

# **Abstracts**

PIERRE VOILLERY

LE KAZA DE STARA ZAGORA (ESKI ZAARA) SELON LES DESCRIPTIONS  
PUBLIÉES PAR LE *CARIGRADSKI VESTNIK* (1858)  
ET LE DOCTEUR POYET (1859)  
(DEUXIÈME PARTIE)

Stara Zagora est une ville de Roumélie bulgare d'environ 20.000 habitants au milieu du XIXe siècle. Elle présente la particularité d'avoir fait l'objet de deux enquêtes statistiques, la première par le Bulgare G. Slavov en 1856, la seconde par le Français Poyet en 1859.

Ces deux textes sont connus mais n'ont jamais fait l'objet d'une étude systématique. C'est la première fois qu'ils sont re-publiés *in extenso*. Ils sont réunis ici pour la première fois. Ils permettent pourtant de voir se dessiner sous nos yeux une communauté bulgare dans les différents aspects de son existence en pleine période du *tanzimat*, qu'ils soient géographiques, administratifs, communautaires, démographiques, économiques, fiscaux, commerciaux, culturels ou religieux.

La première partie de cette étude s'attache à mettre en valeurs les quatre premiers volets. La seconde partie décrit les autres aspects de la vie de cette cité qui, par sa normalité, est à l'image de bien d'autres villes de Roumélie ottomane au moment où le mouvement national bulgare est en plein essor et où se tissent de nouveaux rapports entre les communautés de confession différente.

PETROS SIOUSSIOURAS

GEOPOLITICAL EXPEDIENCIES AND FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
IN GREECE, SERBIA AND BULGARIA FOLLOWING THE SIGNING  
OF THE LAUSANNE TREATY

The Asia Minor Catastrophe has left a host of problems that needed immediate resolution. At that point in time, two mistakes of grave political significance, developed into severe blows weakening further the already enfeebled Greek foreign policy. The first mistake was committed by the renowned international relations expert, Nikolaos Politis, who served as the Greek representative in the League of Nations. Politis and his Bulgarian oppo-

site number, Christo Kalfvf concluded a Protocol, the so-called Politis-Kalfvf Protocol- which recognized the slavophone population of Macedonia as Bulgarians. The second mistake was committed by General Theodoros Pangalos, a well-respected figure, who gained his reputation in the war of Asia Minor. The second mistake was far more critical than the first one, as Pangalos tried to satisfy his secret wish to reoccupy Eastern Thrace, through a military dictatorship. Immediately after his ascent to power, he concluded with Yugoslavia a number of agreements, creating a network of relations favourable to Yugoslavia and establishing a Serbian port in Thessaloniki. Because of the one-sided and burdensome nature these agreements had for Greece, they were termed the "Pangalos' Agreements". The ensuing rise of Eleftherios Venizelos to power marked the beginning of a new era in Greek politics. He laid down new foundations, obeying the spirit of the League of Nations on international cooperation and public diplomacy, revising at the same time, the Greek foreign policy.

*BOŠKO I. BOJOVIĆ*

"QUI HABET TEMPUS HABET VITAM"

THE QUESTION OF THESSALONICA AND THE CRISIS IN THE BALKANS  
YUGOSLAVIA ON THE THRESHOLD OF WAR: BETWEEN DIPLOMACY AND COUP  
D'ETAT (OCTOBER, 1940 - MARCH, 1941)

This article treats, with special reference to the question of Salonika, the long protracted negotiations leading up to the reluctant signing of the Tripartite Pact by Prince-Regent Paul's government of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia on 25 March 1941. Hitler's respect for the Serbs' fighting abilities (e.g. on the Salonika front) led him to make considerable concessions to the Yugoslavs. The inviolability of their frontiers and sovereignty was guaranteed, military assistance and the use of their territory for the movement of troops and military matériel were not insisted upon. Hitler even intimated that Salonika would be ceded to them. The Yugoslavs thus faced a dilemma. They did not want the city, in which Yugoslavia had a free zone sufficient for her needs in the Aegean Sea region, for reasons of sentiment; acceptance would have been dishonourable, a betrayal of their traditional ally Greece, the land of origin, indeed, of their ruler's wife. On the other hand, encircled as they were by the Axis powers elsewhere, Salonika was their only possible strategic link with the Allies with whom their sympathies lay. Furthermore, refusal of such an offer would, in Hitler's eyes, have cast doubts upon their sincerity. In the

event, against Croat opposition. Serbian pro-Allied sentiment allowed a plot of officers to overthrow the government thus provoking Hitler's wrath and bringing Yugoslavia into World War II with the consequent enormous losses, around 1.500.000 civil and military dead, a demographic loss of 2.438.000, many thousands of maimed persons, horrendous matériel destruction and so on.

*GEORGES-HENRI SOUTOU*

FRANCE AND THE BALKANS 1944-1955

Since World War I France had a geopolitical vision for the Balkans: she hoped that ethnic tensions would ease, and that as many Balkan countries as possible would get together to resist foreign threats, coming from Germany before 1945, from the USSR afterwards.

After 1945, and even more after 1949 and the end of the civil war, Franco-Greek relations did not pose any major problem and Paris supported, cautiously but unmistakably, the Royal government. It was different with the communist countries in that region. With Rumania and Bulgaria as soon as 1946 there were no meaningful relations left. The case was different with Yugoslavia, because of the Tito-Stalin break. There France's role was not unimportant, even if she hesitated between trying to regain her former traditional role in the Balkans, without taking into account the changed ideological landscape, or stressing Western unity against communism. Supporters of the former line were ready to go very far with Tito, those of the later did not forget that Tito remained after all a communist leader and they were quite cautious and contented themselves with Tito's break with Moscow without sharing the illusion there could be a "national" kind of communism.

Generally speaking the French were anxious not to provoke the Soviets. That is why, for instance, they were quite lukewarm towards Greece's and Turkey's admission in NATO.

By 1955 Paris witnessed with satisfaction the lessening of ethnic tensions. The Greek-Yugoslav thaw allowed Macedonia and Northern Epirus to become much calmer. As for Yugoslavia, one believed in the Titoist kind of federal system to solve the problem of relations among the different nationalities. But a new problem was seen in Cyprus with the Greek-Turkish tension, and one was conscious of the dwindling French influence because of France's problems (the war in Algeria and an outmoded political system) and because the Anglo-Saxons and the Germans were developing their influence in that region much more efficiently.