognised a casus foederis only in the event of a Bulgarian assault and proposed the triple alliance with Romania as a solution. Miladin Milošević then takes a look at the developments connected with the Constantinople campaign and Greece’s attitude (96-105) and the D. Gounaris administration’s policy towards Serbia and the Allies (105-19). Lastly, there is a—rather brief—reference to the anti-Greek and anti-Serbian movements in Serbia and Greece respectively and the official reactions to these (119-22). At the end of July 1915, the Greek Foreign Minister Christos Zographos raised the question of the anti-Greek activities in Serbia with the Serbian ambassador to Athens, Ž Balugdić (the closing of Greek schools, the propaganda about Thessaloniki being put about by Serbian officials, the general disparagement of Greece), and demanded that the Serbian government make an official stand. The Serbian Prime Minister, N. Pašić, replied that there was freedom of speech in Serbia and retaliated with references to similar anti-Serbian activities in Greece; he did, however, issue orders that anti-Greek articles in the
Serbian press should be cut down. Chapter Two also examines the leadership crisis in Greece in the summer of 1915 and its repercussions on Greek-Serbian relations (122-6), as also Greek reluctance to act when the Central Powers announced their intention of launching a major assault on Serbia (139-46). This was the point when it started to become quite clear that certain elements in the Hellenic political and military leadership—with King Constantine and the General Staff at their head—were absolutely opposed to Greece's participation in the war, even if it meant not meeting their commitments to Serbia.

Chapter Three is titled "The Price of the Alliance: Between the Triple Understanding and the Triple Alliance" (pp. 147-98). It recounts Venizelos's efforts to convince king Constantine of the need for Greece to help Serbia (the Serbian government was even offering Gevgelija and Doirani) and align itself with the Entente (147-60); the German secret diplomacy aimed at securing Hellenic neutrality (160-76); Venizelos's second resignation; the Zaïmis administration and the latter's refusal to admit a casus foederis when Bulgaria attacked Serbia; and lastly the attitude of the Skoufodis government (176-98).

Chapter Four, "Serbia in Greece: Emigration and Occupation" (pp. 199-262), recounts the diplomatic development during the War's most crucial period for the whole region, when events were developing fast and the strife between Venizelists and royalists, Constantine and the Entente, was at its height. Chiefly on the basis of the correspondence between Pašić and Balugdić, the author examines: the arrival of the Serbian government on Corfu and the question of transporting the Serbian troops to Thessaloniki (199-206); the change of government in Greece in September 1916 and the attitude of the Allies (213-20); the Provisional Government in Thessaloniki and the official reactions from Athens and the Allies (221-30); Greece's deteriorating relations with the Allies at the end of 1916 (230-40); the emergence of the dynastic question in Greece and the renewed conflict (240-4); the Allied representations of 16 February (244-52); the ensuing government crisis in Greece owing to Allied pressure (252-8); and the Zaïmis administration (258-62).

The Fifth and last Chapter concerns the final phase of the war in the Balkans, from Venizelos's return to power until the capitulation of the Central Powers (pp. 263-301). Apart from its significance for Greece's entry into the war on the side of the Allies, Venizelos's return to government also spelt the revival of the Greek-Serbian rapprochement and the restoration of friendly relations between the two countries. Venizelos sought to regain the Serbian government's trust right from the start, because the alliance with Serbia was the cornerstone of his Balkan policy (263-72). This final chapter also briefly discusses the significance of the convocation of the new parliament and the publi-
cation of the Greek Foreign Ministry’s *White Book* (272-7), the mutual Greek and Serbian diplomatic efforts against the Bulgarian policy of the separate peace (278-83), and Greek-Serbian relations in the last year of the war (283-301).

In his Epilogue (pp. 302-4), Milošević places the blame for violating the alliance with Serbia squarely on the Greek side and points out that after Venizelos had returned to power, in the summer of 1917, Constantine’s policy of staying out of the war and hoping to reap benefits afterwards still had supporters in Greece. At the same time, the Serbian government, four years on Greek soil, had to maintain the general equilibrium despite the problems created by the Greek side.

As already pointed out, Miladin Milošević book marks the first attempt at a conspectus of the history of Greek-Serbian diplomatic relations during the First World War. Hitherto, they have been examined either from the point of view of the foreign policy of one of the two countries (e.g. George B. Leon, *Greece and the Great Powers, 1914-1917*, Thessaloniki, Institute for Balkan Studies, 1974; idem, *Greece and the First World War: From Neutrality to Intervention, 1917-1918*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1990), or in the context of specific incidents (e.g. Areti Tounda-Fergadi, “The Serbian Troops on Corfu: The Problem of Transporting them to Thessaloniki and Greek Public Opinion on the Affair”, *Proceedings of the 5th Greek-Serbian Symposium: Serbia and Greece during the First World War*, Thessaloniki, Institute for Balkan Studies, 1991, pp. 29-44). There are also, of course, some accounts of Greek-Serbian relations that are contemporary with the events they describe, such as S. Stanoyevitch, *Les Relations serbo-grecques*, Ligues des Universitaires de Serbia, Paris, November-December 1918.

Miladin Milošević uses fundamental Serbian sources —mainly from the Public Record Offices of Serbia and New Yugoslavia— to describe the whole course of bilateral diplomatic relations. The new information presented here includes three very interesting points: i) the fact that Serbia was aware of Constantine’s intention not to offer support in the event of a Bulgarian assault as early as the summer of 1915 (pp. 145-7); so the Serbs could not in fact depend on Greek military assistance, despite the concessions they were prepared to make, even to the extent of ceding Serbian territory; ii) the fact that Serbian designs on Thessaloniki were expressed by high-ranking official representatives, not merely by junior officers and administrative personnel: specifically, Constantine’s successor, Alexander, asked Jovanović, the Serbian Ambassador to London, how far Great Britain would be prepared to support such a claim, only to receive a non-committal, though not entirely discouraging, reply (p.
iii) the fact that Greece and Serbia worked together to counteract the pro-Bulgarian movement within the Entente at the end of the war.

All the same, it must be said that Milošević's account is a rather cursory one. Some points are not developed, while others are not mentioned at all. These include: i) the question of nationality and citizenship, which troubled Greek-Serbian relations from 1913 and for the next ten year or so; ii) the question of the Doirani-Gevgelija enclave, in which the Hellenic governments had —always in the framework of the two countries' allied relations— a declared interest; iii) the Greek and the Serbian propaganda, which receives very short shrift from Milošević; iv) the relations between the Serbian government and the Hellenic Provisional Government in Thessaloniki; and v) collaboration in the peace negotiations. The latter subject is touched up, but only in the most general terms.

Milošević follows the diplomatic sources closely as he develops his subject matter and his argumentation. However, the fact that his sources are exclusively Serbian means that he cannot really present a true, or perhaps more complete, picture of the facts. For instance, in his brief discussion of the Greek propaganda drive with regard to Monastir (Bitola), he states that it enjoyed the support of Venizelos himself (pp. 290-2), though this is not the conclusion to be drawn from a study of the Greek archives, and is in fact refuted by the events themselves. The author also fails to mention the Serbian propaganda, which was most intense in the area of Hellenic Macedonia and is attested in the Serbian sources. The question of the validity of the Greek-Serbian Treaty of 1915 is important today less from a legal point of view (apart, perhaps, from its status in international law) than with regard to its political aspect. Besides, the debate has more or less run its course by now, since historians started writing about it very early on (cf. A. F. Frangulis, La Grèce et la crise mondiale, Paris, Librairie Félix Alcan, 1926, and E. Driault and M. Lhéritier, La Grèce et la Grande Guerre: De la Révolution turque au Traité de Lausanne (1908-1923) [Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce, de 1821 à nos jours, vol. V], Paris, PUF, 1926).

Miladin Milošević's book is certainly an essential tool for students of the period it covers. Even though at some points it fails to go beyond the stereotypes found in the national historiography of all the Balkan countries (including Greece), this is an authoritative, scholarly approach to a period that still presents a number of obscure points and unanswered questions.

Thessaloniki

LOUKIANOS HASSIOTIS